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ABSTRACT
As Europeans expanded across North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, they parceled their territorial acquisitions into a variety o f administrative 
subdivisions. Naming and dividing the land became an integral part o f the project o f 
colonization; the conquest o f territory involved the transformation o f unknown places 
into clearly defined jurisdictions. This dissertation examines the invention o f one 
jurisdiction, the province o f Maine, viewing the evolution o f its boundaries as a reflection 
of the growth of state power in the region. Taking issue with the tendency of historians 
to treat places as if they were objective facts o f the environment, it argues that territories 
are symbolic artifacts that legitimize the possession o f resources by one group to the 
exclusion o f others. Seeing an inextricable link between social and territorial boundaries, 
it ties the development of the territory o f Maine to the formation of an alliance between 
property owners and the state. The alliance promoted a vision o f territoriality in which 
the land was divided into clearly marked jurisdictions exclusively governed by particular 
towns, counties, and provinces. These jurisdictions, in turn, granted and protected clearly 
marked estates that were the exclusive property o f individuals; property rights and state 
sovereignty reinforced one another. This English system of territoriality was not without 
competitors; other visions o f the land became attached to different social arrangements. 
To Native Wabanakis, the right to use the land flowed from membership in Active kin 
groups that included both human beings and the spirits o f surrounding animals and 
natural features. Territory was defined not in terms o f exclusive boundaries but as an 
emanation o f the bonds o f affinity between people and their human and non-human 
neighbors. French officials of the same period treated their possessions adjacent to the 
Gulf of Maine as a network of military, economic, and missionary outposts that upheld 
the authority o f church and state in a peripheral region. English notions of territoriality 
gained precedence over others because the alliance between the state and property owners 
facilitated the large-scale mobilization o f human and material resources in trade and 
warfare. Confident that their investments in real estate would be protected by the 
government, land speculators drew migrants and capital from both sides of the Atlantic to 
develop their holdings in Maine. New England's armies, meanwhile, were bolstered by 
the support o f tens o f thousands o f soldiers and taxpayers who recognized that their 
collective interests rested with the defense o f English frontiers in Maine. The victory o f 
this alliance resulted in the consolidation o f Maine as a bounded territory. Far from being 
unproblematic facts o f the environment, Maine's borders are the physical traces o f a 
historical process in which English colonists acquired vast quantities o f natural resources 
at the expense o f their French and Indian rivals. To give legitimacy to these conquests, 
the colonists promoted a form of sovereignty characteristic o f  English-speaking North 
America: the land, under this system o f territoriality, was construed as a measurable 
object to be possessed by individuals and protected by the state.
ix
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INTRODUCTION
FERDINANDO GORGES’S MAINE
Just as none o f  us is outside or beyond geography, none o f  us is 
completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is 
complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons 
but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.
--Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism
The history of Maine began around 1622, in the mind o f a West Country knight 
named Sir Ferdinando Gorges. Former commander o f the Channel defenses and long­
time advocate of American colonization, Gorges had worked tirelessly for nearly two 
decades toward the establishment o f an English settlement on the coast o f northeastern 
North America. By 1620, he had taken a seat on the Council for New England, which 
possessed a royal patent to all the lands between the fortieth and forty-eighth parallels of 
the continent. The territory was systematically distributed to the members o f the Council, 
and in 1622 Gorges and his partner, Captain John Mason, won a charter to form a colony 
between the Merrimack and Kennebec rivers. With the consent ofthe Council, Gorges 
and Mason called the colony "the Province of Maine," probably after the French county 
o f the same name, or perhaps as a result o f repeated references to "the Maine” -  the 
mainland — in previous charters.1
1 James P. Baxter and Mary Frances Faraham, eds., Documentary History o f the State o f Maine. 24 vols. 
(Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1889-1916), 7:65-71. (Future references to this series cited as
2
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When Gorges and Mason received another grant for roughly the same territory 
seven years later, they rechristened it Laconia after the lakes o f the interior, where they 
hoped to launch a fur trading enterprise. Ten days earlier, the partners had divided their 
holdings in two, with Mason receiving the territory southwest o f the Piscataqua River, 
renaming it New Hampshire. Gorges's share, which extended from the Piscataqua River 
to the lower Kennebec River, was named New Somersetshire in 1635, after the 
proprietor’s home county. Finally, in 1639, four years after the Council for New England 
had reverted its patent to the crown, Gorges obtained a royal charter for his province, and 
definitively reverted to the original name. "We do name, ordain and appoint," Charles I 
declared in his letters patent, "that the Portion o f the Main Land and Premises aforesaid 
shall forever hereafter be called and named the Province or County o f Maine, and not by 
any other Name or Names whatsoever."2
The name did indeed become permanent, although there was little in the history o f 
Gorges's grant that promised that it would. The courtier attracted few migrants to his 
colony and by the time of his death in 1647 the province o f Maine remained more 
imaginary than real, drawn in maps and described in charters but having little palpable 
reality beyond a few fishing posts and straggling farms. The eastern portion of the grant 
became a virtually independent colony known as Lygonia, and by 1658 the colony of 
Massachusetts Bay had annexed both Maine and Lygonia, renaming them Yorkshire. 
Having sprung like Athena from the mind o f a single man, the fledgling province of 
Maine struggled to live beyond its infancy. The lands claimed by Gorges had been given
DHSM.) On the origins of the name, with a brief bibliography, see Charles E. Clark, Maine: A 
Bicentennial History (New York: Norton, 1977), 85-86.
2 DHSM. 7: 224.
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other names a century earlier, such as Norumbega and Tierra de Corte Real, and Maine 
only narrowly avoided the same fate as these stillborn labels.3
The fleeting quality o f such names reminds us that there is a distinction to be 
made between the concept o f Maine and the territory it represents. Royal charters and 
proprietary maps referred to concrete places with an undeniable physical existence -  
rivers, bays, landmasses, islands — but the labels appended to them, and the ways in 
which they were grouped together, were the products o f human imagination. Water 
flowed between the banks o f the Kennebec, but it was a human decision to call it a river 
and a political act to make it the eastern boundary of a colony. As the Mexican historian 
Edmundo O'Gorman once pointed out, America did not have a hidden essence waiting to 
be discovered, but was imaginatively created by Europeans trying to reconcile the 
findings of Columbus with their inherited understandings o f the world.4
This distinction is worth bearing in mind, for historians and social scientists have 
traditionally treated places as containers o f  action rather than products of human agency. 
When we refer to the history o f a place we usually mean the history o f the people who 
lived within its borders, not o f the locale itself. This habit of mind is understandable: by 
treating place as a constant, scholars have been able to get a fix on social dynamics, either 
by comparing one region to another or by tracing the development o f a single society 
over time. Yet this tendency has also produced what geographer Edward Soja calls "a
3 Emerson W. Baker, Edwin A. Churchill, Richard D'Abate, Kristine L. Jones, Victor A. Konrad, Harald A. 
Prins, eds., American Beginnings: Exploration. Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega 
(Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
4 Edmundo O’Gorman, The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature o f the New World 
and the Meaning of Its History (Bloomington. Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1961). See also John H. 
Elliott, The Old World and the New. 1492-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Anthony 
Grafton, New Worlds. Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ed., America in European 
Consciousness. 1493-1750 (Chapel HiU, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
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critical silence, an implicit subordination o f space to time" that obscures the subjective 
and imaginative dimension o f  place. Different communities and individuals have their 
own separate ways o f organizing and representing space, and these differences belie the 
assumption that places are mere containers. Created through the engagement o f people 
with their environment and sustained by social interaction, landscapes are as dynamic and 
mutable as human society.5
The "critical silence" of historians on this question is most audible in their 
division o f history into separate national and regional categories, a practice reinforced by 
disciplinary rules that force them to become specialists in the history o f one country or 
another. By placing the history o f colonial North America into courses on the United 
States before the Civil War or Canada before Confederation, scholars reify present-day 
political boundaries, as if it were possible to extend the forty-ninth parallel backward in 
time. This anachronism is lamentable, given that boundaries in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were fluid and often contradictory and the history o f colonization 
marked as much by failures as successes. Worse still, in treating current borders as 
natural, scholars promote a teleological view o f history in which European conquests 
become inevitable and native claims to the land are virtually erased. Though the political 
map of North America now seems neutral and uncontested, it was created through
5 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion o f Space in Critical Social Theory 
(London: Verso, 1989), 15. On the subjective dimension of place, see Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and 
Place: The Perspective of Experience ('Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); D. W. 
Meinig, ed., The Interpretation o f Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essavs (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979); Denis E. Cosgrove. Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape (Totowa. 
N. J.: Bames and Noble, 1985); Barbara Bender, ed., Landscape: Politics and Perspectives 
(Providence, R. I.: Berg, 1993); Stephen Feld and Keith H. Basso, eds., Senses o f Place (Santa Fe, 
N. M.: School of American Research Press, distributed by University of Washington Press, 1996), 
John A. Agnew, "The Devaluation of Place in Social Science," in John A. Agnew and James S. 
Duncan, The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations 
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 9-29.
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centuries o f struggle in which possession o f the land was transferred from Indians to 
colonists and from one colonial state to another. A full account o f the colonization o f the 
Americas must begin with the recognition that boundaries, both past and present, are 
ideologically charged symbols that reflect and determine the ownership ofthe land by 
competing groups.6
This is not to say that historians or geographers have given short shrift to 
questions o f land use and ownership. Beginning in the middle o f the twentieth century, 
the "Berkeley School" o f historical geography, led by Carl Sauer and his students, took a 
more sustained look at the role of land in the colonial societies o f the Americas. Reacting 
against positivist scholars who reduced human geography to spatial science, the Berkeley 
School sought to recapture geography's cultural and historical dimensions. Sauer was 
particularly interested in how cultures and the natural environment shaped one another 
over time, paying special attention to the formation and evolution o f "landscapes" -- 
traces o f human occupation such as fields, pastures, houses, and orchards that revealed 
the cultural imprint o f different peoples.7
One of Sauer's students, Andrew Hill Clark, adopted this method o f historical 
geography to the examination o f specific regions over time, focusing on places where 
Europeans had conquered indigenous peoples and colonized their lands: New Zealand,
6 On the anachronism of national boundaries in colonial North America, see James Axtell, "A 
North American Perspective for Colonial History," History Teacher 12 (1979): 549-62; on the 
tentative nature of early colonization, see John G. Reid, Nova Scotia. Maine, and Acadia:
Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); on 
the ideological content of boundaries, see J. B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge and Power,” in Denis 
Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds.. The Iconography of Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); idem., "Secrecy and Silences: The Hidden Agenda o f Cartography in 
Early Modem Europe," Imago Mundi 40 (1988): 111-30.
7 Carl 0 . Sauer, "Foreward to Historical Geography," Annals o f the Association o f American Geographers 
31 (1941): 1-24; idem, Agricultural Origins and Dispersals (New York: American Geographical Society, 
1952); idem, The Earlv Spanish Main (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1966).
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Prince Edward Island, and Acadia. Clark's own students at the University o f  Wisconsin 
extended this approach into other parts o f North America where settler societies had been 
established, such as the St. Lawrence River Valley, southeastern Pennsylvania, and 
backcountry Virginia.8 In recent years, environmental historians have shifted the 
emphasis from culture to nature, examining the ecological consequences o f the invasion 
of European people, plants, and animals into the Americas.9
While these works have served as an invaluable corrective to geographers 
dismissive o f history and historians oblivious to the natural environment, most scholars 
continued to treat geographical regions as boundaries for their studies rather than as 
historical variables in their own right. Interested in the relationship between nature and 
society, the Berkeley School tended to view the land as an object that was acted upon 
rather than a subjective category whose meaning could change over time. Sauer and his 
followers believed that nature, land, and geographical region were profoundly shaped by 
human activity but were nonetheless ontologically distinct from society. The problem 
with this assumption, as some critics have pointed out, is that the land is itself a culturally 
defined concept that is organized by the human imagination.10 "Place," as geographer Yi- 
Fu Tuan has written, "at all scales from the armchair to the nation, is a construct of
8 Andrew Hill Clark, The Invasion of New Zealand bv People. Plants and Animals: The South Island (New 
Brunswick. N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1949); idem. Three Centuries and the Island: A Historical 
GeogTaphv of Settlement and Agriculture in Prince Edward Island. Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1959); idem. Acadia: The Geography o f Earlv Nova Scotia to 1760 (Madison. Wise.: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968); R. Cole Harris, The Seieneurial System in Earlv Canada: A 
Geographical Interpretation (Madison, Wise.: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1966); James T. Lemon, The 
Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical Study of Earlv Southeastern Pennsylvania (Baltimore, Md.: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Robert D. Mitchell, Commercialism and Frontier Perspectives on 
the Earlv Shenandoah Valiev (Charlottesville, Va.: University o f Virginia Press, 1977).
9 The best known environmental histories o f colonial New England are Carolyn Merchant, Ecological 
Revolutions: Nature. Gender, and Science in New England (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North 
Carolina Press, 1989); William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians. Colonists, and the Ecology of New 
England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983).
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experience; it is sustained not only by timber, concrete, and highways, but also by the 
quality of human awareness."11 The Berkeley School's emphasis on the external shape of 
landscapes left it blind to the symbolic and subjective dimensions o f place, the ways in 
which nature was cognitively devised category rather than an objective fact.
The philosophical assumption that nature and society are separate categories, 
interrelated but with different essences, has informed most historical writing on territorial 
issues. The tendency among historians has been to treat regions such as Maine as parcels 
of territory that were transferred from one people to another or that were reshaped by 
human effort. But the European conquest o f North America involved a great deal more 
than the simple cession o f territory; it entailed the erasure o f an existing landscape and 
the invention of another. The creation o f the states and provinces o f North America were 
the product of a social transformation by which Europeans gained control over the natural 
resources of the continent while simultaneously developing rationales for their 
possession. The land was not simply conquered by Europeans; it was also reimagined in 
such a way that it legitimized the creation o f a new social order. Unfortunately, a 
division of labor among historians has kept them from linking the invention o f new 
territories to the evolution o f colonial society. Much has been written o f an antiquarian 
nature on the history of American placenames, and generations o f scholars have devoted 
their careers to explaining how Europeans managed to conquer North America.12 But
10 On nature as a cultural concept, see Roy Ellen and Katsuyoshi Fukui, eds., Redefining Nature: Ecology. 
Culture and Domestication (Oxford: Berg, 1996)
11 Yi-Fu Tuan, "Place: An Experiential Perspective," Geographical Review 65 (1975): 165.
12 The most far-ranging study o f this kind is George R. Stewart, Names on the Land: A Historical Account 
of Place-Naming in the United States (New York: Random House, 1945).
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virtually no one has attempted to systematically link the creation of particular places to 
the emergence o f new patterns o f human relations.13
This dissertation attempts to fill this void by examining the development o f the 
territory o f Maine from the early seventeenth century to the fall o f New France, seeing its 
history as the simultaneous creation o f a place and a social order. What makes Maine a 
particularly interesting subject of study is its marginality: perhaps more than any other 
part of the continent, the lands adjacent the Gulf o f Maine during this period were 
contested ground.14 In the first century and a half o f European colonization, portions of 
the territory between the Piscataqua and the St. John rivers were claimed by five separate 
English colonies, the French provinces o f Canada and Acadia, dozens o f  Wabanaki bands
13 A number of studies have examined the different strategies that Natives and colonists used to mark and 
defend their claims to the land. Most prominent among these Patricia Seed, Ceremonies o f Possession in 
Europe's Conquest of the New World. 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Donna 
Merwick, Possessing Albany. 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Cronon, Changes in the Land. One o f the few scholars to systematically link the 
development of a territory to particular social coalitions is Thongchai Winichakul, in his Siam Mapped: A 
History of the Geo-Bodv of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).
14 Colonial Maine has also been marginal in the historiographical sense, at least until the 1970s. While 
Massachusetts was for many years the focus of most scholarly writing on early American history, Maine 
typically was treated as a historical footnote, an outlier that did not conform to the model set by the Bay 
Colony. Even those historians who placed northern New England at the center of their anention continued 
to use Massachusetts as the standard against which Maine's history was measured. Charles Clark, for 
example, pointedly drew a contrast between the hard drinking, loose living West Country fishermen of 
early Maine and the stolid Puritans of southern New England. Edwin Churchill called into question Clark's 
portrait of Maine, claiming that the early colonists were "an ordinary lot o f men," but his implicit definition 
of what was "ordinary" -  a peaceful, orderly community — suggested that the Puritan colony was a point of 
reference. It has only been in the past thirty years that scholars have begun to treat Maine not as a pale 
reflection of Massachusetts but as a border region with its own distinctive characteristics. Historians and 
archaeologists such as Emerson Baker, Gretchen and Alaric Faulkner, Kenneth Morrison, and John G. Reid 
have brought into focus the significance of Maine as a zone of culture interaction, where Native peoples 
and colonists lived, traded, intermarried, and fought with one another over a course o f generations. Their 
research has revealed that in some ways colonial Maine bore greater resemblance to contemporaneous 
frontier areas such as western New York and backcountry South Carolina than it did to southern New 
England. See Emerson Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward': The Failure o f Anglo-Indian Relations in Early 
Maine" (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1986); Edwin A. Churchill, "Too Great the Challenge: 
The Birth and Death of Falmouth, Maine, 1624-1676" (Ph.D. diss., University o f Maine, 1979); Alaric 
Faulkner and Gretchen Faulkner, The French at Pentagoet. 1635-1674: An Archaeological Portrait of the 
Acadian Frontier. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, No. 5 (Saint John, N. B. and Augusta, 
Me.: New Brunswick Museum and Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1987); Kenneth M.
Morrison. The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal o f Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations
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and villages, and even for a short time by the Dutch. Over several generations, the Gulf 
of Maine became a geographical laboratory in which various placenames and boundaries 
gradually took hold while others withered away. Ultimately, Maine developed as an 
exactly-measured state jurisdiction whose boundaries have remained unchanged since 
1842. My aim is to recapture the lost alternatives o f the colonial period and to explain 
why one way o f organizing the land persisted while others did not.
A fundamental premise o f this study is that territorial boundaries did not become 
"real" -  real in the sense that they impinged on people's actions -  until a critical mass of 
individuals accepted their validity. One might draw an analogy in this respect between 
territories and money. Although they may occasionally take the physical form of paper 
bills or coins, units of currency are essentially symbols that denote the worth o f goods 
and services. They only have substance when they become the nexus through which an 
array o f human transactions such as buying, selling, lending, and investing take place. A 
dollar lacks value unless the people who engage in these transactions accept it as legal 
tender; that is, if they consider it to be an adequate symbol o f economic worth. For a unit 
of currency to gain this status, it needs to be supported by wide range o f institutions and 
individuals: a central bank that issues paper money and is able to redeem its bills, a large 
number o f merchants and banks willing to accept it as tender, a commercial economy that 
depends on cash transactions. These people and institutions must not only support the 
currency, but also depend on it. By allowing people to defer the completion o f economic 
exchanges indefinitely, money removes the need for barter and permits them to carry out
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984), John G. Reid, Acadia. Maine, and New Scotland: 
Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1981).
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transactions over a wider geographical area. Banks, businesses, and customers would not 
be able to carry on their daily affairs if  they lost faith in the value o f the dollar.
The same might be said o f a territory. Like money, placenames and boundaries 
are symbols that do not gain currency until a wide cross-section o f people and institutions 
begin to use and depend on them. Ferdinando Gorges’s imaginary province o f Maine 
became real because a host o f  groups took a shared interest in its existence: settlers who 
held their land titles under Gorges, investors with shares in his company, royal officials 
with ties of patronage and clientage to the colony's promoters. A social network was 
created out of a shared desire to extract the fruits o f the land and this web of 
interdependency was both sustained and responsible for the continued existence of Maine 
as a territory. The boundaries o f Gorges's province were real only to the extent that the 
constituent members of this network could protect them, and the land claims o f Gorges's 
grantees were valid only to the extent that his province was real. Far from being 
objective attributes of the natural environment, the territories o f Gorges and other 
colonial projectors were social creations: as geographer Robert David Sack has put it, 
"society and space are... mutually constitutive, each requiring and altering the other."15
The survival o f Maine as a name and a particular kind o f territory -- a bounded 
and exclusive jurisdiction -- was, in other words, also the triumph ofthe social network 
that gave backing to its existence. This network consisted not only o f  people and 
institutions, but a whole host o f social arrangements: the invention o f the territory o f 
Maine was inextricably entangled with the growth of state power and the development of 
a distinctively Anglo-American form o f private property within its borders. The
15 Robert David Sack, Homo Geograohicus: A Framework for Action. Awareness, and Moral Concern 
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 2.
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consolidation o f public institutions and private property in the region depended on a 
particular way of seeing the land; as territory was brought within the English sphere of 
influence it was re-imagined as the exclusive property o f individuals and the sole 
jurisdiction o f governments. The pages that follow examine how this way o f representing 
the land facilitated the growth of English power in the region.
The first two chapters are sketches o f three kinds o f territory in circulation in 
Maine during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one belonging to native 
Wabanakis and the others to French and English colonists. These competing visions of 
the land were sustained by coalitions o f people whose interests were attached to their 
existence. The first chapter examines Wabanaki notions o f  territoriality, showing how 
knowledge and social relationships were written into the landscape through stories and 
daily activities. Territorial boundaries were an emanation o f these relationships and were 
inseparable from the social ties that bound communities together and distinguished them 
from their neighbors. Because patterns o f kinship and alliance were ambiguous and in a 
constant state o f evolution, such boundaries were imprecise, permeable, and negotiable.
The Europeans who arrived in the region during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries radically altered the map o f land ownership in the region, erasing Wabanaki 
claims and drawing new ones o f their own. The second chapter turns to the development 
of boundaries in European maps o f the region, tracing the connections between state 
formation, the evolution o f property rights, and the growth o f  geographical knowledge. 
French and English maps reflect a different pattern o f state power in their respective 
empires, the latter characterized by an alliance between property owners and governments
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and the former exerting its influence through forts, missionary outposts, and alliances 
with Wabanaki groups.
The remainder o f the dissertation addresses the question o f why the English 
territorial vision gained precedence over the others. The third chapter looks at how 
governments and landowners in London and Boston were able to win a measure of 
control over large portions of Maine's territory. Groups in England and Massachusetts 
Bay sought ownership o f Maine's natural resources but could not do so directly because 
of their distance from the colony. The solution was to exploit the extensive networks o f 
communication that connected Maine to the wider world. The position o f people within 
these networks shaped both how they viewed and controlled the lands o f the region.
Ownership of the land was also contested by the region’s native inhabitants, who 
mounted a lengthy resistance to English expansion. The following chapter focuses on the 
encounter between English and Wabanaki notions o f territoriality, treating land disputes 
as a moral as well as a political conflict. The transcripts of treaty meetings between the 
two groups reveal that the two groups were divided by more than a desire to own the 
same lands; they also the different moral responsibilities they attached to ownership of 
the land.
Ultimately, this conflict led the two groups into the battlefield, in a series o f 
imperial wars that began in 1688 and ended with the fall o f New France in the Seven 
Years War. The final chapter offers a geographical interpretation o f this military 
struggle, emphasizing the connections between the civilian and military worlds. The 
strategies, tactics, and war aims o f the groups who fought these wars were shaped by the 
kinds of logistical and moral support civilians lent to their soldiers. At the same time, the
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terms on which the English conquered Wabanaki and French lands were determined in 
large part by the nature o f their war effort.
Language, broadly construed to include forms o f communication such as maps 
and rock art, looms large in these sketches. Ownership o f the land required groups to first 
imagine their territories and then to mark and defend them.16 Language, both as a 
medium of representation and as a means o f communication, was central to all these 
activities. It follows that differences in the nature o f land ownership were closely tied to 
the ways in which various societies used language: whether they were literate or used 
abstract symbols, whether they placed a high value on politeness or on self-assertion, 
whether their transportation networks spanned large distances or were limited in extent.17
The development o f European territories in Maine were predicated on a language 
of abstraction, an ability to reduce the complexities o f the human and natural universe to 
scientific laws and orderly principles. This way o f describing the world -- which 
included distilling territories into a more tractable form by rendering them as geometric 
figures on maps -- was, as James C. Scott has pointed out, closely related to the "state's 
attempt to make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the 
classic state functions o f taxation, conscription, and prevention o f rebellion."18 
Instruments o f statecraft such as cadastral maps, tax valuation lists, muster rolls, and
16 On this point, see idem., Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge University Press, 
1986), Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography No. 7, esp. 20-33.
17 In this respect, I am following in the footsteps of scholars such as Karl Deutsch, Harold Innis, and 
Richard Brown, who all have asked how communications allows people to gain power over the land and 
over each other. See Harold A. Innis Empire and Communications (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950); Karl 
W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Inequality 
(Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1966); Richard D. Brown, Knowledge Is Power The Diffusion of 
Information in Early America. 1700-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
18 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), 2. On this point, see also Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities. 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), esp. 163-85.
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customs records not only allowed governments to tighten their control over Maine's 
territory but also shaped the terms on which people conceived o f this territory. Called 
into being by a stroke o f Ferdinando Gorges's quill, Maine was in a very real sense ruled 
with a pen.
A Note on Terminology
A study that spans nearly two centuries and involves several highly distinct 
cultures and languages strains any attempt to find a standard orthography or system of 
dating, but I have tried to follow a consistent set o f rules throughout. All English dates 
have been changed to New Style, so that February 3,1702 in the original appears as 
February 3, 1703 in the text; French dates have been left as they are recorded in the 
original documents. English quotations have been transcribed verbatim, with the 
exception o f abbreviations such as &, yt, and Govr, which have been rendered and, that, 
and Governor. French quotations are translated into English in the text, with the original 
provided in the footnotes. The letter 8, used by many French writers for the diphthong of 
Algonquian languages, has been changed to w or on. Because Wabanaki languages are 
written according to several different orthographic systems, I have left most Wabanaki 
words as they were spelled in the original.
The term Wabanaki itself needs explaining, since its meaning is ambiguous and 
its uses have been various. It was probably used originally by Montagnais Indians, who 
in speaking to the French referred to the peoples living to the east as "Dawnland" or 
"Eastland" people — or Wabanakiak. In their own languages, these groups called 
themselves as arenabeak (in the dialect spoken at Norridgewock, along the Kennebec
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River), alnobiak (in Western Abenaki), or skijim (Maliseet), all meaning "the people." 
French people had difficulty pronouncing and transcribing the initial w sound in the 
Montagnais, and generally called these groups Abenaquis or Abenakis. Explorers in 
Acadia also called the coastal groups living between the St. John and Saco rivers 
Etechemins, possibly a transcription o f the Maliseet term for themselves, leading many 
recent historians to believe that they were a separate people.19 These groups formed a 
confederacy with the Mi'kmaq and several villages o f Canadian Indians in the eighteenth 
century, and began referring to themselves as Wabanakis, a term that was probably 
borrowed from the Montagnais via the French, but is still current today.20 Some scholars 
distinguish between Abenakis, a narrower term for Wabanakis living in northern New 
England and southern Quebec, and Wabanakis, a broader term that includes the Mi'kmaq, 
Maliseets, and other culturally similar groups. Although this dissertation concerns 
mainly the former groups, I have chosen the broader term because the constant swirl of 
migration and cultural exchange in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries makes it 
difficult to draw clear boundaries between particular groups.
In referring to the native people o f North America more generally, I have used the 
term "Indian," rather than Native American (U. S. English), Native (Canadian English), 
or First Nations People (also Canadian English), because o f its simplicity and general 
currency. Any pejorative associations connected to the name are unintended.
19 Several authors, most recently Bruce Bourque, have argued that the Etechemins were a separate ethnic 
group that occupied the Penobscot and Kennebec River drainages in the early seventeenth century and 
were later displaced eastward as a result of disease and military conflict. See Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity 
on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759," Ethnohistorv 36 (1989), 257-84. Dean Snow, on the other hand, 
has chided such scholars for their uncritical reading o f the source material and has argued against the 
theory of Etechemin mass migration. See Dean R. Snow, "The Ethnohistoric Baseline o f the Eastern 
Abenaki." Ethnohistorv 23 (1976): 291-306.
20 The name Mi’kmaq is inflected with the animate plural -aq; "Mi’kmaqs"is as ungrammatical 
as"Iroquoises" or "Chineses."
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Algonquian refers to a language family as well as its speakers, who despite great social 
differences share some common cultural traits. Algonquin refers to a tribe living in 
present-day western Quebec and eastern Ontario.
Finally, I have used the terms objective and subjective in a very specific sense.
By objective, I mean relating to things (objects) rather than people (subjects). An 
"objective" argument is one that is based on the observation o f inanimate things rather 
than a "subjective" consideration of social relations. O f course, the distinction between 
objects and subjects is culture-bound, since many things that Europeans considered 
inanimate -- rocks, trees, stories -  might have been seen as animate subjects by 
Wabanakis. So "objective" propositions are objective only in the sense that the speaker 
bases his or her arguments on the observation o f things he or she considers to be 
inanimate and divorced from the social world.
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CHAPTER I 
GLUSKAP’S FOOTPRINTS
In all the land and everywhere in the Eastland, there is nowhere where it 
does not show what Kuloskap did.
--Passamaauoddv Texts (1921)
Long ago, when there was nothing but forest, sky, and sea, Gluskap fell from a 
hole in the heavens and splashed into the ocean. Dazed by the fall, he sank until the briny 
water filled his mouth and entered his nostrils. Coughing and sputtering, he came to his 
senses and struggled to the surface. When he looked around there was little to see: water 
surrounded him in every direction and above him was only sky. He squinted harder and 
saw a large canoe bobbing in the distance. The giant slowly swam to the canoe and, 
gripping its sides, lifted himself into it. He discovered a large paddle at his feet and 
dipped it into the water, taking long strokes as he looked in the distance for signs o f land. 
After many days of paddling, he grew tired and decided to rest. Still fruitless in his 
search for the shore, he used his magical powers to turn his canoe into rock. Slowly it 
grew, until it formed a great granite island, so large that millions o f  fish came from all 
around to look at it. The island is now known as Newfoundland. Gluskap lived on this 
island for a while but he grew tired o f spending his days alone and decided to set off in 
search o f adventure. He built himself another canoe and paddled south until he 
discovered the mainland, where he made his new home.
18
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Tall pines soared above the rocky coastline o f this place, which he called the 
Dawnland because it was the first place on the continent to see the sun every morning. 
When Gluskap first arrived, he saw that the rivers were too muddy, so he reached for his 
bow and cleared the murk from their waters. Then he dug passages in the ground so the 
water would run to the ocean. As he finished this task, he noticed that all the animals 
lived near the sea. He told some o f them to move to the forests and the mountains 
because there was not enough for them to eat on the coast. They complained that it was 
too cold in the interior, but he persisted, and the moose, the deer, and other animals went 
to live in the forest. Gluskap was pleased with what he had done but still felt an itch for 
adventure. He set off to explore new parts o f the Dawnland and everywhere he left his 
indelible mark on the landscape.
Near Cape Canso, he chased a man who had transformed himself into a beaver, 
throwing a rock at him which landed in the water and turned into an island. He kept 
pursuing the beaver all the way to the mouth of the St. John River, where he threw a clod 
of earth that landed and became Partridge Island. Another day, at Broad Cove on Cape 
Breton, a giant whale washed up on the shore and people and animals came from all 
around to see it. Each species took muscles from the whale; the moose putting them on 
its back, the beaver in its tail, and human beings placing them on their legs. But soon the 
whale began to stink, so Gluskap took out his bow and arrow and shoved it into the water. 
The carcass of the whale became an island in the middle o f the cove.
On another occasion, Gluskap heard that a village near Moosehead Lake was 
being terrorized by a giant moose who was eating all the village's inhabitants. Gluskap 
heeded the villagers’ pleas for help and set off to hunt the moose. As he ran after the
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creature, he made footprints with his snowshoes, which can still be seen in the rocks near 
Sebec River. After many days of scouting and tracking he finally found the moose and 
slew it with his arrows. He dragged the cadaver to his camp and gutted it, giving the 
intestines to his dog, who let some drop into the water as he ate. The intestines became a 
streak of white rocks at the bottom of the bay near Cape Rosier. Then he cooked the 
moose, and overturned his kettle after he had finished his meal. The kettle is now Kineo 
Mountain.
Remarkable natural features elsewhere had similar stories behind them; the 
reminders of Gluskap's actions were so ubiquitous that when people found stones that 
resembled a human form, they assumed they were self-portraits that the giant had left 
behind. Gluskap eventually left the Dawnland and paddled off to a distant country, many 
years' journey to the south or the east. But he left behind his children, the human beings 
he had fashioned with arrows shot into trees, who kept his memory alive by telling tales 
about what he had done.1
When storytellers related Gluskap’s feats to their listeners, they were vague as to 
when they happened, as if it were so long ago that it scarcely mattered anymore. But if 
asked where they took place — and usually they did not need to be asked -  they were 
always highly specific. Sometimes they told the stories as they passed the site o f their
1 Charles Leland. The Algonquian Legends of New England (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1884); John 
D. Prince, Passamaquoddv Texts. Publications of the American Ethnological Society, vol. 10 (New York: 
G. E. Stechert & Co., 1921; Wilson D. Wallis and Ruth Sawtell Wallis, The Micmac Indians of Eastern 
Canada (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 317-37; Ruth Holmes Whitehead, Stories 
from the Six Worlds: Micmac Legends (Halifax: Nimbus, 1988); American Friends Service Committee, 
The Wabanakis of Maine and the Maritimes: A Resource Book about Penobscot. Passamaouoddv. 
Maliseet. Micmac and Abenaki Indians (Bath, Me.: Maine Indian Program, 1989), section C, 2-26; Frank 
G. Speck, "Penobscot Tales and Religious Beliefs," Journal o f American Folk-lore 48 (19351. 1-107; 
idem, "Penobscot Transformer Tales," International Journal o f American Linguistics 1 (1918), 187-244. 
Western Abenakis have similar stories about the transformer-giant Odzihozo, who created river channels 
and lake basins by dragging his body over the ground, and made hills and mountains by forming piles of
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occurrence, with the landscape acting as a key that called to memory Gluskap's actions.
To the people o f the Dawnland, the natural environment was a vast repository of stories, 
not only o f Gluskap, but o f personal anecdotes, family histories, accounts o f battles 
fought long ago, tales o f hunting expeditions, and rumors o f magical transformations. As 
people crossed a river, passed by an unusually shaped rock, or spotted a familiar island, 
they were often prompted to speak of a momentous event or odd occurrence that had 
happened there. The stories that Gluskap's children told o f these places acted as a kind of 
mental map that oriented themselves in the world, a map that not only told them how to 
get from one place to the next but also rooted their identity and their understanding o f the 
world in local surroundings.
By comparison, contemporary maps that depict the same region before the arrival 
of Europeans seem sparse and lifeless. Reduced to two-dimensional space on a sheet of 
paper, Gluskap's country appears as a thin outline o f coast and an interior streaked with 
the names o f various linguistic or tribal groups. The rivers are sinuous lines and nothing 
more, the mountains only shaded areas, and stories are nowhere to be seen. While 
adequate for the purposes o f their authors -  to distinguish and locate ethnic groups -- 
these maps fail to express the wealth o f associations that Dawnlanders attached to the 
places where they lived. By emptying the landscape of these local meanings, modem 
cartographers turn the natural environment into a mere backdrop, a setting against which 
people act out their lives. Geography becomes an incontrovertible fact, bereft of human 
agency.
dirt with his hand. See Gordon M. Day, "Abenaki Place Names in the Champlain Valley," International 
Journal of American Linguistics 47 (1981): 143-71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
To recapture the human element o f the land requires us to imagine it not as a 
context, but as a medium. Dawnlanders lived their lives through their environment, not 
against it. Continually moving from one place to the next in pursuit o f sustenance, they 
developed patterns of living that connected daily routines with the places where they 
were carried out. Locales became encrusted over time with layers o f significance, 
developed through experience and communicated from one generation to the next 
through stories and anecdotes. The landscape was animated by the imagination of the 
Dawnlanders and organized according to their patterns o f movement and activity.2
The reverse was also true: the physical realities of the environment directed 
human experience along certain channels. Seasonal fluctuations in the location o f flora 
and fauna forced families to periodically shift residence, and these shifts o f residence 
made them familiar with certain preferred paths, waterways, and campsites. As people 
passed through these channels, they inevitably came upon places that evoked memories. 
Encoded as stories, these recollections allowed the landscape to "speak" to the 
Dawnlanders, to remind them o f their personal and collective past. Such stories were 
thought to have a life of their own, independent o f the speaker who told them. They often 
imparted a moral message, reminding tellers and listeners o f the obligations they owed to 
their fellow beings. Many o f Gluskap's adventures were cautionary tales that illustrated 
the dangers o f not sharing with those in need or the dire consequences of overhunting 
game animals. The routines o f daily life, which led people to regularly pass by the places 
that evoked such stories, reinforced these moral lessons through repetition. Locales 
became a kind o f compass that kept people on a straight social path. To Gluskap's
2 On the notion o f landscape as a medium, see Christopher Tilley, A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places. 
Paths and Monuments (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 7-34.
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children, the natural environment was not so much a setting as an actor, a guardian 
keeping a watchful eye over their well-being.3
An accurate map o f the Dawnland, in this light, requires its maker to do a great 
deal more than plot villages and tribes at the correct coordinates o f latitude and longitude. 
To understand the terms on which Wabanakis possessed their land — and the ways in 
which it possessed them — it is necessary to consider the places where they lived as sites 
o f experience and memory. Though they appear as thin lines or blank spaces in 
contemporary maps, the forests, rivers, lakes and mountains o f the region were alive with 
the signs o f human occupation for thousands of years before the arrival o f Europeans. 
Through their daily activities and storytelling, the inhabitants o f the Dawnland, like their 
father Gluskap, left footprints everywhere they went. They left not only physical traces 
o f their existence, but also stories, paintings, songs, and dances, all of which animated 
their natural surroundings and filled their lives with meaning. A faithful map o f human 
occupation in the Dawnland would allow us to begin tracking these footprints, seeing the 
landscape as something that was directly encountered and actively imagined by its 
inhabitants.
The Yearly Round
Gluskap's children did not treat the landscape as an idyll, to be passively observed 
while sitting still. Nor did they view it from on high, as would an eagle surveying the 
panoramic scene beneath. Instead, they approached it level, from behind the gunwale o f a
3 On the didactic qualities of storytelling, see Robert M. Leavitt, "Storytelling as Language Curriculum," in 
William Cowan, ed., Actes du quatorzieme concres des Algonouinistes (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
1983), 27-33. There is a similar connection between places and stories in other parts o f North America: 
see Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits In Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Anache
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canoe or treading along a winding path. They knew the lay o f the land by actively 
engaging their environment, learning its dimensions through paddle strokes and footsteps. 
At the time that Europeans first encountered them, Wabanakis drew nearly all the 
necessities o f life from their immediate surroundings. Animals provided them with meat, 
clothing, tallow, quills, and a variety o f bone tools. From plants, they made dishes of 
com, squash, acoms, and berries, as well as medicines, emetics, and other curatives.
From trees, twigs, bark, and resin, they fashioned not only their houses and their canoes 
but baskets, dishes, and boxes. With stones, they made arrowheads, axes, and pendants; 
with clay they made pottery. Dependent on the environment for all their material needs, 
Wabanakis developed an encyclopedic store o f ecological knowledge, including a canny 
ability to remember when and where game, fish, seals, plants, and other resources would 
be most abundant. Constantly consulting and revising this mental map o f resources, 
Wabanakis periodically moved from place to place in search o f the plants and animals 
that gave them life.
The paths that they took differed from one area to the next, for the Dawnland was 
patchwork o f different environments, each with its own distinctive physiography and 
ecology. People grafted their settlement and subsistence patterns on to their local 
environment so as to make optimal use of their surroundings. The result was a highly 
diverse map of settlement in the Dawnland, with populations adapting themselves to the 
natural environment o f their particular area. Subsistence strategies also changed over 
time, as fluctuations in plant, animal, and human populations forced people to exploit a 
continually evolving mix o f resources. It is difficult to recapture the full diversity and 
variability o f subsistence patterns and it would be misleading to speak o f a single
(Albuquerque, N. M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1996).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
"traditional" or "pre-contact" way o f life among the Wabanakis. But it is possible, at the 
risk of over-generalization, to adumbrate four major patterns o f settlement that 
predominated in the Dawnland on the eve o f European colonization.
On the northern half of the Nova Scotian peninsula and the northeastern part of 
New Brunswick, as far as the Gaspe -  roughly the area occupied in historic times by the 
Mi'kmaq ~  people tended to spend their summers on the coast and winters in the interior, 
taking advantage o f seasonal variations in the availability o f fish and game. Most groups 
lived year-round along the banks o f a river, making seasonal movements upstream and 
downstream. In the spring, as the river ice began to break up, families paddled downriver 
to the bays, coves, and estuaries o f the coast, where they set up fish weirs to catch 
migratory fish such as salmon and alewives on their spawning runs. In the summer, men 
went fishing off the coast for flounder, cod, skates, and other inshore-feeding fish, and 
also hunted for sea mammals such as walruses and seals. Women, meanwhile, dug up 
shellfish such as clams, scallops, and mussels. Throughout the spring, summer, and fall, 
men also hunted migratory birds such as loons, herons, and geese. As temperatures 
cooled and food became less abundant on the coast, people moved inland for the winter, 
where they hunted for large game such as moose, caribou, and deer, and went trapping for 
smaller animals such as beaver. On Cape Breton Island the pattern was reversed, with 
people spending their winters on the coast and their summers by the interior lakes.4
Immediately to the southwest o f the Mi'kmaq was a zone o f coastal settlement 
stretching from the Bay of Fundy to southern New England. People in this region tended 
to live year-round along the estuaries o f  major rivers or at the mouths o f smaller streams.
4 Frances L. Stewart, "Seasonal Movements o f Indians in Acadia as Evidenced by Historical Documents 
and Vertebrate Faunal Remains from Archaeological Sites," Man in the Northeast 38 (1989): 55-77; James
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Lying at the intersection o f fresh-water and maritime environments, estuaries provided 
families with an abundance of resources throughout the entire year. During the summer, 
families lived much as they did in northern Nova Scotia: hunting seals and walruses on 
offshore islands; digging clams, oysters, and other shellfish on the tidal flats; catching 
fish with nets, spears, and lines. But during the winter, people remained close to the 
coast, feeding themselves on shellfish and game caught at the heads o f estuaries. Some 
families between Penobscot Bay and the St. John River spent the winter in partially 
submerged houses that sheltered them from the blustery winds o f the coast. In the spring, 
they moved upriver and set up weirs and nets to catch the runs o f migratory fish. They 
then returned to the coast, occasionally assembling in large villages where they traded 
and feasted with people from nearby areas.5
A third cluster o f communities was concentrated along the valley o f the upper 
Connecticut River and the eastern shores o f Lake Champlain. The rich intervales o f this 
region offered an abundance o f plant and animal resources and supported a large human 
population. Toward the end of the prehistoric period, from about the fourteenth century 
onward, people tended to live year-round in villages along the valleys o f rivers, or at the 
confluence o f lakes and rivers. For several hundred years before then, communities had 
become increasingly attached to certain spots along rivers, to which they returned every 
year during the warmer months to gather nuts and acoms. Beginning some time after 
1000 AD, they complemented these activities with horticulture, raising com, beans, and
A. Tuck, Maritime Provinces Prehistory (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1984), 72-75.
5 David Sanger, "Testing the Models: Hunter-Gatherer Use of Space in the Gulf o f Maine, USA," World 
Archaeology 27 (1996): 512-26: Tuck. Maritime Provinces. 49-54: Douglas C. Kellogg, "Why Did They 
Choose to Live Here? Ceramic Period Settlement in the Boothbay, Maine, Region," Northeast 
Anthropology 48 (1994): 25-60; Bruce Bourque and Steven L. Cox, "Maine State Museum Investigation of 
the Goddard Site, 1979." Man in the Northeast 22 (1981): 3-27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
squash in the fields near their villages, although wild plants still remained a more 
significant part of their diet. From the main villages, men went on occasional forays to 
nearby rivers and lakes to catch fish and eels or to forested areas to hunt and trap deer, 
bear, mink, bobcat, and other animals. Villages also served as ceremonial centers, with 
large numbers o f people regularly congregating at certain spots for feasting and 
exchange.6
Between the Connecticut River Valley and the coast was a region o f upland 
settlement. The northern arm o f the Appalachian Mountains reaches through the center 
of Dawnland as far as western New Brunswick, with a ridge o f peaks that includes the 
White Mountains and Mount Katahdin. Amidst these mountains lie dozens o f lakes that 
are the sources of the large rivers o f the region, which run from the upland areas to the 
bays and inlets of the coast. People living in the upland region tended to prefer to settle 
near rapids or waterfalls where the fishing was good, as well as at the outlets o f lakes and 
the confluence of streams and rivers, which were ideal for trapping beaver.
Archaeologists know comparatively less about this region, and it is possible that inland 
sites may have been temporary camps set up by people from other areas.7
Subsistence strategies within each region depended on the calculated management 
of risk. Because the availability o f particular plant and animal species fluctuated over 
time, people had a vested interest in exploiting as wide a variety o f species as possible. 
Large ungulates such as deer and moose were the hardest animals to track and kill but
6 William A. Haviland and Maijory W. Power, The Original Vermonters: Native Inhabitants. Past and 
Present. 2nd ed., (Hanover, N. H.: University Press of New England, 1994), 85-204.
7 David Sanger, "The Ceramic Period in Maine," in idem, ed., Discovering Maine's Archaeological 
Heritage (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1979), 106. Southern New England 
was similarly divided into estuarine, riverine, and upland populations. See Kathleen J. Bragdon, Native 
People of Southern New England. 1500-1650 (Norman. Okla.: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1996), 55- 
79.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
they provided hunters with a large caloric payoff and were the object of the longest 
hunting expeditions. Knowing that these expeditions carried hunters away from home for 
weeks with no guarantee that they would return with quarry, communities balanced the 
risks of hunting large game by exploiting plants and animals that provided fewer calories 
but were easier to procure.
Most o f the burden o f providing communities with a daily supply o f food fell on 
the shoulders o f women. The general rule in native communities was that adult men 
caught vertebrate fish and hunted mammals, while women, children, and the elderly 
brought home wild and domesticated plants as well as shellfish and other marine 
invertebrates. Women’s activities tended to be less physically demanding but more 
continuous than those of men: they were charged with cooking meals, caring for their 
children, dressing and stretching skins, sewing clothes, making containers, fetching wood 
and water, and gathering a regular supply o f shellfish, nuts, acorns, and berries. Women 
generally stayed within a day's journey o f their homes, making short trips to the fields to 
tend to their crops or to the mud fiats to dig for clams.8
Because women ranged less widely than did men, the location of settlements 
tended to be closely linked to the demands o f female activities. While fish and big game 
provided more calories than did plants and shellfish, hunting was inherently risky -  a 
season of bad fortune brought with it the threat o f starvation. The food gathered by
8 For early historical evidence of women's work, from the perspective of European males, see Reuben G. 
Thwaites, eds., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 1896- 
1901), 3:99-101 [future references to this series appear as JR]; Christopher Levett, "A Voyage into New 
England." Collections of the Maine Historical Society. 2 (1847): 79-109. On the intensification of 
exchange in the late prehistoric period, see Bruce J. Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric Exchange on the 
Maritime Peninsula," in Timothy G. Baugh and Jonathan E. Ericson, eds., Prehistoric Exchange Systems in 
North America (New York: Plenum Press, 1994), 23-46; Robert G. Doyle, "Analysis o f Lithic Artifacts: 
The Identification, Petrologic Description, and Statistical Analysis o f the Lithic Artifacts Recovered from 
the Turner Farm Site," in Bruce J. Bourque, Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies: A
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women, on the other hand, provided a more regular if less abundant source o f  calories and 
acted as a hedge against failure in the hunt. Families tended to move their homes to 
places where women could find a plentiful store of food. Thus families in coastal areas 
generally moved only when women had used up the store o f shellfish in their vicinity. To 
avoid depleting the stock of clams in their flats, women generally dug up only older and 
larger clams, judged by the size o f their siphon holes, and left the smaller clams to grow 
to maturity. Once the larger clams were taken, they were forced to move to a new flat to 
find fresh stocks of shellfish. The decision to shift camp was probably taken primarily by 
women in response to the depletion o f clam banks. It made little sense to travel long 
distances to dig for clams when their nutritional value was relatively light. The 
potentially large returns derived from hunting, on the other hand, justified long journeys 
in pursuit o f game, making the location of dwellings relatively less important for hunters. 
A similar logic led families in other areas to choose the site o f their homes on the basis of 
female activities.9
The choice o f a home was limited not only by the availability o f resources but by 
the presence of other people. Archaeologists have uncovered ample evidence of 
population growth throughout the Dawnland for at least a thousand years before the 
arrival of Europeans. The trend throughout the Ceramic period -- a term archaeologists
Gulf of Maine Perspective (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), Appendix 6.297-316.
9 David Sanger, The Carson Site and the Late Ceramic Period in Passamaouoddv Bav. New Brunswick. 
Archaeological Survey of Canada, Paper No. 135 (Hull: Canadian Museum o f Civilization, Mercury 
Series, 1987), 71-72, 81-83, 117; Mary Beth Williams and Jeffrey Bendrememer, "The Archaeology of 
Maize, Pots, and Seashells: Gender Dynamics in Late Woodland and Contact Period New England," in 
Cheryl Claassen and Rosemary A. Joyce, eds., Women in Prehistory: North America and Mesoamerica 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 136-52. Basing his figures on the reports of 
French observers, Robert L. Kelly has estimated that the Micmac in the early seventeenth century drew 
40% of their total calories from fishing and 50% from the hunt See Robert L. Kelly, The Foraging 
Spectrum: Diversity in Hunter-Gatherer Lifewavs (Washington. D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
1995), 68.
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use to describe the era from the introduction of pottery around 500 BC to the beginnings 
of European colonization — was for people to exploit a greater variety o f species o f both 
plants and animals, to hunt and gather smaller and more marginal species of animals, and 
to hunt and fish in less productive territories. Human skeletal remains in Casco Bay have 
also shown evidence of stunted growth among children, probably due to starvation or 
malnutrition. In all likelihood, population pressures forced people to find new sources of 
food and to become more protective o f the resources they already had. There is 
considerable evidence o f a tendency towards sedentism throughout the Dawnland during 
this period as communities became increasingly attached to certain river valleys or 
estuaries, living there year-round or returning to them at regular intervals. This increased 
sedentism, combined with the need to find new sources o f food, encouraged women as far 
north as the Saco and Kennebec rivers to adopt horticulture towards the end o f the 
Ceramic period.10
Time and Space
The arrival o f European colonists in the seventeenth century threw the native 
societies o f the Dawnland into disarray, with far-reaching effects on settlement patterns.11 
Epidemic diseases carried by the colonists laid waste entire communities, killing about
10 Bruce J. Bourque, Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies: A Gulf o f Maine 
Perspective (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), 222,255; David R. Yesner, "Population Pressure in Coastal 
Environments: An Archaeological Test," World Archaeology 16 (1984): 108-127; David R. Yesner, 
"Seasonality and Resource 'Stress’ Among Hunter-Gatherers: Archaeological Signatures," in Ernest S. 
Burch, Jr., and Linda J. Ellanna, eds., Kev Issues in Hunter-Gatherer Research (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 151- 
68; Haviland and Power, Original Vermonters. 133-45,154.
11 William Wicken has contended that the Mi'kmaq had suffered gradual population loss in the sixteenth 
century as a result of diseases contracted from their contacts with European fishermen, the spread of 
diseases preceding the establishment o f colonies. But his argument is based on a single documentary 
source compounded by a host o f hypotheticals, and may not apply to the Wabanaki groups living in Maine.
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three-fourths o f the total native population. Those who survived often fled to 
neighboring villages or moved to new areas to avoid the spread o f disease. The migrants 
sometimes carried old subsistence strategies to their new homes: by the late seventeenth 
century, villages as far north as the St. John and Penobscot rivers practised horticulture, 
probably introduced by migrants from the south and the west. The expanding scale o f the 
fur trade also may have led Wabanaki men to change their hunting practices, putting 
greater effort into trapping small mammals such as beaver, mink, and squirrel. Yet even 
by the eighteenth century, the pattern that had developed in the Ceramic period remained. 
Communities still followed a seasonal round that involved regular movements along 
rivers and estuaries in search o f seasonally available resources.12
Consider the calendar o f the village of Norridgewock, as described by its Jesuit 
priest, Sebastien Rale, in the first quarter o f the eighteenth century. Norridgewock was 
the northernmost settlement o f the Kennebec drainage, lying near the confluence of the 
Kennebec and the Sandy rivers. Despite the ravages o f  disease and warfare, it remained 
one of the largest Indian villages in Maine, with a population o f several hundred at the 
time of Rale's writing. As they had done since at least the sixteenth century, the 
inhabitants of the village cultivated com, beans, and squash, depending on domesticated 
plants for a large portion o f the calories in their diet. In a letter written to his brother in 
1723, Rale remarked that the men o f the village had overhunted large game in recent 
years, making deer, elk, beaver, and bear very scarce in their vicinity. The lack of game
See Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760” (Ph.D. diss.,
McGill University), 190-97.
12 Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear, "European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The 
Timing of the First Epidemics." Ethnohistorv 35 (1988): 15-33; Harald E. L. Prins, "Cornfields at 
Meductic: Ethnic and Territorial Reconfigurations in Colonial Acadia," Man in the Northeast 44 (1992): 
55-72. Dean Snow has argued that the for trade provided communities on the Penobscot River with a 
hedge against crop failure, which encouraged them to experiment with horticulture in the seventeenth
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meant that they had been forced to rely even more heavily on agricultural produce than
before.13
According to Rale, the Norridgewocks' calendar consisted o f a series o f seasonal 
movements that accommodated the requirements o f planting and harvesting their fields 
while taking advantage o f seasonally-available wildlife. They planted their com in the 
spring and did their last tilling early in June. Then they conferred among themselves to 
decide on a suitable coastal spot to live until harvest time. Having reached a consensus, 
they then made their way to the sea where they lived off shellfish, seals, birds, and other 
animals for several months. They returned to their main village in late August to gather 
their harvest and subsist on com, beans, squash, nuts, and acorns until early November, 
when they went to the coast for a second time. Rale testified that they ate well during this 
season, living on an abundance of large fish, shellfish, fruit, sea birds, and numerous 
kinds o f game. They returned to their village in mid-winter when the men separated from 
the rest o f the village to hunt large game further upland. In the springtime, the men came 
back to the village and went to nearby rivers to catch migrating fish. At the same time, 
the women began sowing seeds, starting once again the annual round of activities.14
One way o f thinking o f the Norridgewocks' calendar is to imagine it as a pair o f 
overlapping circuits, one tracing their passage through time, another their movement in 
space. In both circuits, the villagers moved progressively from one activity to the next, 
but their progress was cyclical, always returning them to familiar places at yearly
century. See Dean R. Snow, The Archaeology o f New England (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 56.
13 JR. 67: 213; Harald E. L. Prins and Bruce J. Bourque, "Norridgewock: Village Translocation on the New 
England-Acadian Frontier," Man in the Northeast 33 (1987): 137-58.
14 JR. 67:213-19. The Norridgewocks' yearly round probably would have been quite different at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. When Samuel Champlain visited the Kennebec River in 1605, its 
headwaters were still occupied by other groups of Indians. See H. P. Biggar, ed., Complete Works of 
Samuel de Champlain. 6 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-36), 1:311-23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
intervals. Men and women were constantly on the move -- canoeing from the village to 
the seashore, walking from the fields to the woods -- but their travels brought them back 
to the same spots year after year. This pattern conformed to a tendency o f  communities, 
observable elsewhere in northern New England during the Ceramic period, to organize 
their lives around focal places such as the village and the estuary. Because the rhythms 
of the natural world regulated both their daily pursuits and shifts o f  residence, the passing 
of the seasons represented the most important divisions o f the Wabanaki calendar. The 
year was broken into periods o f natural abundance that anchored activities in space and 
time -- sowing and fishing at the village during the spring, digging for clams and hunting 
seals on the coast in the summer.
At Norridgewock, time was measured according to the intersection o f human 
experience with the patterns o f the natural environment. The villagers counted years by 
winters, because the winter represented the hunting season. Shorter units o f time were 
also marked by natural cycles: days by the rising and setting o f the sun, months by the 
waxing and waning of the moon. The months drew their names from seasonal activities. 
April was known either as anmsou-kizous, "the moon in which we catch an abundance of 
herring", or kikai-kizous, "the moon in which we sow". July was the moon in which 
blueberries were ripe (sattai-kizous) and eel fishing began (matsinipenanmous), 
September the moon o f acom gathering (maouinai-kizous), and November the moon of 
the beaver hunt {pekouamhani-kisoits). Given the diversity of subsistence patterns in the 
region, it is hardly surprising that neighboring communities had different names for the 
months or that these names changed over time [see Table 1.1].15
15 Sebastien Rasies, A Dictionary o f the Abnaki Language, in North America, ed. John Pickering, in 
Memoirs of the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences, n. s., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Charles Folson, 1833),
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Wabanaki families tended to remain in places as long as food was abundant and to 
work only as hard as was necessary to satisfy their immediate needs. The result was that 
people ordered their days according to the tasks they had to perform, rather than to a rigid 
schedule. Early European observers were often struck by the Wabanakis’ apparently 
relaxed attitude toward the passage of time. ”[T]heir days are nothing but pastime. They 
are never in a hurry," remarked the Jesuit Pierre Biard in 1616, after having spent several 
years in the fledgling colony o f Acadia. "Quite different from us, who can never do 
anything without hurry and worry."16 The Sieur de Diereville, who visited Acadia some 
seventy years afterward, noted that the Wabanakis "do not calculate the years by days, 
weeks, or months, only by the nights, or by events o f importance which occur during 
them, and frequently they let the time pass without keeping account o f it."17
The French, as Biard pointed out, were more conscious o f time than the 
Wabanakis and demanded greater precision in its measurement. To the colonists, time 
was palpable: something that could be spent, saved, or wasted, like money. Wabanakis, 
by comparison, cared very little for these matters, being oblivious to the ticking of clocks 
and the demands o f fixed schedules. The difference was as much social as conceptual. 
Broadly speaking, increased precision in time measurement has almost always been 
associated with a growing scale o f human organization. In large-scale societies such as 
Baroque France or the modem West, the coordination o f a multitude o f activities over 
large areas makes it necessary to adopt units time are artificial, such as the twenty-four
478. On the names of months, see also Gordon M. Day, "An Agawam Fragment," International Journal of 
Linguistics 33 (1967): 244-47.
16JR,3:85.
17 Sieur de Diereville, Relation o f the Voyage to Port Roval in Acadia or New France [1708], trans. Mrs. 
Clarence Webster, ed. and intro. John Clarence Webster (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933), 172. Indians 
counted years by winters, because wintertime was the hunting season: see Public Archives of Canada, 
Archives Nationales, Serie Cl 1 A, vol. 122, fol. 185 [future references to this series appear as PAC, AN].
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hour day or the seven-day week. The complex division of labor in such societies means 
that the pace of work varies greatly from one vocation to the next. When people of 
different walks of life communicate with each other, they need to use notions o f time that 
have no necessary connection to their particular activities. The solution is to adopt 
systems of measurement that are arbitrary and abstract, suited to the requirements of 
large-scale activities but divorced from local contexts.18
But in small-scale societies where there is little division of labor, people tend to 
root their understanding of time in experience. The important markers of time are local, 
not abstract. Just as Wabanakis saw the cyclical passage o f time in terms of seasonal 
activities, their understanding of linear time — time as an arrow of sequential events — 
was framed in equally concrete terms. The important signposts of history for them were 
not numerical dates, but events that were local, idiosyncratic, and often highly personal: a 
battle in which many villagers lost their lives, the day on which an infant died, a year in 
which a comet was sighted in the sky. Because Wabanakis valued knowledge that was 
acquired first-hand, they tended to personalize their understanding o f time, to place 
themselves at the center o f the temporal universe. Storytellers in the Dawnland always 
related historical events as if they themselves had been witnesses.19
Notions o f space were similarly framed in terms o f immediate experience. Just as 
the months o f the calendar were linked to particularly activities, placenames served as a 
map of locally available resources. The names given to many of the bays, lakes, and
18 A. Irving Hallowell, "Temporal Orientation in Western Civilization and in a Pre-Literate Society,” 
American Anthropologist 39 (1937): 647-70; Anthony F. Aveni, Empires of Time: Calendars. Clocks, and 
Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Carlo M. Cipolla, Clocks and Culture. 1300-1700 (New York: 
Norton, 1977); Samuel L. Macey, The Dynamics of Progress: Time. Method and Measure (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1989), 3-61; E. P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial 
Capitalism,” Past and Present 38 (1967): 56-97; Gerard T. Moran, "Conception o f Time in Early Modem 
France: An Approach to the History of Collective Mentalities," Sixteenth Century Journal 12 (1981): 3-19.
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rivers o f the region suggest the intimate association between space and activity: 
Passamaquoddy ("place where the pollock are taken"), Cobbosseecontee ("sturgeon 
gathering place"), Kenduskeag ("eel-weir place"), Manesdayik ("place o f collecting 
clams"). Other names call to mind the eye o f a traveller looking to set up camp near a 
pleasant prospect: Penobscot ("where the rocks widen"), Wulastukw or the St. John 
("beautiful river"), Androscoggin ("river o f rock shelters"). As elsewhere in native North 
America, Wabanaki placenames imparted cultural and ecological knowledge that was 
passed on from one generation to the next. Although people sometimes disagreed about 
the precise meanings o f names, it was generally understood that places were intimately 
linked with human activities.20
To Wabanakis, the landscape consisted of a host of places whose attributes were 
defined by the engagement o f people with their immediate environment. There was no 
such thing as a culturally empty space; all natural features o f the land were filtered 
through human experience. This view o f the land shared very little with the abstract 
forms of land measurement that Europeans rediscovered during the Renaissance: 
Euclidean geometry, which allowed people to imagine space in terms o f ideal, 
quantifiable shapes with regular dimensions, and Ptolemaic geography, which enabled 
them to identify any point on the globe as a set of coordinates o f latitude and longitude. 
The Euclidean universe presumed a number o f discrete forms, such as points, lines, and 
shapes, that could be identified and measured according to their intrinsic properties: a
19 Speck, "Penobscot Tales," 35.
20 Fanny H. Eckstorm, Indian Place-Names o f the Penobscot Valiev and the Maine Coast. University of 
Maine Studies in History and Government, 2nd ser., 55 (1941); American Friends Service Committee, The 
Wabanakis of Maine, section D, 22-23; Edwin H. Churchill, "The Evolution of Maine Place Names,”
Maine Historical Society Quarterly 29 (1989): 66-90; Henry Lome Masta, Abenaki Names. Legends. 
Grammar and Place Names (Victoriaville. Que.: La Voix des Bois-Francs, 1932); Patricia O. Afabie and
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square always had four sides, the angles o f a triangle always added up to 180°. Because 
the regularities of such forms never changed, their existence was independent o f context. 
By the same token, standardized measures o f distance and size were also context-free: 
just a pound o f lead weighed the same as a pound o f feathers, a mile o f valley and a mile 
of mountain were o f equal length.
By contrast, Wabanakis valued geographical knowledge that was dense with local 
context; rather than isolating objects from their surroundings, they made connections 
between the two. None o f their languages contained exact words for abstract shapes such 
as triangle, square, and circle. Instead, they had a rich vocabulary for indicating the 
qualities o f objects or relationships between objects. As in other Algonquian languages, 
the Wabanaki lexicon contains a potentially infinite variety o f compound words, made by 
combining verbs and nouns with affixes that modify their meaning. Many o f these 
affixes, as well as various verbs and nouns, indicate location, shape, or direction. For 
example, the Norridgewocks' word for land, as translated by Rale, was ki. When the 
locative suffix -ek was added, the word became kik, "on the ground." The prefix spem-, 
meaning "above" or "on high", produced spemkik, "above the ground", or heaven. 
Alternatively, the prefix aranm-, "inside" or "under", made the word aranmkik, or hell. A 
recent dictionary o f Western Abenaki includes over a hundred affixes denoting spatial 
relationships or attributes.21
This manner o f word formation meant that Wabanaki representations of space 
were necessarily relational: they situated one object in terms o f another and indicated
Madison S. Beder, "Place-Names," in Ives Goddard, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 17 
(Languages) (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1996), 185-99.
2'.American Friends Service Committee, Wabanakis o f Maine, section D, 69-74; Gordon M. Day, Western 
Abenaki Dictionary. Mercury Series, Canadian Ethnology Service, Paper 128,2 vols. (Hull, Que.:
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shape as an attribute, not an abstraction. Context was an essential element in the 
representation o f place and direction. Descriptions o f places without any local context 
were useless to Wabanakis because they did not attach themselves to any o f the 
guideposts by which they oriented themselves in the world. Instead, they placed value on 
words and phrases that were thick with references to familiar landmarks, that emphasized 
relationships rather than ideal forms. Even measurements o f distance were relative, 
expressed in units of a human scale. Short distances were represented as "looks" -  the 
furthest extent a person could see along a stretch o f river -  while travel to more remote 
places was measured in terms of days and nights o f journey."
Wabanaki perceptions o f space and time were rooted in a distinctive way of 
knowing the world, which was shaped in turn by the patterns o f  their daily activities. 
Educated Westerners often equate intelligence with an ability to reason abstractly and 
treat literacy as a necessary element of education. These presumptions are rarely 
questioned in a world where social success is difficult if  not impossible without a degree 
of formal learning. But in a small-scale society where survival depends on a direct 
engagement with the natural environment, abstract reasoning has little utility and formal 
learning is o f less value than the skills acquired through first-hand experience.
Wabanakis spent their entire lives developing a store o f wisdom about their environment, 
taught by example and mastered through observation and practice. Men learned to tell 
the size, age, and condition o f moose and deer simply by looking at their tracks,
Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1994); Rasies, Dictionary. 455,497,533.
-- Paul J. Lindholdt, ed., John Josselvn. Colonial Traveler A Critical Edition o f Two Voyages to New- 
Eneland [1674] (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1988), 97; Frank G. Speck. Penobscot Man: 
The Life History of a Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 79. 
The Algonquian tendency to look for connections between subjects and objects is not limited to 
descriptions of space. Many nouns always carry a possessive prefix — the Norridgewock word for father 
was never "father" (*mittangous) in the abstract, but "my father" (nemi'ttangous), "your father"
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developed a detailed knowledge of the migratory patterns, mating habits, and physiology 
of a wide variety of species, and became highly skilled at tracking and marksmanship. 
Women gained an equally impressive understanding o f botany, being able to identify 
hundreds of species of plants, recall the medicinal properties o f herbs and roots, and raise 
numerous domesticated crops. Such knowledge had value precisely because it was local 
and idiosyncratic; the people who had the most thorough knowledge o f their immediate 
environment were those who were best able to survive.
Paths and Knowledge
If islands and rivers were evidence o f Gluskap's deeds, paths and trails were the 
visible residue o f human activities. As they moved from clam-digging to berry-picking 
or made the rounds of their trap lines, people cut trails through the brush or left tracks on 
the ground. Because they were both the product and the conduits o f human action, travel 
routes came to stand metaphorically for the activities they made possible. Just as months 
and placenames drew their meaning from human action, trails and rivers gained 
significance from their uses. Not surprisingly, paths were a recurrent motif in Wabanaki 
culture: in the dictionary he compiled while living at Norridgewock, Father Rale listed 
the local term for road or path (anoudi) and a host o f variants: ourighen (a good path), 
matsighen anoudi (an evil path), tekouankanoutsesen (an ascending path), 
penankanoutsesen (a descending path), pekaganoutsesen (a crossing path), 
panbebetganoutssesen (a winding path), sasaghisoui (a straight path), ouani’te (a path in 
the snow that no longer appears because the snow has melted). He also included a 
number of terms describing activities related to paths, including cutting a trail, searching
(kemi’ttangous), "his/her father" (wemi'ttangous).
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for a road, and praying while travelling. The expression to cut someone’s path 
{nenitoupenaran nenitou'kasan, "I cut his path") meant to take a shortcut to talk to 
someone who was already en route.23
Because they were evidence o f people's daily activities, paths came to represent 
the distinctive life experiences o f individuals and groups. Among hunter-gatherers, it is 
common for people to describe their personal histories as a matter o f following old trails 
and blazing new ones. This tendency is true o f collectivities as well as individuals, since 
paths were used by entire communities. The identity o f Wabanaki families was linked to 
the networks o f rivers and paths they used for hunting, fishing, and gathering. According 
to the ethnologist Frank Speck, who did fieldwork among the Penobscots early in the 
twentieth century, hunting ranges in upland areas were traditionally known as nzi'bum, 
literally "my river," and were marked by a set o f crossing trails that radiated from a 
central campsite. Along these trails, people carved or painted their family emblems on 
trees and rocks or cut out birch-bark silhouettes which they placed at the edges o f their 
territory. The emblems were adopted after the animals most abundant in their lands or 
because their family shared some characteristic with the animal. The animals themselves 
were known as ndo'dem, or "my co-relative".24
23 Rasle, Dictionary. 384,411.
24 Tilly, Phenomenology of Landscape. 37-67; Frank G. Speck. Penobscot Man: The Life History of a 
Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 77-78,203-17; Fannie 
Hardy Eckstorm, Old John Nentune and Other Maine Indian Shamans (Portland, Me.: Southworth- 
Anthoensen Press, 194S), SO. In Algonquian languages, the word "totem," or odem, means a group of 
people tied together by kinship; the Wabanaki name for S t Francois, Odanak, or "village," is a variant of 
the same term. Totems also referred to the animals that were emblems of families or groups (in Penobscot, 
according to Frank Speck, they were known as ntuiem, or "my partner of a strange race”). A French census 
of 1736 mentions several emblems used by Wabanaki families, such as the bear, turtle, partridge, beaver, 
and oner. A joint lener sent by the Noiridgewocks and their allies in 1721 represents each group by a 
totem, as do the signatures of sagamores on treaties and land deeds. Totemic animals were distinct from 
guardian spirits in that they could be spoken of openly and were not subject to prohibitions against being 
killed or eaten. See "Denombrement des Nations Sauvages,"l736, PAC, AN, Serie Cl IA, vol. 66, fols. 
236-37; Frank G. Speck, "The Family Hunting Band as the Basis o f Algonkian Social Organization,"
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Family members believed that they were descended from a common ancestor and 
shared stories about how this ancestor came to be. The inhabitants o f the estuaries o f the 
Penobscot and St. John rivers, for example, believed that their origins lay in an encounter 
that Gluskap had with a giant bullfrog who had swallowed the world's supply o f water. 
Suffering from drought, both people and animals implored Gluskap to confront the 
bullfrog and the Gluskap accorded their wish. He travelled to the bullfrog's lair and 
politely asked him to release the waters, but the frog refused. Gluskap responded by 
felling a tree that landed on the bullfrog's back, sending the water flushing out in a great 
torrent. Some people were so eager to quench their thirst that they immediately dived 
into the stream o f water and in so doing were transformed into turtles, lobsters, fish, and 
other sea creatures. The descendants o f these animals took their family emblems from 
these ancestors and made their homes near the stream o f water, which, according to one 
version of the story, had become the Penobscot River.25
The web of connections that tied hunting territories to personal and family 
identity meant that travel along trails and rivers was more than a matter of getting from 
one place to the next. By habitually following certain routes for their hunting, families 
established and reinforced bonds o f affinity between themselves, their ancestors, and the 
animals and other spirits who dwelled on their land. Men who used the same hunting
American Anthropologist 17 (1915): 301; Theresa M. Schenck, "The Algonquian Totem and Totemism: A 
Distortion of a Semantic Field, " in David H. Pentland, ed.. Papers o f the Twenty-Eighth Aleonauian 
Conference (Winnipeg. Man.: University of Manitoba Press, 1997), 341-53; letter of Abenakis and their 
allies to the English, July 28,1721, in James P. Baxter, The Pioneers o f New France in New England 
(Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1894), 112-15.
25 Speck, "Penobscot Transformer Tales," 200-2; W. H. Mechling, "The Malecite Indians, with Notes on 
the Micmacs," Anthropologica. 1st ser., 7 (1958), 111. By the nineteenth century, many of the "salt water" 
families with fish, turtles, or other sea creatures as their totems had moved upland. Speck speculated that 
salt water families, whose myths of origin were not shared by upland families, may have been migrants 
from southern New England. But recent archaeological research has shown that there were distinct 
estuarine and upland populations in Maine for thousands o f years before European contact The creation of
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trails every winter developed a superior knowledge o f their local environment and tended 
to have greater success in the hunt than less experienced partners. From a Wabanaki 
point of view, this success was best explained not in terms of factual knowledge but as a 
consequence o f the social bond that developed between hunters and their game.
Wabanakis believed in a reciprocal relationship between people and neighboring 
animals, sustained by a continuous flow of exchanges between the two groups. The 
animals were thought to be persons -  "bodies animated by a rational spirit," according to 
an eighteenth-century French observer — who allowed themselves to be killed if hunters 
treated them with proper respect. People went to great lengths not to offend their prey, 
hanging the bones of dead animals on trees, cutting out fishes' eyes so the fish would not 
see who had killed them, and never burning the bones o f animals. If the animals were 
shown appropriate courtesy, they would reward hunters by giving themselves as prey, and 
in some cases by acting as the hunters' guardian spirits. If not, their spirits would refuse 
to be reborn and the hunters' lands would be depleted of game. Because men could not 
have success in the hunt without the favor o f the animals they pursued, it was important 
to develop a sense of familiarity between themselves and the animals' spirits. The 
creation of this bond of trust required hunters to establish channels that linked them with 
their quarry: paths that led them to the same places year after year and rituals that 
expressed their respect for the animal spirits.26
a single Penobscot "tribe" that included both inland and coastal populations was probably a post-contact 
phenomenon resulting from generations of intermarriage and social interaction between the two groups.
26 Diereville, Relation. 161; JR, 3:131-35; "Memoiie sur les sauvages Abenakis par M. le Cardinal, 1723," 
Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres. memoires. et autres documents historioues relatifs a la 
Nouvelle-France. 4 vols. (Quebec: Imprimerie A. Cote et Cie., 1883-85), 3:96-97 (future references to this 
series appear as CDRH); Rasies, Dictionary. 470; Frank G. Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism," American 
Anthropological Association Memoirs. 6 (1919), 238-88; Speck, "Penobscot Tales," 22-27; Eckstorm, Old 
John Neptune. 37,97; Calvin Martin, Keeners o f the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur 
Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
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Travel renewed the ties that attached people to their surroundings and reinforced 
the feeling o f kinship they had with their animal relatives. Paths were not merely a 
means of transportation but a social medium that connected people with their natural 
environment. A similar flow of interaction allowed families to cultivate harmonious 
relations with their human neighbors. Wabanakis often described political alliances as 
paths that were kept clear through constant use. If the paths were not followed, if  the 
allies failed to keep up the constant flow of transactions necessary for effective 
communication, they would become overgrown and disappear. It was commonplace for 
orators in the Dawnland to exhort their allies to keep the paths between their villages free 
of obstacles.
One of the earliest recorded uses of this metaphor was spoken in 1653 by a 
Wabanaki ambassador, in response to an incident that had taken place the previous 
winter. Five men from a Connecticut River village who were hunting in the lands south 
of the St. Lawrence River had been caught and tortured by Algonquins from Sillery, who 
mistakenly thought the hunters were Iroquois lying in ambush. When the prisoners were 
brought back to Sillery, a Montagnais chief identified them as Wabanakis, and the 
Algonquins released two of them, sending them to their country with orders to bring back 
a representative o f their village. Soon after his arrival at Sillery in May 1653, the 
Wabanaki ambassador laid out several strings and belts o f wampum in the house o f a 
Jesuit, which he explained one by one to his Algonquin counterparts.
The first belt had a violet and white pattern that illustrated the route between 
Sillery and his village. Lifting it up, he told the Algonquins, "Behold the route that you 
must take to come and visit your friends." The belt, he continued, depicted the all lakes,
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rivers, mountains, portages, and waterfalls to be passed on the way. "Note everything," 
he implored them, "to the end that, in the visits that we shall pay one another no one may 
get lost. The roads will be easy now, and no more ambuscades will be feared. All 
persons who are met will be so many friends." The knowledge contained in the wampum 
belt allowed both parties to prevent misunderstandings o f  the kind that had happened in 
the winter and gave them a means to explain themselves when such mishaps did occur. 
The third string of wampum, made in the form o f earrings, made this point clearer. 
"Those," said the ambassador, "are for piercing your ears, in order that we may speak to 
one another as friends are wont to do, and that we may take part in one another's 
councils." As the ambassador and his listeners knew, alliances could not exist without 
continuous communication, and the significance of paths, literally and metaphorically, 
was that they made this interaction possible.27
Paths were also a medium in the sense o f being a material upon which people 
could inscribe their thoughts and memories, a kind o f natural canvas. Knowledge to the 
Wabanakis was not an abstraction but a palpable object, something that was alive. To 
acquire a piece o f knowledge was to form an alliance with it, much in the same way that 
people formed political unions with their neighbors or reciprocal relationships with 
animals. Such alliances could only be sustained through constant renewal, since a 
person's skills were easily lost without frequent practice. A common method o f 
remembering bits o f knowledge was to encode them in the landscape, either by making a 
physical inscription upon a rock or a tree or by taking mental note o f a certain place.
27 JR. 40:195-209, cit. 205. The path or road was a frequently-used metaphor in diplomatic speaking 
throughout eastern North America. See "Glossary," in Francis Jennings, ed., History and Culture of 
Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties o f  the Six Nations and their League 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 121.
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Because paths regularly brought people back to these familiar places, they constantly 
revived knowledge that would otherwise be forgotten. Trails themselves were a form of 
knowledge that could be taught, learned, and remembered; Rale's dictionary includes an 
entry for the term neki'kinoussaran, literally, "I teach him/her the path."28
The physical layout o f Rale's own mission at Norridgewock provides an example 
o f how information could be written into places. During his thirty years at 
Norridgewock, Rale presided over the construction o f a large, well-adomed church east 
o f the village's palisade, as well as two smaller chapels, one dedicated to the Virgin Mary 
and the other to the Guardian Angel. Both chapels were built on the path leading to the 
woods and the fields, and Rale observed approvingly that whenever people passed by the 
chapels, they went inside to offer prayers. The location o f the chapels next to the village's 
main path was probably strategic, for it integrated Christian ritual into the daily activities 
of the villagers. When leaving to go to the fields in the morning and returning to their 
homes later in the day, men and women always passed by the two chapels, which 
reminded them to pray and acted as avenues o f communication with the spiritual world.29
The village's path in this case played a role analogous to the Christian calendar. 
The round of sabbaths, saints' days, fast days, and holidays punctuated the year with 
reminders o f important events in the life o f  Christ and his apostles. The names o f these 
holidays in Wabanaki were often vivid and literal descriptions o f these events: Easter was
28 Rasies, Dictionary. 445. Penobscot storytellers often prefaced their tales by saying, fVawigi: 
ndatlokagan, or "Here lives my story.” See Speck, "Penobscot Tales,” 34. On the significance of 
knowledge among northern Algonquians generally, see Robin Ridington, "Knowledge, Power, and the 
Individual in Subarctic Hunting Societies," American Anthropologist 90 (1988): 98*110.
29 JR. 67: 85-87; Prins and Bourque, "Norridgewock,” 148-49. Fixing ideas in places was a common 
Jesuit practice; Jesuit novices remembered religious precepts by building "memory palaces" that attached 
the precepts to frequently-visited spots. See Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966); Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (New York: 
Viking/Penguin Press, 1985).
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ni etwousi kigh'housisa, "when he resurrects", the Ascension was ni edoutsi spemkik 
ariransa, "when he ascends to Heaven", the Assumption was ni edoutsi sang-Mari 
spemkik aroussaresa, "when blessed Mary ascends to Heaven". Though these days were 
celebrated by all, their significance could be highly personal. The missionary o f the 
Wabanaki village of Odanak (St. Francois), near Trois-Rivieres, reported that his 
parishioners were eager to leam about the lives o f their patron saints and showed great 
joy when they were told that it was their saint's day. Some kept painted images o f their 
patron and even tried to adopt his or her characteristic virtues. The calendar in these 
instances served the same purpose as the layout of the village, imparting and reinforcing 
Christian concepts through constant repetition. Knowledge was encoded into the cycles 
o f daily life, making it possible to retain important ideas by following familiar paths and 
observing the passage o f the seasons.30
Far from being wholesale European introductions, these practices were accepted 
by the inhabitants o f Norridgewock and Odanak precisely because they conformed to 
native ways of thinking. Wabanakis had themselves developed a variety o f methods for 
remembering ideas with the aid o f the landscape, some of which had been in use for 
thousands o f years. The most visible of these methods were travel shrines and rock art, 
many examples o f which still scatter the landscape of New England and the Maritimes. 
Travel shrines were heaps o f material — usually stone, but occasionally brush or sticks -  
placed at the sides o f trails or pathways where important historical or mythological events 
had occurred. When travellers passed by a shrine, they threw a stone or some other
30 Rasies, Dictionary. 455; JR, 63:35. Other Christian concepts have similarly evocative names in 
Wabanaki languages — in Western Abenaki, the crucifixion is sidakwatahodwogan, "being struck right to 
the wood", and the incarnation is called alnobaiosowogan, "he becomes a human being” or more precisely, 
"he becomes an Indian". See Joseph Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues (Quebec:
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object on the heap as a way o f commemorating the event. A notable example o f such a 
shrine was the pair o f stone heaps known as "the Two Brothers," erected at a Casco Bay 
conference between Massachusetts officials and the leaders o f Norridgewock, 
Anmesokkanti, and Naurakamigou in June 1701. At the end o f the conference, the two 
parties agreed that they should commemorate their alliance by raising two heaps of stones 
because, as the Indian delegates put it, "We understand it better than signing of a 
writing." At a place known as Andrews' Point, the commissioners o f Massachusetts each 
laid foundation stones and the other English added smaller stones until they had formed a 
square pyramid. The Indians made a "roundish" pyramid nearby. Andrews' Point was 
renamed Two Brothers Point, and whenever the English or Indian delegates passed by the 
caims, they added stones to the two heaps as a symbol o f their continued alliance.31
Natural features o f the landscape could serve a similar purpose, allowing people 
to recall past events by associating them with the places where they occurred. Various 
points o f land surrounding the Penobscot village of Panawapskik (Indian Island) were 
named after incidents in the seventeenth-century war against the Mohawks, and the 
names survived into the twentieth century. At a ledge in Passadumkeag Stream about 
five miles from its mouth, a company of old women had been killed by raiding Mohawks, 
who scalped them and impaled their bodies on stakes. The pointed boulder where the 
event took place is known locally as Psinkwandissek, or Scalping Rock. On another
Leger Brousseau, 1884), 13; Day, Western Abenaki. 1:32,450,458.
31 William N. Sainsbury, J. W. Fortescue, Arthur P. Newton, eds.. Calendar of State Panets. Colonial 
Series: America and the West Indies. 44 vols. (London: Public Record Office, 1860-1969), vol. 20 (1702), 
fols. 119,810 (future references to this series are cited as CSPV. Samuel Penhallow, The History of the 
Wars o f New-Eneland with the Eastern Indians... [1726] (Cincinnati: Dodge and Harpel, 1859), 16. 
Examples of travel shrines have been found not only in New England but throughout the Americas and in 
small-scale societies around the world. See William S. Simmons, Spirit o f  the New England Tribes: Indian 
History and Folklore. 1620-1984 (Hanover. University Press of New England, 1986), 251-56; Stephen C. 
Jett, "Cairn and Brush Shrines in the United States Northeast and Southeast" Northeast Anthropology 48
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occasion, the Penobscots captured a Mohawk and brought him back to Panawapskik, 
putting him to death on a square boulder located at the end o f the village's main path. 
They buried him there, but soon afterward they found the grave full o f stones: the 
Mohawks, according to rumor, had stealthily taken his body away and filled the hole with 
rocks. The Penobscots kept the memory o f this event alive by recounting its details when 
they passed the boulder, the outcropping o f rock acting as a mnemonic device that 
preserved historical knowledge.32
Natural features o f this kind were more than symbols, for in many cases 
Wabanakis considered them to be alive, to be inhabited by spirits. In his account o f his 
first voyage to the Kennebec River in 1605, the French explorer Samuel de Champlain 
noticed a cape along the river -  probably Hockomock Point, a high bluff near the river’s 
mouth -- where people left arrows whenever they passed by it. According to Champlain, 
they believed that "unless they do this, misfortune will befall them." Several decades 
later, the fur trader Nicolas Denys observed a tree that floated in the water not far from 
the St. John River. Nearby Indians called it a "manitou" (a spirit) and made offerings of 
peltries and arrowheads when they encountered it. Writing in the same decade as Denys, 
the English naturalist John Josselyn noted that when Indians in New England were cured 
of diseases, they sent wampum belts and furs "to the Eastward, where there is a vast Rock 
not far from shore, having a hole in it o f an unsearchable profundity, into which they 
throw them."33 The offerings that Wabanakis left to the spirits of these places were
(1994): 61-67.
32 Speck, Penobscot Man. 192-94; Churchill, "Evolution o f  Maine Place Names," 72.
33 H. P. Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain. 6 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922, 1:
316-17; Nicolas Denys, The Description and Natural History o f the Coasts o f North America (Acadial 
[1672] (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1908), trans. and ed. William F. Ganong, 117; Lindholdt, John 
Josselvn. 96. See also Denys, Description. 112; CDRH. 3:98.
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probably intended as tokens o f respect, meant to preserve a sense o f mutuality between 
travellers and the spirits o f the land. Failure to observe these practices would have 
displeased the spirits, leading them to bring bad luck to the travellers. Unusual natural 
features such as floating trees and oddly-shaped rocks were similar to animals in that they 
were sentient beings who possessed great power. People could harness this power and 
use it in their own favor, but only if they managed to avoid offending the spirits.
Certain points o f the landscape acted as preferred channels o f communication 
with the spirit world, some formed by nature but others made through human effort. At a 
few sites in northern New England, people engraved ledges o f  rock with images of 
people, animals, and other forms. Typically, these rock carvings are located next to water 
and beside major thoroughfares o f travel. In some cases, such as the petroglyphs on the 
shore of the Kennebec River near present-day Solon, there are over a hundred distinct 
figures depicted at a single site. At Solon and at other petroglyph sites in the Dawnland, 
the etchings feature many of the motifs characteristic o f rock art among North Americans 
generally and northern Algonquians in particular: phallic figures, vulvaforms, men in 
canoes, men with raised arms or horns, animals such as moose or deer, mythical figures 
of Algonquian legend such as the homed serpent and the thunderbird, and shapes such as 
dots, lines, and crosses [see Figs. 1.1-3]. In both New England and in other parts of 
North America, these images were usually associated with shamanism.34
34 Roger B. Ray, "The Embden, Maine, Petroglyphs," Maine Historical Society Quarterly 27 (1987): 14- 
23; idem., "The Machiasport Petroglyphs," Maine Historical Society Quarterly 25 (1985): 22-39; Dean R. 
Snow, "The Solon Petroglyphs and Eastern Abenaki Shamanism," in William Cowan, ed., Paners of the 
Seventh Aleonouian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1976), 281-88; idem., "Rock Art and 
the Power of Shamans," Natural History 86 (1977): 42-49; William A. Haviland and Matjory W. Power, 
"Visions in Stone: A New Look at the Bellows Falls Petroglyphs," Northeast Anthropology 50 (1995): 91- 
107; Churchill, "Evolution of Maine Placenames,” 75; Marion Robertson, Rock Drawings o f the Micmac 
Indians (Halifax: Nova Scotia Museum, 1973); Campbell Grant, The Rock Art o f the North American 
Indians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 53-55; Kenneth E. Kidd, Indian Paintings of the
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Known at Norridgewock as meteourenouak, shamans were men, and sometimes 
women, who sought power with the assistance o f the spiritual world. They typically had 
one or more guardian spirits (known in Penobscot as a baohigan), who enabled them to 
foretell the future and brought them good fortune in hunting and other activities. Both 
the shaman and his spirits were able to change shape, transforming themselves into 
animals, human beings, balls o f fire, or other objects. The baohigan would do its 
master's bidding, but only if the shaman found the means to communicate with it. The 
success of shamans depended upon this skill, for the spirits needed to be cajoled into 
working in their interests. People could come into contact with the spirits in their dreams 
or by entering a trance state through a combination o f fasting, sweat baths, meditative 
isolation, or repetitive drumming and chanting. When shamans reached these altered 
states of consciousness, their souls left their bodies, journeying to distant regions, 
performing remarkable feats, and speaking with other spirit beings.35
Before they went into a trance, people often went to places that conducive to 
communication with the spirits. Spots near the water were preferred, for it was thought 
that the underwater world was a spiritually-charged place where people could find both 
valuable substances such as shell and copper, as well as mythological beings such as the 
great homed serpent. Numerous scholars have argued that the rock art sites of northern 
New England, all located near water, were sacred places that shamans used as a gateway
Great Lakes. 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967).
35 Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism,” esp. 249-53; Eckstorm, Old John Neptune, esp. 5,97; CDRH. 3:97; 
Rasies, Dictionary. 471. Rile lists the singular form, meteourenou. Speck translates the term baohigan as 
"instrument of mystery”, but in his recent dictionary o f Western Abenaki Gordon Day glossed the 
morpheme bao- as "exert personal power by wishing, wish with power", suggesting that a more apt 
translation might be "grantor of wishes". See Day, Western Abenaki Dictionary, xxix.
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to the spirit world.36 The figures etched in stone were probably depictions o f the spirits 
and images they encountered when their spirits journeyed out o f their bodies. When 
shamans returned to rock art sites, the etchings they found there were guides that linked 
them back to the spirit world, providing them with a map of the paths their souls had 
taken in previous journeys.
While the intended meaning o f these maps was accessible only to their authors, it 
is likely that people who had acquired a degree of shamanistic knowledge could "read" 
the etchings o f others, to the extent that they could decipher the significance o f common 
motifs. The readers could then use the maps sketched by others to help induce a trance of 
their own. The location o f rock art sites along travel routes suggests that they were meant 
to be treated in this way and were not merely mnemonic devices but a form of 
communication. Rock carvings were palimpsests, texts whose originals were constantly 
being rewritten but never entirely erased. When shamans visited the petroglyphs, they 
preserved memories of their own visions by inscribing them in stone, and also drew 
power from the etchings of previous visitors. Because rock art tended to be located at 
well-frequented places -- the Solon site, for example, was near a fishing spot not far from 
the village Norridgewock -- it became one o f the methods by which spiritual knowledge 
was passed on from person to person and from one generation to the next.37
36 Haviland and Power, "Visions in Stone," esp. 97-107; Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism," 253; Ray, 
"Machiasport Petroglyphs," 33-4.
37 Haviland and Power, "Visions in Stone,"; Speck, 'Tenobscot Shamanism,". Recent scholarship on rock 
art in North America provides many relevant cross-cultural comparisons: see especially Joan M. Vastokas 
and Romas K. Vastokas, Sacred Art o f the Algonkians: A Study o f the Peterborough Petroglyphs 
(Peterborough, Ont.: Monsart Press, 1973); Annie York, Richard Daly and Chris Amett, They Write Their 
Dream on the Rock Forever Rock Writings of the Stein River Valiev of British Columbia (Vancouver: 
Talonbooks, 1993); Thor Conway, Painted Dreams: Narive American Rock Art (Minocqua, Wis.: North 
Word Press, 1993); idem, "Scotia Lake Pictograph Site: Shamanic Rock Art in North-Eastern Ontario,” 
Man in the Northeast 37 (1989): 1-24.
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The value o f such knowledge was social as well as instrumental, for it bound 
people together through their shared experiences and beliefs. The spirit journeys encoded 
in petroglyphs, like the stories that dwelt in travel shrines and natural features, had 
significance not only because they reminded people o f important truths or because they 
contained useful advice. Their telling and retelling also brought people together and 
formed bonds of solidarity between those who shared such knowledge. The inhabitants 
of Panawapskik all knew that hundreds o f places in the vicinity o f their village contained 
fragments of their collective history. The recounting o f the stories that made up this 
history brought tellers and their listeners together, giving each a sense of membership in 
the community. The landscape in this sense was a symbolic resource that helped to 
establish and sustain human relationships. To know the names o f places and the stories 
that lay behind them was to ally oneself with a particular worldview, a shared set of 
understandings about the workings o f the world. By learning these points o f reference, 
people gained a sense o f belonging, both to their community and to their natural 
surroundings. At Norridgewock and other places in the Dawnland, people were inclined 
to say, nekak'santekandamen ioukki, or "I am attached to this land."38
Hunting Territories
By aligning themselves with those who shared an attachment to the land, people 
also drew a line of difference that separated their community from outsiders. To hunt 
along a stream and its tributaries, to use the estuary o f river, to walk along a set o f paths, 
was to lay claim to the land, to establish a set o f reciprocal bonds that made the 
environment a part o f one's self. Those who did not follow the same paths were
38 Rasies, Dictionary. 388.
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outsiders, who lacked both knowledge and experience o f these paths and as a 
consequence had not established a right to use the land. Whether this bond between 
families and their environment constituted a form o f ownership is a question that has 
been hotly disputed by scholars in this century.
Among the first writers to weigh in on this matter was Frank Speck, whose 
fieldwork among the Penobscots, Montagnais, and other tribes in the first half o f the 
twentieth century led him to develop the notion o f "northern Algonquian hunting 
territories." Through interviews with hunters, Speck discovered that many Algonquian- 
speaking groups in the Northeast divided forested areas into clearly-defined hunting tracts 
that belonged to particular families and were heritable. On the basis o f his reading of 
historical sources, Speck argued that this practice developed before the arrival of 
Europeans and was rooted in the ecological realities o f North America's northern 
deciduous forests. Because groups in this region were relatively dependent on the meat 
of smaller, sedentary mammals such as beaver and squirrels, the geographical distribution 
of animal resources in their territories did not fluctuate greatly from one year to the next. 
By comparison to subarctic hunters, whose pursuit o f  migratory animals such as deer and 
caribou forced them to range widely across the tundra, Wabanakis were more likely to 
subsist on a familiar network of rivers and trails to which they returned every year. 
Because their livelihood depended on the animals killed along these routes, hunters 
developed a degree of proprietary interest in their territories and were more inclined to 
protect their traplines against the incursions o f trespassers.39
39 Speck, "The Family Hunting Band,” 289-305; Frank G. Speck and Loren C. Eiseley, "The Significance 
of the Hunting Territory Systems of the Alongkians in Social Theory," American Anthropologist 41 
(1939): 269-80.
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Speck's description of Algonquian hunting territories was challenged in a 19S4 
article by Eleanor Leacock, who called into question both their aboriginality and their 
significance in the historical period. Basing her claims on documentary research and 
interviews conducted with Montagnais from Quebec’s Lower North Shore, Leacock 
found that hunters seasonally moved from one hunting territory to the next depending on 
the abundance and scarcity of game. Families were somewhat protective o f their 
trap lines, but allowed other hunters to use their territories to hunt for deer, caribou, and 
other animals taken solely for their meat. Leacock argued that hunting territories did not 
exist before the development of the European fur trade and contended that exclusive 
hunting territories existed only in the case o f animals taken for sale rather than those 
captured for use. The latter point was later extended and applied to colonial New 
England by William Cronon, who maintained that Indians claimed use rights to specific 
resources rather than full ownership o f the land itself. The terms on which groups held 
usufruct rights to different species o f game depended on the distribution and migratory 
habits o f the animals: sedentary animals such as beaver were more likely to give rise to 
well-defined hunting territories than more migratory species such as moose or deer.-10
A more recent study by Harald Prins has also cast a shadow of doubt on the 
empirical basis of Speck's notion o f Algonquian hunting territories. Through interviews 
with Mi'kmaq and Maliseet families, Prins reconstructed the history o f land use in the St. 
John River Valley in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with an eye toward mapping 
the geographical distribution o f hunting activities. Instead o f finding a clearly-drawn set
40 Eleanor B. Leacock, "The Montagnais 'Hunting Territory' and the Fur Trade," American 
Anthropological Association Memoirs 78 (1954); idem., "Relations o f Production in Band Society," in 
Eleanor B. Leacock and Richard B. Lee, eds., Politics and History in Band Societies (Cambridge:
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of territorial boundaries, Prins discovered considerable overlap in the hunting tracts of 
different families, consistent sharing o f resources, and a remarkable fluidity in tribal 
alignments. Dismissing Speck's notion o f  hunting territories as ahistorical and overly 
rigid, Prins suggested that Wabanaki groups in the nineteenth century, and probably 
earlier, organized their lands into ambiguously defined hunting "ranges" whose territorial 
limits were permeable and whose geographical extent changed according to the 
availability of game and the distribution o f human population.41
Yet there is documentary evidence o f Wabanaki hunting territories dating to the 
early eighteenth century; whether they corresponded Speck's well-defined "tracts" or 
Prins's vaguely delineated "ranges" is open to dispute. The earliest description of 
Wabanaki territoriality was written in 1710 by an anonymous Jesuit missionary. "These 
Indians divide hunting territories amongst themselves, each family head having a river 
where he goes to hunt," he observed. "[A] man o f another family would never hunt there 
without running the risk o f being accused of theft, for which he would have to make 
amends if the owner were convinced o f his guilt." Twenty-one years later, the surveyor- 
general of New England's forests, David Dunbar, made a similar observation. On a visit 
to the Penobscots to inquire about lands that he wanted to purchase, Dunbar spoke to a 
former resident o f Norridgewock named Captain Nathaniel, whom he considered "a very 
senceible man." Nathaniel told Dunbar that "it is the received opinion of every Indian 
that by nature, each has an interest in every individual spot o f ground, and that it is
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 159-70; William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians. Colonists, and 
the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 58-70.
41 Harald E. L. Prins, "Tribulations of a Border Tribe: A Discourse on the Political Ecology o f the 
Aroostook Band of Micmacs (16th-20th Centuries)" (Ph.D. diss., New School for Social Research, 1988), 
203-87; see also Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759, Ethnohistorv 36 
(1989), 274-75.
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inalienable," but that "they agree for peace and order sake among themselves, to have 
certain rivers, ponds, and tracts o f land for their particular fishing and hunting." In 1764, 
the surveyor Joseph Chadwick confirmed Dunbar's report, indicating that along the 
Penobscot River, "their hunting ground and streams were all parcelled out to certain 
families, time out o f mind."42
All three writers indicated that hunting territories were a tradition of long 
standing, not a recent innovation. Although there is no documentary proof o f the 
existence o f hunting territories in the seventeenth century, circumstantial evidence 
suggests that they predated European contact. Archaeological findings at Ceramic period 
sites in Maine's interior indicate a heavy reliance on beaver and other sedentary animals; 
over 90% of the faunal remains at some sites consist o f beaver bones. Even in the 
historical period, Wabanakis trapped beaver as much for their meat as their pelts; during 
his 1711 voyage from Nova Scotia to Quebec, Major John Livingston and his Indian 
guides subsisted mainly on beaver as they passed through Maine's interior. This 
dependence on sedentary animals probably fostered a more pronounced sense of 
territoriality among hunters.43
It is possible that the introduction o f the fur trade made hunters more protective of 
their lands, but given the modest scale o f the fur trade before the 1620s, it hardly seems
42 "Relation par lettres de l’Amerique septentrionalle," PAC, AC, Serie C l 1 A, vol. 122, fols. 302v-303 (my 
translation; the original reads: "Ces Sauvages se partagent entre eux les endroits de chasse, chaque chef de 
famille a une riviere ou il va la faire et ou un homme d'un autre famille n'oseroit aller chasser a moins qu'il 
ne veuille qu'on 1'accuse de larcin auquel il faut qu'il satisfasse sil en est convaincu."); Lt. Gov. Dunbar to 
Mr. Popple, from Fredericksfort, Nov. 17,1730, CSP. vol. 37 (1730), fol. 533, pp. 345-46; Joseph 
Chadwick, "An Account o f a Journey from Fort Pownal — now Fort Point — Up the Penobscot River to 
Quebec, in 1764.11 Bangor Historical Magazine 4 (18891:143.
43 Dean R. Snow, "Wabanaki Family Hunting Territories," American Anthropologist 70 (1968): 1143-51; 
Arthur E. Spiess, "Archaic Period Subsistence in New England and the Atlantic Provinces," in Brian S. 
Robinson, James B. Petersen, and Ann K. Robinson, eds., Earlv Holocene Occupation in Northern New 
England. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology 9 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation
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likely that the territories were a product o f European contact. A more credible 
explanation is that population pressures in the Ceramic period forced families to develop 
more exclusive claims to the places where they hunted and fished. When large numbers 
of people are competing for scarce resources, there is a tendency to establish social 
controls that prevent over-exploitation, such as stinting (intentionally limiting one's use of 
a resource) or to introduce property rights (which exclude others from using it). In 
arranging river basins into hunting territories, Wabanakis gave each family sole 
responsibility for managing the tract from which its members drew their livelihood. If 
someone overhunted his territory, he ran the risk of offending the animals who lived near 
his river, making it likely that these animals would refuse to let themselves be killed in 
future years. It was therefore in the hunter’s interest to limit his annual hunt and to 
prevent others from using his lands. Chadwick noted that Penobscot families hunted only 
once every third year, killing two-thirds o f the beaver and leaving the rest to breed. 
"[T]heir Beavers," he added, "were as much their stock for a living as Englishman's cattle 
was his living." The absence o f such controls would have depleted the stock of beavers 
and led to disputes between families over the right to hunt prized areas.44
The rights that families enjoyed to such territories were established through 
customary use and reinforced by experienced hunters' superior knowledge of familiar 
environments. When hunting trails became overgrown — when the channels that linked 
hunters to their quarry were not used -- hunters effectively relinquished any prior claim to 
use of their hunting grounds. If outside observers had attempted to map the distribution
Commission, 1992), 176-78, Appendices B-C; "A Journall o f the Travails of Major John Livingstone," 
February 23,1710/11, C§P, 25 (1710-11), fol. 673.
44 Chadwick, "An Account," 143. Frank Speck remarked that Penobscots left portions of their hunting 
territories fallow every year. See Speck, Penobscot Man. 207.
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of hunting territories in any single season, they would have been able to identify certain 
families with their respective hunting trails. But if  they kept records for a longer period, 
they would have been forced to draw a more complicated picture. Changes in the 
distribution of resources constantly forced families to move to new areas and find new 
hunting trails. More importantly, families themselves were in a state o f continual 
evolution, as births, deaths, marriages, and adoptions changed their composition. Sons 
replaced fathers as heads o f household, newly-weds moved in with their spouses’ 
families, boys came of age and joined the hunting party. If a family became too large, or 
if there was not enough game to support it, people might split from the main lodge to find 
a territory of their own, marking its paths with a new family emblem.45
Although Harald Prins claims to have refuted Speck's theory of hunting territories, 
their descriptions o f hunting practices are not necessarily incompatible. In any one 
season, hunters would have been dispersed into their respective territories, each family 
distinguishing itself by using a particular network o f rivers, lakes, and trails. But as 
people formed friendships and gained new kin, they inevitably moved into new hunting 
territories and abandoned old ones. Anthropologist Jose Mailhot has observed this 
pattern among the present-day Montagnais-Naskapi o f Labrador; because o f marriages, 
births, deaths, and evolving friendships, people in this region typically move into new 
hunting territories once every five years. Such moves are almost always a direct 
consequence o f changing social relationships and Mailhot argues that the territorial
45 Speck, Penobscot Man. 208-209,229-30.
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distribution of band members during a hunting season is "a spatial projection o f operative 
kinship ties at that precise moment."46
To treat hunting territories as containers in which people lived out their lives, in 
other words, is to put the cart before the horse. As they passed through various stages of 
the life-cycle, people formed new social relationships and dissolved others; the changing 
use of hunting territories reflected these changes. Land use was so integrated into the 
cultural world o f Wabanakis that it was impossible to separate questions o f ownership 
from patterns of kinship. Because the land was filtered through the lens o f people's daily 
activities, it made little sense to treat it as an alienable commodity. More accurately, it 
was a source of life that provided Wabanakis with all the materials they needed to 
survive; food, clothing, shelter, transportation. Material sustenance was so closely tied to 
the land that people at Norridgewock said that they "ate" their fields. To deny a family 
land under such circumstances was to condemn it to starvation -- an unthinkable act 
among the Wabanakis, who shared food as a matter o f course. Family hunting territories 
allowed people to enjoy the fruits o f the land equally and represented a form of 
communal sharing. To equitably share the land's common wealth, villages allotted 
hunting territories to individual families so that each would have enough resources to 
feed itself.47
46 Jose Mailhot, "Territorial Mobility Among the Montagnais-Naskapi o f Labrador," Anthrooologica. n. s., 
28(1986): 92-107, cit. 104.
47 Rasies, Dictionary. 407. Indians in southern New England also said that they "ate” the land and it was 
common among North American Indians to describe hunting grounds as a "plate" from which all could eat 
See Bragdon, Native People. 136; "Parolles des sauvages Onnondaguez, a Monsieur le marquis de 
Vaudreuil," Montreal, January 28,1710, PAC, AN, Serie C11A, vol. 31, fol. 91; Victor P. Lytwyn, "A 
Dish with One Spoon: The Shared Hunting Grounds Agreement in the Great Lakes and S t  Lawrence 
Valley Region," in Pentland, Papers o f the Twenty-Eighth Algonquian Conference. 210-227. Judging from 
Speck's map of nineteenth-century hunting territories in Maine, the tracts seem to have been similar in size, 
all being large enough to feed an extended family.
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Because it was membership in a community that gave a person rights to the land, 
the boundaries o f land ownership were shaped by the limits o f sociability. Property rights 
are primarily social, not legal, in character: broadly defined, they are relationships 
between people with respect to the right to use certain objects. If a family "owns" a tract 
of land, it is because its neighbors recognize that it has established an exclusive claim to 
its use. The concept of ownership necessarily draws a line o f distinction between people 
who enjoy these rights and those who do not. A shared right to the land implies a sense 
of mutuality, and if this right is not extended to others it is because they are outsiders, 
people who do not belong to the community. The Western legal tradition has tended to 
treat these matters implicitly, emphasizing not relationships between people but the 
relationship between the object and its owner. The strength o f a claimant's rights to the 
land, from this point o f view, is based on the extent to which he or she has developed a 
rationale for its exclusive enjoyment: someone might claim possession to a piece o f land 
by inheritance, by purchase, by custom, or by discovery. Wabanakis were more inclined 
to make the social character of property explicit, paying greater attention to the human 
consequences o f dividing the land. The most important consideration from this 
perspective was not the strength o f an individual's claims to ownership but the effect of 
land tenure on human relations.48
It was this emphasis on the social dimension of land ownership that represented 
the most important difference between English and Indian notions o f land tenure, more so 
than the distinction between usufruct rights and absolute rights to the land. The concept 
of usufruct originated in Roman law, which had a highly restrictive definition o f property
48 Bragdon, Native People. 135-9; Cronon, Changes in the Land. 54-81; Alan Barnard and James 
Woodbum, "Introduction,'' in Tim Ingold, David Riches, James Woodbum, eds., Hunters and Gatherers. 2
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as an absolute and inalienable right held by individuals. Usufruct, literally "use and 
enjoyment," was a residual category that accounted for cases o f land use that did not fit 
this narrow definition. English common law, by contrast, allowed much greater latitude 
in the definition of real property rights and accommodated customary uses o f forests, 
commons, and rivers. The records o f every colony in New England are replete with 
examples of usufruct rights: water rights, fishing rights, mill rights, rights o f way. Rather 
than accepting an anachronistic separation o f absolute and usufruct rights, it makes far 
greater sense to treat ownership, as Henry Sumner Maine once put it, as a socially 
recognized "bundle of rights and duties."49 Because colonists and Indians used the land 
differently, it follows that the bundle o f rights that each group accorded to land owners 
was not the same. The intensive farming practices o f  the English forced them to rework 
large swaths of territory and they tended to see land ownership as a matter o f possessing 
surface area. Wabanakis, on the other hand, were likely to view possession in terms of 
the paths and rivers that gave them access to plants and animals. But the two groups were 
distinguished by more than the kinds o f rights they accorded to the land; the manner in 
which these rights were asserted and protected was altogether different. Wabanaki land 
tenure was characterized, to a degree that would have been unimaginable to the English, 
by an inextricable connection between land use and patterns o f sociability. Because the 
land was owned communally, the most important criterion in determining ownership was
vols. (Oxford: Berg, 1988), 2:4-31.
49 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to 
Modem Times (18611 (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), 148.
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the degree o f social integration into the collectivity, rather than the strength o f legal title.
50
Territorial Disputes: Three Cases
Land claims were consequently enforced not according to a rigid set o f rules but 
as improvised responses to specific situations. Extant evidence o f land disputes — the 
few examples involve land contested between tribes rather than within communities -- 
suggests that the resolution o f these conflicts was a matter o f diplomacy rather than 
jurisprudence. The parties involved were as much concerned with smoothing over 
misunderstandings as they were with protecting their territorial claims. The quarrel that 
took place in the first decade o f the eighteenth century between inhabitants of the 
Wabanaki village o f Odanak and their Montagnais and Algonquin neighbors offers an 
illuminating example of this approach to settling disputes. By 1700, Odanak was a 
community o f several hundred people on the St. F rancis River, with a population largely 
of refugees from northern New England. The village had been established by Sokoki 
migrants from the Connecticut River around 1670 and had a drawn a steady stream of 
Wabanaki refugees since then, particularly in the bloody aftermath o f King Philip's War 
and its northern sequel. This stream became a flood in 1700, when Jesuits moved the 
mission of Saint Franpois de Sales from the Chaudiere to the St. Franpois River. The 
Chaudiere mission was itself the product o f relocation, having drawn much of its 
population from the mission village o f  Sillery, originally established for Montagnais 
converts in 1637. Two prolonged wars against the English between 1688 and 1713 had
50 Tim Ingold, The Appropriation of Nature: Essavs on Human Ecology and Social Relations (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1987), 130-64.
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driven hundreds o f new refugees to Odanak, swelling its population with migrants from 
the Connecticut River Valley and Lake Champlain, as well as more distant regions such 
as the Merrimack and the Kennebec rivers.51
The hunting territories o f Odanak at this time extended well beyond the 
immediate area o f the village, and many inhabitants went far afield in search o f game. In 
the winter o f 1705, a band of about 60 families from Odanak crossed the St. Lawrence 
River to hunt in the region south of Lac St.-Jean.52 According to some French locals, the 
Wabanakis o f Odanak had begun to hunt in this area only in the past five or six years, and 
had had little success in capturing beaver nearby. Going no farther than forty or fifty 
miles from Trois-Rivieres, they had caught few beaver and no moose. With the 
encouragement o f French fur traders, the Wabanakis in 1705 went further afield, making 
their way up the St. Maurice River into territory usually hunted by the Montagnais and 
the Algonquins. The season was a success: the Wabanakis, joined by a number of 
Hurons from Lorette, took 350 moose hides as well as beaver and marten furs, which they 
traded at Trois-Rivieres and Quebec. But it was also marred by quarrels with their 
neighbors over hunting rights. On one occasion, a Wabanaki hunter wrested a moose 
hide from the hands o f an Algonquin hunter named Miniomeiguici, accusing him of 
hunting on Wabanaki territory. Miniomeiguici raised his hatchet at his accuser and was 
stopped from striking him at the last moment by another Wabanaki. A seigneur from 
Trois-Rivieres later remarked that many at the time were afraid that a war would erupt 
between the two groups.
51 Gordon M. Day, The Identity of the Saint Francis Indians. Mercury Series, Canadian Ethnology Service 
Paper No. 71 (Ottawa: National Museums of Man, 1981), 11-35; Pere-Andre Sevigny, Les Abenaouis: 
Habitat et migrations f!7e et 18e sieclesl (Montreal: Editions Bellarmin, 1976), 161-5.
52 The following account is based on the documents contained in PAC, AC, Serie C l 1 A, vol. 25, fols. 29-
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In the spring, a Wabanaki sagamore named Tekwerimat and his son Louis found 
traps in his territory and, being short o f provisions, decided to follow the trapline until it 
led to its owner. They agreed that once they had found the trapper, they would ask him 
for some food and inform him that he was hunting on their land. Tekwerimat and Louis 
soon arrived at the cabin o f Joseph Marachicatik, a Montagnais who had been hunting 
south o f Lac St.-Jean that winter. The Wabanakis told him that he had placed his traps on 
Wabanaki territory and asked for restitution. Marachicatik complied, giving them six 
moose hides and offering to let them stay the night. The next morning, he told them 
where they could find caches o f food and provided them with a sleigh for their voyage 
home. Tekwerimat and his son assumed that the matter was resolved, but the next fall 
they received a summons from the intendant of New France to respond to a complaint by 
the agent of the Compagnie du Canada in Tadoussac, Francois Hazeur.
Hazeur, a prominent merchant who sat on the governor’s council, complained that 
the Wabanakis had ravaged the district to the south o f Lac St.-Jean, killing all the moose 
and other animals and leaving the Montagnais and Algonquin hunters of the region 
unable to pay their debts. Some of the hunters, now dependent on Hazeur for supplies, 
had applied to a headman from near Lake Mistassini for the right to hunt on his band's 
grounds. Hazeur asked for restitution and suggested that the Wabanakis be forbidden 
from hunting north of the St. Lawrence River. When Louis arrived before the council, he 
explained that the territory where they had been hunting was closer to Trois-Rivieres than 
to Lac St.-Jean and that the lands belonged to his father, who had inherited them from
47, 75-85; vol. 27, fol. 55.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
Louis’s grandfather. Louis insisted that the Montagnais were in the wrong, for they "had 
in effect killed the Abenakis by killing all the Animals of that place."53
Though he did not mention it at the time, Louis's family background helps to 
explain the confusion over hunting rights. Tekwerimat was almost certainly a successor 
of Noel Negabamat, the most prominent o f the original neophytes at the Jesuit mission of 
Sillery. Negabamat was a Montagnais from the north shore o f the St. Lawrence, who had 
first encountered the French at the trading post at Tadoussac. He grew interested in their 
religion and at the invitation o f Father Paul Le Jeune he became the first settler o f a new 
mission village at Sillery. While the mission itself was a failure, Negabamat was 
baptized in 1639 along with his wife and children. His faith was tested soon after the 
baptism, when a smallpox epidemic swept through Sillery, afflicting Noel and killing 
four of his five children. He was deeply affected by their loss, and early in the 1640s he 
began calling himself Tekwerimat, probably an alternative spelling o f the Montagnais 
word Outagaouerimon, or "he grieves their death." These trials only strengthened his 
attachment to Christianity, and over the next several decades he distinguished himself 
both as a trusted ally o f the French and a peacemaker among Indians. Three years after 
his death in 1666, his family resuscitated his name in an elaborate ceremony at Sillery, 
bestowing it upon a Tadoussac war captain formerly called Negaskaouat.S4
The Louis Tekwerimat who presented himself before French officials in 1706 
was, by adoption or direct descent, either the grandson or great-grandson o f Noel
53 PAC, AC, Serie Cl 1 A, vol. 25, foL 35-36v. (My translation; the original reads: "les dites montagnais 
ont Comme tue les abennaiquis en tuant touttes les Bestes qui estoient en cet endroit la.")
54 J. Monet, "Negabamat," Dictionary o f Canadian Biography. 1:516; Antoine Silvy, Dictionnaire 
Montagnais-Francais [ca. 1678-84] (Montreal: Presses de lUniversite du Quebec, 1974), 10; James Axtell, 
The Invasion Within: The Contest o f Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 61-2.
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Negabamat. Louis' family had probably moved from Sillery to St. Frantjois de Sales in 
the 1680s and then to Odanak around 1700. According to French officials, his father had 
become a powerful sagamore at Odanak, receiving tribute from many o f his neighbors.
He was known by two names: Tekwerimat to the French, and Outakamachi'ouenon to the 
Wabanakis. (In the dialect spoken at Odanak, the word machinawinno means "dead 
person"; his name was almost certainly a direct translation from the Montagnais.)55 In all 
likelihood, the family continued to hunt the same territories their ancestors had 
established in the seventeenth century. But their identification with the Wabanakis had 
made the continued use o f these lands a touchy issue, for the hunting districts on the north 
shore of the St. Lawrence had customarily belonged to the Montagnais and Algonquins. 
The influx of war refugees from northern New England, which had brought Odanak more 
mouths to feed, probably led the inhabitants o f the village to test the boundaries of these 
territories. The Montagnais and Algonquins understandably viewed their hunting trip as 
an incursion into their lands and reacted accordingly.
The aggrieved parties resolved their dispute through a delicate balancing act 
between aggressive assertions of their respective rights and conciliatory attempts to 
resolve their differences. Indians did not have a court system nor a sovereign authority 
charged with enforcing the law. Instead, when someone had trespassed on their lands or 
had done them some other injury, they defended themselves through their own exertions 
or with the support o f their kin. Threats o f retaliation were one o f the most effective 
means o f protecting territorial boundaries under these circumstances, for they forced
55 Day, Western Abenaki. 1:282. One of the signatories of a 1749 dedicatory letter from Odanak to the 
chapter of Chartres was Michel Terrouermant. Possibly Terrouermant and Tekwerimat (also spelled 
Tekouerimat or Thek8erimat) are the same name. See JE, 69:71; Day, Identity o f the S t Francis Indians. 
88.
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potential intruders to consider the consequences o f  their actions. If  the Wabanakis 
entered the hunting grounds with "hatchets in their hands" and "knives at their wrists," as 
it was rumored, the Montagnais were wise to take notice. But the disadvantage o f violent 
threats was that very often people were forced to make good on them, creating a desire 
for revenge on the part o f the trespasser and his kin. This desire could be satisfied only 
by another act of violence, which would in turn lead to further acts o f vengeance: in short, 
a cycle of bloody retribution spiralling out of control.S6
Matters rarely came to such a head, for Indians had more peaceful means of 
settling their quarrels. Above all, they depended on exchanges o f gifts and words as a 
way of mending social wounds and compensating injured parties for their losses. Just as 
an arrowhead or beaver skin could placate the spirits o f sacred places, a similar token of 
respect, combined with a few words o f apology, could erase the resentments aroused by 
trespasses and other injuries. Gift-giving was a well-established custom under these 
circumstances. If a hunter pursuing a moose was led to enter another’s territory, he 
always gave a present o f furs to the family that owned the land. Similarly, when 
travellers entered into the territory o f another group, they were expected to pay a few 
skins as tribute. Such presents symbolically recognized the proprietor’s claims to 
stewardship of the land and ensured that there would be no misunderstandings between 
the intruder and the offended party. "The greatest offense one can make against an Indian 
is to accuse him of stealing," said Godefroy, Sieur de Saint-Paul, a seigneur o f Trois-
56 "Declaration Messurs Les Directeurs Generaux de la Compagnie de la colonie de Canada," Chicoutimi, 
21 mat, 1705, PAC, AC, Serie C l I A, vol. 25, fol. 84. Wabanakis also protected their lands with magic. 
According to Frank Speck, shamans used their powers of divination to detect any intruders on their 
territories. The shamans then called on their guardian spirits to punish the intruders. See Speck, 
"Penobscot Shamanism," 244.
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Rivieres, "but the Tribute they demand from other Indians is not considered by them to be 
theft or pillage but as a right that is due to them."57
Such exchanges fostered a sense o f goodwill between people by creating a bond 
o f trust between the giver and the recipient.58 They also helped to establish the channels - 
- the paths -- that made communication possible. Exchanges o f words and goods through 
these channels allowed people to develop a sense o f community and a degree of shared 
interest. An obstacle in the path, such as a land dispute, could threaten this feeling of 
mutuality. But people were more inclined to remove the obstacle, to settle or to forget 
the dispute, than they were to abandon the path altogether. Thus Tekwerimat, mindful of 
the need to appease his French and Montagnais allies, backed down from his claims. The 
Wabanakis gave up their hunting territories on the north shore o f the St. Lawrence and 
did not return again until the nineteenth century. The desire to preserve peace with their 
neighbors ultimately outweighed the Wabanakis' legitimate claims to ownership o f the 
land through customary use. The intervention of the French in this respect was crucial, 
for Tekwerimat did not want to jeopardize his alliance with them for the sake of a few 
moose hides and beaver skins.59
In cases where the social distance between opposing parties was greater, 
Wabanakis tended to be less forgiving. If paths did not exist or were overgrown, there 
were few channels for resolving disputes peacefully and little incentive to do so. The
57 Deposition of Godefroy de Saint Paul, PAC, AC, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 25, fol. 41. For examples of foreign 
travellers paying tribute, see JR, 12:187-9; Joseph Francois Lafitau, Customs of the American Indians 
Compared with the Customs o f Primitive Times [1724 ], ed. and trans. William N. Fenton and Elizabeth L. 
Moore, 2 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974), 2:185.
58 On the social significance of gift-giving, see Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for 
Exchange in Archaic Societies, translated by W. D. Halls (London: Routledge, 1990), and Marshall 
Sahlins' extended commentary on Mauss in Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. 1972), 149- 
83.
59 Gordon M. Day, "Western Abenaki," in Bruce G. Trigger, ed.. Handbook o f North American Indians.
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potential for violence in such cases increased dramatically. The inhabitants o f Odanak 
took a more rigid position when it was their enemies, not their allies, who encroached 
upon their lands. When English colonists, spurred by rapid population growth and a 
burgeoning economy, began to eye the fertile lands o f the upper Connecticut River valley 
in the early 1750s, the Wabanakis who hunted and planted in these regions had little 
interest in accommodating them. Since the late seventeenth century, the Wabanakis and 
the English had squared off in five bloody wars, with each side developing a growing 
sense o f antagonism toward the other. The latest round, part o f  a larger imperial struggle 
between France and Britain, had ended in 1749 with the signing o f a treaty between the 
Wabanakis and the provinces o f New England at Falmouth in Casco Bay. Far from 
ending hostilities, the treaty merely reduced them in scale. Over the next few years, the 
two sides wrangled over the return o f war captives, compensation for peacetime murders, 
and English incursions into Wabanaki lands.
In July 1752, delegates from Odanak met in Canada with Captain Phineas 
Stevens, commander o f New Hampshire's Fort Number 4, to complain about the arrival 
of a surveying party sent by a land speculating company to a meadow near the Indian 
village of Cowass (Koes) on the upper Connecticut River. In the presence of the 
governor o f Canada and Mohawk representatives from Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, 
Odanak's chief orator, Artiwaneto, told Stevens that the elders o f village had allowed the 
English to settle as far as Schaghticoke but he would not permit them to take "one inch" 
more. He continued that the English could live and trade on the coast, but that "we 
expressly forbid you to kill a single beaver or take a stick o f wood from the lands where 
we live." Stevens responded that the surveying party had not been authorized by the
vol. 15 (Northeast)_(Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 152.
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government and asked if recent attacks on English settlements were made in response to 
incursions on Indian lands or as vengeance for the murders o f Wabanakis by Englishmen. 
Artiwaneto explained that the previous year's attacks were carried out because the English 
had murdered a man and woman from Odanak, but that recently two backwoodsmen had 
been killed and two others captured because they had gone trapping in Wabanaki 
territory. "Listen, our English brothers," he said, "this is the Indian way; among us, if  we 
find people on our lands we take their game and if they resist we break their heads."60
Artiwaneto's bald threat contrasted with the more diplomatic tone of Indians who 
lived closer to English settlements. The inhabitants o f villages near the coast, such as 
Norridgewock and Panawapskik, were more cautious in the wording o f their grievances 
to New England's officials. Since they lived far away from the French colonies -- about 
two or three weeks journey from Quebec — and within a few days of the closest English 
settlements, they were dependent on the English for guns, powder, and other trade 
articles. They also had borne the brunt of English attacks in recent wars and did not want 
to break the tentative peace they now enjoyed. While many at Norridgewock and 
Panawapskik retained an attachment to the French, a sizable pro-English faction had 
emerged in recent decades as it became clearer that peace would not be possible without 
some form of Anglo-Wabanaki entente. When Loron (Laurent) Sauguaaram, a leading 
sagamore o f Penobscot, spoke to Massachusetts officials at Fort St. George in August 
1751, he complained that an Englishman had built a house on Matinicus Island in
60 "Paroles des Abenakis de St. Francois au Capitaine Stevens," CDRH. 3:509-12, quotations on 510 and 
512. (My translation; the original of the first quote reads: "nous vous defendons tres expressement de tuer 
un seul castor, ny prendre un morceau de bois sur les terres que nous habitons." The second quote reads: 
"Ecoutez, nos freres les Anglois, quelle est notre maniere sauvage; entre nous des personnes que nous 
trouverions sur les terres que nous possedons, nous prendrerions leur chasse et s'ils faisaient quelque 
resistance nous leur casserions la tete.") Indian threats against English trappers on the upper Androscoggin 
River led the government of Massachusetts to pass a law forbidding all trapping north of English
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Penobscot Bay, where the Indians hunted birds and seals. Rather than threatening the 
English officials with violence, he reminded them that according to the terms o f the treaty 
they both signed in 1725, colonists were not allowed to live on the island. ”[T]hat Island 
is our Livelihood," he told them, adding that the treaty "says we shan't loose a Foot of 
Ground."61
Sauguaaram had himself been a signatory o f the 1725 treaty and had acted as the 
leading negotiator of the Wabanaki delegation. Since then he had expended great effort 
in rallying other Wabanakis to respect the peace and forcing the English to abide by the 
terms of the treaty. His work had helped to clear a path between the Penobscot Indians 
and the government o f Massachusetts, which, he hoped, would allow them to redress each 
other's grievances in a peaceful manner. But the Anglo-Penobscot alliance was 
constantly threatened by conflicts between colonists and Indians. In the summer of 1751, 
the settler at Matinicus, Ebenezer Hall, had shot and killed two Indians, burying them in 
his garden. In a deposition made three years later, one of his servants explained that Hall 
had entertained and lodged Indians during their hunting season, but one day late in the 
summer, thinking that a war had broken out, he had fired upon two hunters passing near 
his house. The murders were cause for violent retribution, but the sagamores o f 
Penobscot, in deference to the terms o f the 1725 treaty, decided to resolve the matter by 
applying to the governor o f Massachusetts for Hall's removal. Two years later, after 
receiving several more complaints from the Penobscots, including a letter in which they 
threatened to remove Hall themselves, the government finally took action, issuing an 
order for his expulsion from the island in June 1753. The Penobscots' reluctance to resort
settlements or east of the Saco truckhouse. See DHSM. 23:443-4.
61 DHSM. 23:416. Matinicus had been a favorite spot for English traders and fishermen since the early
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to violence in this case was a consequence o f their desire to live harmoniously with their 
English neighbors. Unlike the Odanaks, who lived a great distance from English 
settlements, the Penobscots could not afford to be uncompromising in the defense o f their
lands.62
The most important consideration for the Penobscots was not the strength o f their 
claim to the island but the human consequences o f land use. The island was their source 
of food, their "Livelihood," which they would gladly share with others. If their guests 
acted in an unsociable or hostile manner, as did Ebenezer Hall, the Penobscots withdrew 
their hospitality. Yet they did so in a way that would not threaten the peace by offending 
their allies in the Massachusetts government. Territorial boundaries were inseparable 
from social boundaries, for Wabanakis willingly shared with their friends and kin, but 
were indisposed to do so with their enemies.
Inside the Wigwam
This attitude toward land ownership meant that land claims were always 
somewhat ambiguous, for the lines that divided social groups from each other were not 
always clearly drawn. It is wrong, in this respect, to imagine the Wabanakis as they are 
sometimes represented in modern-day maps: as well-bounded tribes with an unchanging 
territorial base.63 A better approach is to think o f political relationships in terms that the 
groups themselves would have understood. As Benedict Anderson has argued, nations
seventeenth century.
62 DHSM. 23:448-9,451-2. Loron's son had died in the last war and he was at pains to prevent further 
deaths from warfare.
63 On this point, see Prins, "Tribulations of a Border Tribe," esp. 120-202; David L. Ghere, "The 
'Disappearance' of the Abenaki in Western Maine: Political Organization and Ethnocentric Assumptions," 
American Indian Quarterly 17 (1993): 193-207.
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and other polities are "imagined communities," organizations created by human intellect 
and sustained through communication. Words keep these communities together, for 
people cannot feel an affinity for one another unless they share their ideas and 
experiences. Words also allow people to represent themselves collectively, to see large 
groups, whether they number in the hundreds or the millions, as a single unit. To gain a 
faithful understanding of the social universe of the Wabanakis, we need to retrieve the 
vocabulary they used to describe themselves and their relations with others.64
The organizing principle of the Wabanaki political world, and of eastern North 
America generally, was kinship. Wabanakis spent most o f their years with an extended 
family group who lived together in a single wigwam or a number o f wigwams placed 
together.65 At regular intervals, they joined together with other families in villages or 
large camps to perform certain tasks, such as planting, fishing, and feasting, but the 
family band remained the fundamental social unit throughout the entire year. A family 
was a valuable source o f support, for its members looked after each other both materially 
and socially. When men had bad luck in hunting, they went to their relatives to obtain 
food; when travellers went on long journeys, they stayed overnight in the homes of their 
kin. And when someone had been caused an injury, he or she turned to family for 
assistance. People consequently measured their political power in terms o f the number of
64 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Snread o f Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983).
65 Archaeologists have recently discovered the remains o f a longhouse at Norridgewock, the only known 
example of such a structure in Maine. See Robert S. Grumet, Historic Contact: Indian People and 
Colonists in Today's Northeastern United States in the Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries (Norman. 
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 82-4.
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kinfolk they had: at Norridgewock, the expression nemesairangoudamen meant both "I 
have many relatives" and "I have many allies."66
Since the family group was a source o f social support, Wabanakis defined kinship 
inclusively so as to bring as many people as possible within the family circle. Wababakis 
sometimes referred to their cousins as siblings and spoke o f their friends as cousins or 
brothers. This practice confused many Europeans, who thought it odd to be called cousin 
or brother by near-strangers. When the English explorer Christopher Levett visited Casco 
Bay in 1624, he was told by local sagamores that he should be their cousin. "[Y]ou may 
imagine I was not a little proud," he commented wryly in a later account of the voyage, 
"to be adopted cousin to so many great kings at one instant."67 Behind Levett's bemused 
remark was a very real difference in the ways in which English and Wabanakis defined 
kinship. In England, one of the central roles o f the family was to transmit property from 
one generation to the next. Lineal kin -  that is, relatives descended from the same line, 
such as fathers and sons — tended to have close attachments to each other, because 
property was passed on from parents to children. Collateral kin -- relatives not descended 
from the same line, such as cousins and siblings — had weaker ties to each other, and 
those who were not blood relatives were considered to be outside the family altogether.68
66 Rasies, Dictionary. 499.
67 Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 87. See also the Sieur de Diereville’s surprised reaction at being 
called brother by a Micmac acquaintance. Diereville. Relation. 150-1.
68 Consider John Demos’ description of kinship in the Plymouth Colony: "Direct bloodlines were accorded 
a special sort of precedence in the family feeling o f the colonists: a man was involved, first of all, with his 
wife and children, and then with his grandchildren. Somewhat less intense was the relation to his own 
brothers and sisters, and to their children. Parent-child; grandparent-grandchild; brother (or sister)-brother 
(or sister); uncle (or aunt)-nephew (or niece): this was the general order of priority." Demos, A Linle 
Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (London: Oxford University Press. 1970), 124. See also 
Alan Macfarlane, The Family Life of Ralph Josselin. a Seventeenth-Centurv Clergyman: an Essav in 
Historical Anthropoloev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 105-43. Two of Josselin’s 
cousins were prominent figures in early Maine; Henry Josselyn was a magistrate in Gorges’s province and 
James Josselyn was a naturalist who wrote a book on the natural and social worlds of New England.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Wabanakis did not accumulate much property during their lifetimes and what 
little they owned was buried with them when they died. The transmission o f property 
was consequently a minor consideration in the Dawnland and figured very little in the 
reckoning of kinship. What did matter was the need to share the risks associated with 
hunting and planting. All hunters, no matter how skilled, at times faced runs o f bad luck 
and failed to bring animals home to their families. Similarly, a summer o f drought or 
blight might cause crops to die, leaving a village without a harvest. Such failures caused 
hunger and even starvation if people were left to their own devices. But if a family could 
turn to a network of in-laws, siblings, cousins, and friends for food during times o f 
hardship, the consequences o f bad luck in hunting and planting were much less severe. 
Collateral kin were as valuable as lineal kin in this respect, for cousins and siblings often 
dwelt in areas where game was more abundant or nuts and berries more plentiful. The 
importance of this social tie may explain the Wabanakis' elaborate vocabulary for 
describing collateral kin. In Wabanaki languages, there are four terms for sibling: "my 
brother" (spoken by a male), "my brother" (spoken by a female), "my sister" (spoken by a 
male), and "my sister" (spoken by a female). There are also single words that describe 
male and female cousins (each with a different form for male and female speakers), and 
equally concise terms for more complicated relationships, such as "my father's sister's 
daughter's husband" (spoken by a male).69
69 Eckstorm, Old John Neptune. 50; Speck, Penobscot Man. 203-6,229-30; Rasies, Dictionary. 498. On 
the connection between property and systems of kinship, see Lewis Henry Morgan, Systems of 
Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family. Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge, No. 17 
(Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1871); Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family. Private 
Property and the State [1884] (New York: International Publishers, 1972); Elisabeth Tooker, "Women in 
Iroquois Society," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, Marianne Mithun, eds., Extending the Rafters: 
Interdisciplinary Annroaches to Iroquoian Studies (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), 109-23.
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The flexible nature o f Wabanaki kinship made families open-ended, always 
capable of bringing new members within their fold. The connection between kinship 
terms and actual relations of consanguinity was more tenuous among the Wabanakis than 
in Europe, and names such as "father" or "cousin" were often meant to imply a set of 
social obligations rather than an actual blood tie. This practice allowed people to express 
all social relationships in eastern North America, even relations with near-strangers, in 
the language of kinship. Units o f political association larger than the family band were 
understood as metaphorical extensions o f the family circle. Alliances, for example, were 
often described as wigwams, in which various peoples lived under the same roof. Early 
in the eighteenth century, the villages o f the Dawnland formed a confederacy with the 
Mohawks of the St. Lawrence Valley and Algonquian groups to the north and the west. 
According to oral tradition, they described the confederacy as a wigwam enclosed by a 
great fence. In the middle o f the wigwam was a fireplace, which was kept at the Mohawk 
village o f Kahnawake. The fence symbolized the confederacy agreement, and all those 
who tried to escape from it -- those who violated the terms of the alliance -- would be 
whipped by the "father" o f the confederacy, the Ottawas, who had played a leading role in 
the formation of the league. The wigwam itself symbolized the peace between the 
members of the confederacy, for the peoples living within it had to act as a family.
"There would be no arguing again," it was said. "They had to live like brothers and 
sisters who had the same parent." All the members of the confederacy except the Ottawas 
described themselves as siblings o f graded ages. The Penobscots, who by the eighteenth 
century had become the most influential Indian group in their region, were considered the 
eldest brother of the Wabanaki communities.70
70_Lewis Mitchell, Wapapi Akonutomakonol: The Wampum Records: Wabanaki Traditional Laws, rev.,
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The symbol o f the wigwam resonated because the home was the focus o f family 
life. It was also a symbol o f order, o f social boundaries. For practical reasons, family 
members each had reserved places within the house according to their age and gender. In 
the cramped space of the wigwam, it was difficult to move without disturbing others, so 
people performed all their activities while sitting in their assigned place. Fathers and 
mothers sat at the back of the house behind the fire, while boys and girls sat on the sides. 
A place of honor was always reserved for guests. Even when the family broke camp and 
moved to a new area, the seating plan remained the same. From outside the wigwam, it 
may have appeared that families were in constant movement but within the wigwam the 
social spaces of the family were fixed. At confederacy councils, the delegates had 
assigned places that symbolized their place within the alliance. In metaphorical terms, 
this meant that the hierarchy of the confederacy would remain constant no matter how 
much the world changed around it. Wabanaki members sat on one side o f the fire, with 
the Penobscots acting as their leading spokesmen, while western delegates sat at the 
opposite side, with the Ottawa representative holding a whip, symbolizing his paternal 
authority over the other league members.71
The fireplace at the center o f the delegates was itself a metaphor, represented by a 
large wooden hoop in the council house at Kahnawake. As in other cultures, the hearth
ed., and trans. Robert M. Leavitt and David A. Francis (Fredericton, N. B.: Micmac-Maliseet Institute, 
University of New Brunswick, 1990), 40. On the confederacy, see Frank G. Speck, "The Eastern 
Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy," American Anthropologist 17 (1915): 492-508; Willard Walker, Robert 
Conkling, Gregory Buesing, "A Chronological Account of the Wabanaki Confederacy," in Ernest L. 
Schusky, ed., Political Organization of Native North Americans (Washington, D. C.: University Press of 
America, 1980), 41-84. On the Ottawas' role in peace negotiations among eastern North American Indians, 
see Gilles Havard, La Grande Paix de Montreal de 1701: Les voies de la diplomatic franco-amerindienne 
(Montreal: Recherches amerindiennes au Quebec, 1992), esp. 138n.
71 W. C. Orchard, "Notes on Penobscot Houses," American Anthropologist 11 (1909): 601-6; Speck, 
Penobscot Man. 27-34; Wallis and Wallis, The Micmac. 226-8; Adrian Tanner, Bringing Home Animals: 
Religious Ideology and Mode of Production o f the Mistassini Cree Hunters (New York: St. Martin's Press,
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was a symbol o f domesticity because the fireplace was always the focal point o f the 
home. A council fire stood for the polity itself because the hearth implied, by metonymic 
extension, the family that sat around it. The image of the fire also evoked the ephemeral 
nature of alliances, since friendships, like campfires, die out if  they are not continually 
renewed. When the confederacy members met at the council house, they marked the end 
of their speeches by presenting belts o f wampum, which they hung on the wooden hoop 
that symbolized the fire. Orators said that the belts were "brands" that they placed in the 
fire to keep it burning brightly. If they failed to stoke the fire by adding new belts every 
three years, it was assumed that the fire would be extinguished and the confederacy with 
it.72
In Penobscot, people figuratively referred to wampum as gelusewangan,
"speech," and it was believed that the belts contained or embodied the orations o f the 
delegates. A single bead of wampum was known as a "word," and people could "write" 
belts by stringing varicolored beads into a pattern and "read" them later by deciphering 
the pattern.73 The hanging of belts around the hoop at Kahnawake symbolized the 
renewal of alliances through the exchange o f words. The purpose o f such speeches was 
to create bonds of affection and trust among the delegates. The confederates rarely 
expected their meetings to produce clearly-worded policies or binding pacts. Instead,
1979), 73-87; Speck, "Eastern Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy," 497.
72 Speck, "Eastern Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy," 496-7; idem, "The Functions of Wampum among 
the Eastern Algonkian," American Anthropological Association Memoirs. 6 (1919); Willard Walker, 
"Wabanaki Wampum Protocol," in William Cowan, ed., Papers of the Fifteenth Algonquian Conference 
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1984), 107-22.
731 put these terms in quotes because wampum belts were not strictly speaking a system of writing.
Written texts symbolically represent components of language such as phonemes and words. Wampum 
belts, on the other hand, embody stories and ideas and do not stand for specific linguistic formulations. 
Holders of the belts usually tell their stories in their own words and do not worry about adhering to their 
original phrasing. See David R. Olson, The World on Paper The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications 
of Writing and Reading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 69-71.
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their orations served much the same purpose as a stone thrown on a travel shrine or an 
arrow left at Hockomock Point: they regenerated alliances by keeping channels o f 
communication open. The paths that they cleared in council allowed the allies to air their 
grievances, make amends for injuries, and resolve conflicts peacefully. But if they did 
not periodically renew their friendship, the paths would become overgrown and the fire 
would flicker out.74
This way o f imagining alliances was fitting to an oral culture, in which units of 
political association did not exist "on paper" but needed to be constantly and actively 
renewed and recreated. Reciprocal bonds, established through ties o f  kinship and 
reinforced through sharing and gift-giving, were the social glue that held people together 
and imbued them with a sense o f common purpose. Since land use was one o f the means 
by which these social ties were expressed, territoriality in the Dawnland was 
characterized not so much by lines o f division as by links o f reciprocity. The strength of 
land claims was commensurate with the intensity o f social ties. Families shared their 
land in the same way they shared their food -- in fact, the two were inseparable in their 
minds -- and would willingly let allies hunt on their territories if the visitors demonstrated 
their goodwill by paying furs as tribute. Land dealings, from this perspective, were social 
rather than economic transactions. If one group allowed another to hunt on their lands, 
they effectively invited them into their wigwam and signaled that they would treat each 
other as kin. Such an invitation benefited the host as well as the guest, for the arrival o f
74 Michael K. Foster, "Another Look at the Function o f Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils," in 
Jennings, ed., History and Culture o f Iroquois Diplomacy. 99-114. Other valuable items such as beaver 
skins could serve the same purpose as wampum. When Noel Negamabat visited the Kennebec River in the 
winter of 1650-1, he brought with him a bundle o f furs, which he presented as a gift to John Winslow, the 
Plymouth colony’s agent at Cushnoc. He told Winslow that the furs were his "word”, which he "added" to 
the word of the governor of New France, delivered by Father Druillettes. He expected that Winslow would 
transmit both their messages (the gift and his speech being one and the same) to the governor o f Plymouth.
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new kin into a community swelled the ranks o f its warriors and widened the circle of 
sharing, providing all concerned with greater military and material security.75
When strangers began arriving from across the ocean, Wabanaki sagamores 
treated them as potential allies and eagerly sought to win their favor by exchanging 
presents and inviting them to live near their rivers.76 The wording o f early land deals 
between Englishmen and coastal sagamores suggests that Wabanaki leaders in the early 
part of the seventeenth century understood land deals as alliances, rather than commercial 
transactions. The preamble of the 1638 deed stated that the sagamores "are Inclined to 
have the English Inhabit amongst us," adding that English settlement would eventually 
make the natives of the region "Strengthened against our Enemys the Tarenteens 
[Mi'kmaq] who yearly doth us Dammage." The sagamores were "Likewise... purswaded 
that [settlement] will be for the good of us and our posterity." The deed conveyed the 
coastal area between the Merrimac and Piscataqua rivers to the English but allowed 
Indians to continue hunting, fishing, and fowling within the same tract. The sagamores 
received a gift of coats, shirts, dried foods, and other items in return for the land, with the 
"Chief Sagamore" o f the region, Passaconaway of Pennacook, being promised a yearly 
payment o f one coat o f trucking cloth by the English settlers.77
See JR, 36: 83-5.
75 One example of such a transaction is the invitation made in 1719 and 1723 to the inhabitants of Odanak 
to "go eat the beaver’s tail” in the Foxes' lands south o f the Great Lakes. The Foxes, who had been at odds 
with the French for over a decade, were poised to enter a war against the Illinois, Sauteurs, and Ottawas. 
Their invitation to the Wabanakis to come live in their lands was an attempt to recruit warriors for the 
impending conflict. The inhabitants of Odanak, mindful o f governor Vaudreuil's disapproval o f the Foxes’ 
gambit, ultimately refused the invitation. See Vaudreuil au Ministre, October 11, 1723, PAC, AN, Serie 
Cl 1A, vol. 45, fols. 148-9v; JR, 67: 129.
76 For early attempts by sagamores to lure French and English colonists to settle on their lands, see Levett, 
Voyage. 88,92-3; JR, 2:249,3:269; Vovages of Samuel de Chamnlain. 1 :294; Marc Lescarbot, History 
of New France [1618] (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1907), transl. and edited by W. L. Grant, 3 vols., 
1:355.
77 H. W. Richardson, W. M. Sargent, L. B. Chapman, and E. C. Bowler, eds., York Deeds. 18 vols. 
(Portland, Me.: J. T. Hull 1887-1910), vol. 8, fol. 16 [future references to this series appear as York
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The terms o f purchase were typical of seventeenth-century Anglo-Wabanaki land 
transactions. Many other deeds stipulated that Indians could continue to hunt and plant 
on the lands sold to the English, even though these tracts nominally belonged to the 
purchasers. From a Wabanaki perspective, the "sale" o f land in 1638 may in fact have 
been a declaration of alliance whereby the sagamores o f the region invited the English to 
come live with them and received trade and military support in return. The articles they 
received in exchange for the land, in their eyes, were a form of tribute that the English 
paid to show their respect for the original owners. The sagamores had little to lose in the 
transaction, for the epidemics o f 1616-19 and 1634 had ravaged native New England, 
leaving coastal areas with only a small fraction of their former population. With their 
villages greatly reduced in size, native communities probably had more land than they 
needed and it was in their interest to find new sources of support, including trade with 
Europeans.78
Needless to say, the sagamores did not know that the purchasers were the crest of 
a human tidal wave that would soon swamp all o f New England. Nor did they fully 
understand that the English, who had never heard o f Gluskap and knew nothing of what
Deeds!. The date of the deed is listed as 1629, and the purchase had supposedly been made while the 
colonists were still living in England, but this date is almost certainly the result of forgery. The sale of land 
was probably made in April 1638, when the Reverend John Wheelwright and his followers, expelled from 
Massachusetts because of their involvement in the Antinomian crisis, decided to make a settlement at 
Exeter in present-day New Hampshire. See Charles E. Clark, The Eastern Frontier The Settlement of 
Northern New England. 1610-1763 (Hanover, N. H.: University Press o f New England, 1970), 37-9.
78 Emerson W. Baker, ’"A Scratch with a Bear’s Paw': Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine." 
Ethnohistorv 36 (1989): 235-56; Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear, "European Contact and Indian 
Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics," Ethnohistorv 35 (1988): 15-33; Arthur 
E. Speiss and Bruce D. Spiess, "New England Pandemic of 1616-1622: Cause and Archaeological 
Implication," Man in the Northeast 34 (1987), 71-83. Deeds drawn up later in the century tended to give 
the English purchasers exclusive rights the land but as late as the 1680s, English farmers in York County 
paid a peck of com every year to Madockawando, the leading sagamore of the region in recognition of his 
suzerainty over their lands. See depositions of John Boden and Richard Webber, December 27,1736, in 
Samuel Waldo, A Defence of the Title o f the Late John Leverett... (Boston: Kneeland and Green [?], 1736), 
Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 4098; State o f the British and French Colonies in North America
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he had done, imagined the landscape in a manner entirely different from their own. To 
the colonists, the country where they chose to settle was literally a new England, a blank 
slate on which the landscape o f old England could be redrawn. Over the next several 
centuries, they busily covered the land with their own distinctive footprints ~  turning 
forests into fields, meadows into towns, bays into harbors -- with consequences that 
Gluskap's children could not ignore.
(London: A. Millar, 1755), reprinted 1967 by S.R. Publishers, Johnson Reprint Corp., 25-27.
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TABLE 1.1. WABANAKI CALENDARS, 17TH-19TH CENTURIES.
Gaspe,
17thC
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
Norridgewock 
18 thC
time of great cold
fishing moon
abundant fishing
fishing herring/ 
sowing moon
Penobscot
19thC
hard times/ 
winter moon
Odanak
19thC
New-year’s 
greeting moon
wind scatters leaves bough 
over crust o f  snow shedding
egg-laying moon
alewife moon/ 
spearfish moon
covering the com planting moon
moose-hunting
moon
sugar-making
moon
planting moon
harvesting
Jun.
Jul.
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov. rivers begin to 
freeze
Dec. tomcods ascend 
the river
when we bank up seals rise on water hoeing moon
the com
blueberries ripen/ berry ripe moon hay-making
eel season moon
large sun/long days seals fattening/
gathering acorns
when the shores 
freeze
making holes in 
ice to hunt beaver
the moon is long
com moon moon
animal rutting/ corn-reaping
reddening o f leaves moon
leaf falling/ leaf-falling
ice forms on shores moon
rock-cod moon
big moon/ 
winter coming/ 
Xmas eve moon
ice-forming
moon
winter moon
Sources: Chrestien Leclerq, Relation o f  Gaspesia. 138-9; Rasies, Dictionary. 478; Speck, Penobscot Man. 263-4; 
Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues. 223. For the sake o f  brevity the word "moon" has been 
omitted in some entries.
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FIGURE 1.1. CANOES IN ROCK ART.
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(a)
(b) (c) (d)
(e)
Canoes in rock art, from: (a) Lake Kejimkook, N. S.; (b) Solon, Me.; (c) Agawa Rock, Lake Superior, Ont; (d) Solon, 
Me.; (e) Lake Kejimkook, N.S. Drawings of canoes and other boats are a common motif in petroglyph sites 
throughout North America, and are probably associated with the travels of the shaman's spirit Sources: (a,e) 
Robertson, Rock Drawings of the Micmac Indians: (b,d) Snow, "Solon Petroglyphs”; (c) Grant The Rock Art of the 
North American Indians.
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FIGURE 1.2. ITHYPHALLIC THEMES IN ROCK ART.
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(e)
V
(0
(g )
Ithyphallic themes in rock art, from: (a-f) Solon, Me.; (g) Machiasport, Me. To Wabanakis, spiritual power and sexual 
potency were closely related, indeed inseparable from each other. Men may also have seen an analogy between the 
pursuit of game and the pursuit of women -  present-day Cree hunters in James Bay jokingly use the same expressions 
for "he shoots" and "he ejaculates”, "shotgun” and "penis", "gunpowder” and "sperm", "gun sheath" and "condom". ' 
See Colin Scott, "Science for the West, Myth for the Rest? The Case for James Bay Cree Knowledge Construction," in 
Laura Nader, ed., Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry into Boundaries. Power, and Knowledge (N. Y.: Routledge, 
1996), 75. Sources: (a-f) Snow, "Solon Petroglyphs”; (g) Ray, "The Machiasport Petroglyphs”.
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FIGURE 1.3. HUMAN HEADS IN ROCK ART.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Human heads in rock ait, from: (a) Bellows Falls, Vt; (b) Dighton Rock, Taunton, Mass.; (c) Peterborough, Ont.; (d) 
Fairy Point, Missinaibi Lake, OntThe horns on the heads of human figures are symbols of their shamanic power. 
Similar figures, also with haloes and power lines emanating from their heads, are found throughout North America and 
around the world. Sources: (a) Haviland and Power, "Visions in Stone,"; (b) Mattingly, Picture-Writing of the 
American Indians: (c) Grant, The Rock Art of the North American fndians: d) Thor Conway, "Scotia Lake Pictograph 
Site".
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CHAPTER H
DRAWING LINES
Before I  built a wall I ’d ask to know 
What I  was walling in or walling out.
And to whom I  was like to give offence.
-Robert Frost, "Mending Wall"
Suppose it were possible to lay all the maps ever drawn of Maine end to end and 
in chronological order. If this column were wrapped around a spinning reel and viewed 
through an aperture, one could see all the maps in rapid succession, like a film. Imagine 
for a moment how this film might appear. In the opening scenes the foreground is the 
Atlantic Ocean, crisscrossed by rhumb lines, dotted by clusters o f fishing banks, and 
decorated with fanciful sea monsters swimming at the edges o f the frame. The interior of 
the continent is largely blank, with the exception o f a scattering o f names along the coast, 
indicating geographical features such as rivers and bays. The shoreline itself takes shape 
only gradually, evolving from a wavering, inchoate shape into an precise tracing o f the 
jagged coast of northern New England.
Soon the major rivers of Maine — the Androscoggin, the Kennebec, the Penobscot 
-  begin to snake their way into the interior, revealing their sources among the lakes and 
highlands o f the region. The map also becomes cluttered with the signs o f human 
occupation: a scattering o f European settlements huddled against the coast, a number of
87
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Indian tribes farther inland. Colonies appear, indicated as free-floating words slightly 
larger than the names o f the Indians. Eventually, a number o f boundary lines divide these 
colonies from each other, though not from the Indians, who in a matter o f time seem to 
vanish altogether. At first the boundaries are clumsily drawn and flicker wildly from one 
map to the next. But after a while they gain a certain consistency and vary only in their 
details. As these lines become more fixed, the rugged, lopsided diamond shape o f the 
state of Maine emerges, bounded to the west by the inverted triangles o f New Hampshire 
and Vermont, and to the north and east by the gaping mouth o f Quebec and the scraggly 
parallelogram of New Brunswick.
Suppose that this film had a narrator, or several narrators, for it tells at least three 
different stories. In one version, the story would be one o f growth, o f the cumulative 
expansion of European knowledge about the territory of Maine. In the earliest maps this 
knowledge was tentative, hypothetical, based on explorers' sketches o f the coast, added to 
scraps of information gleaned from Indians, and supplemented by a heavy dose of 
educated guessing. Through a process o f trial and error, Europeans gradually produced a 
more precise picture o f the territory, methodically plotting the coast and the interior on 
mariners' charts and surveyors' plats. The steady accumulation o f empirical observations 
produced an image of the territory that was more scientific, if  less colorful. The 
Penobscot River in the earliest maps had been the site o f the mythically opulent city o f 
Norumbega;1 by the close of the eighteenth century the river’s meanderings close to the
1 Historians since the nineteenth century have puzzled over the origins of the name Norumbega, some 
suggesting that it was a corruption of a Wabanaki word, others that it is derived from the name Norvegia, 
or Norway. But no one has yet considered the possibility that Norumbega was a variant spelling of 
Norimberga, the Latin name of the city state of Nuremberg. Early in the sixteenth century, Nuremberg was 
an important center of humanist scholarship and the printing trade. Its printers were especially known for 
their woodcuts and copper engravings -  Albrecht Durer’s works being the most famous examples — and 
these skills made Nuremberg one o f the mapmaking capitals of Europe. Europe's oldest existing globe,
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coast had been measured to the last rod and its sources farther inland dutifully recorded 
by military engineers. The effect o f several centuries o f such painstaking observation 
was to transform, in the European imagination, a formless terra incognita into an exactly 
measured landscape.2
This transformation was not innocent, for the story o f expanding knowledge is 
connected to a second narrative, a story o f conquest. The dimensions o f the American 
landscape, recorded and described by explorers and colonists, were more than an object 
of idle curiosity for Europeans. Maps of the Americas gave them information that 
allowed them to steer their ships safely into harbor, to find the interior waterways of the 
continent, to catalogue and lay claim to the natural riches o f the land. Cartographic 
knowledge in these respects was a faithful handmaiden o f colonial enterprise.
As early as the sixteenth century, mapmakers placed flags and coats of arms on 
the North American continent to symbolize the sovereignty o f various European powers
dating from the late fifteenth century, was made by a citizen of Nuremberg, Martin Behaim. The city was 
also a major commercial center in the sixteenth century and its merchants had provided financial backing 
for several Spanish ventures in the New World. Given that early maps o f America were largely a product 
of the imagination, sixteenth century cartographers — many of whom lived or had received their training in 
Nuremberg -- may have placed the name Norumbega in the New World as a patriotic flourish or as a nod 
to their financial backers. Norumbega in New World maps often appears as a wealthy city surrounded by 
forest, the mirror image of Nuremberg in the Old World (see, for example, Gerard Mercator’s map of 1569, 
Fig. 2.2). In his 1548 map of America, Giacomo Gastaldi gives the northeastern part of North America the 
name Nuntmberg, not Norimbega. Possibly, cartographers saw parallels between ancient Germany and the 
New World. German humanists such as Konrad Celtis, who had written a 1495 history of Nuremberg 
titled Norimberea. had since the late fifteenth century revived and reprinted classical texts describing 
Germany as a land populated by "wild" yet free tribes, who dressed in animal skins and lived by the hunt. 
These classical texts were widely circulated among citizens of Europe's republic o f letters (John Milton, for 
example, placed Norumbega in its classical context in Paradise Lost ! Being humanists themselves, most 
map printers were familiar with these texts and perhaps thought that Norumbega was an apt name for the 
northern regions of America, which were also inhabited by "wild", forest-dwelling folk. On Nuremberg, 
see Gerald Strauss, Nuremberg in the Sixteenth Centurv: Citv Politics and Life Between Middle Aces and 
Modem Times (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); Schama, Landscape and Memory. 81-100; 
on Norimbega, see Samuel Eliot Morison, The European Discovery o f America: The Northern Voyages. A.
D. 500-1600 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 464-70,488-91; Richard D'Abate, "On the 
Meaning of a Name: 'Norumbega1 and the Representation of North America," in Emerson W. Baker et al., 
eds., American Beginnings: Exploration. Culture, and Cartography in the Land o f Norumbega (Lincoln, 
Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 61-88.
2 On the expansion of geographical knowledge of northern New England, see Baker et al., American
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over its territory and people. Over time these quixotic claims to continental empires, 
made on the basis o f a hazy knowledge o f the coastline, became self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Early in the seventeenth century, colonization companies sponsored by the crowns of 
France and England began to exploit the natural resources o f eastern North America 
through a combination of trade and settlement. The French and English colonies asserted 
their authority over a widening swath o f territory, extending their government over all 
who lived within their respective jurisdictions.
If the expansionist impulses o f Europeans remained constant throughout the 
colonial period, the means by which they marked their conquests did not. A third story of 
the film --less perceptible but just as important as the other two -- is one o f changing 
form, of an evolution in the methods by which cartographers represented the limits of 
state power. In the earliest maps, European powers planted their flags in the middle of 
the continent, writing the proposed names o f new colonies in large letters across the lands 
they claimed to possess. By the early years o f settlement, the flags had disappeared, but 
the names remained. In a few maps, they were separated by dotted lines or colored wash, 
but in most cases there were no boundaries on the map. In French versions, the names o f 
native tribes were often written alongside the names o f colonies, and portions o f the 
continent seemed to belong simultaneously to New France and the Indians. Early maps 
also depicted a growing number o f settlements along the continent's coastline and river 
valleys, represented by dots, crosses, and clusters o f  houses.
Cartographers o f the eighteenth century continued to use the vocabulary 
developed by their predecessors — boundaries as lines, settlements and forts as points, 
colonies and tribes as free-floating names — but they reshuffled its order o f emphasis,
Beginnings, especially chapters 1-3.
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giving increasing attention to the definition of boundaries. Mapmakers began drawing 
lines between colonies, some o f them following the course of rivers and others running 
straight through the interior. By the beginning o f the nineteenth century, the boundless, 
ambiguously defined polities typical o f the early cartography o f the region had 
disappeared almost entirely. Mapmakers now carved the eastern half o f the continent into 
a number of multicolored jurisdictions, each separated from the other by clearly drawn 
lines: a motif familiar to anyone who has ever consulted a twentieth-century atlas or road 
map.
The emergence o f boundary lines in the eighteenth century was o f  great 
consequence to the inhabitants o f Maine, for their region had been a borderland from the 
earliest years o f European settlement. In other parts of North America, colonies had 
expanded outward from territorial nuclei formed early in their existence: Canada had 
taken shape along the St. Lawrence, New Netherlands and New York along the Hudson 
River, Maryland and Virginia in Chesapeake Bay. But the lands between the St. John 
and Piscataqua rivers had seen a succession o f colonies rise and fail ~  Sagadahock, 
Laconia, New Somersetshire, Lygonia, Acadia, Devonshire, Georgia — each o f them 
laying claim to portions o f the same territory but none o f them managing to establish 
exclusive jurisdiction over their lands. Far from being dominated by a single colony, the 
region was defined by a series o f borders that separated one colony from the next.
The distinctive character o f the region makes it necessary to approach its early 
history not in terms of the growth o f a single colony but as a gradual evolution o f political 
borders. The emergence o f clearly drawn boundaries in the eighteenth century represents 
a watershed in this history, yet has been the subject o f surprisingly little attention among
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historians. Perhaps the Anglo-American tendency to see frontiers and boundaries as 
distinct subjects has blinded historians to the continuities between the two. Content with 
the geographer's dictum that one is an area and the other a line, most scholars have treated 
the frontier as the exclusive province of social historians and boundaries as the bailiwick 
of high diplomacy. But as Lucien Febvre once remarked, frontiers and boundaries are 
variations on the same theme: both are the envelope of the state, the outer edges of 
political power. While linear boundaries are virtually the sole expression of this concept 
in present-day maps, past societies have imagined and protected their peripheries in a 
variety of ways, from the marches o f Carolingian Europe to the defensive walls o f the 
Chinese empire. These kinds of frontiers were not supplanted by the linear boundaries of 
the modem map until after the sixteenth century, as the territorial state began to squeeze 
out other forms of political organization.3
Seen in this light, the replacement of free-floating polities with well-bounded 
states in maps of Maine during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was inseparable 
from the growth o f state power in the region. Boundaries are never neutral or merely 
descriptive; they decide what belongs to whom and allow governments and landowners to 
exert control over places and people. The transformation of frontiers into boundaries 
during the eighteenth century was part of a larger complex o f social and political changes 
that ultimately served to produce the territorial state in North America. Our map film 
depicts this process in miniature, graphically illustrating how the vaguely-defined borders 
of seventeenth-century Maine became the exactly surveyed lines o f the present day. But
3 Lucien Febvre, A Geographical Introduction to History, with a contribution from Lionel Bataillon, trans.
E. G. Mountford and J. H. Paxton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932), esp. 304. See also Michel Foucher, 
L'invention des frontieres (Paris: F. E. D. N., 1986); Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State 
Formation in the Modem World (London: Polity Press, 1996). The French use the same term for boundary
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it also presents this change as if  it were the inexorable unfolding o f a grand plan, wholly 
independent of human agency. This image is illusory, for the development o f boundaries 
was the cumulative product of countless decisions by political officials, military leaders, 
and ordinary people. By rewinding the reel and examining it frame by frame, we can 
recover the human side o f the story, seeing each map as product o f its social and political 
context.
Two Kinds o f  Map
The earliest European cartographers o f North America were faced with a blank 
slate, a continent of which virtually nothing was known. But if  the land was new to them, 
the techniques they used to represent it were not, for the mapmaking art was centuries old 
by the sixteenth century. Political maps had an especially long and distinguished lineage, 
for cartography had always been a tool o f political elites. The development of 
mapmaking as a craft in ancient Europe and Asia was closely related to the emergence of 
states as a form of political organization, since rulers on both continents found maps to be 
a useful aid in monitoring and controlling the more distant parts o f their dominions. 
Political maps in the ancient and medieval world served a multitude o f purposes, from the 
evaluation o f land values to the planning o f pilgrimages. They took an equally diverse 
number of artistic forms, ranging from the mappae mundi o f medieval Europe to the 
"fish-scale" property maps o f Ming China. But in the broadest terms, cartographers 
tended to use a combination o f two basic motifs in preparing maps for political purposes 
[see Fig. 2.1]. The first was a pattern o f nodes and links, a map in which strategic points 
o f the political landscape such as cities and forts were connected together by a network of
and frontier (frontiere).
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rivers and roads. This kind o f map was well suited to the planning o f military campaigns 
or the collection of tribute and taxes, for it illustrated the lines o f communication that 
allowed rulers to control the peripheral regions o f their dominions. The second pattern 
was one o f bounded areas, o f a page divided into shapes by straight and curving lines.
This motif allowed rulers to identify and separate different jurisdictions or, more 
commonly, to record the ownership o f real property. In general, the second pattern was 
reserved for plans o f a small scale, and was characteristic o f cadastral maps, which 
illustrated property rights in land.4
The first European maps o f the New World tended to be o f the first type, with the 
difference that political centers were linked to the Americas by an ocean rather than a 
river. The earliest maps were generally compilations o f nautical knowledge, which 
illustrated the features of the American coastline and the rhumb lines that allowed 
European navigators to find their way safely into harbor. This knowledge o f was o f 
greatest interest to pilots and adventurers, who purchased portolan charts made by 
cartographers in the Atlantic ports.5 The mapmakers usually conferred with pilots and 
shipmasters from nearby areas, who provided them with sketches and descriptions of the 
coast. The cartographers supplemented these sketches with information drawn from older 
maps, from which they copied the missing portions o f their charts. The portolan charts
4 On the connection between cartography and the state, see J. B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge, and Power," 
in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds., The Iconography of Landscape: Essavs on the Symbolic 
Representation. Design, and Use o f Past Environments (Cambridge University Press), 277-312. On the 
emergence of cartography as a consequence of the growing scale of societies, see Denis Wood, The Power 
of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, 1992), esp. 38-39. For cross-cultural comparisons, see J. B. Harley 
and David Woodward, eds., The History o f Cartography. 2 vols. to date (Chicago, University o f Chicago 
Press, 1987-); Norman J. W. Thrower, Maps and Civilization: Cartography and Culture in Society 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); P. D. A. Harvey, The History of Topographical Maps: 
Symbols. Pictures and Surveys (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980); Peter Whitfield, The Image o f the 
World: Twenty Centuries of World Maps (San Francisco: Pomengranite Books, 1994).
5 Portolan charts were nautical maps that were commonly used in the Mediterranean during the Middle
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were suitable for shipboard use, providing navigators with careful tracings o f  the 
coastline, along with the compass roses and rhumb lines that allowed the pilots to find 
their bearings and set their course [see Fig. 2.2].6
The workshops that drew the portolan charts were the cartographic equivalent of 
medieval scriptoria, being small guilds o f skilled artisans working with pen and ink to 
produce elaborately decorated documents. Although they did make copies o f their works, 
mass reproduction was beyond their means; by the end of the sixteenth century they had 
become specialists in customized maps made for an exclusive clientele o f  merchants, 
shipmasters, and pilots. Members o f the wider public who had an interest in New World 
exploration had to turn to maps issued by the urban printing presses o f Germany, Italy, 
and the Netherlands. At first made with woodcuts, then by copper engraving, printed 
maps of the Americas were often inserted as supplementary sheets in editions of 
Ptolemy's Geoeraphia that kept readers abreast o f recent exploration in the New World. 
Unlike portolan charts, which scattered the coastline with flags and coats o f arms, printed 
maps tended to be cautious in illustrating political jurisdictions, leaving boundaries 
ambiguous and including only colonial claims that were beyond dispute. Wanting to 
reach as broad a public as possible, commercial map printers avoided alienating potential 
buyers by taking sides in territorial disputes. This political neutrality meant that 
commercial cartographers stood at a distance from the crowns and merchants who backed 
colonial ventures and were not privy to conversations with explorers. Printed maps were
Ages. They were drawn on vellum and were generally accompanied by a written text.
6 Tony Campbell, "Portolan Charts from the Late Thirteenth Century to 1500," in Harley and Woodward, 
History of Cartography, vol. 1,371-463; Morison, European Discovery. 326-38; Seymour I. Schwartz and 
Ralph E. Ehrenberg, The Mapping of America (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1980), 38-40.
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consequently o f little value to navigators, since they were based on information that was 
often ten or twenty years out o f date.7
But for ordinary readers commercial maps provided a compendium of European 
knowledge about the world and illustrated widely shared understandings about the extent 
of colonial claims in the Americas. Gerardus Mercator's celebrated 1569 world map 
offers an example o f how learned Europeans might have imagined North America in the 
mid-sixteenth century [see Fig. 2.3]. At first glance, the form of the map seems familiar 
enough; the continent's coastline has roughly the same shape that it has today and is 
crisscrossed by a grid of longitude and latitude. But upon closer examination, the 
political landscape o f  the map appears alien to present-day sensibilities. The names o f La 
Florida, Apalchen, and Norombega -- a colony, a tribe or mountain range, and a quasi- 
mythical place -  are written in the same size type, as if  they belonged to the same 
category of place. New France (Nova Francia) apparently embraces the entire region 
surrounding the St. Lawrence River, yet Mercator also recognizes native cities such as 
Honguedo (a settlement o f Gaspe, incorrectly placed near the site o f present-day 
Quebec).8 The territorial limits o f the colonies, furthermore, are left ambiguous since 
there are no boundary lines on the map other than the colored wash that tints the 
coastline.
This apparent confusion was not simply a product o f Mercator's ignorance o f the 
New World, for his illustration of Europe jumbles together political labels and 
geographical features in a similar manner. Political jurisdictions such as France and
7 Lloyd A. Brown, The Storv of Maps (New York: Dover Publications, 1949), 113-79. Mapmakers did 
have to please local officials, since maps, like other printed materials, had to pass inspection by 
government censors.
8Jacques Crevel. Honguedo ou rhistoire des premiers easpesiens (Quebec: Gameau, 1970).
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England are mixed together with the cultural regions o f  Germany and Italy, and boundary 
lines are entirely absent. Far from being exceptional, Mercator’s approach to the 
representation of political jurisdictions was typical o f sixteenth-century cartography.
Like other mapmakers of his time, Mercator used the writings o f the Alexandrian 
geographer Claudius Ptolemy as a model for his work. Although none o f Ptolemy's maps 
survived, European cartographers tried to duplicate the image of the world described in 
his Geoeraphia. and their maps were consequently based as much on classical models as 
they were on contemporary reality.9
Cartographers of the late Roman Empire and Middle Ages had paid little attention 
to the definition of boundaries in world maps, being more concerned with the location of 
important places and the direction o f roads and rivers that connected them. The typical 
map placed the emperor or the pope at the center o f the world, with roads radiating out 
from his seat of power in Rome or Constantinople. This cartographic form was a graphic 
expression of the concept of imperium, or the absolute authority o f the emperors and 
popes. The power of popes and emperors was thought to extend to the ends o f the earth, 
making it impossible to represent the outer boundaries o f the empire on maps.
Boundaries might separate provinces or kingdoms, and outposts might mark the limits of 
effective political control, but the ends o f the Empire and Christ's Kingdom, which were 
imbued with spiritual significance, could never be drawn.10
9 James R. Akerman, "Cartography and the Emergence of Territorial States in Western Europe," 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 10 (1982), 85-87.
10 Pol Trousset, "La frontiere romaine et ses contradictions," in Yves Roman, ed.. La frontiere: seminaire 
de recherche (Lyon: GDR-Maison de 1’Orient, 1993), 25-33; C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman 
Empire: A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). The Romans 
made a crucial distinction between fines, which were the boundary lines o f particular provinces, and limes, 
which were outposts that defended areas under Roman control: one might imagine the distinction as one 
between a boundary map and a map of links and nodes.
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By the early years o f European exploration in the Americas, the ideology o f 
imperium had been adopted by many monarchs in Europe, who were eager to curb the 
power of the papacy and to gain an upper hand over noble magnates within their own 
dominions. Most promulgated an attenuated version of imperium, under which the 
absolute authority claimed by early modem monarchs was limited to their own kingdoms. 
But concepts o f imperium became more expansive in the New World, which was open to 
legitimate conquest by Christian kings because it was peopled by "heathens." Limits to 
colonial possessions in the Americas were set only by the competing claims of other 
European powers, which forced the crowns to develop distinct spheres o f influence on the 
continent. Cartographers recognized these spheres of influence by recording the names of 
colonies and placing royal coats o f arms at the center o f their territories. But it made little 
sense to draw boundaries between these territories, not only because their frontiers were 
poorly defined, but because each crown held out the possibility o f further conquests.11
Of course, the symbolic representation o f state sovereignty on maps had only a 
tenuous connection to the actual control exercised by Europeans in North America during 
the sixteenth century. Aside from a few failed attempts at permanent settlement, the sole 
European footholds on North American soil north o f Florida were makeshift stations 
established by traders and fishermen during the summer months, which were privately 
funded and did not depend on the approval o f the crown. The weakness o f royal 
authority in these regions did not necessarily undermine the crowns' claims to their 
possession, for imperium was an innate quality o f the monarchy distinct from the actual
11 On the Roman model and its early modem interpretations, see Anthony Pagden, Lords o f All the World: 
Ideologies of Empire in Spain. Britain, and France, c. 1500-c. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995); Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World. 1492-1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 179-93.
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power exercised by Icings. The French crown had taken the St. Lawrence River, or New 
France, under its jurisdiction because it had established an exclusive right to its 
possession: whether it chose to exercise this right or not was immaterial. There was, in 
other words, a vast gulf between the theory and practice o f sovereignty in the New World. 
The nodes-and-links pattern o f early maps allowed cartographers to finesse this problem 
by leaving the actual extent o f colonial possessions open to interpretation.
Merchants and Monopolies
The gap between theory and practice began to narrow in the seventeenth century, 
as trading companies from France and England established permanent settlements on the 
mainland. Faced with increasingly intense competition in the cod fisheries and fur trade 
during the last decade o f the sixteenth century, merchants in the Atlantic ports looked for 
new sources o f fish and furs and sought monopolies over existing fishing grounds and 
trading posts. Many entrepreneurs also supported the idea o f establishing permanent 
colonies, which prevented competitors from landing on American shores and provided 
their backers with a continual supply of commodities. Like monopolies, permanent 
settlements depended on the support of the crown, since they required a royal charter that 
excluded others from their territory. Although many smaller operators opposed such 
monopolies, politically influential investors in both France and England used their 
connections at court to obtain colonial charters in the first decade o f  the seventeenth 
century.12
12 On the controversy over monopolies, see Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an 
International Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 52-94.
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In 1603, five years after the marquis de La Roche's disastrous attempt to settle lie 
de Sable, Henri IV of France created a commission to draw up a new colonial charter for 
New France, which was ultimately awarded to Pierre du Gua, sieur de Monts, a Protestant 
soldier who had been appointed governor o f Saintonge as a reward for his service to 
Henri during the Wars o f Religion. The charter gave de Monts a ten-year monopoly over 
trade in the lands lying between 40° and 46° o f latitude, or "La Cadie", the name being a 
variation o f L'Arcadia or l'Acadie, a term found in many sixteenth-century maps.13
Around the same time, West Country investors in England were sponsoring a 
series o f reconnaissance voyages to the Gulf o f Maine in the hope of finding new sources 
of fish and other commodities. Ships commanded by Bartholomew Gosnold in 1602, 
Martin Pring in 1603, and George Weymouth in 1605 all returned from their voyages to 
New England with abundant supplies o f fish and furs, as well as a number o f Indian 
captives. They also brought back promising reports o f rich winter fishing grounds off the 
coast o f New England, raising hopes that the region might serve as a base for year-round 
operations. In 1606, a company of investors from Plymouth applied for and received a 
colonial charter from James I, who granted them all the lands between 38° and 45° of 
latitude in North America not in the possession o f the French.14
Both the English and French companies soon moved to make good on their 
claims. In 1604, de Monts set out from Le Havre with a Saintongeais pilot, Samuel de 
Champlain, to chart the coasts of the Bay of Fundy and establish contacts with the 
Indians of Acadia. Champlain remained for three years, mapping the coast between Cape
13 David Buisseret, Henrv IV (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 138-39; DHSM 7:1-6; "Defense 
du Roi...," PAC. AN, Serie C l 1 A, vol. I, fol. 48-51.
14 Faith Harrington, '"Wee Tooke Great Store of Cod-Fish': Fishing Ships and the First Settlements on the 
Coast of New England, 1600-1630," in Baker et al., American Beginnings. 192-97; DHSM. 7:6-12.
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Sable and Cape Cod and helping to establish a small settlement at Port Royal. Toward 
the end of his stay, in 1607, a party o f Englishmen led by George Popham, son o f Lord 
Chief Justice John Popham, established a rival colony at the headwaters o f  the Kennebec 
River. Both colonies were short-lived: the settlement at Port Royal was abandoned in 
1613 after it was sacked by a fleet from Virginia, while the Popham colony barely lasted 
a year, with many of its inhabitants dying from disease and hunger. Yet the two colonies 
represented the beginnings o f a determined effort to establish a permanent European 
presence in North America, an effort that would bear fruit in the ensuing decades.
Compared to the seasonal voyages of sixteenth-century fishermen and fur traders, 
these enterprises required enormous expenditures on the part o f their financial backers. 
With little chance o f receiving immediate returns on their investment, colonial companies 
had to supply and outfit ships to transport the settlers, furnish them with several months' 
provisions and a stock o f merchandise to trade with Indians, and advance the funds and 
materials necessary to build houses and fortifications. While fishing voyages received 
their backing from small circles o f creditors in the port towns, colonial ventures 
demanded a much larger outlay o f capital and depended on wider networks o f investors. 
In England, the projectors responsible for these colonies looked to inland commercial 
centers for new sources o f credit and found a large and diverse group o f investors who 
were becoming increasingly speculative and aggressive in their dealings. In France, 
merchants o f various port towns banded together to support colonial enterprise jointly. 
With access to a more substantial pool of capital, seventeenth-century entrepreneurs in
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both countries had a better chance to succeed in New World ventures than their 
predecessors o f the previous century.15
To protect their territories against competitors, colonial investors also needed 
political backing from the crown, typically in the form o f a charter. This kind of 
recognition tended to be difficult to obtain, for when monopolies were granted they 
frequently gave rise to cries o f corruption and political favoritism. Faced with a threat to 
their livelihood, rival firms vociferously and often successfully opposed the charters, as 
when the protests of Malouin merchants forced King Henri HI to revoke the monopoly he 
had granted in 1588 to Etienne Chaton and Jacques Noel for the fur trade in Canada. The 
success o f colonial companies consequently depended on their ability to enlist the support 
of gentlemen and nobles with influence at court and to convince the wider public that 
royal charters were necessary to the well-being of colonial enterprise.16
Pursuing political leverage and a far-flung network o f investors, colonial 
companies undertook extensive public relations campaigns, designed to convince others 
of the benefits o f overseas colonies and the need for trade monopolies to ensure their 
success. Beginning with Richard Hakluyt, colonial promoters from the late sixteenth 
century issued dozens o f books, handbills, and pamphlets describing riches o f the New
15 Carole Shammas, "English Commercial Development and American Colonization, 1560-1620," in K. R. 
Andrews, N. P. Canny, and P. E. H. Hair, eds., The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in [reland, the 
Atlantic, and America. 1480-1650 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), 151-74; Patrick 
McGrath, "Bristol and America, 1480-1631," in idem., 81-102; Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise and Empire: 
Merchant Investment in the Expansion of England. 1575-1630 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967), esp. 23-25; Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade. Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the 
Genesis of the British Empire. 1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 310-12; Marcel 
Trudel, The Beginnings o f New France (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 68-70. The English and 
French undertook different investment strategies. The English relied above all on joint-stock companies, 
which were legal corporations that spread the risk of colonization among a large pool of investors, while 
the French raised funds through informal networks of merchants, shipmasters, and courtiers.
16 Henry P. Biggar, The Early Trading Companies o f New France: A Contribution to the History of 
Commerce and Discovery in North America (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1901), 34-35; Trudel, 
Beginnings of New France. 58-60. On English political controversies surrounding monopolies, see Linda
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World and exhorting their readers to take the lead in exploiting them. Published by the 
printing shops o f  Paris and London, this propaganda circulated throughout the provinces, 
finding a ready market among nobles, merchants, and gentlemen seeking outlets for their 
capital.17
Many of the publications included maps drawn by pilots and officials who had 
visited the colonies. Like the texts they illustrated, these maps were colored by the 
political interests of their authors, presenting an image o f the New World that legitimized 
the claims of the colonial companies. The first printed maps o f Acadia and New France, 
included as plates in Marc Lescarbot's Histoire de la Nouvelle France, reinforced the 
colonial vision of Monts and his lieutenant, Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt. Lescarbot 
was Poutrincourt's lawyer and had accompanied him to Port Royal in 1606, returning to 
France the following year when Monts's charter was revoked. In 1609, he published an 
account of his stay in Acadia, to which he added an idiosyncratic history o f sixteenth- 
century voyages to North America and an epic poem recounting a raid led by the 
Mi'kmaq sagamore Membertou on a village at Saco.
Like the accompanying text, the several maps included in Lescarbot's work were a 
mixture o f informative detail and thinly-veiled propaganda. His large-scale map o f New 
France and Acadia [Fig. 2.4], copied from Champlain's sketches of the coast and 
engraved by Jan Swelinck, depicted the Bay o f Fundy for the first time in a European 
map. The plate's imagery suggested the importance o f fish and furs to the colony, dotting 
the sea with fishing banks and scattering the coastline with wigwams. A cornucopia of 
maize and grapes at the lower left-hand comer illustrated the region's potential wealth,
Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Earlv Stuart England (London: Routledge, 1993), 134-60.
17 Rabb, Enterprise and Empire. 25-26.
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and the Bourbon coat o f arms, placed above it, signified royal sanction o f Poutrincourt's 
enterprise. The various crosses placed at points o f French control also reminded the 
reader that the colony was an outpost o f Christianity. This symbolism equated the private 
interests of Lescarbot's client with the public good, making it clear that the colony not 
only brought profits to its investors, but extended Christian knowledge and royal 
authority into the New World. Since Poutrincourt had intensively lobbied for the renewal 
of his monopoly since 1607, Lescarbot's map amounted to a graphic legal brief on his 
client’s behalf.18
"Upon View o f the Mapps"
Although it is their promotional quality that is most striking, the maps 
commissioned by early colonizing companies also had utilitarian value. The leaders of 
the companies were faced with the problem of controlling and developing lands that lay 
an ocean away. Maps were a vital tool to these men, for they gave a concrete form to 
their possession, which was otherwise an abstraction. A clearly-drawn plan enabled 
investors to survey their lands as if they were a chessboard on which various pieces — 
settlers, forts, ships -- could be played. With their possessions laid out before them on a 
map, the shareholders o f companies had a ready knowledge o f limits and location o f their 
patents, making it possible to sell, divide, or bequeath them with relative ease. One o f the 
most notable instances o f this way o f using maps was the division o f the New England 
patent. Following the failure o f the Popham colony, the members o f the Plymouth 
company had put the settlement o f New England on hold, devoting their funds to fishing
18 Marc Lescarbot, History o f New France, ed. and trans. W. L. Grant (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 
1907); "Lescarbot, Marc," in DCB 1:469-72; Schwartz, The Mapping of America. 88-90.
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expeditions instead. But the growing number o f vessels sailing to fish in the wintertime 
off the coast o f New England in the second decade o f the seventeenth century had revived 
interest in permanent settlement.19
In 1620, a group of over forty gentlemen and nobles led by Sir Ferdinando Gorges 
formed the Council for New England, a body that assumed control over the northern 
portion o f the original 1606 charter. Two years later, the council divided the patent into 
shares, with each member o f the council receiving a tract o f land along the coastline. 
Lacking any first-hand knowledge o f the region, the council assigned shares "upon view 
of the mapps," which provided knowledge o f the location and names o f  rivers, bays, and 
islands. The boundaries o f each individual tract were defined by rivers and imaginary 
lines that extended through the interior. The Duke of Lenox, for example, was given a 
patent for rectangular tract extending fifteen miles eastward from the mouth o f the Saco 
River and thirty miles northwest into the interior. A second division took place at 
Greenwich in 1623, with the council presenting King Charles I with a map of all the 
coasts and lands of New England, carefully apportioned into 20 individual shares. The 
division of the patent was recorded in a 1624 map by Sir William Alexander, the Earl of 
Stirling, who had himself received a charter for Nova Scotia in 1621. The map was 
printed in support o f Alexander’s own claims in Nova Scotia, but it also took note o f the 
grants o f the Council for New England, inscribing the names o f  each shareholder along 
the coastline to indicate the tracts they had received [see Fig. 2.5].20
19 Only six or seven English vessels fished on the New England coast in 1620; by 1624 the number had 
risen to fifty or so. See Harrington, '"Wee Took Great Store o f Cod-Fish,'" 203-207.
20 DHSM 7: 20-45, 61-64 , 73-75, cit. 63.
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Brian Harley has singled out Alexander's map as an instructive example of the 
imaginative power o f cartography.21 Not only did the map erase all signs o f native 
possession in the region it described, it allowed the patentees to divide a distant region 
into political jurisdictions and alienable property. Without ever having laid eyes on the 
New World, Harley points out, the Council neatly portioned New England into shares to 
be held in perpetuity. Yet this power had its limits, since the division o f shares was 
essentially meaningless if the Council did not succeed in establishing and protecting its 
monopoly. Determining the boundaries o f a tract was only the first step o f land 
ownership: full possession would come only when the boundaries were also marked and 
defended. While the Council had successfully completed the first step, the second and 
third steps, as they were soon to learn, would be far more difficult.
The division of the patent was never consummated and the inaction o f most of the 
patentees left the initiative for settling New England in the hands o f Gorges and Captain 
John Mason, who had recently completed a six year term of service as governor of 
Newfoundland. In 1622, Gorges and Mason had obtained a joint charter for the province 
of Maine, which extended from the Merrimack to the Sagadahock rivers, reaching sixty 
miles inland. The following year, the Council issued a grant o f6,000 acres in Maine to 
Christopher Levett, a mariner from Somersetshire, and several months later Levett sailed 
to New England to trade for furs and to find a suitable spot for settlement. When he 
arrived, he found numerous fishermen and traders plying the coastal waters, even though 
the New England charter’s banned ships from visiting the coast without a license. 
Determined to defend the Council's authority in New England, Levett approached one o f
21 J. B. Harley, "New England Cartography and the Native Americans," in Baker et al., American 
Beginnings. 309-11.
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the leading traders in Casco Bay and reminded him that he was acting against the law.
The trader dismissed Levett's charge out o f hand. Claiming that the Council had "sent 
men over into [New England] with commissions, to make a prey of others," he told 
Levett that "he cared not for any authority in that place, and though he was forbid to 
truck, yet would he have all he could get." He was both willing and able to defend this 
claim against his rivals, Levett noted, having seventeen pieces o f ordnance and fifty men 
on his ship.22
The trader did not speak only for himself, for many other small operators chafed 
at the Council's restrictions. The year before, Gorges had sent his son Robert along with 
Captain Francis West to New England to enforce the company’s regulations, but the 
fishermen of the region -  "stubeme fellows," as West called them -  paid him no mind.23 
The problem was that the Council's monopoly lacked teeth: Gorges and his colleagues 
received neither financial nor military backing from the crown and did not have the 
means to defend thousands of miles o f coastline against well-armed fishermen. 
Independent operators could ignore the warnings o f West and other company agents, 
since in practical terms the company possessed little authority on the American side of 
the Atlantic.
To prevent their competitors from fishing and trading on the coasts, colonizers 
would have to establish permanent outposts manned by company agents. Lacking the 
means to fund such stations itself, the cash-strapped Council issued land grants to 
individual entrepreneurs, assigning them exclusive rights to fish and trade at strategic 
points along the coast. In return, these entrepreneurs upheld the authority o f the Council
22 DHSM 7: 64-73, Levett, Voyage. 89-91.
23 Quoted in Innis, Cod Fisheries. 73. The fishing monopoly was revoked by Parliament in 1624.
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in New England and in many cases pledged to bring over a required number o f settlers 
within a stipulated term o f years. Beginning in the early 1620s, the Council allotted the 
islands and bays o f New England in a piecemeal fashion to various merchants, 
gentlemen, and colonizing companies. As early as 1622, Gorges had established a fishing 
station at Damariscove Island, and over the next ten years other English investors 
launched operations at Cape Newagen, Piscataqua, Monhegan, Pemaquid, and Richmond 
Island. Fur trading posts also sprung up along the region's waterways, some supported by 
West Country merchants, others by the Plymouth colonists o f southern New England. By 
the early 1630s, these outposts were joined by a growing number o f  permanent settlers 
who farmed the lands adjacent to the coast and along the banks o f rivers.24
Although the growth o f English settlement strengthened the Council's grasp of the 
region, it did not eliminate challenges to its authority. Land grants merely shifted the 
burden of defending claims onto the shoulders of individual patentees. For those who 
held patents to fur trading posts, the defense of title often involved violence or threats of 
violence since there was no civil authority that protected their trading rights. Traders had 
a vested interest in keeping their rivals from encroaching on their territories because 
competition for furs allowed Indians to sell to the lowest bidder and thereby reduce the 
traders' profits. Often the only way they could keep their competitors from trading 
nearby was to threaten them with muskets and shot.
The fur trade was a high-risk enterprise that promised enormous profits but also 
entailed the possibility o f heavy losses and violent confrontation. Like privateers and
24 Edwin A. Churchill, "English Beachheads in Seventeenth-Century Maine," in Richard W. Judd, Edwin 
A. Churchill, and Joel W. Eastman, eds., Maine: The Pine Tree State from Prehistory to the Present 
(Orono: University of Maine Press, 1995), 52-54; Francis X. Moloney, The Fur Trade in New England- 
1620-1676 (Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1967), 27-40.
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pirates, the men who engaged in the trade were often adventurous types eager to get rich 
quickly. Some had few scruples when it came to business practices and sought to make 
their profits by hoodwinking their native trading partners or stealing from their European 
rivals. The near-absence of state authority at trading posts meant that the victims' only 
avenue of redress was to take violent revenge for their injuries. The earliest permanent 
English resident of Richmond Island, Walter Bagnall, was killed by Wabanakis for 
trading abuses in 1631, making him the first in a long line o f frontier traders whose shady 
dealings were punished by death.25 The intense competition o f  the fur trade, combined 
with the weakness of state authority and absence o f strong social ties, meant that frontier 
traders had little reason to trust each other. To gain a measure o f security in the region, 
traders had to develop alliances with Wabanakis and other Europeans, or intimidate rivals 
through displays of force. The second option was chosen as often as the first, leaving the 
early years of the fur trade in New England punctuated by violence.
Some of the best known incidents occurred at the Plymouth colony’s northern 
trading posts, which had been established in the late 1620s. Burdened with debts and 
sorely in need of exportable commodities, the colony had sent a ship to the Kennebec 
River in 1625 which returned laden with seven hundred pounds o f furs. The Pilgrims 
returned to the Kennebec over the next several years, and by 1629 they had established a 
permanent trading post at Cushnoc and obtained a patent to the lands adjoining the river. 
They began another post at the Penobscot River the same year, and in 1631 they started a 
trade at Machias. The easternmost stations fell within the jurisdiction o f French trader 
Charles de la Tour, whose father had been in Acadia since 1610. In 1632, the Treaty of 
St. Germain had returned Acadia to the French crown and La Tour received a commission
25 William Willis, "History of Portland," Maine Historical Society, Collections, ser.l, 1 (1831): 21.
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from the French king for the governorship o f Acadia. In 1633, he sent a group o f men to 
Machias, who killed two of the Plymouth traders, seized all their goods, and sent the 
remaining captives back to France. The same year, a party o f French landed at 
Penobscot, forcing the Plymouth traders to hand over some £400 or £500 in furs and 
other merchandise. Two years later, another party of French, this time led by La Tour's 
rival, Charles Menou d'Aulnay, removed the Plymouth traders for good, forcing them to 
hand over their trade goods and abandon their post.26
The Plymouth colony was troubled by English competitors as well. In 1634 a 
Piscataqua trader named John Hocking sailed up the Kennebec River, intending to go 
beyond Cushnoc to fetch furs. The captain of Cushnoc, John Howland, refused him 
passage, but Hocking ignored the order and anchored his pinnace upriver. When 
Howland sent his men in canoes to cut the ship's cables, Hocking fired upon them, killing 
Moses Talbot. A friend o f Talbot shot back and Hocking fell to his death. One of 
Hocking's kinsmen sought justice for the murder, writing to the proprietors o f the 
Piscataqua colony in England and applying to Governor John Winthrop o f Massachusetts 
Bay for a trial. Winthrop set a date for a hearing at Boston, but the representatives from 
Piscataqua failed to appear and the governor let the matter drop.27
Although Plymouth's governor, William Bradford, lauded Winthrop's handling of 
the case, the decision not to prosecute anyone for the murders owed as much to the
26 William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation. 1620-1647. ed. Samuel Morison (New York: Knopf, 1953), 
244-46,275-77; Leon E. Cranmer, Cushnoc: History and Archaeology o f Plymouth Colony Traders on the 
Kennebec. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology No. 7 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic 
Preservation Commission, 1990); Moloney, Fur Trade. 25-31. La Tour had also received a baronetcy in 
Nova Scotia from William Alexander in 1630.
27 Bradford, Plymouth. 262-68; Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, and Laetitia Yeandle, eds., The Journal of 
John Winthrop. 1630-1649 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1996), 114-15,122-23, 131; Shurtleff, 
Records of Massachusetts. 1 :119. The English backers o f the Piscataqua colony were Puritans, led by 
Lords Saye and Brooke, who corresponded with Winthrop.
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weakness o f colonial government as it did to Winthrop's wise jurisprudence. Fur traders 
tended to be independent-minded men who did not brook political interference in their 
affairs unless it worked in their favor. Unable to muster much in the way o f military 
force, colonial authorities could not cudgel them into submission and had little muscle in 
the more distant parts of their jurisdiction. Traders aligned themselves with particular 
colonies, investors, companies, and even crowns as it suited their purposes, not out o f a 
reflexive sense of allegiance. It is anachronistic in this sense to treat them as 
representatives o f nation states, since their primary attachments were local: to family, to 
partners, to patrons. Not only are there many examples o f peaceful cooperation between 
members of different national groups in the region during the seventeenth century, there 
were also some notable instances in which traders who were ostensibly subjects o f the 
same crown fought for control o f the same territories. In Acadia, the La Tour family and 
Charles d'Aulnay feuded for nearly twenty years over the control o f the Acadian fur trade, 
with each party claiming to be the rightful governor o f the province.28
Two Kinds o f Colony
Yet the national origins o f traders mattered to the extent that French and English 
leaders pursued different strategies o f colonization. The early rulers o f Acadia were 
nearly all noblemen who had received offices and grants o f land from the king as a 
reward for military service. The rules o f derogeance, which prevented nobles from 
pursuing occupations that were not suitable to their rank, kept them from engaging in
28 On examples of intercultural cooperation, see John G. Reid, "An International Region o f the Northeast: 
Rise and Decline, 1635-1762," in Stephen J. Hornsby, Victor A. Konrad, and James J. Herlan, The 
Northeastern Borderlands: Four Centuries of Interaction (Fredericton. N. B.: University of Maine and 
Acadiensis Press, 1989), 10-25. On the contest between La Tour and Aulnay, see M. A. McDonald,
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manufactures or other "demeaning" commercial activities. But the fur trade, with its 
attendant risks and promise of adventure, was an occupation open to them, and they 
sought to make it second only to the fisheries in order o f economic importance.29
Acadia's proprietors did sponsor the migration o f a few hundred French men and 
women, the majority o f them settling along the tidal flats o f the Bay of Fundy. The lands 
in these areas were nominally held under a seigneurial system o f tenure, but tenants' fees 
were negligible in comparison to the great profits to be reaped from the fur trade and 
fisheries, and lords often did not bother to collect them. With the energies o f leaders such 
as La Tour and Aulnay devoted primarily to the fur trade, the Acadian settlements 
developed as relatively autonomous and self-regulating communities. Settlement was 
concentrated in the coastal areas o f the Acadian peninsula -- there were never more than a 
hundred French people living west of the St. John River valley — and the seigneuries that 
were granted in southwestern Acadia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were essentially monopolies that gave their holders exclusive rights to trade along 
rivers.30
The trading outposts La Tour and Aulnay established in southwestern Acadia 
between the St. John and Penobscot rivers were bastonaded forts made o f stone, and were 
clearly intended to be permanent establishments. At Pentagoet, Aulnay erected a mill and
Fortune and La Tour The Civil War in Acadia (Toronto: Methuen. 1983).
29 Two of the founders of Acadia had served as governors of frontier provinces in France before they made 
their way across the Atlantic: Monts was governor of Pons in Saintonge, and Poutrincourt governor of 
Mery-sur-Seine in Champagne. See "Biencourt de Poutrincourt et de Saint-Just, Jean de," and "Du Gua de 
Monts, Pierre," in DCB 1:96,291.
30 Andrew Hill Clark, Acadia: The Geoaranhv of Earlv Nova Scoria to 1760 (Madison, Wis.: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1968), esp. 90-95,113-15. According to a French census o f 1687-88, there were only 58 
French senlers and 3 soldiers west of the S t John River valley, with only 22 acres in the region under 
cultivation. With an estimated population o f445, Indians far outnumbered the French at these settlements. 
See "General Census o f the Country o f Acadia, 1687-1688," in William Inglis Morse, ed., Acadiensia Nova 
U 598-17791. 2 vols (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1935), 1:144-60.
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a farmstead and built several ships using lumber from nearby areas. In order to develop a 
bond of trust with their trading partners, leading fur traders also made alliances with their 
Wabanaki neighbors: the younger La Tour even married a Wabanaki woman. The 
importance of these alliances to the fur trade, combined with the nobles' highly cultivated 
sense o f honor, made French traders unlikely to cheat the Wabanakis in their commercial 
dealings.31
The English trading posts, by contrast, were sparsely furnished wooden buildings 
manned by agents of trading firms from England and southern New England. The 
stations' ramshackle architecture was a consequence o f their impermanence, since most 
English merchants treated the fur trade as a temporary measure that would raise the 
capital necessary to pay off debts, purchase land, and launch other business enterprises. 
Southern New England's Puritan and Separatist leaders tended to regard fur traders with a 
degree of suspicion -  on various occasions, William Bradford referred to traders as 
"profane", "base fellows", and "loose and drunken fellows" -- and countenanced their 
libertine way of life only because the colonies needed the quick profits that came from 
the trade. The transitory character o f the trading posts left English colonists with 
relatively little interest in diplomacy with their native neighbors. Marriage between
31 Alaric Faulkner, "Gentility on the Frontiers of Acadia, 1635-1674: An Archaeological Perspective," 
Dublin Seminar for New England Folklife. Annual Proceedings 14 (1989): 82-100; Alaric Faulkner and 
Gretchen Faulkner, The French at Pentagoet. 1635-1674: An Archaeological Portrait o f the Acadian 
Frontier. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, No. 5 (Saint John, N. B. and Augusta, Me.: New 
Brunswick Museum and Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1987), esp. 1-20; Naomi Griffiths, 
"1600-1650: Fish, Fur, and Folk," in Philip A. Buckner and John G. Reid, eds., The Atlantic Region to 
Confederation: A History (Fredericton, N. B. and Toronto: Acadiensis Press and University of Toronto 
Press, 1994), 59. The ideology of nobility, both in the Old World and the New, was in tension with the 
emergent commercialism of French life. Nobles paid lip service to the feudal belief that commerce was 
dishonorable, yet they actively sought out new sources o f  wealth to support their genteel way of life. The 
noble background of the early colonizers did not make them reluctant to engage in commercial enterprise; 
to the contrary, they aggressively searched for economic opportunities. Aulnay, for example, built several 
ships at Pentagouet on the Penobscot River and owned farmland near the fort. But these activities were a 
supplement to the fur trade, and Aulnay would never have styled himself a merchant, a farmer, or a
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Wabanakis and English settlers was unheard of, and when Plymouth's authorities 
discovered that a trader named Edward Ashley had engaged in sexual relations with 
native women, they sharply reprimanded him for his "uncleanness."32
The social and religious background of Plymouth's authorities helps to explain 
their ambivalence toward the fur trade. The leaders of southern New England tended to 
be members of the gentry with little military experience and a distrust o f courtly life. 
Although they recognized the importance o f fisheries and the fur trade to the prosperity of 
their region, men such as Bradford and Winthrop hoped to establish colonies that were 
"plantations," or settlements with agriculture as the dominant economic activity. Devout 
Calvinists, they believed that people should slowly accumulate their wealth through 
discipline and hard work, rather than seizing it by plunder and profiteering. They 
expected that husbandry and industry, pursuits that required diligent labor, would become 
the basis of their colonies. The fur trade in New England was expected to be a prop to 
settlement and not an end in itself.33
The permanent settlers who arrived in northern New England in the 1630s and 
1640s did not necessarily share the religious beliefs o f their neighbors to the south, but 
they did have the same economic aspirations. Brought over as servants o f fishing 
companies or as tenants o f the Council's patent holders, English people purchased and 
settled parcels o f land along the coasts and rivers, with the largest communities
shipbuilder.
32 Cranmer, Cushnoc. esp. 51, 89; Bradford, History. 219,232-33,244-45; Emerson W. Baker, The Clarke 
and Lake Company: The Historical Archaeology of a Seventeenth-Centurv Maine Settlement. Occasional 
Publications in Maine Archaeology No. 4 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission,
1985),10-12,62. According to a French report o f  1715, the Wabanakis o f Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and 
the St. John River never married English settlers, war captives included. See letter o f Begon to the 
Ministre de la Marine, September 25,1715, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 35, fol. 116.
33 Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New 
York: Norton, 1995), esp. 64-106.
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developing at Strawberry Bank (Portsmouth) and Kittery along the Piscataqua River. 
While the inhabitants of coastal fishing stations and interior trading posts were 
predominantly unattached young men, settlers usually arrived as nuclear families headed 
by middle-aged fathers.34 Like other English people o f their time, these families hoped to 
acquire the economic independence that came from land ownership. Agricultural land in 
seventeenth-century England was the primary source o f productive wealth, providing 
families with food and other products for home consumption and commodities for 
exchange. It was also a patrimony that could be passed from one generation to the next, 
allowing children to enjoy the fruits o f their parents' labor. Without land, a family would 
be dependent on others for its economic well-being; with a small allotment o f acres its 
members could become comfortably self-reliant.35
While land was scarce in the Old World, it was abundant in New England, making 
it possible for a wide section of the colonial population to acquire real property. Vast 
areas of land in the region were opened to settlers as crowns and colonies established 
their jurisdictions in the New World. Because the possession o f land depended on the 
political control of these authorities, land owners were forced to pay taxes or other fees to 
their government, essentially as a form of tribute. Maine's earliest settlers did not have 
absolute rights to their lands but held them under socage tenure, whereby a tenant's rights 
to the land were derived from his lord. Sir Ferdinando Gorges envisioned a colony with a 
seigneurial system of land tenure, in which settlers would receive the protection o f their
34 In the 1640s, the government of Maine passed an act forbidding women from living on the Isles of 
Shoals, the main site for fishing stations at the mouth of the Piscataqua River. See Charles T. Libby, Neal 
W. Allen, and Robert E. Moody, eds., Province and Court Records of Maine. 6 vols. (Portland, Me.: Maine 
Historical Society, 1928-75), 1: 119. (Future references to this series appear as PCRM.l
35 Daniel Vickers, "Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” William and 
Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 48 (1990): 3-29.
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lords in exchange for quit rents and work duties. In the early land grants, tracts o f land 
were leased to patent holders for annual fees, with the expectation that the patentees 
would in turn receive rents from the settlers they transported to the colony.36
"We Shall Understand a Little Geogrijy"
One of the earliest patentees to settle in the colony was Edward Godfrey, a 
merchant from London who had been associated with the Council for New England since 
the early 1620s. Around 1630, he had migrated to Maine, establishing residence along 
the Agamenticus (York) River. In 1636, Godfrey returned to England and obtained a 
patent from the Council for the lands lying to the south o f Gorges's possessions along the 
river. Several years later, Godfrey and his associates divided the 12,000 acres o f the 
patent amongst themselves, with Godfrey and his partners receiving a substantial portion 
of the tract. The settlers who lived on his lands asked him to confirm their title, and he 
complied, granting deeds and running the bounds of their estates. By 1655, at least 
seventeen inhabitants owning over six hundred acres o f land traced their title to deeds 
issued by Godfrey.37
Although Godfrey hoped to receive a return on his investment by collecting rents 
and other dues from his tenants, he discovered that many settlers were reluctant to 
comply. In a 1654 petition to the General Court o f Massachusetts Bay, he complained 
that the inhabitants o f York had divided and shared a large portion o f patent's unallocated
36 John G. Reid, Acadia. Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 104-6; Edwin A. Churchill, 'Too Great the Challenge: The 
Birth and Death of Falmouth, Maine, 1624-1676" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maine, 1979), 122-24.
37 Charles E. Banks, History of York. Maine. 2 vols. (Boston, 1931-35; reprint ed., Baltimore: Regional 
Publishing Co., 1967), 1:46-50,81, 133: DHSM 4:121,127; William M. Sargent, "The Division of the 
12,000 Acres Among the Patentees at Agamenticus," Maine Historical Society Collections. 2nd ser., vol. 2 
(1891): 319-27.
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lands amongst themselves. Remarking that settlers had taken control o f most o f the 
marshland in the patent -- marshes being prized as pasture for livestock ~  he claimed that 
his "Rentes and acknowledgments" had "been detayned," leaving him without enough 
marsh to feed even five head o f cattle.38
The tension between Godfrey and the inhabitants of York had been exacerbated 
by Massachusetts Bay's 1651 annexation o f most o f Maine's settlements. In the 1640s the 
outbreak of civil war in England had forced Gorges to neglect the administration his 
colony, leaving the Bay colony with the opportunity to assume control o f his lands. 
Massachusetts leaders managed to do so with relative ease, partly because their 
landholding system was more appealing to settlers than the seigneurial regime o f Maine. 
Lands in Massachusetts were held under "free" socage tenure, which allowed people to 
purchase and possess tracts without paying entry fees, quit rents, or other manorial 
exactions. Landowners held their titles in perpetuity and received their grants directly 
from the towns or the colony. As Joseph Wood has put it, towns in colonial 
Massachusetts were "effectively manors without lords."39 To many of Maine's settlers, 
rule by Massachusetts Bay offered an opportunity to gain a clearer title to their land, 
unencumbered by quit rents and work duties. Godfrey, on the other hand, actively 
opposed annexation, knowing that it would wrest power from local magistrates and place 
it in the hands o f the Massachusetts General Court. By 1652, it was clear that the battle
38 DHSM 4: 121-22; Reid, Maine. Acadia, and New Scotland. 133-35. Godfrey was not the only 
proprietor whose lands were divided by inhabitants. After the deaths o f Sir Ferdinando Gorges and 
Captain John Mason, thirty settlers at Kittery and Agamenticus (York) divided the lands of their patents 
amongst themselves and seized the mills built by Mason. See DHSM 4:94-95.
39 Joseph S. Wood. The New England Village (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 38.
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had been lost and Godfrey petitioned the Massachusetts General Court for confirmation 
of his land titles.40
Though Godfrey had denigrated the Court, accusing them only six months earlier 
of attempting to "ingraspe" Maine's lands, the magistrates o f Massachusetts grudgingly 
accorded Godfrey's request. Throughout the controversy over annexation, they had 
promised not to interfere with existing property rights, and in setting up an inquest into 
Godfrey's titles, they were merely keeping their w ord41 The refusal to punish Godfrey or 
any others for their opposition signaled the determination o f Massachusetts leaders to 
remain impartial in the adjudication o f disputes over real property. Custom and legal 
title, untarnished by political favoritism or personal vindictiveness, would continue to be 
the basis o f land ownership.
This approach placed objective criteria, such as the placement o f fences and the 
content o f written deeds, above social considerations in the adjudication o f property 
disputes. While the seigneurial system was defined by human relationships, particularly 
the ties that bound tenants to their lord, the laws o f Massachusetts emphasized the 
owner's exclusive right to enjoy his property. The defense o f this right was grounded not 
in self-interested individualism but in the knowledge that disputes over property were a 
threat to social harmony. By making property rights explicit and exactly defined, the 
leaders o f Massachusetts allowed judges and juries to adjudicate disputes on the basis of 
criteria that were in theory impartial and impervious to political influence. As early as 
1647, the General Court passed a law requiring selectmen to run the boundaries o f their
40 DHSM 4: 36-7. By the second half of the seventeenth century, most o f the seigneurial provisions of 
land deeds -  time limits on leases, work duties, quit rents — had disappeared, making freeholds virtually 
the only form of tenure in Maine. See Churchill, 'Too Great the Challenge," 269-70.
41 DHSM 4: 17; Shurtleff, Records of Massachusetts. 3:333-34,363.
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towns every three years, taking care to record and maintain the ditches and stones that 
marked the limits o f their jurisdiction. The preamble o f the law explained that the 
"deficiency and decay o f markes" caused "great jealousies o f persons, troubles in townes, 
and incumbrances in Corts."42 Soon after their annexation, the towns o f southern Maine 
were ordered to perform similar perambulations, with explicit orders not to interfere with 
existing property rights. Wrangling over competing claims left local officials unable to 
carry out the surveys themselves, and they were forced to turn to commissioners from 
Boston, who laid out the dividing lines between the towns. By the end o f the century, 
virtually all the boundaries of the southwestern towns of York County had been surveyed 
and agreed upon.43
The annexation o f Maine was itself justified by surveys commissioned by the Bay 
colony. According to the terms of its 1628 charter, the northern limit o f Massachusetts 
Bay was set three miles to the north o f the Merrimack River. At the time, the members of 
the Council for New England believed that the river ran eastward from the interior to the 
coast. But explorers soon discovered that the river changes course some twenty miles 
from the coast, winding northward as far as Lake Winnipesaukee. In August 1652, the 
General Court hired two surveyors to find the northernmost point o f the river, which they 
fixed at a latitude o f 43° 40' 12" north. In November o f  the same year, the Court declared 
this latitude to be the northern limit o f colony, running east-west from sea to sea, and 
renamed the part o f Maine that fell within this line York County [see Fig. 2.6]. Two
42 Shurtleff, Records of Massachusetts. 2:210. Property disputes in Maine tended to be more rancorous 
than in the Bay colony, and in many cases were marked by violent incidents. For examples, see PCRM. 
vol. 1:44, 51-52, 53,58-62, 106-107; vol. 2:24; DHSM. 4:8-9.
43 DHSM 4: 35-36, 64; ShurtlefF, Records of Massachusetts. 3:402; 4/1: 128-31,340,373,375,380,399; 
Kittery Town Records, fols. 93-94; Biddeford Town Records, fols. 25-26, 131; Scarborough Town 
Records, fols. 21-22.
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years later, the Court sent another pair o f  surveyors to Casco Bay to find the same latitude 
along the coast. Using nautical instruments and mathematical calculations, they placed 
the limits of the colony across the bay from Clapboard Island, marking several trees with 
the letters "MB," for Massachusetts Bay.44
Many inhabitants o f Maine saw Massachusetts' actions as a transparent ploy 
designed to justify the Bay colony's aggressive expansion into their jurisdiction.
Godfrey, who had become governor o f the colony following Gorges' death in 1649, wrote 
that he "marvell[ed]" that Massachusetts extended its government from sea to sea, adding 
that "we shall understand a little Geogrify or Cosmogrifie."45 Yet in basing the 
boundaries of the colony on the wording o f their charter and the scientific measurement 
of space, the leaders of Massachusetts simply extended the logic o f property rights to 
include the land possessed by the colony itself. If the annexation o f Maine was a matter 
of applying the letter o f the law, then the General Court's actions were impartial and 
above politics. Working with the pen rather than the sword, the leaders o f the Bay colony 
legitimized their claims by grounding them in documentary title.
The General Court's understanding of its jurisdiction, like its approach to real 
property rights, was based in a belief in the sanctity o f written contract. The Puritans' 
understanding of themselves as a covenanted community, combined with their opposition 
to the absolutist tendencies o f the early Stuart kings, made them committed to the need to 
draw up and to obey written agreements.46 Once the colony's charter, or any other 
transaction, had been framed as a legally binding document, the Puritans believed that the
44 DHSM 4: 18; DHSM 7:273-76; Shurtleff, Records o f Massachusetts. 3:361-62.
45 DHSM 4: 18.
46 Innes, Creatine the Commonwealth. 194-97. The contractualism of Puritan society was also a result of 
their widespread involvement in a commercial economy; the colony itself was originally a joint-stock
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signatories were bound to its terms. When parties interpreted the contract in divergent 
ways, as did Massachusetts Bay and the Council for New England, they could resolve 
their differences by appealing to the provisions o f the contract, which were theoretically 
objective and unbiased, since both parties had agreed to them.
The belief that property rights could be defined objectively was a fiction, since 
there was always a subjective element in the resolution o f property disputes. The 
enforcement of contracts depended on an elaborate social edifice o f laws, courts, 
magistrates, clerks, and governments. These agencies oversaw the drafting o f written 
agreements and punished those who failed to conform to their terms. The validity of land 
deeds and other legal titles was inseparable from the authority o f  such agencies, since 
property owners depended on the protection of courts and governments. When 
governments failed to exert their authority over lands that lay within their jurisdiction, the 
rights o f landowners were placed in danger.
No one knew this better than the patentees who held their lands under Gorges's 
charter. Other than two brief periods, 1636-37 and 1640-45, in which a proprietary 
government held courts and received petitions, the settlers in his colony were left to fend 
for themselves.47 Matters were often confused by vague or overlapping titles which 
assigned portions of land to two or more owners. Lacking an exact knowledge o f the 
region's geography, the Council allocated its lands in a haphazard fashion that made 
disputes between title holders inevitable. One o f the most notable conflicts took place 
between George Cleeve, an entrepreneur and early settler o f  Maine, and John Winter, a 
representative of English merchants Robert Trelawney and Moses Goodyear. As an
company.
47 Gorges's descendants also tried, unsuccessfully, to reestablish proprietary government on two occasions
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incentive to settlement, Sir Ferdinando Gorges had promised Cleeve 2,000 acres of 
unoccupied land in New England, and around 1630 Cleeve had established himself at the 
mouth o f the Spurwink River in Casco Bay. He soon formed a partnership with Richard 
Tucker, who had purchased an adjoining tract. But two years later, the Council issued a 
patent for Richmond Island and the adjoining mainland -  a tract that included the land 
possessed by Cleeve -- to Trelawney and Goodyear. Winter arrived in New England to 
manage their operations the next year and drove Cleeve and Tucker from their original 
settlement, forcing them to relocate on a neck o f land adjoining the Casco River. Cleeve 
returned to England in late 1636 and obtained a patent for the new settlement from 
Gorges, but soon after his return Winter attempted to seize the lands occupied by Cleeve 
and Tucker, again claiming them on behalf o f Trelawney and Goodyear. The dispute was 
left to fester until Sir Ferdinando Gorges sent his nephew Thomas Gorges to Maine late 
in 1639 to establish regular government in the province. The following year, Cleeve 
brought two trespass suits against Winter at a Saco court and both juries found in his 
favor, rewarding him with damages and a confirmation o f his title to the lands on the 
neck.48
The weakness o f property rights and the persistence o f disputes over land owed 
much to the relative absence of a strong provincial government. Because large portions 
of Maine had been distributed in the form o f extensive patents in the 1620s and 1630s, 
much of the authority over land holdings remained in the hand o f individual patentees,
in the 1660s.
48 PCRM. 1: 58-64; Willis, "History of Portland," 21-62; Thomas Gorges to John Winter, [October 1740]; 
Thomas Gorges to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, July 7,1641; Thomas Gorges to Robert Trelawney, [Sept?
1641], in Robert E. Moody, ed., The Letters of Thomas Gorges. Deputy Governor o f the Province of 
Maine. 1640-1643 (Portland. Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1978), 20-22,31-33,73-75; Reid, Maine. 
Acadia, and New Scotland. 106-109,111-14,134. Settlers who held their titles from Winter and Cleeve 
continued to have disputes into the 1660s.
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who were only sporadically checked by provincial authorities. Listing twenty distinct 
land grants within the territory o f  Maine, one anonymous writer in the mid-1630s 
remarked that disputes between settlers o f different patents were "seldome, or never 
ended because there is none in the countrie that hath authority to decide them; every mans 
power beinge limitted, with his owne Patent." Like many other colonists, the observer 
pleaded for the establishment o f a central authority that would adjudicate disputes 
between the patentees, explaining that "[tjhere wants uniformytie in the Lawes and 
Customes o f severall Patents and alsoe a generall unitie, in thinges that conceme the 
publique good of the Countrie."49
The proprietors' inability to provide adequate protection to landholders in the 
province made many settlers receptive to the entreaties o f the Massachusetts Bay, which 
promised regular courts and an orderly system of town government. In a 1656 petition to 
Oliver Cromwell, the supporters o f the Bay colony in Maine complained of the 
proprietors' silence over several years, "both in their tongues and penns," which had let 
the colony "sinke into great distractions," and had forced them to look to Massachusetts 
Bay for effective government.50 Over the next several decades, York's inhabitants began 
to clarify their titles through the county courts, settling land disputes through a series of 
suits and counter-suits. While judges and juries tended to base their decisions on 
customary possession, plaintiffs and defendants in civil suits presented written deeds and 
depositions from knowledgeable neighbors.51
49 Charles E. Banks, ed., "Relation Concerning the Estate of New England, about 1634," New England 
Historical and Genealogical Register 40 (1886): 73.
50 DHSM 4: 139.
51 PCRM. vols. 2-4, passim. Town governments were also had a vested interest in recording of real 
property rights; the town of Wells ordered in 1651 and 1658 ordered a survey o f its marshes to make it 
easier to rate taxes. See PCRM 1:171,2:37
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In the early years o f the colony, the allocation o f  land had taken place informally, 
often without any written documentation or official recording o f property titles.
Typically, proprietors or towns issued grants o f a specified number o f acres to settlers, 
who searched for parcels o f land that could be immediately turned to cultivation.
Because land was abundant and the settler population largely illiterate, few smallholders 
recorded the exact limits o f their estates. Many did not delineate their property 
boundaries until disputes with neighbors over salt marshes and other scarce resources 
forced them into court. But once they became embroiled in land disputes, settlers began 
to appreciate the value o f clearly defined property boundaries. John Treworgy, an early 
settler of Kittery who quarreled with his neighbor John Heard over a marsh near Sturgeon 
Creek, proposed that the dispute be settled by informally dividing the marsh according to 
natural markers such as trees and bushes. "Come, what should wee have difference about 
marsh," he told four of his fellow townspeople, "wee will devid it and live like 
neighbors." Unfortunately, this informal division did not settle the matter; Heard 
successfully sued Treworgy in 1645 for trespassing on his marsh and Treworgy lost a 
counter-suit in 1647. A year before, Treworgy had tried to reclaim the marsh by force but 
had been violently beaten back by Heard's wife. It was perhaps the threat o f such 
unneighborly behavior that caused the town meeting o f Cape Porpoise in 1663 to lay out 
the property boundaries o f six o f its inhabitants ”[f]or the preventing o f striffe, that peace 
and quietnesse may bee mantayned amongst us."52
52 PCRM. 1:93-95, 106-107, cit. 94-95; York Deeds, vol. 1, fol. 145. On the parallel development of 
property boundaries in nearby Essex County, see David T. Konig, "Community Custom and the Common 
Law: Social Change and the Development of Land Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," Journal of 
American Legal History 18 (1974): 137-77.
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Gradually, towns and courts began to accumulate a large store of knowledge 
about property boundaries, transfers o f title, customary uses, and land grants. Although 
the county government did not compile a full-fledged registry o f its lands, its role as an 
arbiter of land disputes and a repository o f deeds and wills forced it to develop an 
extensive understanding of real property rights in its jurisdiction.53 By the 1670s, the 
measurement and description o f land grants issued by both towns and the province 
became increasingly precise. Towns in the last quarter of the seventeenth century began 
to hire or appoint surveyors to lay out the grants and append their signatures to the deeds; 
by the early eighteenth century, virtually every chartered town in York county had 
appointed at least one person to the office o f land surveyor.54 Earlier town grants had 
often been vague; a 1653 deed to Robert Beth and Walter Pemwell from the town of Saco 
(Biddeford) allowed them a tract of land "60 poles in bredth or ther abouts be it more or 
less."55 By the last quarter o f the seventeenth century, towns such as Kittery sometimes 
included small diagrams of the grants in their records and typically described the parcels 
as being "measured and laid out" instead of "granted and laid out," the less precise phrase 
used in grants made before the 1670s [see Fig. 2.7].56
The earliest existing property maps o f Maine date to the 1670s, and in the next 
two decades provincial and town officials stepped up their efforts to place land titles on a
53 Gorges had already established a kind o f informal land registry in his colony; when he first received a 
charter for the province, he issued an order that required all land transactions to be reported to the Council 
for approval. See James P. Baxter, ed., Sir Ferdinando Gorges and His Province o f Maine. 3 vols. (Boston: 
The Prince Society, 1890), 3:67.
54 See, for example, Biddeford Town Records, vol. 1, fol. 143; Brunswick Town Records, vol. 1, 
Appointments for 1720; Kittery Town Records, vol.l, fols. 34ff; vol. 2.
55 Grant to Robert Beth and Walter Pemwell, July 12, 1653, Biddeford Town Records, vol. I, fol. 4.
56 Kittery Town Records, Maine State Archives, Augusta, Maine, vol. I, esp. fols. 34ff; Richard M. 
Candee, "Land Surveys o f William and John Godsoe of Kittery, Maine, 1689-1769," in Peter Benes, ed., 
New England Prospect: Mans. Place Names, and the Historical Landscape. Dublin Seminar for New
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more solid footing. The government o f Massachusetts played an important role in these 
efforts, strengthening its own hand in the process. Merchants and speculators from 
southern New England had been acquiring land titles in Maine since the 1630s, and the 
integration o f the province into the political fold o f Massachusetts offered them an 
opportunity to purchase new holdings or to protect the legal basis o f their existing deeds. 
In 1680, two years after the Gorges family had ceded its outstanding claims to Maine to 
Massachusetts in exchange for £1,250, the General Court reorganized the government o f 
the province. The General Court appointed Thomas Danforth, a magistrate from 
Cambridge, to the office of president o f Maine. Danforth was given the powers o f a 
colonial proprietor, having the right to grant new townships to existing towns or 
companies, confirm land titles granted in the past, or grant lands of his own accord. 
Among the earliest actions of this government was an order requesting a survey of lands 
in Maine.57
Virtually the same powers were assumed by Edmund Andros, who was appointed 
governor-general o f the Dominion of New England in 1686. A fierce defender o f  the 
royal prerogative, Andros sought to make the crown rather than the provincial 
government the ultimate source o f land titles in the colonies. He ordered that New 
England's inhabitants would have to validate all future land purchases with new deeds 
and would be forced to pay quitrents on the same. Although many New Englanders were 
outraged by the reforms, several prominent landowners in Maine with connections to 
Andros's regime eagerly seized the opportunity to place their holdings on a more solid
England Folklife Annual Proceedings (Boston: Boston University Press, 1980), 9-46. The first map 
included in the Kittery town records was dated March 2,1696: see vol. I, fol. 71.
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footing. They convinced many neighbors with more modest estates to do likewise: the 
result was a flood of petitions that requested confirmation of new or existing tracts o f 
land to the eastward; well over a hundred settlers applied to Andros for deeds to their 
land.58 Surveyor Richard Clements measured out twenty-three such grants in Falmouth 
to local allies of the Andros administration [see Fig. 2.8].59 Because the region's settlers 
welcomed this opportunity to gain more secure title to their lands, many had no qualms 
about paying hefty fees to the Andros government in return for a survey of their lands and 
a confirmation of their deeds. Several landholders from Massachusetts who had gained 
title to large patents under the presidency o f Thomas Danforth were outraged by Andros's 
rejection o f their titles but it was Andros's dismissal o f existing land rights, not the 
involvement o f the provincial government, that stoked their ire.60
Some settlers in Maine were also angered by what seemed to be a form of 
extortion by Andros and his allies. The settlements east o f the Piscataqua River had been 
riven by faction for generations, largely because there had been so many competing 
sources of authority: first the various holders o f patents under Gorges, then the competing 
governments of Massachusetts and Maine, and finally the supporters o f Andros and the 
backers of the Danforth administration.61 But all land holders wanted more secure title to
57 Theodore B. Lewis, "Land Speculation and the Dudley Council of 1686," William and Mary Quarterly. 
3rd ser., 31 (1974): 255-72; Order for survey of lands in Maine, May 26, 1680, Massachusetts Archives, 
vol. 3, fol. 342a.
58 For petitions to Andros for confirmation of land titles see DHSM. 6: 219-468, passim.
59 See Land Office Maps, Maine State Archives, Augusta, Me., Map Case 4, Drawer 5, Items 9-18,21,23- 
30,53-58,60; Massachusetts Archives, Boston, Maps and Plans, 3rd Series, vol. 1, p.135-36; vol. 32, p. 9; 
vol. 33, p. 7; vol. 37, pp. 2 ,4 ,8 , 16,19,24.
60 John Frederick Martin, Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England 
Towns in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 17-18, 
20-21, 105-110,260-66.
61 On opposition to Andros's land reforms in Falmouth, see Willis, "History o f Portland," 188-92; on 
factionalism in Kittery, see Jonathan A. Chu, "The Social and Political Contexts o f Heterodoxy: Quakerism 
in Seventeenth-Century Kittery," New England Quarterly 54 (1981): 365-384.
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their holdings; the dilemma was to determine which government held ultimate authority 
over the region's lands. By the last decade o f the seventeenth century, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the province o f Massachusetts was the only sovereign authority 
that could reliably grant, record, and protect real estate holdings in Maine. By the early 
eighteenth century, land grants by the General Court were increasingly becoming a matter 
of routine: although most grants were issued by towns, the province also confirmed and 
granted numerous tracts o f land in York County every year, frequently including 
diagrams of the real estate next to the orders that confirmed them. The increasingly 
active involvement o f the provincial government in the authorization, measurement, and 
protection o f land titles served to tighten the connection between Maine's settlers and the 
General Court.
Occasionally, towns and the province stumbled in their effort to accurately 
measure the private holdings of their citizens. In 1710, for example, the town o f Kittery 
was forced to redraw the property boundaries of several inhabitants who had discovered 
that the placement o f their fences did not accord with the descriptions o f their deeds to the 
land.62 On another occasion, the Massachusetts General Court granted land along the 
Newichawanock (Salmon Falls) River that already belonged to a settler named Thomas 
Broughton.63 But both towns and the province owned up to their mistakes and redoubled 
their efforts to measure their land holdings more accurately. Treating the land as durable 
and consistently measurable object served a valuable political purpose: if governments 
demonstrated an ability to impartially record and protect property rights, they gained 
legitimacy in the eyes o f the region's settlers.
62 York Deeds, vol. 7, fol. 175
63 DHSM. 4: 13.
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There was, in other words, a thread o f authority that attached the titles of land 
owners to the jurisdiction of governments. Lands could not belong to private individuals 
unless the title holders received the backing o f courts and political authorities. If these 
authorities were weak, or if  their jurisdiction overlapped with another government, the 
owner's exclusive right to use his or her tract was jeopardized. But if the government had 
established an uncontested claim to sovereignty over the land, the owner’s rights were 
secure. Conversely, the government's own authority depended on its ability to make itself 
legitimate in the eyes o f the people it ruled. Governments that threatened existing 
property rights -  such as the administration o f Edmund Andros, which called into 
question the very basis of land titles in the Bay Colony -- were unpopular and liable to be 
overthrown.64 In New England, where property ownership was widely diffused, the 
strength of political authorities depended to a large extent on their ability to defend 
private property. Towns, counties, and colonies were consequently defined as clearly 
defined territories with well-marked boundaries, all having the right to grant lands within 
their respective jurisdictions.65
Two Kinds o f  Frontier
This type of arrangement could only work in areas with substantial English 
settlement. In the seventeenth century, Massachusetts Bay had its strongest hold on the 
small towns of southwestern Maine -- Kittery, Wells, York, Scarborough, and Falmouth -
54 On Andros's assault on land titles in Massachusetts, and the consequent rebellion of New Englanders 
against his administration, see Martin, Profits in the Wilderness. 260-80.
65 The thread of authority arguably extended as far heads of household, nearly all o f  them male, who 
theoretically had exclusive control over the disposal o f their families' real property.
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- where nearly all the English population was concentrated.66 The colony did little to 
extend its authority beyond these towns, failing to hold courts east o f Wells or to build 
any large forts in Maine before the 1675-78 Anglo-Wabanaki war. On coastal islands and 
at inland trading posts, political authority effectively remained in the hands o f traders and 
fishermen. The traders were nominally subjects o f the French or English crown, but they 
were notoriously flexible in their loyalties. In 1674 a party o f English and Dutch 
privateers sacked French outposts at Pentagoet, Machias, and St. John, claiming them on 
behalf of the Prince of Orange and using them as bases for the plunder o f English ships. 
When they were brought to trial in an English court, they pled innocence to charges o f 
piracy, insisting that they had received letters o f marque from the Prince o f Orange and 
were defending his territory against English interlopers. The privateers were sentenced to 
death, but the episode laid bare the weakness o f state authority in the region east of Casco 
Bay.67
Because the leaders of Massachusetts Bay had neither the means nor the will to 
enforce its authority in these distant regions, which in any event were not included in the 
colony's original charter, they involved themselves very little in the regulation o f such 
disputes. Before the 1675-78 war, most frontier traders were independent operators with 
little interest in attaching themselves to one government or another. Political authority 
near the frontier outposts consequently had a different character than in settled areas. 
Although the territorial boundaries o f traders' monopolies were described precisely in 
patents and other land grants, in practice they were ambiguous. The aim o f most traders
66 In 1675, there were roughly 3,500 English people living in the towns between Piscataqua and 
Sagadahock, and another 775 or so living between Sagadahoc and S t  Georges River. See Robert E. 
Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 259-60.
67 DHSM 6:49-88; 7:328-34.
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was to secure important thoroughfares o f communication such as harbors and rivers and 
thereby monopolize all the commerce that passed through them. They defended their 
monopolies by forming alliances with trading partners and by using force to keep out 
their competitors. No traders ever bothered to survey the boundaries o f  their grants, since 
their interest was in controlling strategic points o f trade, not in the protection o f large 
swaths of agricultural land.
There were, in short, two kinds o f frontier in seventeenth-century Maine: one 
consisting o f outposts and the other o f settled farmland. In cartographic terms, the first 
was best expressed by the pattern o f nodes and links. The nodes were the outposts that 
enforced political control in peripheral regions, such as towns and forts, while the links 
were the maritime and riverine transportation routes that allowed colonies to provision 
and supply the outposts. Nearly all the large scale maps o f New England in the 
seventeenth century took this form [see Fig. 2.9]. Political boundaries in such maps were 
either absent or ambiguously defined, since no colony had exclusive political control of 
frontier regions. Possession of Penobscot Bay was claimed by the English, French, 
Wabanakis, and even the Dutch, and any political boundaries that might have been drawn 
around it in the seventeenth century would have been artificial. In practical terms, 
possession of the Bay had to be negotiated, either by placating rivals with presents and 
favors or intimidating them with displays o f force.
If power at frontier outposts came from the barrel o f a gun, in settled areas it 
flowed from the nib o f a pen. Although county courts and town meetings had some 
coercive power, their authority ultimately came from their ability to protect property and 
to regulate social rifts in a peaceable manner. Knowledge, not force, was the foundation
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of their power. Property owners depended on the documentary authority o f the 
government to such an extent that when the county recorder in 1686 announced that he 
was intending to move Maine's records from York to Black Point -- a journey of only 
twenty-five miles -- over a hundred men petitioned the government to forbid the move, 
claiming that the previous recorder had dropped deeds and other documents into rivers in 
his travels, "to the great Damage of many o f the Inhabitants."68
Because o f their importance in granting land and settling property disputes, towns 
and counties were defined territorially, as bounded and well-defined jurisdictions. Their 
limits were clearly marked and measured, since land owners depended on a government 
that had exclusive control and exact knowledge of its lands. A pattern that had since 
ancient times been associated primarily with maps o f land ownership -- a landscape 
divided into a patchwork o f regular shapes — began to be applied to political cartography. 
The similarity was no coincidence, since the clear definition o f political boundaries in 
early New England was a consequence o f the division o f the land into private property. 
The first jurisdictions to clarify their boundaries were settled areas such as towns and 
counties, where land values were highest and where disputes over real property rights 
were most likely to take place. These boundaries tended to stick because property owners 
had a vested interest in supporting a government with exclusive authority over their 
lands: the boundary lines between the towns o f Kittery, Wells, and York in the late 
seventeenth century were roughly the same as they are today. These borders did not 
generally appear in large-scale maps, since they were only o f interest to people who had a 
stake in the land. But in a few instances, such as John Seller's 1675 map o f New England
68 DHSM 6:213-15. The occasion of the move was the replacement of Edward Rishworth by Thomas 
Scottow as clerk of the court.
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[see Fig. 2.10], the boundary lines o f colonies and counties were clearly if  awkwardly 
drawn. Although this pattern was only vaguely discernible in the last quarter o f the 
seventeenth century, over the next hundred years it would begin to appear in maps of 
New England with increasing regularity.
Imperial boundaries
If the delineation of boundaries in regional maps was caused by property disputes, 
the development o f border lines on a continental scale was the result of imperial wars. 
During the last third of the seventeenth century, the crowns o f France and England 
tightened their control over their colonial possessions, taking a more direct role in their 
administration and becoming more vigilant in the collection o f customs duties and the 
regulation of trade. As royal power expanded, the crowns assumed many o f the roles that 
had previously been played by the proprietors o f colonial companies. Perhaps the most 
important change was that the monarchs now became responsible for the military 
protection of their subjects in the colonies. Regular troops replaced militiamen and 
proprietors' private armies at frontier outposts, and navy ships protected ocean shipping 
lanes against pirates and privateers. The involvement o f the crowns in military affairs 
brought the colonies greater prosperity through the expansion of trans-Atlantic trade, but 
it also involved them in imperial conflicts of an increasingly large scale.
Like colonial proprietors, royal officials found maps to be an effective instrument 
of political control, serving both as propaganda and as sources o f information. As early 
as 1675, English officials had complained of a "want o f  maps," and the next year they 
sent a circular letter to the governors o f  New England requesting them to send accurate
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maps of their colonies. By the end o f the century, the Board of Trade, a committee o f the 
Privy Council charged with oversight o f colonial affairs, had compiled several dozen 
maps of the colonies, most o f them in the private collections of Board members such as 
William Blathwayt. The French government, meanwhile, had also launched an ambitious 
cartographic program under the guidance of Louis XIV's Comptroller General, Jean- 
Baptiste Colbert. In 1663, he ordered provincial officials to gather local maps and to 
send them to the royal cartographer for correction. The government also requested maps 
of French exploration in North America, usually drawn by Jesuit missionaries, whose 
academic curriculum placed a heavy emphasis on cartography and geographical 
knowledge.69
Both crowns sponsored the publication of maps, providing royal cartographers 
with manuscript maps and other materials necessary for their preparation. Where 
sixteenth-century printed maps were cautiously neutral, their eighteenth-century 
equivalents were overtly political, with the typical sheet spelling out the cartographer's 
royal commission at a comer o f  the page. To please their patrons, mapmakers presented 
the most generous possible interpretations o f their respective crown's territorial claims in 
the Americas. The map of New France engraved by royal cartographer Nicolas Sanson in 
1656, for example, placed the limits o f the colony at the Kennebec River, even though 
two years before English privateers had seized control o f Acadia and had removed all 
French officials from the region [Fig. 2.11]. Like other maps o f the time, Sanson's sheet
69 CSP. vol. 9 (1675-76), fols. 672,810; William Blathwayt, The Blathwavt Atlas: A Collection o f 48 
Manuscripts and Printed Maps of the Seventeenth Century.... ed. Jeanette D. Black, 2 vols. (Providence: 
Brown University Press, 1970); David Buisseret, "Monarchs, Ministers and Maps in France before the 
Accession of Louis XIV," in idem, ed., Monarchs. Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as 
a Tool of Government in Earlv Modem Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 99-100; 
Brown, Story of Maps. 241-45.
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was a mixture o f propaganda and practical information, illustrating the course o f rivers 
and the location o f Indian tribes while simultaneously backing the French crown's 
vaunted notions o f its North American empire.70
The delineation of boundaries in Sanson's map was exceptional, since most maps 
of his time represented the colonies as free-floating names. But over the course of the 
next century, boundary lines became commonplace in the maps o f royal cartographers, 
largely as a result of the series o f imperial wars that took place between France and 
Britain between 1689 and 1763. Extensions o f dynastic conflicts in Europe, the wars 
accentuated national differences in the colonies, forcing colonists to identify themselves 
as subjects of one crown or the other. Territories that lay between the French and British 
colonies became flashpoints o f imperial rivalry as both sides claimed them as their own. 
The positions o f both crowns were graphically supported in royally-commissioned maps 
that traced boundary lines around the possessions o f each crown. Each map invited a 
response from the opposite crown, leading to a prolonged cartographic struggle in which 
the exaggerated claims of one side were met by the extravagant counter-claims of the 
other. The opening volleys were fired in early eighteenth-century maps prepared by 
cartographers such as Guillaume de 1'Isle and John Senex, but the battle reached a fever 
pitch in the "map wars" o f the 1750s, as the printing presses o f London and Paris rolled 
off dozens o f maps supporting the claims o f their respective crowns in North America 
[see Figs. 2 .12,2.13].71
70 On the practical and symbolic uses of maps in seventeenth-century England, see Peter Barber, 
"Necessary and Ornamental: Map Use in England under the Later Stuarts, 1660-1714," Eighteenth-Centurv 
Life 14 (Nov. 1990): 1-28.
71 On the map wars of the 1750s, see William P. Cummings, British Maps of Colonial America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 59-60.
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Unlike the straight lines that separated towns and counties in New England, the 
borders that divided New France from the English colonies never became fixed. While 
an exact knowledge of town limits was necessary to preserve social peace, imperial 
boundaries were essentially military fronts that guarded the possessions o f one crown 
from the armies o f the other. The colonies o f New France and New England were girdled 
by a chain of forts, garrisons, and missionary outposts that acted as a line o f first defense 
against enemy attacks. The boundary lines o f continental maps approximated the pattern 
of this chain, but the extent o f political control was a matter o f interpretation and could 
change as the military fortunes of either colony rose or fell. The diplomatic 
representatives o f the two crowns never agreed upon an official border line between their 
respective colonies -- indeed, none o f Louis XTV's treaties ever made mention of political 
boundaries, either in Europe or the Americas. When the French crown handed possession 
of Acadia over to the British in 1713, the territorial extent o f the colony was left 
ambiguous, with its boundaries to be decided by a joint commission at an unspecified 
date in the future. The French dragged their feet on the issue, making political control o f 
the region a matter o f unresolved dispute over the next fifty years.72
Though imperial maps of the mid-eighteenth century implied that the French and 
British crowns had exclusive sovereignty over their North American dominions, their 
control in border areas was tenuous at best. The most distant outposts o f empire in the 
eighteenth century were manned by military officers and other royal agents who upheld
72 Foucher, L'invention des frontieres. 60. Boundaries were frequently mentioned during the negotiation 
of treaties in the first half of the eighteenth century, but were never incorporated into the written texts. 
During negotiations for the Peace of Utrecht, French and English officials shuttled maps o f Acadia back 
and forth, with each side illustrating the extent o f their respective claims with dotted lines. See "Precis de 
ce qui c'est passe pendant la Negotiation de la paix d'Utrecht au Sujet de L'Accadie...", July 1711-May 
1713, PAC, AN, Serie C l ID, vol. 8, fol. 3-25.
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their jurisdiction through a combination o f military force and political suasion, much like 
the frontier traders o f the previous century. If colonial officials failed to win the 
obedience of people living in frontier areas, the boundaries of imperial maps remained 
more theoretical than real.
This point was not lost on the British officials charged with assuming control of 
Acadia after the Treaty o f Utrecht in 1713. Two years after the treaty's signing, the 
government of Nova Scotia sent two representatives in a sloop to proclaim the authority 
o f the British king in newly conquered areas. They met a cool reception throughout 
Acadia. At the mouth of the Penobscot River they were greeted by several hundred 
Indians from Panawapskik, who listened stoically as they read their proclamation. After 
holding council, a spokesman for the village told the officials that "I will not make an 
Oath of loyalty to anyone; I do not want a Foreign King; I have my natural Kings and 
governors who are my chiefs and elders." To add insult to injury, the Indians prevented 
the officials from seizing a trading vessel from Casco Bay that was plying the waters of 
the Penobscot. The shipmaster was trading illegally, since he did not have a license from 
the Nova Scotia government, which claimed jurisdiction o f the lands east o f the St. 
George River. But the Penobscots, who were his trading partners, told the Nova Scotians 
that the Indians would consider the seizure o f the ship's cargo as theft o f  their own 
property. Not wanting to provoke a party o f several dozen well-armed men, the officials 
returned to Annapolis Royal without making an arrest.73
73 Lt. Gov. Caulfield to Council ofTrade, Annapolis Royal, Jan. 3,1715/6, CSP. vol. 28 (1714-15), fol. 
142, p. 63; Begon au ministre, Quebec, Sept. 25,1715, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 35, fol. 109-114, c it 
113. (My translation; the original reads: " Je ne veux point prester Serment de fidelite a personne, Je ne 
veux point de Rois Etranger, jay mes Rois naturels et mes gouvemeurs qui sont mes chefs et mes anciens.") 
Indian speakers used the first person singular when referring to their village or tribe collectively.
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As Nova Scotia's government learned, agreements made in the drawing rooms of 
Europe were not always easy to enforce in the forests o f North America. No matter 
where boundary lines were drawn on maps, governments could not control territories 
unless they forced or enticed people within their borders to bend to their rule. The 
inhabitants o f borderland regions, who were distant from political centers and often 
courted by more than one colony, tended to be particularly difficult to govern. The 
Wabanakis who lived in the lands south o f the St. Lawrence River valley and north o f the 
Piscataqua were adept at playing British against the French and extracting concessions 
from both. The Wabanakis' trump card was the strategic location o f their villages, which 
lay in a buffer zone between the colonies of New France and New England. The travel 
corridor formed by the Kennebec and Chaudiere rivers represented a potential invasion 
route between Quebec and New England, and officials from both colonies vied for its 
control. Since Wabanakis were virtually the sole inhabitants o f the region, no 
government could control the border region unless it had the support o f the Indians.
French and British officials, o f necessity and by design, undertook different 
strategies to win the allegiance o f the Wabanakis. Faced with the problem of 
administering a thinly-populated continental empire, the governors o f New France 
adopted policies that played to the strengths o f French colonial enterprise. Although New 
France had not matched the commercial success o f the British colonies, the French by the 
end o f the seventeenth century had succeeded in gaining possession o f the two most 
extensive river drainages o f the continent: the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system and the 
Mississippi River. These river systems acted as vital links in a network o f entrepots that 
facilitated the distribution o f trade merchandise and military supplies. In the imagination
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
of French officials, New France was a vast hinterland controlled by the government at 
Quebec through a network of military garrisons, trading posts, and mission villages.
Since the French population o f the furthest outposts was tiny, control o f surrounding 
areas usually depended on the support of Indian allies.74
Acadia was a peripheral concern to the governors at Quebec, who devoted most of 
their attention to the settlements of the St. Lawrence River and the outposts o f the Great 
Lakes. During the latter half of the seventeenth century, French officials had established 
military garrisons at the forts o f Pentagoet near the Penobscot River, and Nashwaak and 
Jemseg on the St. John. The rulers o f New France had also considered building a string 
of outposts along the Chaudiere and Penobscot rivers to facilitate communication 
between Quebec and Pentagoet. But the cost o f such projects was too high, and by the 
end o f the seventeenth century Acadian officials increasingly looked to defend their 
southern frontiers with Wabanaki warriors fighting under the command of French 
officers. Following the Treaty o f Utrecht, the French withdrew the officers, leaving 
Jesuit missionaries and French traders as their only representatives in the region.75
French maps o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries consistently recognized 
the importance of the Franco-Wabanaki alliance. The Wabanakis always appeared in 
maps of the northeast, which placed their names in large letters across their homelands.
A 1713 map of Canada and Acadia drawn by the Jesuit missionary Father Joseph Aubry, 
for example, assigned the Atlantic coast between Casco Bay and the St. John River to the
74 VV. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier. 1534-1760. rev. ed. (Albuquerque, N. M.: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1984), esp. 1-11. The leaders of New France even thought this way about the British 
colonies, describing them not as bounded territories but as hinterlands controlled by political centers. They 
referred to Massachusetts as Baston (Boston), New York as Orange (Albany), and New Hampshire as 
Pescadoue (Piscataqua).
75 On communications between Quebec and Pentagoet, see CDRH. 1:207,209,211,212-14,243,325-25; 
Jean Talon, "Memoires sur le Canada, 1673," PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 4, fol. 43.
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Wabanakis, and identified the isthmus o f Chignecto with the Mi'kmaq. The only major 
settlements in the interior, the map seemed to suggest, were the Wabanaki villages of 
Norridgewock, Narakamigou, Panawapskik, and Medoctec. Yet Aubry still claimed the 
entire region on behalf o f "Canada ou Nouvelle France," drawing the line between the 
British and French colonies at the Kennebec or St. George rivers [see Fig. 2.14; see also 
Fig. 2.15].
Aubry's map is puzzling to the modem eye, for it recognizes the Wabanakis1 
territorial possessions while simultaneously claiming them on behalf of the French 
crown. Since the Wabanakis were independent political actors and French officials 
understood them as such, it seems a contradiction that their lands could belong to both 
themselves and the French colony. Yet it is a contradiction only if one accepts the 
modem assumption that territories cannot belong to two polities at once. Present-day 
political maps, with their clearly drawn boundaries, are based on the premise that states 
have exclusive jurisdiction of their territories. Government may be divided into different 
levels of an administrative hierarchy, with municipalities, counties, and provinces neatly 
fitting into each other like a set of nested Russian dolls. But every inch of land must 
belong to only a single city, a single county, and a single nation; it is impossible for two 
jurisdictions of the same kind to overlap. In the eighteenth century, by contrast, polities 
did not necessarily define their sovereignty territorially, making it possible for lands to 
belong to two or more groups at once. If an empire is treated as a web o f human 
relationships, in which a king is connected to his subjects through ties o f fealty and 
deference, the territorial extent o f the empire becomes a matter o f secondary importance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
What matters instead is the personal bonds that make the ruler and the ruled loyal to one 
another.
Aubry's map presents a view of sovereignty in which territorial possession flows 
from human relationships, a view that had long been held by French officials. Since the 
earliest years o f colonization, the French had based their territorial claims in North 
America on ceremonies that registered the willing subjugation o f  native peoples to the 
French crown.76 The legitimacy o f French rule, both in theory and in practice, depended 
on the consent o f Indian nations. The territorial extent of New France was determined 
not so much by the boundaries recorded in colonial charters as it was by the alliances that 
the French government developed with native groups such as the Wabanakis. While the 
Wabanakis did not consider themselves to be subjects o f the king, they called the 
governor of New France their "father," and expected to receive presents from him in 
return for their loyalty and military service. French claims to the region to the south of 
the St. Lawrence depended almost entirely on these reciprocal bonds, which were 
renewed every year by the distribution o f gifts and strengthened by the presence o f Jesuit 
missionaries in Indian villages. Practically the French had little control over the 
Wabanakis' territory, yet the Franco-Wabanaki alliance allowed officials in Quebec to 
claim the Indians' lands as their own in the imperial struggle against the British.77
New England's leaders were also aware of the strategic importance o f Indian 
alliances, yet the Wabanakis did not figure prominently in their cartographic imagination. 
Few British maps o f the sixteenth and seventeenth century ever depicted the Wabanakis,
76 Seed, Ceremonies of Possession. 41-68.
n  W. J. Eccles, "Sovereignty-Association,1500-1783," in idem.. Essavs on New France (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press), 1987, 156-81; Cornelius J. Jaenen. "French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood During 
the French Regime," in J. R. Miller, Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada
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and those that did were usually military plans or copies o f  French originals.78 The 
absence o f Indians in maps was a consequence o f New England's diplomatic policy 
toward the Wabanakis, which aimed at pacification rather than alliance.79 Since the last 
quarter of the sixteenth century, the settlements o f northern New England had been 
devastated by Indian raids, losing hundreds o f lives and untold amounts o f property 
during the 1675-78 war and the imperial wars o f 1688-1713. In the hope o f preventing 
future attacks, Massachusetts leaders launched a number o f policies designed to appease 
the Wabanakis. In the 1690s, the province assumed control o f the fur trade, establishing 
truck houses that sold Indians English merchandise at low cost. At conferences and truck 
houses, Massachusetts officials treated Wabanaki leaders with gifts and favors and even 
issued military commissions to pro-English sagamores. New England's leaders also 
attempted, with little success, to establish Protestant missionaries among the Wabanakis. 
Yet these policies were based on a denial rather than a recognition o f Wabanaki 
sovereignty. Since the 1690s, Massachusetts' governors had demanded that Wabanaki 
leaders take oaths o f submission to the British crown as a condition o f their treaties. If 
they were treated as British subjects, their lands fell within the dominion of the crown,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 19-42.
78 The only colonial map that represented Wabanaki lands as a bounded territory was drawn by a 
Frenchman. In October 1738, the owner of the fief of Lussaudiere, Jutras des Rosiers, wrote the Minister 
of the Marine to complain about Indians from Odanak who had used some fifty acres of his land with the 
tacit approval of Father Aubry and Governor Vaudreuil. He appended a map representing his fief, along 
with the "Village des Sauvages" (Odanak), and two large rectangular areas on either side of the St. Francois 
River marked "Terrain dont JouTssent les Sauvages" (land enjoyed by the Indians). See Rosiers to the 
Comte de Maurepas, October 1738, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 70, fols. 230-34, map on 234.
79 The Iroquois were the only Indian group that appeared regularly and prominently in English maps, 
largely because of their roles as military allies of the British and middlemen in land deals between colonial 
speculators and western tribes. See, for example, Lewis Evans’s famous 1755 map o f the middle colonies, 
in which Iroquois territories stretch from the Ohio Valley to Lake Champlain.
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and their attacks on English settlements became acts of rebellion that invited swift and 
unmerciful reprisal on the part o f Massachusetts' authorities.80
The ultimate goal o f this policy was to neutralize the Indians as a military force 
and open their lands to English settlement: it was the Wabanakis1 lands, not the 
Wabanakis themselves, that interested the leaders o f  Massachusetts. By the last quarter 
o f the seventeenth century, merchants and political officials on both sides o f the Atlantic 
had taken a growing interest in the lands east o f the Piscataqua River, seeing them as a 
potential source of timber, naval stores, and agricultural land. But economic 
development of the region could not proceed if French-supported Wabanakis resisted 
English incursions into their territories. With the backing o f royal officials and 
mercantile interests, Massachusetts' governors sought to bring the Indians to heel through 
a combination of diplomacy and intimidation. Gifts and truck houses were one side of 
this strategy, scalp bounties and garrison forts were the other.
The forts and truck houses represented the effective limits o f British control in 
northern New England, yet they were not depicted with any regularity in maps o f the 
region. The boundaries of Massachusetts, in the minds o f its leaders, were defined not 
through alliances with the Indians but by the terms o f its charter. From its beginnings, 
the colony's jurisdiction had been defined territorially, as an expanse o f land that could be 
parcelled out to settlers and towns. The outer limits o f the colony were not entirely clear 
during the seventeenth century, since Massachusetts' claims were challenged by rival 
colonies and the crown. But the advance o f settlement in the eighteenth century led to an
80 Ronald Oliver MacFarlane, "The Massachusetts Bay Truck-Houses in Diplomacy with the Indians," 
New England Quarterly 11 (1938): 48-65; Axtell, Invasion. 247-54; Myron O. Stachiw, comp, and ed., 
Massachusetts Officers and Soldiers. 1723-1743: Dummer*s War to the War o f Jenkins' Ear (Boston: The 
Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and The New England Historical and
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increasingly precise definition of boundaries, as the distribution o f lands forced the 
colonies of New England to clarify their respective jurisdictions.
Maine Takes Shape
In the years that followed the Treaty o f Utrecht, the population o f northern New 
England grew rapidly, as settlers migrated to frontier regions in search o f cheap land and 
real estate companies sought to develop their holdings in New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts. In 1690, there were fewer than 6,000 English inhabitants residing in 
twelve towns in northern New England. By 1760, the region's population had swelled to 
almost 60,000, with the number o f incorporated towns rising to sixty-five.81 The growth 
of settlement entailed the transformation of thousands o f acres o f forest and vale into 
parcels of real estate. As in the previous century, the occupation o f these lands took place 
within a political framework that attached property owners to town meetings and county 
courts. Since the security of land titles depended on the strength o f civil authorities, the 
spread of settlement brought with it an expansion and a reordering o f political 
jurisdictions. Dozens of new townships, all with the power to grant lands, were chartered 
where none had existed before.
It was imperative under these circumstances to eliminate overlapping 
jurisdictions, which inevitably gave rise to disputes between settlers over conflicting land 
titles. This problem was particularly sticky along the border between New Hampshire 
and Massachusetts. Although New Hampshire had been independent o f Massachusetts
Genealogical Society, 1979), passim.
81 Clark, Eastern Frontier. 336. The number of towns was artificially large in New Hampshire, since the 
provincial government had granted several "paper townships" to obviate a British law that prevented 
logging outside town boundaries.
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since the late seventeenth century, the Bay colony still held claims to the lands north o f 
the Merrimack River according to the terms o f its original and second charters. In the 
1720s, the expansion o f settlement led both provinces to grant overlapping townships in 
the region between the Merrimack and Connecticut rivers, with the leaders of 
Massachusetts hoping an influx o f settlers from the Bay colony would strengthen their 
territorial claims. Since neither province had clear or exclusive jurisdiction over the new 
townships, the inhabitants' property rights were left in the air. Numerous violent 
skirmishes took place between settlers living in the disputed territory, with many being 
jailed for their refusal to pay taxes to both provinces. Unable to resolve these disputes 
themselves, the government o f New Hampshire in 1733 asked the Board o f Trade to 
establish a boundary commission that would arbitrate between the two sides.82
After several years o f lobbying and appeals, King George II finally issued an 
order in 1740 settling the boundary line between New Hampshire and Massachusetts. His 
decision favored New Hampshire, setting its southern limit three miles north of the 
Merrimack River until it reached Pawtucket Falls, at which point it continued in a straight 
line due west. The ruling placed nearly thirty Massachusetts townships under the control 
of the government o f New Hampshire. The decision also drew a boundary between New 
Hampshire and Maine, represented by an imaginary line that began at the mouth of the 
Piscataqua River, ran up the Newichawanock (Salmon Falls) River as far as Lovell's 
Pond (Great East Lake), and followed a straight course 2 degrees northwest for another 
120 miles [see Fig. 2.16]. This northerly line was not run until a dispute over timber
82 The boundary dispute between New Hampshire and Massachusetts was one of many in the British 
colonies during the mid-eighteenth century. The Board of Trade was also forced to settle the boundaries 
between New York and New Jersey, Virginia and North Carolina, South Carolina and North Carolina, and 
Pennsylvania and Maryland (the latter survey carried out by Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, hence the
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rights led the Massachusetts General Court to order a survey o f  the Maine-New 
Hampshire border in 1763.83
In the twenty-year period that preceded the 1740 ruling, both colonies had 
experimented with new methods o f town planning designed to promote the rapid and 
orderly settlement of their frontiers. Although there were many other models, the typical 
plan by the 1740s was a township six miles square, divided into a checkerboard of 
hundred-acre farms. The rectangular shape o f townships and lots was adopted because it 
made surveying a simple matter o f running straight lines with compass and chain. 
Individual farms were allotted as shares to proprietors, with each receiving a number 
commensurate with the value o f their investment. The lots were then sold or leased to 
tenants or occupied by the proprietors themselves. These "range" townships, as they 
came to be known, rationalized the process o f settlement, making it possible for town 
planners to rapidly divide and distribute their lands as numbered lots. For this kind o f 
township to be successful, proprietors had to survey their holdings in advance of 
settlement, measuring and marking the boundaries o f lots on the basis o f a predetermined 
plan.84
It was this pattern that became the prototype for settlement in Maine during the 
second half o f the eighteenth century. The English population o f the region had grown
"Mason-DLxon line.")
^.Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. Public and Private, of the Province o f the Massachusetts Bav. 21 
vols. (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1869-1922), 17:361-62,429.
84 James L. Garvin, "The Range Township in Eighteenth-Century New Hampshire," in Benes, New 
Eneland Prospect. 47-68; Roy H. Akagi, The Town Proprietors o f the New England Colonies 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1923; reprint ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), 
230-81. Surveyors kept notebooks in which they recorded points of reference such as marked trees and 
heaps of stones, the direction of the lines run (according to degrees and minutes of the compass), and rods 
travelled. They later translated the information into plats o f property boundaries, using a ruler and 
protractor. For an early example of a surveyor’s notebook, see John Brown, "Field Book o f Bakerstown 
&c., 1767-68 (Now Minot)," Pejepscot Proprietors Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me.,
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steadily since the Treaty of Utrecht, but the advance o f settlement had been slowed by the 
renewal of warfare against the French and Wabanakis after 1745. With the conquest o f 
Quebec in 1759, this barrier to English settlement was removed and the result was an 
explosive growth in population east o f the Piscataqua. Between 1763 and the American 
Revolution, the number o f English inhabitants in Maine doubled from 23,000 to over 
47,000. Almost a hundred townships were founded during the same period, most o f them 
range townships. Many were established east o f the Kennebec River, a region that had 
been sparsely settled before the end o f the imperial wars.85
The town of Gorham offers an example o f how these settlements were created. 
Originally known as Narragansett No. 7, Gorham was one o f seven townships awarded 
by the provincial government in 1733 to veterans o f King Philip’s War and their heirs. 
Although most veterans o f the Narragansett campaign had since passed away, 840 people 
in Massachusetts still claimed land under the grants and all were eager to gain a share o f 
the buoyant real estate market o f the 1730s. The grantees divided themselves into seven 
corporations of 120 partners each, and every corporation was awarded a township. The 
seventh of these proprietary bodies, which was later renamed after its leading light, John 
Gorham, was given the rights to form a township to the west o f Falmouth.86 Although
Collection 61, Box 2, Folder 17.
85 Evarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, comps., American Population before the Federal Census 
of 1790 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932; reprint ed., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966), 
36-40; Stanley B. Attwood, The Leneth and Breadth o f Maine (Augusta. Me.: Kennebec Journal, 1946; 
reprint ed., Orono: University of Maine Press, 1974), 21-22. In the two years that preceded the conclusion 
of a peace with France, the leaders of Massachusetts, forseeing the rapid growth of settlement, undertook a 
series of policies that strengthened the province’s territorial claims to the lands east of the Piscataqua River. 
In 1761, the House of Representatives sponsored a survey of the lands south of the St. Lawrence River and 
ordered a perambulation o f the boundary line between New Hampshire and Maine. The government also 
backed a survey of its boundary with Nova Scotia at the S t Croix River in 1762, and granted ten townships 
in the lands between the Penobscot and the St. Croix between 1762 and 1763. See Massachusetts, Acts and 
Resolves, vols. 16:691; 17:47,163-76,191,211,246,256,289,361,429,474-79.
86 Clark, Eastern Frontier. 180-82; Proprietors’ Records, Gorham, Maine, Maine State Archives, Augusta, 
Maine, fols. 1-31,33,77.
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the settlement o f the township proceeded slowly, the proprietors were quick to order 
several surveys o f their holdings. In the surveys, the lands o f the township were divided 
into rectangular lots, which were assigned to individual proprietors. The township 
became the physical embodiment of the corporation, the lots within the town representing 
shares o f each individual proprietor [see Fig. 2.17].
Other land companies emerged from the embers o f  long-lapsed patents, 
transforming seventeenth-century frontier outposts into agricultural settlements. The 
holdings o f the Plymouth Company, one of Maine's most prominent o f the land firms in 
the eighteenth century, were possessed under the Plymouth colony's original patent to 
lands along the Kennebec River, which was sold to four Boston merchants in 1661. The 
Plymouth Company had also acquired two adjoining tracts along the river that had 
originally been held by two fur traders from Boston, Major Thomas Clarke and Captain 
Thomas Lake. The fur traders had abandoned their posts during the 1675-78 war and had 
never returned. But their land deeds were kept by their descendants, who divided them 
into shares, which circulated among investors in Boston during the early part o f the 
eighteenth century. Following the conclusion o f a peace on the Maine frontier in 1749, 
the shareholders decided to begin the division and settlement o f their tract [see Fig. 
2.18].87
The intent of the original patent holders had been to trade for furs, and the 
boundaries o f their patent, which encompassed some 1,500 square miles, were meant to 
represent the limits o f their trade monopoly. But in the hands o f  the Plymouth 
proprietors, the patent became a title to a vast agricultural estate, which could be
87 Cranmer, Cushnoc: Baker, Clarke and Lake: Gordon E. Kershaw, "Gentlemen o f Large Property & 
Judicious Men": The Kennebeck Proprietors. 1749-1775 (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1975),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
149
parcelled out into individual farms and sold to settlers. By the 1750s the proprietors had 
begun measuring and dividing their tract into townships in preparation for settlement. 
They also sought to defend their title against rival claimants, launching an ambitious 
public relations campaign and bringing ejectment suits against settlers who obtained their 
lands from other companies. Although their plan did not unfold as smoothly as they had 
hoped, the proprietors by the end of the century had succeeded in establishing a ribbon o f 
townships along both banks of the Kennebec River.88
As the Kennebec valley was divided into townships and the townships sectioned 
into farms, the region began to assume the shape o f a property map writ large, a 
landscape overlaid with a rectangular grid [see Fig. 2.19]. By the late eighteenth century, 
forts and trading posts had disappeared from maps o f the region, and the river itself had 
become a property boundary that broke up the regular rectangular pattern o f the 
townships. The Kennebec Valley was not exceptional in this respect, for in other parts o f 
Maine the nodes-and-links pattern o f the outpost frontier was also being transformed into 
a grid of orderly settlement. In the decades that followed the end o f the American 
Revolution, lands seized or purchased from the Wabanakis were quickly occupied by 
migrants from southern New England, and the rapid growth o f settlement led to the 
creation of dozens o f townships and several new counties. As the white population 
pushed eastward along the coast and northward into the interior, disputes over logging 
and land rights between Downeasters and New Brunswickers also made it necessary to 
demarcate the border lines between Maine and its neighboring governments. Although 
Maine did not assume its present-day shape until the Webster-Ashburton Treaty o f 1842
3-20.
88 Kershaw, The Kennebec Proprietors.
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settled its northern boundaries, by the late eighteenth century it was increasingly clear 
that the district would be a bounded territory, with its borders defined by its ability to 
grant and protect real property.89
The straight lines o f the state's boundaries were a visible trace o f the distinctive 
path o f state formation in Maine and North America generally. While the interior and 
exterior boundaries o f countries in Europe and much of Asia have an irregular pattern that 
typically corresponds to natural features such as rivers and mountain ranges, much o f 
North America is divided by straight lines that separate states, provinces, counties, 
townships, and farms. The immediate cause o f this difference was the Northwest 
Ordinance, the Homestead Act, the Dominion Lands Act, and other legislation that 
authorized the distribution o f public lands in an orderly manner.
But the deeper cause o f the differing patterns was a divergence in the evolution of 
political authority in North America and Eurasia. An alliance between property owners 
and the state had also fostered the creation o f clearly delineated boundaries in Europe but 
the political dynamics o f the continent left a different impression on the political map. 
Because traditional landowners such as nobles, peasants, and burghers formed powerful 
political blocs within their respective countries, states were inclined to respect existing 
property boundaries. Borders both between and within European countries tended to 
reflect idiosyncratic patterns o f land ownership that had developed over centuries as well 
as "natural" frontiers such as rivers and mountains that impeded the progress of
89 The eastern boundary was surveyed by the St. Croix boundary commission o f 1798, and the northern 
boundary was settled by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. The boundaries of Maine's territorial waters (an 
oxymoron if there ever was one) were not defined until the Gulf of Maine Treaty of 1984. On the 
boundary disputes of the 1790s and 1840s, see David Demeritt, "Representing the True St. Croix: 
Knowledge and Power in the Partition of the Northeast,” William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 54 (1997):
515-48; Howard Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations (Chapel 
Hill, N. C.: Unversity of North Carolina Press, 1977).
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conquering armies. In North America, on the other hand, customary property boundaries 
were virtually erased as states pushed Indians into reservations and parceled their lands 
out to white settlers. Once the Indians were removed as a barrier to expansion, vast 
sections of territory were opened for occupation. Straight lines, because o f the ease with 
which they could be surveyed, facilitated the process o f  settlement, making it possible for 
the spoils o f conquest to be allocated according to a rational plan. The rapid and peaceful 
manner in which lands were distributed — as distinct from the violent way in which they 
were taken from the Indians -- owed much to an alliance between states and property 
owners, in which each gave backing to the exclusive territorial claims of the other. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the creation o f an egalitarian republic of 
property holders, in Maine as elsewhere in North America, was made possible by the 
virtual eradication o f the Indians' rights to the land.90
90 On property ownership and the rise of the territorial state in Europe, see Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign 
State and Its Competitors: An Analysis o f Systems Chanee (Princeton. N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1994). A pattern of irregular boundaries developed in most o f South and Central America, even though 
many Latin American countries were settler societies like the U. S. and Canada. The difference is partly 
attributable the region's geography, which is divided between coastal lowlands and interior highlands, 
which made the gradual westward movement o f population that characterized North America an 
impossibility. But just as importantly, the primary instrument of colonization in Spanish America, 
particularly in peripheral areas, was the encomienda, which gave encomenderos authority over people but 
not their lands. Territorial boundaries were consequently more likely to reflect customary patterns of land 
ownership that had been established before the arrival of Europeans. See David J. Weber and Jane M. 
Rausch, eds., Where Cultures Meet: Frontiers in Latin American History (Wilmington. Del.: SR Books, 
1994).
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FIGURE 2.1. TWO KINDS OF MAP.
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(a)
Fort
Town
O  Town
Two kinds of map: (a) is a boundary map, while (b) forms a nodes-and-links pattern. The extent of territorial control is 
clearly demarcated in the first map, but in the second it is ambiguous and depends on a host of contingencies, such as 
the trade contacts between the two towns, the strength of the fort, the nature of the terrain, and so on.
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FIGURE 2.2 "OCEAN ATLANTIQUE" (DETAIL), PIERRE LEVASSEUR, 1601.
A later portoian chart of the French Dieppe school, drawn on parchment Some place names may appear upside down 
or sideways because portoian charts were meant to be rotated by their users. The lines radiating from the compass rose 
helped pilots to set their course; Levasseur's chan, like many other ponolans of his time, also includes lines of latitude. 
By the end of the sixteenth century the French knew of fishing banks as far south as Cape Sable, illustrated by clusters 
of dots, and were well acquainted with the course of the St. Lawrence River. The Bay of Fundy is missing, suggesting 
that French mariners did not venture beyond Cape Sable at this time. Photocopied from Joan Dawson, The 
Macmaker*s Eve. Map 1:3.
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FIGURE 2.3. "NOVA ET AUCTA ORBIS TERRAE DESCRIPTIO AD USUM 
NAVIGANTIUM EMENDATE ACCOMMODATA" (DETAIL), GERARD
MERCATOR, 1569.
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The first example of Mercator’s projection, this map was intended for seafarers — "ad usum navigantium" — although 
there is little evidence that it was ever used as such. The coast of North America as far as the Gulf of Mexico is 
colored with a brown wash, while Newfoundland, called by its Iberian/Latin name "Terra de Bacalaos" (land of cod), 
is tinted yellow. Photocopied from Marcel Trudel, Atlas de la Nouvelle France. Figure 23.
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FIGURE 2.4. "FIGURE DE LA TERRE NEUVE, GRANDE RIVIERE DE CANADA, 
ET COTES DE L’OCEAN EN LA NOUVELLE FRANCE," MARC LESCARBOT,
1609.
Since Lescarbot never travelled west of the S t Croix River, it is almost certain that he obtained his geographical 
knowledge second hand, probably from Champlain, who drew a detailed map of the colony’s coastline on vellum in 
1607. Champlain's earliest printed map, included in an account ofhis voyages, was issued in 1613. Lescarbot lacked 
Champlain's skills as a draughtsman, and his map appears rather crude by comparison. Photopied from Seymour 1. 
Schwartz and Ralph E. Ehrenberg, The Mapping of America.
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FIGURE 2.5. "A MAPP OF NEW ENGLANDE" (PORTION), SIR WILLIAM
ALEXANDER, 1624.
The names of the patentees stretch from Cape Cod to Penobscot Bay. This map was printed in support of Alexander's 
own claims in Nova Scotia, although it also includes an illustration of the New England Company's holdings. While 
Alexander probably consulted maps drawn by Champlain, he eliminates nearly all traces of French possession south of 
the St. Lawrence River, turning Acadia into New Scotlande, la Baie Franfaise (Bay of Fundy) into Argals Bay, the St 
Croix River into the River Tweede, the S t John into the River Clyde. Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of 
Congress.
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FIGURE 2.6. [BOUNDARIES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY COLONY], 
WILLIAM STOUGHTON AND PETER BULKELEY, CIRCA 1677.
Tin  ...... ..
Following the annexation of Maine, the Massachusetts General Court prepared a map for the English Parliament 
delineating the boundaries of the colony. It was lost in transit to England in I6SS, but a second map was produced ten 
years later. The above is a later copy, presented to the Lords of Trade by agents of Massachusetts Bay in 1678. Note 
the latitude scale in the center of page, and the line cutting through Lake Winnipesaukee and Casco Bay at a latitude of 
43° 40' 12". Photocopied from photostat at the Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 2.7. NINETEEN ACRES "MEASURED AND LAID OUT" FOR WILLIAM 
PEPPERELL BY WITHERS BERRY (SURVEYOR), 1720
A confirmation of tract in fCittery originally granted in 1699 to Pepperrell, one of the leading merchants and land 
holders in the town. Photocopied from fCittery Town Records, vol. 2, January 13,1719/20.
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FIGURE 2.8. "THE DRAFT OF NONSUCH POYNT...," RICHARD CLEMENTS,
1687.
Jf 1*A -■•xinaiv.iwij
*
One of twenty-three surveys carried out in Falmouth by Richard Clements, deputy surveyor under the Andros 
administration. The map represents a grant to Sylvanus Davis, who along with Edward Tyng, supported Andros's 
demand that land titles in the town be reconfirmed upon payment of a fee to the provincial government Photocopied 
from Massachusetts Archives, Maps and Plans, 3rd series, vol. 33, fol. 7.
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FIGURE 2.9. "A MAP OF NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK" (PORTION), JOHN
SPEED, 1676.
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Speed's plate is one of the later examples of the Jansson-Vischer series, a group of maps of New Netherlands and New 
England based on originals printed in Holland in the 1630s. This version erroneously has the Merrimack River 
running into Lake Champlain (Lake of the Iroquois). The edition of this map in the possession of the Lords of Trade 
has boundary lines drawn in watercolor around the New England colonies. The southern boundary of Maine is set at 
the Piscataqua River, its northern boundary near the Penobscot New Hampshire appears on the map, bordering 
Massachusetts just north of Salem. Photocopied from reproduction at Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 2.10. "A MAPP OF NEW ENGLAND BY JOHN SELLER 
HYDROGRAPHER TO THE KING" (PORTION), 1676.
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Published in Seller's Atlas Maritimus. The printed map is based on manuscript maps sent from Boston to London.
The boundaries of Essex, Middlesex, and Suffolk counties in Seller’s map are roughly the same as they are today. The 
land to the north of Norfolk (the name of New Hampshire while under the control of Massachusetts) is called, "Lacona 
or the Province of Maine." Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 2.11. "LE CANADA, OURNOUVELLE FRANCE, &C.” (PORTION),
NICOLAS SANSON, 1656.
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The limits of the colony are represented by a dotted line, which is filled in around New England. The name 
"Etechemins", another term for Wabanakis west of the Acadian peninsula, is written across the river. Sanson leaves 
the unknown regions of the interior blank, and his map is sparse in comparison to the ornate plates of his predecessors. 
Photocopied from Marcel Trudel, Atlas de la Nouvelle France. Fig. 36.
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FIGURE 2.12. "AMERIQUE SEPTENTRIONALE, DRESSE, SUR LES RELATIONS 
LES PLUS MODERNES DES VOYAGEURS ET NAVIGATEURS..." (DETAIL), 
DIDIER ROBERT DE VAUGONDY, 1750.
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From his Atlas Universe!, a compilation o f  108 maps. Vaugondy was the royal cartographer o f  Louis XV, and 
prepared this map following the end o f  the War o f  Austrian Succession. All o f  the territory north o f  the Kennebec 
River is claimed on behalf o f  the Estechemins, o r Wabanakis. Photocopied from the Smith Collection at the Osher 
Map Library, University o f  Southern Maine, Reel 21:10204.
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FIGURE 2.13. "A MAP OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SETTLEMENTS IN 
NORTH AMERICA" (DETAIL), J. RIDGE (ENGRAVER), [1755?].
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One of many maps that illustrated the causes of the conflict between the French and British colonies in the 1750s. The 
shaded area, as the cartographer explains, represents "French Incroachments" on British territory. The map does 
include the Wabanaki village of Norridgewock, but it is placed far in the interior, just to the south of the St. Lawrence 
River. The map also illustrates two British forts built along the Kennebec River in the 1750s, Fort Halifax and Fort 
Western. Photocopied from the Smith Collection at the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine, Reel 21: 
9896.
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FIGURE 2.14. "CARTE DU CANADA AVEC PARTIE DES COTES DE LA 
NOUVELLE ANGLETERRE ET DE L'ACADIE," FATHER JOSEPH AUBRY, S. J.,
[1713?].
Aubry was a  missionary who lived at Odanak for many years, and prepared this map for French authorities at Quebec. 
Crosses represent Wabanaki mission villages, squares stand for European settlements. The waterways o f  the interior, 
o f  great interest to French authorities, are represented in detail. Source: PAC, H3/900. Photocopied from W. J. Eccles, 
The Canadian Frontier. 1534-1760. 138.
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FIGURE 2.15. "CARTE DE L'ACADIE," ANONYMOUS, 1702.
A map published in France representing French possessions in Acadia. The name o f  Acadia stretches from the 
Penobscot River to the Acadian peninsula, but portions o f  the same area are assigned to Wabanaki ethnic groups such 
as the Ethechemins, Canibas, Abenaquis, and Socoquis. Photocopied from photostat at the Library o f  Congress.
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FIGURE 2.16. "ACCURATE MAP OF HIS MAJESTYS PROVINCE OF NEW 
HAMPSHIRE IN NEW ENGLAND" (DETAIL), SAMUEL LANGDON, 1756.
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A manuscript version o f  a map that Langdon later published for the government o f  New Hampshire in collaboration 
with Joseph Blanchard. The 1740 boundary lines between Massachusetts and New Hampshire are clearly drawn. The 
curving line o f  the townships in the western part o f New Hampshire are the result o f  the claims o f  the Masonian 
Proprietors, a  group o f  investors who revived Captain John Mason's patent to a  semi-circular tract o f  land radiating 
sixty miles from the mouth o f  the Piscataqua River. Photocopied from a  photostat a t the Library o f  Congress.
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FIGURE 2.17. SURVEY OF LOTS ADJOINING ROAD, GORHAMTOWN, JOHN
SMALL (SURVEYOR), 1754.
A survey o f  lots ordered by the town proprietors and recorded in their records. Photocopied from Gothamtown 
Proprietors’ Records. Maine State Archives, vol. I, p. 77.
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FIGURE 2.18. "A TRUE COPPY FROM AN ANCIENT PLAN...," THOMAS 
JOHNSTON (ENGRAVER), 1753.
CaOimyyZjfmaid
This map was included in a pamphlet published by the Brunswick Proprietors, who were rivals of the Plymouth 
Company. The map places the Plymouth claim far into the interior, on the reasoning that the Kennebec River to the 
south of Merrymeeting Bay was called the Sagadahock and therefore did not belong to the Plymouth patent. The 
Plymouth Company responded with a map of their own a year later, also published by Thomas Johnston, in which 
their lands extended all the way to the coast. The two Indians in the cartouche at the lower right hand comer, one 
carrying a war club and the other a rifle, are made to speak the words, "GOD hath planted us here," and "GOD decreed 
the land to us," sentiments that presumably support the validity of Indian deeds. Photocopied from reproduction at 
Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 2.19. "A MAP OF THE DISTRICT OF MAINE...," OSGOODE CARLETON,
1795.
. ExpUnmioii,
 v  J »w»i
h k w h h v u s  w i t «
One of the leading American cartographers of his time, Carleton based this map on proprietary plats and surveys 
carried out under a 1794 Massachusetts town mapping law. Much of the land in the eastern counties of Lincoln, 
Washington, and Hancock has been laid out in a grid pattern, and the lands on either side of the Kennebec Rivers are 
divided into townships. A corridor ofland along the upper Penobscot River is marked, "Land reserved for the 
Indians." Photopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.
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LEVIATHAN’S TONGUES
The effective government o f  large areas depends to a very important 
degree on the efficiency o f  communication.
--Harold Innis, Empire and Communication
In October 1756 northern New England's first newspaper was launched by Daniel 
Fowle, a Boston printer who had recently arrived in Portsmouth. Named the New- 
Hampshire Gazette, the weekly was printed on a single large sheet folded into four pages 
and distributed through the mail to subscribers in New Hampshire and Maine. Like other 
provincial newspapers o f the time, the Gazette published little in the way o f original 
material, relying on stories reprinted from periodicals in Britain and Boston for most of 
its copy. To the news stories were added local advertisements, lists o f ships arriving and 
departing from the port of Piscataqua, printed letters, and bits o f gossip spread by word of 
mouth. The Gazette's contents were meant to suit the tastes o f  the local gentry, and 
Fowle wrote a brief editorial in the newspaper's first edition in praise o f their good sense. 
He noted that the many "Friends to Learning, Religion and Liberty" in the province had 
encouraged him in his efforts and that their appetites for timely news had been whetted 
by the recent outbreak o f war in America and Europe. Newspapers such as the Gazette, 
he continued, allowed "every Lover o f Mankind" in New Hampshire "to be acquainted
171
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with the Affairs of his own Nation and Country."1 Fowle's editorial was somewhat 
disingenuous -- the truth o f the matter was that he had run afoul o f authorities in Boston 
and fled to New Hampshire -- but in his second edition he pressed the point further, 
publishing an essay in celebration o f printing.
Claiming that the printing press was "one o f the most useful Inventions the World 
has ever seen," he recited the great advances in civil and religious liberties since the 
advent o f the printed book. In Turkey, where printed materials were outlawed, there was 
"neither Liberty, Property, true Religion, Arts, Sciences, Learning, or Knowledge." But 
in countries with a lively press, these things flourished. The printed word, he reasoned, 
broadened the mind because it diffused knowledge throughout the world, imbuing all 
readers with a sense of fellowship. The spread o f information through newspapers and 
books united the inhabitants of the world, giving them the ability to see beyond their local 
surroundings and to understand their commonalties with the rest o f humanity. Periodicals 
such as the Gazette facilitated the "speedy Communication of the State o f Affairs from 
one part of the World to another" and the "Intercourse maintain'd between the different 
Parts o f a Kingdom." The transmission o f information through the printed word united 
the subjects of the British crown, allowing them to leam of events in other parts o f the 
empire and to determine "what Measures connected with the general Good are to be 
pursued." The diffusion o f printed news, Fowle concluded, was "like a good Circulation 
in the natural Body," for it "keeps the Body Politic (if not alive, at least) in sound 
Health."2
1 New-Hampshire Gazette. October 4.1756.
2 New-Hampshire Gazette. October 11,1756.
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Fowle's comparison between bodies physical and political was no more original 
than his second-hand copy or his characteristically British prejudices. The image o f a 
body politic had its roots the writings o f classical authors such as Plato and had been 
become a stock phrase by the Middle Ages. Only a century before, the metaphor had 
been brilliantly extended by Thomas Hobbes, who compared a commonwealth to a 
leviathan or "Artificiall Man," whose anatomy could be dissected and analyzed in the 
same manner as a human body. If there was anything new in Fowle's editorial, it was his 
observation that the health o f the body politic depended on a steady circulation of 
information. Hobbes himself had noted that speech was necessary for the creation of a 
civil society but his discussion of language was only tangentially related to his treatment 
of politics. Fowle, on the other hand, placed language at the center o f his argument, 
holding that communication was the lifeblood of the political world, creating affinities 
between strangers and facilitating the dissemination o f information. The boundaries of 
the human community and the British commonwealth, he seemed to suggest, were 
defined not by borders but by the limits o f human interaction.
This point o f view came easily to someone living in northern New England, 
where it was difficult to indulge in the illusion that colonies were self-contained worlds. 
Maine was twice a colony, a satellite o f Massachusetts that also felt the tug o f the mother 
country's political gravity. Since its beginnings, the colony's lands had been controlled to 
varying degrees by outsiders from Boston or London, who lived at distance from the 
settlements yet claimed them as their own. The ability o f merchants and administrators 
make good on their claims o f ownership depended on the co-operation o f agents and 
allies living in the colony, which they won through a continual exchange o f  favors,
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rewards, and payments. This flow of transactions between Maine and its two metropoles 
was the means by which outsiders gained access to the region's resources and the method 
of Maine's connection to the wider world.
The land, from this perspective, was a collection o f resources whose exploitation 
depended on the co-operation thousands if  not millions o f people living on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The holdings o f individual landholders in Maine were confirmed by towns 
and protected by the county courts, and towns themselves received their charters from the 
provincial government. The provincial government, in turn, held its charter under the 
crown and was answerable to the Privy Council. The development o f these holdings was 
a joint endeavor that required an even higher level o f social cooperation. Maine's 
families worked together to provide themselves with food, shelter, and clothing, and also 
produced large quantities o f goods to be sold at market. For the marketing o f these 
commodities, they looked to merchants and wealthy landowners, who provided them with 
wages, credit, and milling services. The merchants also handled the distribution of 
exportable goods to foreign markets, shipping them to overseas ports with the aid of ship 
captains, mariners, stevedores, and shipwrights. Shipping lanes, meanwhile, were 
protected against pirates and privateers by the merchant marine and royal navy, who were 
paid with revenues collected from British taxpayers. This web o f  interdependency could 
be extended almost infinitely, since New Englanders participated in an international 
economy with a highly complex division o f labor.
It may be fruitful, in this context, to imagine the region's polities in Fowle's terms: 
not as bounded territories but as social networks woven by communications. These 
networks were not contained within territorial boundaries; to the contrary, it was the
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existence o f far-flung social ties that allowed people to control and exploit the land. 
Northern New England's relationship with the mother country was defined not by a static 
constitutional framework but by the exchange o f words and goods across the ocean. 
Merchants and administrators in London sought to tap the riches o f the region by sending 
agents and officials across the Atlantic to promote their authority and to lay claim to a 
portion of the products o f the land. New Englanders, on the other hand, defended their 
interests at home by establishing agents and patrons in London. This pattern of give-and- 
take between metropolis and colonies had its beginnings in the late seventeenth century 
and had become a central fact o f political life in the New England by the 1750s.
It is impossible to understand the development o f this relationship without taking 
into account the modes and methods of communication that linked the two sides. The 
degree o f control that Londoners and Bostonians exercised over the lands o f Maine rested 
on their ability to establish lines of contact with the region. Letters and parcels carried by 
sailing vessels and post riders were the means by which merchants and officials from 
distant capitals gained authority over northern New England, and also the tools that the 
region's inhabitants used to tap into the imperial economy. To trace the lineaments o f the 
leviathan in northern New England one must begin with what Fowle called the 
"Circulation" o f the body politic: patterns o f communication.
Arteries o f  Communication
To people accustomed to the bustling cosmopolitanism o f London or the 
burgeoning commercial life o f Boston, the lands east o f the Merrimack River, or "Eastern 
Parts" as they were known in the eighteenth century, must have seemed a backwater, a
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region far removed from the center o f things. But the people living on this remote 
frontier were not without attachments to a wider world. Merchants in Kittery and 
Portsmouth knew that crop failures in Madeira and sugar gluts in the Leeward Islands 
would cause fluctuations in the prices o f commodities at their own ports. Settlers in 
Brunswick and Dover understood that when war was declared in Europe, it would only be 
a matter of time before their farms were threatened by French-backed Indian raids. While 
the forests and meadows o f the interior invited settlers to push further into the continent, 
the attraction o f markets in Europe and the West Indies pulled them back toward the 
arteries o f water-borne transport. Like the other colonies o f the North America, Maine 
and New Hampshire were the product o f commerce and empire and looked to the ocean 
for their contacts with the wider world.3
In the earliest years of the colony, Maine's trade was oriented primarily toward 
England, particularly the West Country. Fishermen relied on the metropolis for supplies 
o f fishing gear and provisions and found a ready market for their catch in England, where 
it was re-exported to southern Europe or consumed domestically. But by the mid­
seventeenth century, the relative importance o f English trade declined as Boston's traders 
exerted increasing control over the colony's economy. Faced with an unfavorable balance 
o f trade with the mother country, the merchants o f Massachusetts Bay actively sought 
supplies of exportable commodities in neighboring areas: furs from Maine and the
3 In 1796, real estate agent Alexander Baring remarked that settlers in Maine were "in general nearly equal 
in information, manners and comforts of life to those of the old New England states." He saw newspapers 
in nearly every farmhouse and was impressed by the settlers' grasp o f European and American politics.
The prosperity and sophistication of the settlements, he explained, were "an advantage resulting from the 
easy water communications with all parts, which in fact brings them nearer the old countries than any back 
lands at not one third the real distance." See Alexander Baring to Hope and Company, Philadelphia, 
December 3,1796, in Frederick S. Allis, Jr., ed., William Bingham’s Maine Lands. 1790-1820.2 vols., 
Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 36-37 (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 
1954), 2: 768.
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Connecticut River Valley, fish from the Gulf o f Maine, and lumber from the Piscataqua. 
They also looked for commercial opportunities in distant parts o f the Atlantic basin, 
finding outlets for the fish and lumber in southern Europe, the Caribbean, and the islands 
of Madeira, the Azores, and the Canaries. As the volume of this trade grew, New 
England's merchants assumed an increasingly important role in the emerging Atlantic 
economy.4
By the last quarter o f the seventeenth century, this economy had developed a 
discernible pattern. The bulk of New England's maritime trade was carried on with the 
sugar plantations o f the West Indies and the vineyards o f the Atlantic Islands. The 
economies of both groups o f islands were oriented toward staple production and their 
inhabitants were in constant need o f food and other provisions. Extensive cultivation on 
the islands had led to deforestation, making them dependent on foreign supplies o f wood 
for housing, cooperage, and firewood. Vessels from New England brought cargoes o f 
fish and lumber to the islands, returning to their home ports laden with sugar, molasses, 
rum, fruit, wine, and other tropical commodities.5 The importance of this trade is readily 
apparent in the port records o f Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Records for the last decade 
of the seventeenth century indicate that nearly half the ships entered and cleared by the 
naval officer at Portsmouth were trading with the West Indies. Most o f the West Indian
4 Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard 
University Press, 1955), esp. 112-42.
5 These commodities were not the only things that were exchanged; trade was more than a simple barter of 
goods. New England's merchants faced a chronic trade deficit with the mother country and were 
constantly in search of "returns" such as commodities, specie, and bills of exchange that would get them 
out of the red. Ships that sailed to the West Indies returned not only with sugar, rum, and molasses, but 
also with trade credits that enabled New Englanders to purchase manufactured goods from Great Britain.
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traffic was with Barbados, the most important sugar-producing island o f the time.6 The 
Wine Islands, meanwhile, accounted for a little less than a fifth o f the port's traffic; more 
vessels arrived in Portsmouth from the Azores and the Canaries than from England.7
The West Indian trade retained its central place in the maritime trade o f northern 
New England during the eighteenth century, but the region's merchants also found new 
commercial opportunities in the Carolinas, the Chesapeake, Nova Scotia, and southern 
Europe [see Figs. 3.1,3.2]. Vessels to and from the West Indies continued to account for 
nearly half o f Piscataqua's traffic in 1724, with an increasing portion o f the vessels sailing 
to the Leeward Islands, which were overtaking Barbados as the center o f sugar 
production in the British Caribbean. Merchants in Kittery and Portsmouth also developed 
contacts in North Carolina, exchanging lumber, rum, and English manufactured goods for 
naval stores and provisions. Another outlet for trade was to the northeast: northern New 
England supplied Newfoundland, and later Nova Scotia, with provisions, timber, and 
livestock. New Hampshire's merchants also traded on a more modest scale with 
Philadelphia, New York, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Bermuda, and West Africa. 
Nearly all this commerce was carried by smaller vessels -- sloops, schooners, brigantines,
6 Some of Che clearances for Barbados may have in fact ended up trading with other colonies. Since 
Barbados was the most windward of the islands, shipmasters usually arrived there first, and if they found a 
poor market for their goods, followed the winds to the Leeward Islands and Jamaica.
7 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fols. 1-5. These figures are based on a partially incomplete series of 
naval office lists for Portsmouth kept between August 1694 and September 1695. Earlier, less complete 
records exist for a twelve-month period in 1680-81 and a three-month period in 1692. Fifty-one vessels 
were reported to have entered at Portsmouth between April 14,1680 and April 12,1681, but the customs 
officer noted that many of the ships were "driven in by contrary winds and made but little stay." See CSP. 
vol. 11 (1681-85), fol. 98, p. 46. For the quarter in 1692, clearances included four vessels bound for 
London, one for Newfoundland, one for the Canaries, and one for Virginia, twelve coasters for Boston and 
one for Nantucket. Entries included five vessels for Barbados, three for London, eight coasters from 
Boston, and one coaster from Hampton. See Nathaniel Bouton, ed., Provincial Papers o f New Hampshire. 
7 vols. (Concord, N. H., 1868-72), 2:77-83.
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and the occasional snow — with crews o f fewer than a dozen men and burdens o f less than 
a hundred tons.8
Only a small portion o f Piscataqua's trade was directly with Great Britain, and the 
bulk o f this commerce was carried by mast ships, vessels o f several hundred tons with 
hulls specially designed for transporting masts. The ships arrived as a fleet during the 
summer, after the spring thaw had flushed cut timber downriver to the harbors of 
Piscataqua and Casco Bay. Their outward cargoes consisted mainly o f manufactured 
goods, which were purchased by Piscataqua's merchants with the profits o f the West 
Indian trade. The return cargoes were consignments o f masts, spars, bowsprits, timber, 
and naval stores, which were transported to the naval shipyards o f England. Many of 
Piscataqua's leading families had West Country connections and also acquired 
manufactured goods from the ports o f Devon, Cornwall, Hampshire, and Somerset. 
Merchants also traded periodically with ships from other parts o f the British Isles, 
obtaining coal from Swansea, linen from Cork, and sundry manufactured goods from 
Liverpool and Glasgow.9
The naval office shipping lists generally did not include the coastwise trade 
between Piscataqua and southern New England, since the sloops that carried the trade 
were not large enough to require customs inspection. But the existing evidence indicates 
that considerably more coasting vessels than ocean-going ships called at the ports o f 
northern New England. In the twelve-month period between August 1694 and July 1695, 
92 coasters were cleared for Boston in the port of Piscataqua, while only 28 vessels left 
for other ports. By 1713, the number o f coasters sailing from Piscataqua to Boston had
8 Public Record Office, CO 5/967-68. Piscataqua in this context referred not only to the river but to the 
entire drainage, which included the Salmon Falls, Cocheco, Lamprey, Oyster, and Exeter rivers.
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risen to 129, and by 1724, even as northern New England was embroiled in a war with 
the Wabanakis, the figure had reached 197. Coasting vessels from other ports in southern 
New England, such as Salem and Newport, also visited Portsmouth in smaller numbers. 
Because Piscataqua was the center o f the timber industry in the early part o f the 
eighteenth century, it received most o f northern New England's coastal traffic. But as 
settlement and the lumber trade moved eastward, a growing number o f coasters plied the 
route between Boston and Casco Bay. In 1773, Hugh Finlay, the surveyor o f the post 
roads for North America, remarked that there were two or three packet boats "in constant 
employment" between Boston and Falmouth, each of them making some twenty trips 
yearly.10
The importance of the coastal trade was a consequence o f Maine's economic 
dependence on southern New England. The region's quasi-colonial relationship with 
Massachusetts Bay had developed in the middle o f the seventeenth century, as 
entrepreneurs from Boston sought to tap the rich natural resources o f northern New 
England and the Gulf o f Maine. The merchants had established trade contacts with West 
Indian and Iberian planters and had built the vessels necessary to transport fish and timber 
to other Atlantic ports. But they also needed the labor o f fishermen and lumbermen, 
without which there would have been no commodities to export. Since most producers in 
northern New England lacked the means to purchase fishing vessels or saw mills and had 
few ready outlets for their commodities, they looked to Boston's merchants for credit and
9 Public Record Office, CO 5/967-69.
10 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fol. 6-8; Boston News-Letter. 1713-24, cited in Byron Fairchild, 
Messrs. William Peoperrell: Merchants at Piscataqua /Ithaca. N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), 84n; 
Hugh Finlay, The Hugh Finlav Journal: Colonial Postal History. 1773-74 ([n. p.]: U. S. Philatelic Classics 
Society, 1974), 17. According to Massachusetts law, coasting vessels carrying less than I 1/2 tons of 
enumerated goods did not need to clear customs when travelling within the boundaries of province. See 
Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1:21.
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merchandising opportunities. The Bostonians advanced them physical capital — ketches 
and gear for fishermen, oxen and saw mills for lumbermen — and provided them with 
provisions and alcohol to tide them over during the fishing and lumbering seasons. In 
return, the merchants received a share o f their produce, which they sold overseas at a high 
markup. This proved to be a very profitable relationship for the Bostonians, who held a 
virtual monopoly on the supply o f fish and lumber while also cornering the market on 
finished goods in northern New England. As the English visitor John Josselyn remarked 
in 1674, merchants from Massachusetts "set excessive prices" on manufactured goods, 
and "if they do not gain Cent per Cent, they cry out that they are losers." Josselyn added 
that many fishermen in Maine were indebted to the point that they became "the 
Merchants slaves," and were forced to forfeit their land and livestock to their creditors.11
Boston's grip on northern New England weakened slightly during the last quarter 
of the seventeenth century as mercantile communities developed in Portsmouth and 
Kittery. The leading families o f Piscataqua by the beginning o f the eighteenth century 
owned several dozen vessels and were actively involved in the carrying trade o f the 
Atlantic.12 Yet the colonists o f northern New England, particularly those who lived east 
of Kittery and York, remained economically dependent on Massachusetts’s merchants. 
Most inhabitants marketed their timber and fish through Boston on coasting vessels. 
When warfare discouraged coasters from making trips to the eastern settlements, 
colonists were often unable to dispose o f their produce. In a letter to Boston in 1746, the
11 Paul J. Lindholdt, ed., John Josselvn. Colonial Traveler: A Critical Edition of Two Voyages to New- 
Eneland [1674] (Hanover University Press ofNew England, 1988), 143,145.
12 In 1697, the governor ofNew York and New England, Lord Bellomont, reported that the merchants of 
Piscataqua owned eleven ships and thirteen smaller vessels. The shipyards o f Maine were nearly as active 
as those ofNew Hampshire, building twenty-three ships and twenty-seven smaller vessels between 1674 
and 1714, although most were owned by merchants in Boston and Britain. See William G. Saltonstall,
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leading inhabitants o f Falmouth complained that warfare had left the families to the east 
of Casco Bay in "the most dispirited, distressed Condition," not only because Wabanaki 
attacks threatened their homes but because the dearth o f coasters had turned their winter’s 
work "to no account," leaving thousands o f cords o f wood rotting on the ground.13
In peacetime, the coasters arrived more regularly, with most vessels shuttling back 
and forth between Boston and Maine several times a season. The rhythms of maritime 
life at Piscataqua were tied closely to the demands of coastal trade. The heaviest period 
o f traffic at the port was during the spring and early summer, as vessels arrived from 
Boston to take on wood and timber that had been cut during the winter. Because o f their 
small size, the coasting sloops did not spend long periods in port loading and unloading 
their cargoes, and during the summer most made round trips between Boston and 
Piscataqua every fortnight. Between March and October in 1695, twenty coasters made 
trips between New Hampshire and Boston, with some o f them making as many as ten 
voyages [see Fig. 3.3]. Winter was the slack time for the coastal trade, as many 
shipmasters laid their vessels up for the season, but some coasters continued to make 
voyages in December and January, carrying timber for re-export to the West Indies or for 
domestic consumption in Boston.14
Ocean-going traffic, meanwhile, tended to follow the schedules o f the West 
Indian trade. Although there were entries and clearances for the West Indies in every 
month of the year, certain months were more active than others. The produce o f sugar 
plantations came gradually on the market between February and June, and shipmasters
Ports of Piscataqua (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), 18; Massachusetts Archives, vol. 7, 
Commercial, 1685-1714.
13 Boston Gazette. April 29, 1746.
14 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fol. 9.
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from New England tried to time their arrival accordingly. The trick was to arrive before 
the market for fish and lumber was glutted but after the planters had brought their 
produce to harbor. If vessels landed too early, they would have to spend idle time in port 
or be forced to sail to another island; if they landed too late, they would be forced to sell 
their cargoes at a low price. Since the voyage from Piscataqua to the West Indies 
generally took about six weeks or seven weeks, the peak period for clearances to the West 
Indies was in January, with ships leaving in time for the beginnings of the sugar market. 
Mid-summer represented a second, if lesser, jump in the number o f clearances at 
Piscataqua. While many vessels engaged in the West Indian trade made a third leg 
between the Caribbean and Great Britain, others completed two six-month round-trips 
every year, departing for the second voyage in June or July. The busiest period of entries 
at the port came somewhat earlier, during the spring and early summer, as vessels arrived 
from Europe and the West Indies to load cargoes o f timber [see Fig. 3.4].15
The arrival and departure of ships at Piscataqua was a matter o f interest to many 
people in nearby areas, since they relied on maritime traffic for the circulation of goods 
and information with the rest o f the world. Merchants and political officials had the 
greatest investment in these contacts, but others also looked forward to the arrival of 
ships. The vessels came loaded not only with West Indian sugar and English goods but 
with letters from friends and family and newspapers from other ports. During the 
seventeenth and most o f the eighteenth centuries, these communication networks were 
sustained by an informal method o f letter carrying. Shipmasters made public 
announcements o f their dates o f departure and left mail bags hanging in a tavern or coffee 
house to be filled with letters, each costing the sender a penny. The shipmasters then
15 Public Record Office, CO 5/967-69; New-Hamnshire Gazette. 1756-65.
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carried the bag to their designated port, and made a second public announcement asking 
the recipients to come fetch their letters. In 1699, the deputy postmaster for the North 
American colonies, Alexander Hamilton, proposed that all letters to and from America be 
required to pass through the post office, but his suggestion was not followed and most 
letters continued to be carried by private shipmasters in the eighteenth century.16
But Hamilton, with the cooperation of colonial legislatures, succeeded in 
establishing an intercolonial postal system in the last decade o f the seventeenth century.
In 1691, a Whig courtier named Thomas Neale had been awarded a monopoly for the 
colonial posts, and Neale appointed Hamilton, then governor o f East and West Jersey, as 
his deputy. With Hamilton's encouragement, several northern legislatures passed acts 
establishing an official post office in their colonies. Under the terms o f Massachusetts's 
law, passed by the House of Representatives in 1693, the postmaster at Boston was to 
receive two pence for single letters sent to Europe and the West Indies, and four pence for 
packets of letters sent overseas. Letters sent to Piscataqua cost six pence -  about a half­
day's pay for a typical laborer -- and were carried by a post rider who made weekly trips 
to the north. The postal service did not extend past the Piscataqua River, so letters to 
people living in Maine were deposited at the Portsmouth post office to be picked up by 
their recipients, or, if a sufficient number o f letters were collected, to be delivered by a 
post rider. As Maine's population grew, post riders made their trips with increasing 
regularity, and by 1757 a weekly mail was established between Piscataqua and Falmouth. 
During the summer this postal route carried relatively little mail, since most letters were
16 Memorial of Andrew Hamilton, April 26, 1699, General Post Office, Treasury Letter Books, vol. 1691- 
99, fols. 253-58. Hamilton remarked that the informal system of letter-carrying was susceptible to abuse 
by merchants who rifled through mail bags to find their competitors' letters, and shipmasters who tossed
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transported by coasters from Boston, but during the winter the overland post became the 
primary means of communicating with southern New England.17
Because travellers had to cross dozens o f rivers, streams, and rivulets as they 
moved along the coastline, their progress was often slow and arduous. The towns o f 
northern New England cleared fording places, made by placing stones across a river so 
that travellers could step or wade across the water when its level was low. When the 
water level was higher, people were carried across the river by a ferryman, who was 
typically also an innkeeper. During the winter, the ferry was not needed because most 
rivers became frozen highways, easily traversed on foot. A number o f towns also built 
bridges, although the cost was steep and some towns by the middle of the eighteenth 
century began to raise the funds through lotteries or by petitioning the province's General 
Court for aid.18
Townspeople were also responsible for building and maintaining the road network 
o f the region, a task they performed with mixed results. Since the seventeenth century, 
inhabitants o f towns had been required to devote several days o f work a year to the repair 
and laying out of roads, a practice rooted in the manorial custom of corvee. But towns 
often neglected the duty, and their roads, many o f them little more than trails, were often 
impassable during the summer. The county court tried to correct this problem by issuing
the bags overboard as soon as they left port. Hamilton's observations were, of course, colored by a degree 
of self-interest.
17 Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic. 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 121-23; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1:115-17; Hugh 
Finlav Journal. 17-19; Clark, Eastern Frontier. 264,339-40; New-Hampshire Gazette. July 1, 1757 and 
March 31, 1758.
18 Herbert G. Jones, The King's Highway from Portland to Kitterv: Stagecoach and Tavern Davs on the 
Old Post Road (Portland, Me.: Longfellow Press, 1953), 12; PCRM 1:90,111,126,146, 186,307-08, 2: 
68, 80,94, 118, 123,134,155,157, 168, 170,283,318,416,479,487,3:106,205,243-45,260,4:94, 
275-78; New-Hamnshire Gazette. February 24,1758, September 8, 1758, November 10,1758, October 26, 
1759; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves 1:183; 4:46,285.
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orders that forced the towns to build and maintain an adequate system o f roads. The 
court had initiated plans for the cutting o f roads as early as the 1640s and its orders 
became more systematic after the region was annexed by Massachusetts. In 1653 the 
court demanded that York and Kittery make "Convenient ways" and bridges between the 
towns that were "fitt for horse and man," and in the ensuing years the court issued orders 
for further roads from Portsmouth as far as the Saco River.19 Towns often ignored the 
court's decisions, preferring to pay fines than to bear the expense o f building roads and 
bridges. A 1673 plan to build a highway (country road) between Wells and Casco Bay 
was dashed because the cost was too great. But over time a small road network 
developed in York County and was most elaborate in the settled parts o f Kittery,
Berwick, York, and Wells. Further east, roads were fewer in number and in greater need 
of repair. The upper portion o f the King's Highway -- the name of the less-than-majestic 
road that connected Maine's settlements from Portsmouth to Casco Bay ~  was not 
completed until around 1740.20
Because most people in Maine relied on water-bome transport for their travel, 
existing roads sometimes received little use. During the War o f Spanish Succession 
(Queen Anne's War in the colonies), the ferrymen licensed by the towns o f Kittery and 
York petitioned the General Court for aid, complaining that the war had cost them their 
business. By law, soldiers and officers were ferried for free, forcing both men to 
constantly attend to their posts. Meanwhile paying passengers, as the ferryman at York
19 PCRM. 2: 14-5.
20 PCRM 1:255, 3: 107,261,277; Jones, The King’s Highway. 15. According to a guidebook published 
in 1731, roads linked forts and settlements along the coast as far as Fort Richmond and Brunswick in Casco 
Bay, although the quality of the easternmost roads was probably very poor. See Thomas Prince, The Vade 
Medum for America (Boston: Kneeland and Green for Henchman and Hancock, 1731), 195-97.
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put it, were "few... indeed almost none at all."21 Even in peacetime, road traffic was light; 
in denying a petition from Falmouth requesting funds to repair a bridge over the Fore 
River, the General Court noted that "not one in five hundred" o f  the inhabitants o f York 
County ever passed over the bridge.22
Roads were most frequently used for travel over short distances, acting as links 
between neighboring farms and settlements. The earliest court orders required highways 
to be large enough to accommodate a horse and a man, but by the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century most orders and statutes stipulated that highways should be sixty-six 
feet wide when running straight and slightly wider along curves and at fording places. 
This breadth made it easier for farmers to drive their livestock to market, since wide 
spaces allowed the animals to graze or sleep on the road and enabled the drovers to keep 
watch for wild predators. Smaller roads and trails connected neighboring farms and were 
used by settlers to visit kinfolk and friends, to attend church and town meetings, and to 
exchange cloth, eggs, butter, cider, and other produce with their neighbors. Another set 
of roads in the backwoods allowed lumbermen to haul their timber to water with chains, 
carts, sleds, and oxen.23
Although governments and settlers saw a need for better roads, ambitious plans 
for improving inland communications were rarely realized. Maritime transport was 
essentially a private matter: merchants built, maintained, and insured their own vessels
21 Petition of William Brier, November 9,1704, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 121 (Travelling, 1644- 
1774), fol. 121; petition of Arthur Beal, May 30,1705, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 121, fol. 122.
22 Answer to petition, 22 November, 1744, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 121, fol. 266.
23 PCRM 2:345,3: 124,4:283,317-18,365,5: 174; Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A 
Historical Geography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 96-98. On local exchange 
networks, see Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Good Wives: Image and Reality in the Lives of Women in Northern 
New England. 1650-1750 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), esp. 26-27,43-48; Jere R. Daniel, Colonial 
New Hampshire: A History (Millwood, N. Y.: KTO Press, 1981), 153-54. Beyond the pale o f English
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and whatever benefits they received from their use were undeniably their own. Roads 
and bridges, on the other hand, were usually public property and building them was a 
politically contentious matter. Because the routes established by roads were fixed, land 
owners inevitably lobbied for roads that connected their holdings to ports and market 
towns — thereby raising their value, since roads made it easier and less expensive to 
market their produce -  and against roads that cut through their farms, stripping them of 
valuable land.24
Disputes also arose over the expenses of inland transportation because road and 
bridge projects required a pooling o f capital and labor. In 1693, Massachusetts passed a 
law that required every town to appoint two selectmen as surveyors o f the highways as a 
way of ensuring that roads and bridges would be built and maintained within their 
jurisdiction. In 1713 the act was amended, allowing justices o f the peace to require towns 
to lay out public roads and private ways. But the role o f the provincial and county 
governments under these acts was punitive rather than enabling: the courts fined towns 
for failing to maintain their roads, but did little to fund their construction or repair. 
Although some town proprietors by mid-century scored minor victories in winning funds 
for bridge and road building, there was little public support for such projects because the 
benefits o f the roads accrued mainly to the proprietors while their expenses were borne by 
all the taxpayers o f the province. Reporting on the Plymouth Company's efforts to 
receive provincial funding for roads within their patent, surveyor o f the posts Hugh
settlement, colonists were forced to use Wabanaki trails and portage routes, often with the aid o f an Indian 
guide.
24 Inland transportation projects of a large scale did not begin anywhere in North America until early in the 
nineteenth century. These undertakings depended on a growing concentration of capital and an increasing 
willingness of state governments to support and partially finance inland transportation projects. In both the 
North and the South, states gave charters to private companies responsible for the building o f turnpikes and
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Finlay explained that "[t]he Public says, let the Plymouth Company improve their 
property by opening high-ways, why shou'd the people contribute to make their estate
valuable."25
Lacking public funding and frequently in a state o f disrepair, Maine’s muddy back 
roads supported a commercial world that was tiny compared to the far-flung trade 
networks of the Atlantic. While oceanic shipping lanes carried thousands o f tons o f 
commodities, the paths of Maine facilitated bartering and borrowing on a small scale, 
often so small that it was never recorded in account books. Ocean-going vessels and 
inland roads supported two distinct if interrelated economies, one based on profitable 
long-distance exchange and the other oriented toward local self-sufficiency.26 There were 
many points of articulation between the two economies and it would be misleading to 
refer to the region's settlers as subsistence farmers. According to a 1751 petition from the 
town of Kittery, fewer than a half o f its inhabitants were able to make their own clothing, 
grow their own wheat, or raise their own livestock.27 Although towns with more fertile 
and abundant lands were more self-sufficient, none was divorced from the commercial 
economy. The inhabitants of Falmouth and Berwick spent their winters cutting and
canals and often helped to pay for their construction and maintenance. See George R. Taylor, The 
Transportation Revolution. 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart, 1951), esp. 18-55.
^.Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1: 136-37,721-22; Hugh Finlav Journal. 15. The Plymouth 
Company had made some efforts in road building; in 1757, the proprietors' committee, "being 
apprehensive that the laying out good Roads in Towns for plantation will be of very great advantage to the 
Inhabitants round about," proposed construction o f two roads running from Fort Shirley on the Kennebec 
River to Wiscasset on the Sheepscott River and Newcastle on the Damariscotta. See Committee to Samuel 
Goodwin, Boston, October 5, 1757, Kennebec Purchase Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, 
Box I, Folder 18.
26 By an insidious logic, poor transportation networks acted as a lag on economic development and 
economic underdevelopment impeded the improvement of communications. The rude state of roads made 
it difficult and expensive to bring produce to market and nearly impossible to transport merchandise in 
large quantities. High transaction costs discouraged trade, limiting the amount of investment in the region. 
Without the funds that came from trade, towns were unable to afford the taxes and loans necessary to 
improve their roads.
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sawing wood and many were dependent on wages for their subsistence. Farmers who 
owned salt marsh and meadows in Scarborough, Biddeford, and the Kennebec River 
Valley raised livestock for sale in overseas markets, curing and barrelling their meat or 
shipping live cattle and horses to purchasers in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the West 
Indies. Merchants in port towns who made their fortunes through the wholesaling trade 
of the Atlantic also played an important role in the local economy. Families such as the 
Pepperrells, the Frosts, and the Hammonds sold English manufactured goods to their 
neighbors, extended credit to producers, and provided milling services to farmers and 
loggers.
Pine Tree Politics
While the loggers and hardscrabble farmers o f Maine's back settlements had little 
in common with the periwigged merchants and tar-smeared seamen o f the port towns, 
channels of communication extended even to the most isolated farmsteads, linking them 
with other parts o f the British empire. People living in New England and London viewed 
these connections differently, as if they were looking through the opposite ends o f a 
telescope. In the unlikely event that merchants and royal officials in London ever thought 
about Maine at all, they considered it a marginal part of the empire whose worth was 
commensurate with its ability to supply the metropolis with scarce commodities. But 
New Englanders placed themselves at the center o f their world and cherished their 
connection to the mother country, not for its own sake but because it provided political 
favors, military protection, and commercial opportunities.
27 Petition of town of Kittery. March 20,1751, Collections o f the Maine Historical Society. 2nd ser., vol. 4 
(1898), 197-205.
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In general, this difference in perspective did not matter since both sides benefited 
from their relationship. But there was one issue over which colony and metropolis were 
sharply divided and would remain so throughout the century: the disposal o f Maine's 
woods. The crown's interest in the forests o f New England had been inspired by the 
expansion of the English navy, which had grown steadily since the civil war and by the 
middle o f the eighteenth century had become the backbone o f the nation's military might. 
At the end of the seventeenth century, the navy had built a fleet o f nearly a hundred ships 
and was competing with Holland and France for naval supremacy in Europe. The 
construction o f men-of-war demanded a large and skilled workforce, as well as a 
continual supply of building materials, particularly timber. Approximately 50,000 cubic 
feet of timber were needed in the construction o f a third-rate ship o f 1,000 tons. Ships 
also required timber for at least 23 masts, cross yards, and a bowsprit. Larger men-of-war 
were fitted with a main mast that could be as large as 40 inches in diameter and up to 120 
feet in length.28
Navy shipwrights built hulls with domestic supplies o f oak, but they needed to 
search abroad for the pines used to make masts, yards, spars, and bowsprits. The navy 
had traditionally purchased its masts from Scandinavia and the Baltic but by the second 
half of the seventeenth century, these supplies were becoming inadequate. The hulls of 
men-of-war tended to be more durable than their masts, which were easily broken during 
battle or worn through use. Ships in wartime were frequently refitted with new masts, 
making it necessary to find ample supplies o f tall pine trees suitable for large ships. 
During the first Dutch War in the 1650s, the navy had procured shipments o f masts from
28 Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power The Timber Problem of the Roval Naw. 1652-1862 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), 92-93; Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 90-91.
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northern New England, where white pines grew in abundance. New England's pines, it 
turned out, were superior in quality to those o f Scandinavia; because they retained their 
moisture under hot and dry conditions, pine masts from Maine and New Hampshire lived 
four times as long as sticks from Norway. The demand for New England masts grew in 
the second Dutch War o f 1664-67, as Dutch blockades and a Swedish ban on the felling 
of pine trees had forced the English navy to outfit their ships with American masts.29
Colonial imports seemed to be an ideal solution to the problem of acquiring pine 
trees since shipments from New England kept trade within the empire and made the 
crown less dependent on foreign powers. But the colonial trade had problems o f its own. 
Not only was it expensive and risky to transport pines across the ocean, the supply of 
masts was threatened by the rapid deforestation o f coastal New England. The timber 
trade had played an important part in the region's economy since the beginnings of 
permanent settlement. Nearly every town in northern New England built a sawmill 
within a few years o f their establishment, and by 1682 there were some twenty-four mills 
operating in Maine, each capable o f producing between 500 and 1,000 feet o f pine boards 
per day. Northern New England's timber trade by the last quarter o f the seventeenth 
century had eclipsed the fisheries in importance, and the export o f sawn lumber to 
Boston, Iberia, and the West Indies had become an indispensable source o f income for 
Maine's settlers.30
29 Albion, Forests and Sea Power. 200-230.
30 Charles F. Carroll, The Timber Economy of Puritan New England (Providence: Brown University Press, 
1973), 104-11; Willis, "History of Portland," 179-80. By 1709, there were about seventy sawmills in 
operation along the Piscataqua and its tribuaries. See CSP. vol. 24 (1708-1709), fol. 428. Maine's 
fishermen by the 1670s were finding it increasingly difficult to compete with their counterparts in Essex 
County, who received better financial backing and were better equipped to exploit the cod-filled waters of 
the Grand Banks ofFNewfoundland.
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Colonists made use o f all species o f trees, fashioning fence rails with ash, staves 
with oak, boards with hemlock, pegs and clothespins with birch. But for commercial 
purposes, white pines were preferred because they were more easily floatable and less 
likely to be rotten than old-growth hardwoods such as maple, birch, and hemlock.
Loggers often bypassed hardwoods near settled areas as they searched for the tall conifers 
that flourished at higher elevations. While the work o f cutting and hauling the trees was 
performed by poorer settlers, who went logging in winter to earn credit and cash for their 
farms and families, the processing and marketing o f timber was the responsibility of 
wealthy and well-connected merchants. Making pines into masts or boards was a 
profitable but laborious process that involved dozens o f workers and large outlays of 
capital. Lumberjacks first "bedded" a pine by felling trees that were in the path o f their 
fall, then sawed until the tree was toppled. After stripping it o f its bark, they "baulked” 
the tree to the river by wrapping it with chains attached to teams o f  oxen and dragging it 
through the snow or along a cleared path. Once they reached the riverside, they flipped, 
or "twitched," the tree into the river. The pines made their way downstream until they 
reached the mast ponds o f the ports, where they were finished by mastwrights or cut by 
sawmills, and loaded into ships. The merchants who backed this enterprise needed deep 
pockets because they had to pay crews o f lumberjacks their daily wages, supply several 
dozen teams of oxen, and purchase shares in the large ships that transported the masts.31
Like other merchants, timber traders sought to limit competition while opening 
markets for themselves. The British system of military contracting offered just such an 
opportunity for a select group o f merchants, since the navy granted exclusive contracts to 
mast suppliers in England, who hired agents to cut the pines and ship them from America.
31 Saltonstall, Ports of Piscataqua. 56.
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Merchants who failed to win such contracts were naturally hostile toward the system, 
dependent as they were on the sale o f pine to overseas markets. Most were inclined to 
ignore royal directives, devoting themselves to the production o f boards, planks, staves, 
and other sawn lumber while sending many potential masts to the sawmills. Other pine 
trees were sold as masts in Portugal and Spain, or as ship timber at the dockyards of 
Piscataqua, which by the last quarter o f the seventeenth century specialized in the 
construction o f large ships.32 The settlers' activities were a cause for concern among 
royal officials, since the deforestation of Maine and New Hampshire threatened the 
navy's future supply of masts. Edward Randolph, a former timber agent for the navy and 
a commissioner of the Lords o f Trade in New England, sent home a report in 1676 that 
brought the problem to their attention. Randolph excoriated Massachusetts for its open 
defiance of the Navigation Acts, and claimed that New England's timber trade violated 
trade laws and depleted the stock o f pine trees in Maine and New Hampshire. The Lords 
o f Trade quickly responded to his criticisms, revoking the colony's charter and appointing 
Randolph surveyor o f pines and timber in Maine and New Hampshire, a post that came 
with a £50 annual salary. Randolph became mired in the controversies o f the Andros 
administration and did little to serve his office, but his reports brought the mast problem 
to the attention of the Lords o f Trade.33
Randolph and Governor Andros were jailed during New England's version o f the 
1688-89 Glorious Revolution and returned to England upon their release. Randolph 
remained an influential figure at the Colonial Office and helped to insert a clause in
32 Joseph A. Goldenbere. Shipbuilding in Colonial America (Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press, 
1976), 36ff.
33 Joseph Malone, Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and Forest Policy in Colonial New England. 
1691-1775 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965), 1-9.
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Massachusetts's second charter that reserved to the crown all white pine trees greater than 
two feet in diameter growing on the province's public lands. Because Randolph had burnt 
his political bridges in New England, he could not enforce the provision himself. But by 
early 1690s, as the depredations of French privateers limited the supply o f masts and 
naval stores from the Baltic, the Lords of Trade and the Navy Board took a growing 
interest in New England's supply o f pines. This interest was cultivated by merchants and 
political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, who saw the development o f forest policy 
in New England as a potential source of enrichment and political advancement.34
New Englanders hoped to obtain contracts for the supply o f masts and bounties 
for encouraging the production o f naval stores such as tar and pitch. A month before the 
granting o f the second charter in 1691, governor William Phips, a native o f Maine and a 
former ship carpenter, had written a letter to the Lords o f Trade informing them that there 
were ample quantities o f timber in Piscataqua and Nova Scotia fit for naval purposes. In 
addition to oak and ash, there were "such abundance o f pines that were they well 
improved they would supply the whole Navy with pitch and tar, better and cheaper than 
in Europe."35 A group led by Joseph Dudley repeated Phips's overtures in 1693-94, 
lobbying the crown with the aid of Sir Henry Ashurst, a merchant and member of 
Parliament with close connections to New England. Ashurst and Dudley looked to obtain 
a charter for the production of naval stores and arranged a trial shipment o f masts to 
England in the hope of winning the favor o f the Lords o f Trade. Encouragement also
34 Malone, Pine Trees. 10-27; Michael G. Hall, Edward Randolph and the American Colonies. 1676-1703 
(Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, I960), 96-97.
35 CSP. vol. 13 (1689-92), fol. 1725.
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came from England, both from merchants lobbying for masting contracts and political 
officials eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the crown.36
Although New England and the Naval Office had a shared interest in the 
promotion of the mast trade, they understood its benefits differently. Both knew that the 
navy's demand for masts and naval stores was matched by the abundant timber supplies 
of Maine and New Hampshire, but each side sought to tip the scales o f the market in its 
own favor. As timber producers, New Englanders supported royal forest policy only to 
the extent that it opened up commercial opportunities for the region's lumbermen and 
merchants. In their eyes, masting contracts were valuable because they limited 
competition and gave lumbermen a reliable market for their timber. Without subsidies 
and protective legislation, New England was unable to compete with Scandinavia in the 
sale of timber and naval stores. High labor costs and the long Atlantic voyage made the 
transportation o f masts and tar expensive and risky in America. John Taylor, a New 
Hampshire merchant with many years in the masting trade, made this point clear in a 
memorial presented to the Lords of the Admiralty in 1694. "I would gladly see this 
Kingdom independent o f Sweden and Denmark," he assured them, "but 1 must speak as a 
merchant who judges his trade only by the measure of profit; and then arises the difficulty 
o f how we shall bring bulky goods from a very remote part as cheaply as from countries 
near us." Taylor explained that it was impossible for Americans to sell masts and naval 
stores at as low a price as the Scandinavians and suggested that the crown should treat 
New England as a supplier o f last resort for timber products, "with more regard to getting 
it than the price." The surest way of guaranteeing a supply o f naval stores, he concluded,
36 Malone, Pine Trees and Politics. 11-17.
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was by encouraging the manufacture o f pitch and tar in New Hampshire, presumably with 
bounties and other subsidies.37
British authorities were willing to support Taylor’s program, but they also sought 
to protect naval timber against indiscriminate felling by New England’s lumbermen. As 
purchasers o f timber and naval stores, the navy commissioners wanted a continual supply 
of pines and oak for as low a price as possible. The rapid depletion o f the forests of New 
Hampshire and Maine threatened to limit this supply and drive prices upward. In a 1700 
report to the Privy Council, the Board o f Trade speculated that "in two or three years time 
there will not be a good tree left for the use o f His Majesty's Navy, but what will be so far 
up in the country that the carriage to Piscataway will cost more than it will be worth."
Pine trees suitable as masts on naval vessels were being cut into deals and staves or were 
sent as masts and spars to Portugal and Spain, countries that, the Board reminded its 
readers, "upon a turn o f affairs, may prove our enemies." The only way to protect white 
pines against the depredations o f lumbermen was to introduce punitive measures, 
preferably through an act o f Parliament, that would force the inhabitants o f New England 
to reserve a portion o f the forest to the crown.38
On the basis o f these recommendations, Parliament passed a law in 1705 that 
extended the provisions o f the Massachusetts charter to include all o f the northern 
colonies, placed bounties on the production of naval stores, and prohibited the felling of 
pitch and tar pines for non-naval purposes. This act became the basis o f  the crown's 
"broad arrow" policy in North America, so called because surveyors o f the woods marked
37 CSP. vol. 14 (1693-96), fol. 967.
38 CSP. vol. 18 (1700), fol. 841, pp. 563-67. The Board's report was based primarily on information 
provided by the Earl of Bellomont, governor of New England and New York, who was looking to win 
points with his superiors by taking the lead in the development of royal forest policy.
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potential mast trees with three hatchet strokes that resembled an arrow or a crow's foot. 
Soon after the passage of the act, Jonathan Bridger, a former shipwright and naval purser 
who had played a leading role in formulating the broad arrow policy, was appointed 
surveyor-general o f the king's woods in America. Unlike his predecessor, Jahleel 
Brenton, a customs collector who had done little to earn his salary as surveyor, Bridger 
was firmly determined to uphold royal authority in New England’s forests.
Surveying the Woods
The broad arrow policy made all tall white pines on public land in New 
Hampshire and Maine the property o f the crown, prohibiting lumbermen from felling 
them without a royal license. But the crown's property rights did not have teeth unless it 
defended them in the courts or protected them with the sword. Like colonial proprietors 
of the previous century, royal officials were presented with the problem of making good 
on land claims that had more legitimacy in Europe than in America. Separated by an 
ocean from Maine and New Hampshire, royal officials in Whitehall could not control 
crown lands directly and depended instead on agents in the colonies. The agents' task 
was to defend the crown's property through a combination of enticements -  in the form 
of bounties on pitch, tar, turpentine, and hemp — and the enforcement o f prohibitive 
timber laws.
Like Gorges and Mason, the crown was hamstrung in this task by a lack o f funds 
and weak lines o f communication. Jonathan Bridger in 1705 was paid a salary o f £200, 
which was rather modest given that a substantial portion o f it was used to pay his 
deputies and to cover travelling expenses. With the aid o f two or three deputies, Bridger
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was expected to mark all the tall white pines found near the Piscataqua and its tributaries 
-- a vast area that extended some fifty miles into the interior ~  and to protect them from 
illegal cutting. Because the territory was so large and his deputies so few, Bridger had 
little hope o f catching violators red-handed and depended on paid informants who 
fingered wrongdoers, receiving a portion o f the seized logs in return. Even when 
lumbermen were caught and prosecuted, they were unlikely to be convicted because their 
cases were tried by the county judiciary, which was dominated by local timber interests.
In 1708 Bridger brought charges against John Plaisted, a prominent New Hampshire 
merchant and council member, for cutting mast trees without a license. Claiming that he 
had a license through Francis Collins, an English merchant with a contract from the navy, 
Plaisted had sent lumbermen into the woods during the winter, telling them to cut as 
many mast trees as they could. Bridger estimated that only one in four o f the trees that 
they felled were deemed worthy to be masts, while the rest were sent to the sawmills. 
Bridger took the case to York County court, but after a summary trial the jury found 
Plaisted innocent of all charges, leading Bridger to grumble that the jurymen were "all as 
guilty" as the defendant.39
Although Badger's superiors in London were sympathetic to his cause, there was 
little they could do to help him. In the age o f sail, distance presented a formidable barrier 
to administrative centralization and left the American colonies with a remarkable degree 
of political independence. Merchantmen sailing between Britain and New England in the 
eighteenth century had to complete a voyage o f some 2800 miles, which most sailed in 
seven or eight weeks. Although vessels became more complex in their sails and rigging 
during the eighteenth century, the duration o f this journey did not decline much before
39 CSP. vol. 24 (1708-1709), fol. 428, p. 259.
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the introduction o f the clipper and the ocean steamer in the 1830s.40 Trans-Atlantic 
correspondents had to contend with a two-month lag in the transmission o f their letters, a 
problem that was compounded by the seasonality o f commerce between Britain and New 
England. The only time o f the year in which vessels from the mother country were 
certain to be calling at New England's ports was in the summer, when the mast fleet made 
its arrival. During the rest o f the year, correspondents were often forced to find more 
circuitous methods of communicating across the ocean.
The uncertainty o f communication was particularly burdensome for royal 
officials, who were expected to report regularly to the Board o f Trade. Joseph Dudley, 
governor o f Massachusetts during the War of Spanish Succession, often lamented in his 
letters that the irregular traffic between Boston and London prevented him from reporting 
to the Board of Trade as regularly as he would have liked. Between October 1705 and 
July 1706, he received no letters from the Board, while sending four o f his own, one in 
April by a vessel that he considered to be an "uncertain conveyance" and another in July 
sent via Barbados to be transferred to a packet boat travelling to England. In this last 
letter, which did not arrive at the Board's offices until November, Dudley remarked that
40 Steele, English Atlantic. 17,57-77,249-50, Table 4.4; Gary M. Walton, "A Quantitative Study of 
American Colonial Shipping: A Summary," Journal o f Economic History 26 (1966): 597. Improvements 
in maritime transport before the American Revolution were the result of a growth in the frequency, rather 
than the speed, of voyages. The expansion o f Atlantic trade, particularly after the Treaty of Utrecht, 
created a steady increase in the volume o f oceanic traffic at all ports in the British empire. More vessels 
built to accommodate this traffic, and the existing mercantile fleet became more efficient. The growth of 
markets made it easier for ships to acquire and dispose of cargoes, so that vessels did not need to spend 
long periods in port waiting for the arrival of goods. Fewer days in port meant more days in transit, and 
vessels by the mid-1700s were making more voyages during their lifetimes than they had a century earlier.
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he had so little confidence in the trans-Atlantic mails that he did not intend to send a full 
report until the departure of the mast fleet in September.41
Maritime communications became somewhat more dependable after the Peace of 
Utrecht, and Massachusetts's officials by mid-century were less likely to encounter 
difficulties in exchanging letters with the Board o f Trade. But the long oceanic voyage 
remained a source of frustration. The length o f the journey made it impossible for the 
metropolitan government to respond immediately to crises in North America or to 
involve itself to any significant extent in the day-to-day business o f governing the 
colonies. The Privy Council intervened only periodically in the administration o f the 
colonies, issuing broad directives to governors, adjudicating disputes, and appointing and 
dismissing colonial officials. Even in these cases, the Council's authority was limited 
because the enforcement of orders depended on the compliance of local authorities and its 
personnel decisions were invariably influenced by lobbying on the part o f colonial agents. 
The govemors-general, who acted as the crown's representatives in the colonies, were 
more directly involved in provincial politics, but they, too, were constrained by distance. 
A journey of at least a day by sail and as much as a week by horse separated Boston from 
Casco Bay, making it difficult for royal officials in the capital to react promptly to events 
on the eastern frontier.
The barriers o f land and sea made government primarily a local responsibility.
The town meeting in Maine and New Hampshire was the focus o f most political activity: 
assessing and collecting taxes, distributing lands, cutting roads, building churches and 
schools, maintaining garrison houses, settling minor disputes, caring for the poor, and
41 CSP. vol. 23 (1706-1708), fols. 288,443, pp. 213, 178-79. Dudley had improvised in similar fashion in 
the past, having sent a letter to the Board by way of Lisbon in April 1704. See CSP. vol. 22 (1704-1705),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
202
supporting ministers. Because selectmen met their fellow townspeople nearly everyday, 
it was easy for them to respond promptly to local concerns. Officials working in London 
and Boston, on the other hand, were distant from the places they governed, and 
encountered more difficulties in gathering information and enacting policies. The 
crown's authority in the New World depended on the existence o f trans-Atlantic political 
networks sustained by maritime transportation and the written word.
Every year the Board of Trade, the advisory body charged with oversight o f  the 
American colonies, received hundreds of letters from correspondents in North America 
and the West Indies and dozens more from colonial agents in London. Although the 
Board was staffed by an assortment o f clerks and copyists, it was not in any real sense a 
bureaucracy; its commissioners were political appointees rather than career civil servants 
and its procedures were relatively informal. More importantly, the Board did not have an 
agency devoted exclusively to the disinterested gathering o f information and depended on 
reports from outsiders for its knowledge of the colonies. The bulk o f these reports came 
from governors and other royal officials, who owed their posts and salaries to the crown 
and were consequently loyal to the royal prerogative. Official memoranda were 
supplemented by letters from colonial agents, representatives o f proprietary companies, 
and private individuals, who weighed in on issues in which their interests were at stake.42
This communication was often personal in character; many letters were addressed 
to individual commissioners rather than the Board itself and were couched in deferential
fol. 455, p. 213.
42 Mary P. Clarice, "The Board ofTrade at Work," American Historical Review 17 (1911), 17-43; Charles 
M. Andrews. The Colonial Period of American History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), vol. 4, 
272-317; Richard M. Brown, "The Anglo-American Political System, 1675-1775: A Behavioral Analysis," 
in Alison G. Olson and Richard M. Brown, eds., Anglo-American Political Relations. 1675-1775 (New 
Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 14-28.
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language that explicitly recognized the social superiority o f the person being addressed. 
Letters and petitions — the typical method by which corporations, informal associations, 
or private individuals brought their grievances to the authorities — were customarily 
directed to an "honored Sir" and signed by a "humble and obedient Servant."43 This 
deferential language reflected not the slavish subservience o f the correspondents but the 
continuing importance o f patronage and personal ties in the political world o f the early 
eighteenth century. Although many impersonal, "modem" forms o f political association, 
such as lobbying organizations and national parties, had their tentative beginnings in 
eighteenth-century Britain, family ties, friendships, and patronage remained central to 
political life. The Board ofTrade, as Ian Steele has pointed out, "should be viewed as a 
changing group of individuals rather than a bureaucratic institution," because "in the early 
eighteenth century [personal] connections were bureaucracy." At both the Colonial 
Office and other departments o f the government, the exercise o f power depended on a 
pyramid of patron-client relationships that connected the political centers o f Westminster 
and Whitehall with the localities.44
These relationships acted as conduits for both patronage and information. 
Possessing only the bare bones o f bureaucratic organization, agencies such as the Board 
ofTrade drew their knowledge of the colonies mainly from petitions and reports, which 
were inevitably colored by the interests of their senders. The typical petition began by
43 A petition in the eighteenth century could be brought by a single individual and did not need to be 
accompanied by a long list of signatures. Much of the legislation of Massachusetts General Court during 
peacetime was initiated by petitions; Alison Olson has estimated that about half the taws passed in the 
American colonies before the Revolution were based on petitions. See Alison G. Olson, "Eighteenth- 
Century Colonial Legislatures and Their Constituents," Journal of American History 79 (1992): 543-67.
44 Ian K.. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board ofTrade in Colonial Administration. 1696-1720 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), xiii. On the importance of connections between Parliament and 
the localities in Britain, see Jeremy Black, The Politics of Britain. 1688-1800 (Manchester Manchester 
University Press, 1993), 55-93.
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outlining the problem at hand, skewing the information to make the writer's demands 
seem reasonable. The petitioner then outlined a plan o f action for the government, 
emphasizing its importance to the interests o f king and country, even though its most 
immediate beneficiary was nearly always the petitioner himself. Because such petitions 
and letters formed the basis o f the Board's knowledge o f the colonies, they strongly 
influenced the formulation o f colonial policy. The commissioners knew that letters from 
America served as a useful guide to public opinion and as an indication of the extent to 
which royal initiatives would be palatable in the colonies.45
Political favor, as a consequence, tended to flow along the channels cut by 
communication; unless people had the ear o f the government, they could not expect it to 
work on their behalf. Personal ties mattered a great deal under these circumstances, since 
government officials were inclined to see the justice in their friends' grievances and the 
faults in those of their enemies. Patronage flowed freely to those who won the favor of 
the government and ran dry for its opponents. Not surprisingly, political life in Georgian 
England was characterized by intrigue and underhanded dealings as ambitious merchants 
and politicians courted the favor o f the powerful while simultaneously attempting to 
undermine their rivals. Because political figures represented and drew support from their 
followers, competition for place and patronage was not merely a matter of personal 
striving but a contest between rival interest groups.46
45 As Richard Bushman has pointed out, deferential language of petitions allowed people to express their 
grievances against the authorities without calling into doubt their sense o f allegiance. See Richard L. 
Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1985), 46-54.
46 The classic work on patronage networks in eighteenth-century Britain is Sir Lewis Namier, The 
Structure of Politics at the Accession o f George m  (London: Macmillan. 1957). Namier has been justly 
criticized for underestimating the importance o f ideology and o f popular politics. John Brewer’s Party 
Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976) offers a sharp rebuttal to Namier's rather cynical view of political life.
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Personal attacks against public figures in this context were also assaults against 
the policies they represented. If laws and directives were based on petitions and pleas 
from the localities, the crown could count on local cooperation in their enforcement since 
the inspiration for the policies lay among the very people they were intended to affect.
But initiatives devised by outsiders needed to be enforced by outsiders, and colonial 
resentment against unpopular laws was usually directed against the officials sent to 
uphold them.47 The provisions o f the 1705 forest law that rewarded the lobbying efforts 
o f New Englanders, particularly the bounties on naval stores, were well received in 
America and did not face popular resistance. But the punitive aspects of the law, which 
placed a ban on the felling o f pines, were drawn up in Britain by men such as Edward 
Randolph and Jonathan Bridger, who were indifferent if  not hostile to the interests of 
New England. These provisions had little support in New England, and local opposition 
focused on the man who was appointed to enforce them, Jonathan Bridger.
Soon after Bridger began to prosecute lumbermen such as John Plaisted for 
violations o f forest laws, the notables o f New Hampshire and Maine launched a 
counterattack against him, assailing his reputation in England and America. Through 
their contacts in England, Plaisted and his allies sent messages to the Board ofTrade 
accusing him of corruption and suggesting that he had allowed local mill owners to saw 
mast trees into lumber in return for bribes. When Bridger was informed o f the rumors, he 
dispatched a letter to the Board in March 1709, denying all wrongdoing and asking that 
his accusers come forward to be publicly interrogated on their charges. Aware that his 
connections in the mother country were in need o f repair, he apologized for past
47 Patricia Bonomi, The Lord Comburv Scandal and the Politics of Reputation (Chapel Hill, N. C.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
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"mistakes," particularly his persistence in asking for a higher salary. He then made a 
journey through the settlements of New Hampshire, posting notices on meetinghouse 
doors in which he refuted the charges and promised a reward o f £100 to any person who 
could prove his guilt. He also listed the regulations for cutting trees and promised a 
reward to people who brought information that led to a successful conviction.48
Bridger understood that attacks against his reputation threatened his political 
career. Like all royal officials in America, his political survival depended on his ability 
to remain in the good graces of the Board ofTrade, which was responsible for his 
appointment and his salary. Its members needed to be assured that he was carrying out 
his office honestly and not using it as a platform for jobbery and extortion. Since the 
Board did not have any impartial agents who could monitor Bridgets actions, its 
evaluation of his performance was based on information obtained from letters written in 
the colonies or from conversations with colonial agents. This information was inevitably 
colored by the interests o f those who delivered it because few people would bother to 
write unless they had a political axe to grind. If Bridgets opponents managed to cast 
doubts on good faith, he would lose the Board's confidence and would be recalled to 
England. And if they undermined his reputation, they would call into question the 
credibility of his reports from the colonies. Bridger knew the danger o f malicious 
rumors, and his regular correspondence with the mother country was meant to ensure that 
the Board would see his side o f the story.49
48 DHSM 9: 270-71.
49 When Bridger prosecuted three men in 1720 for cutting mast trees, he told the Board ofTrade that they 
"may expect a cloud of witness's affadavits against me," because he had attempted to uphold the 
prerogative. See CSP, vol. 32 (1720-21), fol. 118, p. 55.
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Because his office led him to trample on local interests, the surveyor o f the woods 
inevitably became a magnet for personal attacks. The most sustained assaults came in the 
second decade of the century, as timber merchants in New Hampshire and the "populist" 
party in Massachusetts -- a group o f assemblymen hostile toward the expansion o f royal 
prerogative -- united in their opposition to Bridger. The earliest accusations came from 
merchants who were directly affected by Bridger’s prosecutions. In February 1710, 
Bridger complained in a letter to the Board ofTrade that he was being made the object of 
a personal vendetta by John Mico, the agent of Francis Collins, a London merchant who 
held a masting contract with the navy. Mico's "mallice is as great as ever," he told them, 
"and reports all over the countrey he will turn me out, if it cost him £10,000." Bridger 
was not mistaken: a few months later, a number o f merchants allied with Mico and 
Collins brought a report to the Board ofTrade accusing Bridger o f being "guilty of 
bribery and corruption, and making devastation o f the woods he was sent to preserve." 
They claimed that Bridger had allowed the "common people to cut what trees they 
please" in exchange for bribes and had recently received £50 for an illegal shipment of 
masts.50
The circle o f Bridger's enemies widened after the Peace o f Utrecht as growing 
numbers o f investors in Massachusetts became interested in the lands o f Maine and New
50 CSP. vol. 25 ( 1710-11), fols. 86,329. Bridger's reputation also came under attack by fellow officials. 
His first voyage to New England in 1698 had been described to the Board ofTrade in an unflattering light 
by the Earl o f Bellomont, then governor of New York and New England. Bellomont reported that Bridger 
and two other surveyors sent by the commissioners of the navy had been blown off course and forced to 
land in Barbados, where Bridger and a colleague fell sick of a fever "contracted by a debauch." Bridger’s 
colleague, considered "the better of the two" by Bellomont, died in Barbados, but Bridger recovered and 
went on to New Hampshire. The governor scolded Bridger for his "foolish and unhappy parsimony," 
which had brought "[m]uch disappointment and loss of time" in the task o f furnishing the navy with naval 
stores from New England. Though Bellomont was a loyal defender of royal forest policy, he saw Bridger 
as an officious meddler and potential rival, and his remarks about the surveyor's syphilitic episode in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
Hampshire. In 1713 the provincial government revived the Committee o f Eastern Claims 
and Settlements, which had been established for two brief periods in 1700 and 1702. The 
committee began preparing the Book of Eastern Claims, a registry o f land titles for the 
region east of Wells that allowed former inhabitants o f Maine to reclaim holdings they 
had abandoned during wartime. The list o f people who presented deeds to the committee 
included former inhabitants of Maine as well as speculative land companies from Boston 
that had purchased seventeenth-century patents and other titles in the hope o f profiting 
from the settlement o f Maine's lands.51
One of these groups of investors was the Lincolnshire Company, or Muscongus 
Proprietors, who had acquired title to approximately one million acres between the St. 
George and Penobscot rivers on the basis o f a 1630 patent to John Beauchamp and 
Thomas Leverett and a 1694 deed between Madockawando and Sir William Phips. The 
original deeds belonged to the descendants o f Leverett and Phips, who in 1719 sold 
shares to thirty investors expected to provide the financial backing for the settlement of 
their lands. Several o f the shareholders were also members o f the populist party, 
including Dr. Elisha Cooke, Jr., one o f the most vocal critics o f royal prerogative in the 
House o f Representatives. To men such as Cooke, Bridger became both a symbol of 
arbitrary royal power and a practical impediment to the development o f their holdings in 
York County.52 Early in 1718, Cooke and his allies launched a campaign to discredit 
Bridger, using Massachusetts's agent in London, Jeremiah Dummer, to lobby for his
Barbados were meant to undermine his credibility in the eyes of the Board. See CSP. 16 (1697-98), fol. 
502, pp. 240-41.
51 Clark, The Eastern Frontier. 111-43; Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607-1763” (Ph.D. diss., 
Yale University, 1933), 319-45.
52 Cooke and others had substantial holdings in Maine even before the acquisition o f the Muscongus 
Patent.
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dismissal. Cooke also took direct aim at the broad arrow policy, arguing that it did not 
apply to Maine's lands. Since the region had been purchased from the Gorges family, he 
reasoned, it was private property, and according to the terms o f the 1705 act white pines 
were protected only in territory that was not divided into private holdings.53
In February 1718, Cooke took his case to the House o f Representatives, accusing 
Bridger of corruption. Loggers, he claimed, had been forced to pay bribes to the surveyor 
before entering the woods to cut white pines. In the ensuing months, Cooke collected 
depositions from more than a dozen lumbermen, most alleging that they had been made 
to pay six shillings for every team o f oxen sent into the woods. In a later speech to the 
House, Cooke reported that John Mico had paid the surveyor £50 for the right to send a 
shipload of masts to England. Many o f those who backed Cooke's charges were 
respected figures in northern New England; among the deponents were members of New 
Hampshire's leading families, including Archibald Macpheadris, Timothy Wentworth, 
and Elisha Plaisted. Bridger had already been threatened with dismissal in the winter of 
1715-16 and had been forced to return to England to restore his reputation. Cooke's 
campaign, combined with Jeremiah Dummer's lobbying efforts in London, put the final 
nails in the surveyor's coffin. By October 1718 a letter arrived in Boston reporting that 
Bridger had been relieved o f his post and replaced by Charles Bumiston, a London 
merchant. In a letter written the same month, Bridger openly criticized the Board's 
decision but also admitted that his unpopularity in Maine and New Hampshire had made 
it nearly impossible for him to carry out his office. Claiming that "my life is threatened if
53 On the political background o f Cooke's campaign, see William Pencak, War. Politics, and Revolution in 
Provincial Massachusetts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 62-67. Bridger received support 
from governor Samuel Shute, who opposed Cooke's plan for the establishment of a private bank to increase
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found on my duty in the woods," he reported that backwoodsmen had "begun to cut [and] 
destroy all before them" since news o f his dismissal had spread to northern New
England.54
Although he almost certainly did not reach the heights o f venality described by 
Cooke, Bridger had probably engaged in activities that left him open to charges of 
corruption. Like other royal officials o f the time, Bridger was remunerated not only with 
a salary but with various perquisites o f office that allowed him to increase his income.
The crown in this respect behaved much like a merchant o f the time, both o f them faced 
with the problem of directing large organizations with an insufficient supply o f funds. 
Wholesalers in port towns advanced credit to producers such as farmers and fishermen 
with the knowledge that both creditor and debtor would receive a share o f their crops or 
their catch. Debtors would divide their time between producing for the market and 
working for their own subsistence. This arrangement allowed merchants to limit their 
expenses because they did not have to provide for their workers year-round. It also 
passed some o f the merchant's risk on to the producer, since debtors were legally 
obligated to make good on their loans. In similar fashion, the crown advanced a post and 
a modest salary to its officeholders with the understanding that civil servants would make 
additional income through the performance o f their office. This practice cut the expenses 
of governments and allowed them to shift some o f the burden of risk — say, o f failures to 
collect revenues or o f botched privateering expeditions — on to their office holders. But
the money supply in the province. Cooke and other members of the populist party knew that the removal 
of Bridger from office would be a blow to Shute and his supporters.
54 CSP, vol. 29 (1716-17), fol. 33, p. 10; vol. 30, fol. 735, pp. 368-69; vol. 31, fol. 578, pp. 365-68.
Cooke's charges were later confirmed by Bridger’s successor, Robert Armstrong, who reported that Bridger 
had accepted bribes from timber merchants and had looked the other way as they illegally cut mast trees. 
Yet Armstrong’s charges were self-serving, since he had a vested interest in appearing more vigilant than 
Bridger. See CSP, vol. 32 (1720-21), fols. 669,694.
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the crown, like a wholesaling merchant, could not directly supervise its employees and 
was dependent on their good faith, hence the constant ruminating at the Board ofTrade as 
to whether the reports of royal officials "had credit" or were credible.55
In Bridger's case, the salary that came with the post o f surveyor was inadequate to 
maintain a genteel lifestyle, and it was understood that Bridger would also receive a share 
o f all the fines exacted under the forest laws. But Bridger was unable to collect this 
revenue because o f his inability to successfully prosecute violations o f the laws. Even 
when he finally managed to secure a conviction in 1713 against three men for cutting a 
mast tree, none of their neighbors would purchase their estate at public auction, making it 
impossible to collect their fines.56 Without the fines, Bridger’s deputies and informers 
could not be paid their rewards and consequently had little reason to be vigilant in the 
enforcement of the forest laws. In a December 1717 letter to the Board ofTrade, Bridger 
reported that he had appointed seven deputies "well knowing in the woods and people of 
good repute," but admitted that he "cannot give them any reward so what may be 
expected from them I humbly submitt to their Lordshipps."57 To make matters worse, the 
surveyor did not receive any salary at all in the last two years o f his tenure and was 
dependent on loans for his subsistence. In all likelihood, the frustrations o f his office led 
Bridger to charge all lumbermen a fee before entering the woods, thus guaranteeing 
himself a steady income and a modicum of control over the timber trade.
55 On the connection between merchant credit and the management of risk, see Rosemary E. Ommer, ed., 
Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective (Fredericton, N.B.: Acadiensis Press,
1990); on credit and the economy of early modem England, see Craig Muldrew, The Economy of 
Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Earlv Modem England (New York: S t Martin's 
Press, 1998).
56 CSP, vol. 27 (1712-14), fol. 518, p. 257; fol. 249, p. 126.
57 CSP, vol. 30 (1717-18), fol. 283, pp. 139-40.
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In accepting this compromise, Bridger effectively admitted defeat in his battle 
against New England's timber merchants over the enforcement o f  forest laws. Far from 
accepting the notion that white pines were the property o f the crown, the inhabitants o f 
Maine and New Hampshire treated the trees that grew on public lands as a common 
resource to be divided amongst themselves. This point of view was upheld by the judges 
and juries of the Court o f Common Pleas, who consistently thwarted any attempts to 
enforce the broad arrow policy. Acting as agents o f community sentiment, the courts 
refused to indict offenders of the forest laws and tacitly defended the notion that forest 
products were owned by New Englanders themselves, to be sold to the highest bidder on 
an open market. Because the county courts were the only legitimate arbiter o f  property 
rights in the region, Bridger's attempts to prosecute the laws were doomed to failure. He 
admitted as much in several letters to the Board ofTrade, telling them that "all the people 
on the frontiers depend on the woods for their livelyhood and say the King has no woods 
here, and they will cut what and where they please as long as the Charters good."58
Bridger's only recourse was to turn to his superiors at Whitehall for support, but 
they failed to provide him with the funds and personnel necessary to enforce the forest 
laws. Worse still, New Englanders proved effective at using trans-Atlantic lines o f 
communication to their own advantage. By flooding the Board ofTrade with rumors of 
Bridger’s wrongdoings, Elisha Cooke and his allies undercut the surveyor's authority in 
New England by calling into question his reputation in the mother country. This strategy 
eroded Bridger’s power and allowed New Englanders to evade punitive forest laws. Not 
only did Yankee merchants continue to export masts and other timber to Iberia and the
58 Ibid.
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West Indies, they also transshipped naval stores from North Carolina to England, 
collecting the bounties on tar and pitch made by the Carolinians.59
Bridger’s ordeal was an instructive example o f the limitations o f imperial power in 
the First British Empire. As Jack Greene has argued, the coercive model o f late 
nineteenth-century imperialism fits poorly with the political facts o f the previous era of 
colonization. The effective operation o f  early modem empires century depended on the 
consent of colonists living at the peripheries, who accepted royal authority only because it 
protected their customary liberties.60 The circuitous methods by which imperial 
authorities controlled and gained knowledge of distant territories tended to reinforce this 
relationship. In the heyday o f nineteenth-century imperialism, European powers ruled 
vast territories through colonial bureaucracies whose knowledge o f their subjects 
depended little on the cooperation o f native inhabitants. The authoritarian structure of 
power in these colonies was reflected and reinforced by centralized techniques of 
information-gathering: British knowledge o f India, for example, owed little to native 
map-making and much to large-scale land surveys carried out by highly trained engineers 
using geodetic triangulation.61 In the eighteenth-century, by contrast, knowledge and 
control o f the land depended on the cooperation o f colonists, who were steadfast in their 
defense of customary rights and liberties. The flow of information determined the 
balance o f power; because the Board ofTrade received much o f its information about
59 Malone, Pine Trees and Politics. 28-46.
60 Jack P. Greene, "Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the 
Early Modem Atlantic World," in Negotiated Authorities: Essavs in Colonial Political and Constitutional 
History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24.
61 C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India. 1780- 
1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: 
Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993); Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: 
The Geographical Construction of British Tndia. 1765-1843 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1997).
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Maine from merchants and agents from New England, its centralizing policies were 
doomed to fail.
Samuel Waldo and the Muscongus Patent
The short trip between Boston and Maine posed a less o f an obstacle to political 
authority than the Atlantic, and the leading figures o f the Bay Colony wielded greater 
influence to the eastward than did their metropolitan counterparts. The resettlement of 
Maine following the Peace o f Utrecht brought the region's towns deeper into the political 
fold o f Massachusetts, as the provincial government took an active role in sorting out the 
land claims of returning colonists. After they had resolved disputes between rival groups 
of proprietors over the distribution o f common lands, towns from Casco Bay westward 
became increasingly integrated into the world o f provincial politics, sending 
representatives to the assembly, winning a handful o f appointments to the council, and 
shaping legislation through petitions and informal influence. To the east o f Casco Bay, 
on the other hand, lay a large expanse o f territory that had been weakly held or never 
occupied by the English. With the cession o f Acadia by the French, the time seemed ripe 
for its settlement, and the lead was taken by a number o f land companies from Boston 
and environs who derived their title to vast proprietary holdings from seventeenth-century 
patents, grants, and Indian deeds.62
To the merchants and gentlemen who invested in these companies, the lands of 
Maine were a form o f capital stock whose value was expected to accrue overtime. With 
a rapidly expanding population and a growing demand for natural resources, it was
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generally understood that the value o f land would steadily rise throughout New England. 
The safest investments were in holdings within chartered townships but the most 
spectacular profits were made in frontier areas, where land could be purchased cheaply 
and sold later at a much higher price. As in any speculative venture, investments in land 
companies were made with the expectation that the value of stocks would rise in the 
future. The stockholders of the companies believed that population growth would fuel a 
demand for lands in marginal areas such as Maine, and that as more colonists settled in 
York County, the clearing of roads and construction o f mills would drive up land prices 
further still. But the problem was to establish ownership of the land in advance of 
settlement and to hold the land in reserve until prices had risen sufficiently.63
Success in this regard required a defensive strategy o f protecting the land against 
rival claimants and an offensive strategy o f promoting the settlement o f proprietary 
holdings. The effective use o f communication was essential to both aims. In the 
eighteenth century, merchants made their profits not so much by increasing the volume of 
production as by merchandising and speculation. Traders flourished when they cornered 
the market on various commodities and controlled their distribution. Because their 
success depended on their ability to link producers with consumers, merchants were 
constantly in need of reliable and timely information about prices, markets, and sources 
of goods. They were also continually courting political favor, since the ability to secure 
exclusive rights to a commodity often depended on the influence o f public authorities.
The land was a good like any other in this respect, and the successful promotion of
62 Roy H. Akagi, The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1923; reprint ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), 188fT; Moody, "Maine 
Frontier," 319-424.
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company holdings depended on the creation o f human networks that enabled proprietors 
in Boston to develop and protect their lands from afar.
The case o f Samuel Waldo, one o f the leading promoters o f proprietary holdings 
before the Seven Years War, provides an illuminating example o f how such networks 
were created. Waldo's great-grandfather, Cornelius, had been one o f the founders of 
Chelmsford and Dunstable, and his father and uncle were two o f the original investors in 
the Lincolnshire Company. By the time he was in his twenties, Samuel was trading 
merchandise from his house on Queen Street in Boston on capital advanced by his father, 
Jonathan. In 1728, Jonathan also gave Samuel his share in the Muscongus Patent as a 
deed of gift, encouraging his son's emerging career as a speculator in Maine's lands.64 A 
year earlier, Samuel had begun to purchase portions o f the estate o f Sylvanus Davis, a 
seventeenth-century trader who had built two sawmills and acquired extensive land 
holdings in Falmouth. His interest in Maine real estate climbed dramatically after he 
negotiated the confirmation o f the Muscongus Patent by the Privy Council in 1732 and 
was rewarded half the Patent for his services. He added to his holdings after his return to 
New England, investing over £14,000 in Maine lands between 1732 and 1736 and 
receiving an additional share from the Lincolnshire Company65 By the time o f his death 
in 1759, Waldo had acquired approximately 13,000 acres in Falmouth, 350 acres in 
Scarborough, 200 acres in Biddeford, some 1,000 acres in North Yarmouth, two mills 
with four saws at Presumpscott and Stroudwater streams near Casco Bay, as well as the
63 On land speculation in colonial British North America, see Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling o f British 
North America: An Introduction (New York: Vintage, 1986), 65-85.
64 York Deeds, vol. 12, fol. 355; "Waldo, Samuel," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds.. Dictionary 
of American Biography. 10 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), vol. 10:333.
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400,000-acre share he held in Muscongus Patent: the executors o f  his estate valued his 
holdings in York County at £41,387.66
Although Waldo made frequent visits to his eastern holdings, his business was 
carried out for the most part by a number o f agents acting on his behalf. In the 1730s, he 
formed a partnership with Thomas Westbrook, a masting agent and landowner who had 
moved to Falmouth after serving as commander o f Maine's forces during Dummer’s War. 
Not long after the war, Waldo won an appointment as the agent o f Ralph Gulston, an 
English merchant who held a masting contract with the royal navy. Waldo retained the 
services o f Westbrook as his own agent, who hired teams o f lumbermen to cut and haul 
the trees specified in the contract and brought additional timber to Waldo's sawmills. 
Westbrook had acted in the past as a representative o f the Pejepscot and Lincolnshire land 
companies and Waldo came to rely on him as his eyes and ears in real estate dealings in 
York County. The two men jointly purchased numerous tracts in Maine, and Westbrook 
kept Waldo abreast of potential buyers and sellers, estates made available by the deaths of 
landowners, and threats to Waldo's interests.67 A similar role was later played by Waldo's 
sons, Francis and Samuel, Jr., and his son-in-law, Isaac Winslow. A variety o f other 
agents served Waldo in Maine by collecting rents and debts, paying bribes, organizing 
shipments of lumber, and retailing provisions and other goods. Still others carried out
65 York Deeds, vol. 15: fols. 119,234-39,251-53; vol. 16: fols., 22-29,32,97, 159-75,214-220; vol. 17, 
fols. 11, 61-68, 103, 117-18,209-11,229,235-36,271,284-85,288-89,296-98; vol. 18: fols. 31-32,57- 
59, 73, 81, 129-33,214-17,223-25,227.
66 Inventory of Waldo estate, Boston, August 18,1760, Waldo Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, 
Me., box 1, folder 8, fols. 4-5.
67 York Deeds, vol. 13, fols. 151-53; vol. 15:118; vol. 16:97; vol. 17: 103,236,271; vol. 18:57-68; 
deposition of Joseph Connant, August IS, 1759, Waldo Papers, Maine Historical Society, box I, folder 8; 
petition of Richard Fry, Collections of the Maine Historical Society. 1st. ser, vol. 3 (1853): 335-37; DHSM. 
11: 1-4,41-43.
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land surveys and facilitated the settlement o f the Lincolnshire Company's townships [see 
Fig. 3.5].68
The regular communication o f Waldo with his agents was made possible by the 
frequent sailings of coasting sloops between Boston and Maine. As the center o f  timber 
trade moved from Piscataqua to Casco Bay, a steadily increasing number o f vessels called 
at Falmouth and points eastward, carrying cargoes on the accounts o f Waldo and other 
merchants. Waldo was not himself a ship owner but the steady stream of coasting vessels 
trading to the east allowed him to keep a constant communication with his agents in 
Maine. In May and June 1744, he received over two dozen letters from correspondents in 
York County, with some correspondents writing several times a week.69 The high 
volume of mail was largely due to preparations for war -- Waldo was commander o f York 
County's eastern regiment -  but it also reflected the rapidity and reliability o f 
communication between Boston and Maine. Waldo made ample use of coasting vessels, 
corresponding and visiting his eastern settlements regularly. The success o f his business 
in Maine depended on this active involvement; when Waldo went to England for several 
years after 1749, his son remarked that his "Eastern affairs" suffered from neglect.70
But it was in his effective use o f  overseas networks o f communication that Waldo 
made his mark. Located in a region where land claims conflicted and political authority
68 For purchases of land, see indenture with Thomas Smith, October 27,1732; for the collection of rents 
and debts, see letter of Sebastian Zuberbuhler, May 6,1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical 
Society, Boston, Mass.; indenture with Enoch Freeman, December 29, 1758; for shipments of timber, see 
letters of Thomas Carver, May 18,1744, Enoch Freeman, June 6 ,7 ,8 , 1744, Samuel Waldo Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society; for payments ofbribes, see letter of Enoch Freeman, June 8,1744,
Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; for retailing, see letter o f Captain Phillips, Boston, June 
29, 1753, Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass., vol. 50, fol. 119; 
certificate from Thomas Fuller, Knox Papers, vol. 50 fol. 133; receipt, Knox Papers, vol. 54, fol. 2; for 
surveys, see depositions of George Drinkwater, January 14,1734/5, Jonas Willson and Henry Macintire, 
March 27, 1734, Stephen Jones, May 19,1738, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fols. 8,9 ,32.
69 See 26 letters dated May and June, Samuel Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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was precarious, the Lincolnshire Company's holdings were secure only if  the owners 
managed to get the backing of several levels o f government. Waldo was intensely aware 
o f the connection between commerce and politics and spared no effort in his attempts to 
influence provincial and imperial leaders. The first challenge he faced was from David 
Dunbar, an Irish-born military officer who was appointed surveyor-general o f the woods 
in 1728.71 Having learned from Bridgets failures that surveyors could not count on local 
cooperation in the enforcement o f the broad arrow policy, Dunbar introduced a proposal 
that would allow the crown to gain tighter control o f New England's forests without 
having to defer to the region's authorities. His solution was to establish a royally- 
administered settlement in Sagadahock, the name traditionally given to the territory 
between the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers. Soon after his arrival in New England in 
1729, the surveyor-general recruited some three hundred Scotch-Irish migrants to move 
to the lands east o f the St. George River and proposed that a separate province be 
established east of the Kennebec, to be called Georgia.72 Knowing that Dunbar
70 Letter of Francis Waldo to Samuel Waldo, May 18, 1752, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 110.
71 Dunbar's strongest backer at the Board of Trade was Colonel Martin Bladen, one o f the leaders of the 
West Indian party in Parliament. Like other West Indian planters, he resented New England's extensive 
involvement in illegal trade with the French Caribbean, which flooded the British market with French 
tropical produce and drove down the price of sugar from the English islands. Beginning in 1727, Bladen 
took the lead in pushing for a reform of the colonial administrative system, demanding tighter control of 
the colonies and a more rigid enforcement o f the Navigation Acts. As the colony responsible for the most 
flagrant violations of trading laws, Massachusetts became a focal point of Bladen’s campaign. In an effort 
to bring the New Englanders to heel, Bladen and his allies introduced legislation designed to clamp down 
on smuggling in the West Indies and also attempted to enforce existing imperial regulations, including the 
forest laws. See "Bladen, Martin," in Romney Sedgwick, ed., The House of Commons. 1715-1754. 2 vols. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 1:465-66; James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect": Colonial 
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton. N. J.r Princeton University Press, 1972), 60-106.
72 DHSM. 10:451-69. The lands east of the Kennebec nominally belonged to Massachusetts on the basis 
of its 1691 charter but they had been virtually unoccupied by the English since French and Wabanaki 
forces razed their fort at Pemaquid in 1696. After the Peace of Utrecht, various companies had floated 
schemes to settle the region, including a group led by the merchant-philanthropist Thomas Coram, who had 
begun his career as a shipwright in New England and had since become one o f London's most successful 
merchants. Coram’s plan to settle discharged soldiers in the region was scuttled after the bursting of the 
South Sea Bubble in 1720. But the merchant brought his scheme to the attention of the Board o f Trade
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threatened the validity of the Muscongus Patent and promised to interfere with his 
masting operations, Waldo departed to England to plead the case o f the Lincolnshire 
proprietors. Conscious of the value o f metropolitan connections -- he even went so far as 
to name his youngest son after his English patron, Ralph Gulston -- Waldo exerted his 
influence at the Privy Council for over a year, winning a revocation o f Dunbar’s colony in 
1732.73
The Privy Council's decision did not spell the end o f Dunbar’s stay in New 
England; in 1731 the Board o f Trade had appointed him lieutenant-governor o f New 
Hampshire in order to strengthen his position as surveyor-general. In the years that 
followed, Dunbar was drawn into a peculiar alliance with Waldo, the two of them united 
in opposition to the governor o f Massachusetts, Jonathan Belcher. In 1734, an employee 
of Waldo's, William Leighton, organized a logging party to cut pine trees in Berwick in a 
forested area whose title was held by John Frost, a member o f Piscataqua’s oligarchy of 
merchant families. Dunbar assisted in the operations, marking the trees that were suitable 
for shipment as masts. Frost took Leighton to court on trespass charges, as much to make 
a political point as to collect damages. The county court found in Frost's favor, and over 
the next several years the case became tied up in a series o f  appeals and counter-appeals, 
eventually reaching the Privy Council in London. Much to Waldo's dismay, Belcher 
failed to lend support to his case and tacitly worked to advance the cause o f Frost and his 
allies.74
once again in 1728 and it was quickly adopted by Dunbar. See CSP. vol. 27 (1712-14), fols. 357,364,366, 
385; vol. 29 (1716-17), fol. 577; vol. 36 (1728-29), fol. 628; DHSM. 10:436-444.
73 DHSM 11: 134; Samuel Waldo, A Defence of the Title o f the late John Leverett. E s q . :  to a Tract of 
Land in the Eastern Parts of the Province of the Massachusetts Bav. commonly called Muscongus Lands, 
lying unon St. George's. Muscongus. and Penobscott Rivers (Boston: Kneeland and Greenf?], 1736), Early 
American Imprints, 1st sen, no. 4098, 7-9.
74 Andrew M. Davis, "The Case o f Frost vs. Leighton," American Historical Review 2 (1897): 229-40.
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Two years later, the governor again provoked Waldo's ire by failing to support 
him in a dispute with the Wabanakis over the settlement o f the upper St. George River. 
Knowing that Belcher’s reputation was vulnerable on both sides o f the Atlantic, Waldo 
launched a public relations campaign at home — which included two lengthy pamphlets 
that delineated the history o f the Muscongus claim and insinuated that the governor 
surreptitiously encouraged the Indians — and an intense lobbying effort in London to 
remove Belcher from office. By 1741, Waldo's efforts bore fruit with the replacement o f 
Belcher by William Shirley, who had acted as Waldo's first lawyer in the Leighton case 
and was given a share of the Muscongus Patent as a reward.75
In his many voyages to England -- he made fifteen in his lifetime — Waldo did 
more than protect his political interests; he also did much to promote the development o f 
the Muscongus Patent. The recruitment o f  settlers was crucial to this effort, since the 
worth o f real estate grew as its population increased; in 1729, Waldo told a colleague that 
the Muscongus Patent would in a few years be "very valuable, more especially as Lands 
adjacent thereto will soon be settled."76 But because Maine's soils were relatively 
infertile and its settlements vulnerable to Indian attack, land companies were hard pressed
75 Samuel Waldo. Whereas since mv Return from St. George's River.... (Boston: n. p.. May 22, 1735), 
Early American Imprints,1st ser., no. 40087; idem., Defence of the Title: indenture of land from Samuel 
Waldo to William Shirley, July 3, 1738, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fols. 34-35. Waldo belonged to one of 
several groups in New England who called for Belcher's removal. Elisha Cooke and his radical allies 
opposed the governor on constitutional grounds, criticizing on principle the representative of the 
prerogative in Massachusetts. The Wentworth family of Portsmouth was irritated by Belcher’s close 
friendship with Richard Waldron and William Vaughan, who were the factional opponents of the 
Wentworths in the New Hampshire assembly. Belcher’s attempts to control appointments to the provincial 
council and his desire to annex New Hampshire to Massachusetts bothered them even more. Both Waldo 
and the Wentworths had powerful metropolitan connections: William Shirley was the brother-in-law o f the 
Duke of Newcastle, while Mark Hunking Wentworth was the masting agent o f John Thomlinson, an 
influential figure in the Walpole administration. It was these connections that made Belcher’s removal 
possible. See John A. Schultz, "Succession Politics in Massachusetts, 1730-1741," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 15 (1958): 508-20; £SP, vol. 41 (1734-35), fol. 166, p. 103; Malone, Pine Trees. 118- 
23.
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to attract families from southern New England. Waldo printed numerous handbills and 
inserted several advertisements in Boston newspapers announcing the availability of 
tracts in Maine, but because farmers preferred to purchase lands within their own 
townships or nearby areas, few people from Massachusetts proper took his offer.77
Like the proprietors o f other companies, Waldo was forced to look across the 
ocean for settlers, recruiting migrants from Ireland, Scotland, and Germany. As early as 
1720, the Lincolnshire Company had contracted with an agent in Ireland to send fifty 
families to settle two townships on the St. George River. But the deal fell through, as did 
several later attempts to recruit Irish settlers, and it was not until the 1730s that large 
numbers of foreign immigrants began arriving in the lands o f the Muscongus Patent.78 
The first group were the fifty families brought over by David Dunbar, many o f whom 
later purchased deeds from Samuel Waldo for holdings between the Muscongus and St. 
George rivers. In 1735, Waldo contracted with another group o f Scotch-Irish families to 
settle at St. George River and in 1740 he made a similar agreement with some forty 
German families from Saxony. Although many o f the settlers abandoned their holdings 
during the War of Austrian Succession (King George's War), others returned after the war 
and were joined by several more shipments o f migrants in the 1750s. By 1760, it was
76 Samuel Waldo to Thomas Paine, December 22, 1729, Miscellaneous Mss., Massachusetts Historical 
Society, Boston.
77 For an example of a handbill, see Samuel Waldo, Samuel Waldo o f Boston, merchant... hereby notifies 
all Persons... (Boston: n.p., March 3, 1734), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 40088; for an example 
of a newspaper advertisement, see Boston Gazette. August 22,1737.
78 Akagi, Town Proprietors. 262-63. On Scotch-Irish and German migration to America, see Graeme 
Kirkham, "Ulster Emigration to North America, 1680-1720," in H. Tyler Blethen and Curtis W. Wood, Jr.. 
eds., Ulster and North America: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Scotch-Irish (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: 
University of Alabama Press, 1997), 76-117; Jane Bramwell, "Irish Migration to New England, 1714-1722: 
An Early Example of the Emigrant Trade" (M. A. thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1995); Marianne 
Wokeck, "Harnessing the Lure of the 'Best Poor Man's Country1: The Dynamics of German-Speaking 
Immigration to British North America, 1683-1783," in Ida Altman and James Horn, eds., 'To Make 
America": European Emigration in the Earlv Modem Period (Berkeley: University o f California Press,
1991), 204-243.
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estimated that there were 145 households established on Waldo's holdings at St. George, 
Medumcook, and Broad Bay, most o f them with Scottish, Irish, or German surnames.79
The transportation o f these immigrants across the Atlantic was an audacious 
undertaking that involved the coordination o f several networks o f communication. 
Recruiters in Europe sought out information about sources o f prospective settlers and the 
costs o f transporting them, sent out printed and spoken calls for migrants, and made 
arrangements for the settlers in America. The immigrants themselves shared information 
about transportation costs, economic opportunities in America, and prospects in different 
colonies. Agents in America, meanwhile, organized the transport o f migrants from major 
ports to frontier areas, located and divided unsettled lands, and supplied the migrants with 
provisions.80 Waldo's role was to bring these networks together, encouraging and 
facilitating the movement o f families from Europe to his holdings near the St. George 
River. He proved remarkably adept at synthesizing information drawn from various 
sources, contacting immigration agents in Frankfurt, recording the freight rates charged 
by shipmasters in Rotterdam, and learning how a settler family could support itself in its 
first year in Maine.81
Yet he faced major obstacles in his efforts to recruit migrants. As a location for 
settlement, Maine paled in comparison to Pennsylvania or the Carolinas, which offered 
migrants richer soils and readier access to markets. German and Scotch-Irish settlers 
were more likely to follow their kin and neighbors to the Middle Colonies and the South
79 List of the settlers in St. Georges River, Medumcook and Broad Bay, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 166.
80 On the workings of trans-Atlantic migration, see Bernard Bailyn, Vovagers to the West: A Passage in 
the Peopling of America on the Eve o f the Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1986), 3-352.
81 See, for example, letter of Waldo to Jean Palairet, Sept 20,1757, Fursdich Wiedisches Archiv Neuwied, 
Schrank 30, Gefach 3, Fascil 1 (photostat at Library of Congress), fols. 69-77, in which Waldo lists freight
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than to take their chances in cold and war-tom northern New England. Even when Waldo 
located a willing group of migrants, he was unable to bear the full cost o f transporting 
them across the Atlantic and needed assistance from immigration agents or the 
immigrants themselves.82 Waldo countered the first problem by launching an ambitious 
propaganda campaign, issuing printed circulars in Ireland and Germany that advertised 
the availability of land in Maine. Generously describing the region’s climate as "healthy" 
and its soils "exceedingly fruitful," the handbills offered attractive terms o f settlement, 
typically allowing migrants one hundred acres gratis or for a nominal quitrent."83 The 
circulars specifically asked for migrants who could pay their own freight, and Isaac 
Winslow informed Waldo in 1752 that the Germans who migrated to Broad Bay were 
families who were "little in debt."84
Constantly short o f funds, Waldo also attempted between 1757 and 1759 to entice 
a Rhineland count to provide financial backing for the migration o f a thousand German 
families, offering him a 200,000-acre share o f the Muscongus Patent in return.85 Waldo 
once again painted a deceptively rosy picture o f his holdings, reporting to the count's 
agent that Maine's lands were more fertile than those o f Pennsylvania, that he had already 
settled three hundred German families along the Medomack River, that the value o f some
rates and explains in detail how the ownership o f a breeding sow could help a family to survive its first 
winter in New England.
82 According to a petition from the immigrants, most owned land and houses in Germany, which they sold 
to pay their way to New England. See petition on behalf of Palatines, May 25,1748, Massachusetts 
Archives, vol. 15A, fol. 33.
83 "General Waldo’s Circular," in Samuel L. Miller, History o f the Town of Waldoboroueh. Maine 
(Wiscasset, Me.: Emerson, 1910), 33; "Advertisement," in Ruth Aiken, ed., Records of Lower St. Georges 
and Cushing. 1605-1897 (Cushing, Me.,: Driftwood Farm, 1987), xv
84 Isaac Winslow to Samuel Waldo, May 12, 1752, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 109.
88 Waldo made this rationale clear in a letter to one o f his agents in 1749, when he wrote that "the most 
effectual way to increase [the value of his holdings] will be to sell a Large share of the Lands to some 
Gentleman of Distinction, Fortune or Interest." Samuel Waldo to Captain Bradford, Boston, October 20, 
1749, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 427.
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o f Waldo's holdings had increased between thirty and seventy times since he first 
purchased them, and that the provincial government was considering plans to build a fort 
on the Penobscot River large enough to house a thousand soldiers. Waldo also floated a 
scheme in which the count would send a regiment o f soldiers to fight in North America 
and have them settle in Maine after the end of the war. The deal foundered because 
English law prohibited the ownership o f so large an estate by a foreigner, but Waldo's 
creative efforts underscored his inability to finance migration on his own.86
Once the migrants had arrived in Maine, they continued to rely on Waldo's 
assistance. Most settlers were indebted to Waldo, either for his payment o f their passage 
or for shipments of provisions and tools from Boston. They were obliged to make good 
on their debts, typically by sending him shipments o f timber or by performing services on 
his behalf. Waldo himself was chronically indebted, so much so that he was forced to 
foreclose on the properties o f his partner Thomas Westbrook in 1743. Financial 
difficulties also led him to return to England in 1749 to collect fees for military services - 
- after he had successfully defended a suit by his former ally William Shirley, who 
charged him, among other things, with failure to make good on debt payments.87 A 
scarcity o f money, combined a need to share the risks o f settlement and the timber trade, 
created a web of interdependence structured by patterns o f debt and credit. Because 
people at all stages o f the social hierarchy had an interest in Waldo's enterprises, no one 
was exempt from their risks: Waldo, his settlers, agents, and patrons were all linked
86 Letter of Jean de Palairet to Count of Neuwied, March 25,1757, London, Furstlich Wiedisches Archiv 
Neuwied, Schrank 30, Gefach 3, Fascil 1 (photostat at Library of Congress), fol. 4; letter o f Palairet to 
Count of Neuwied, 19 July 1757, ibid., fol. 16; letter o f Waldo to Jean Palairet, Sept 20,1757, ibid., fols. 
69-77; "His Excellency the Count of Neuwied's Covenants with Samuel Waldo," August 3 1, 1757, 
Furstlich Wiedisches Archiv Neuwied, Schrank 6, Gefach 5, Fascil 2.
87 Account of trial between Shirley and Waldo, Boston, February 1749, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 96.
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together in a chain of credit fashioned out o f the promises each group made to one 
another.
Thus in October 1752, Waldo's agent, Isaac Winslow recorded the sums owed by 
27 German settlers for shipments o f provisions and tools, for amounts running from a 
little over five shillings to nearly £84. Meanwhile, Winslow and other agents were 
running their own debts with Waldo's Boston business partner and future son-in-law 
Thomas Flucker, who had loaned Waldo £280 in 1747 and continued to ship goods to his 
eastern settlements. Waldo himself was indebted to his English patrons; the letters he 
received from England consistently reminded him of his financial obligations. In 
England in 1757, he borrowed £8,000 from William Sitwell o f London, a weighty sum 
even for a prosperous merchant such as Waldo. Because such loans were granted on the 
basis of trust -- prosecutions against debtors, as Waldo well knew, were costly in 
financial and personal terms and were to be avoided except as a last resort -- Waldo and 
his settlers became enmeshed in a network of debt and credit that increased their reliance 
on one other. Settlers came to depend on Waldo for the land and goods he advanced 
them, while Waldo drew much o f his income from the rents and commodities supplied by 
his tenants in Maine.88
Waldo and his settlers were also bound together by a shared interest in the land. 
One of the greatest demons Maine's inhabitants faced was the precariousness o f their hold
88 List of debts due to Isaac Winslow by settlers at Broad Bay, October 17, 1752, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 
112; list of supplies sent by Thomas Flucker, 1753-54, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 128; indenture between 
Samuel Waldo and Thomas Flucker, September 15,1749, Samuel Waldo Papers, Maine Historical Society, 
box 1, folder 8; indenture between Samuel Waldo and William Sitwell, August 10, 1757, Knox Papers, vol. 
50, fol. 138. For examples of Waldo's indebtedness to his English patrons, see: John Thomlinson to 
Samuel Waldo, London, April 7, 1742, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 118; Beaves and Stanton to 
Samuel Waldo, London, June 8, 1742, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 125; Joseph Gulston to Samuel 
Waldo, July 13, 1742, London, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 129; Robert Sedgwick to Samuel 
Waldo, London, July 27,1742, Massachusetts Arhives, vol. 53, fol. 133.
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on their farms; persistently faced with Indian attack and disputes with rival claimants, 
frontier families were grateful to anyone who strengthened the security o f their title. 
Waldo gladly played this role, defending his settlements against competing companies 
and using his influence to bolster English defenses on the eastern frontier. Following the 
declaration of war against the French in 1744, Waldo received dozens o f letters and 
petitions from his settlers, asking for reinforcements to garrisons, shipments o f provisions 
financial aid to outlying towns, and commissions for officers. The merchant complied 
with many of the requests, taking a leading role in recruiting soldiers in 1744 and acting 
as one o f the leaders o f the Louisbourg expedition. He also battled more familiar 
enemies, preventing a rival proprietor from chartering a township on land belonging to 
his settlers.89
Although he was not elected to office, Waldo served as a political representative 
of his settlers, receiving petitions from aggrieved parties and exerting his influence in the 
provincial government. His son, Francis, also played a more official role, as a 
representative in the provincial assembly and customs inspector for Falmouth. Far from 
resenting the political connections o f their landlord, settlers recognized that their interests 
were tied to his own and advanced by his influence on public officials. "I thank the 
Lord," wrote a clergyman from Georgetown of Waldo's friendship with William Shirley 
on the eve of war in 1744, "who hath put a Gentleman into the Chair o f Government to
89 Letters of Joshua Bang, May 4,1744; Alexander Nichols, May 5,1744; letter from townspeople of 
Walpole, May 8, 1744; William Bums, May 20,1744; Benjamin Larabee, May 20,1744; William 
McCleland and George Ferguson, May 24,1744; Sebastian Zuberbuhler, May 25,1744; Sebastian 
Zuberbuhler, May 31, 1744; Joshua Moody, June 1744; Arthur Savage, June 16,1744; Robert Carver, June 
16, 1744; Samuel Wheelwright, June 25,1744; Henry Alexander, June 28, 1744; Joseph Woods, July 2, 
1744; William Bums, July 2,1744; Boyce Cooper, July 5,1744; William Bums, August 25,1744, Waldo 
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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whom you have ready access, with whom you have a Good understanding, and whose 
Impartial administrations give us great consolations in this day o f trouble."90
As in the case o f earlier land companies, settlers and proprietors were tied 
together by a shared claim to ownership o f the land. By weaving a web of 
communication that tied the interests o f both London merchants and frontier farmers to 
the protection of his property rights, Waldo managed to gain a large measure o f control 
over his holdings. Where imperial agents had failed to gain the support of the local 
population, he deliberately fostered an identification between the public interest and his 
private emolument.91 Of course, the only people entitled to Waldo's protection were 
those who accepted his authority; those who claimed holdings under rival proprietors had 
interests directly opposite to those o f the Lincolnshire Company. Because Waldo's claim 
was backed by an order of the Privy Council, few were willing to contest it and the rights 
o f his settlers were generally secure. But further to the west, in the region adjacent to the 
Kennebec River, several large and powerful land companies made overlapping claims to 
large portions of the same territory. The Kennebec (Plymouth), Pejepscot, Clarke and 
Lake, Brunswick, and Sheepscot companies all held claims along or near the lower 
Kennebec River, which they defended with greater energy following the declaration of 
peace in 1749.92
Settlers who held title to their lands under rival companies ran the risk o f being 
ejected from their farms for no other reason than being on the wrong side o f a proprietary
90 M. Clenachan to Samuel Waldo, May 23,1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
91 Waldo's success in prosecuting cases in the York County Court of Common Pleas is a measure of his 
influence in the region: the court found in his favor in every one of the nearly two dozen cases he contested 
at the county level: see York County Court of Common Pleas Records, Maine State Archives, Augusta, 
Me., vol. 9: 245-46; vol. 10:158-61,187-88,361; vol. 11:184-85; vol. 13:15; vol. 14:293-94,372,452, 
456-58,472,477-79,503,534-37; vol. 15:52-53.
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dispute over legal title. Deeds issued by the Kennebec Proprietors in the 1750s required 
settlers to hinder others from lumbering or planting on the proprietors' lands. Squatters 
and settlers who held title from rival land companies were to be brought to the attention 
of the proprietors and charged with trespass.93 In general, the proprietors sought 
ejectment rather than damages in trespass suits, calling into question the defendants' 
rights to the land and forcing them to quit their claims if  they lost the case. The 
proprietors were also more likely to bring their suits to the Supreme Court, since the 
justices who sat on the provincial bench tended to be members o f Boston's elite with 
family or political connections to the proprietors. Although York was one o f the least 
populous counties in Massachusetts, it consistently provided a large proportion o f the 
trespass suits heard by the Supreme Court. With less than one-tenth o f the province’s 
population, York accounted for twenty-two of the sixty-seven, or nearly a third, o f the 
cases tried by the Court in 1750.94
The actions o f proprietary companies sometimes made innocent victims of 
Maine's settlers, who worked the land with their own hands and depended on it for their 
subsistence. Summary ejectments cost families tracts that they had themselves improved 
and the high cost o f company lands left many with so little land that they could not make 
a living. By the 1760s, frontiersmen in Maine began engaging in acts o f sabotage and 
intimidation against representatives o f the proprietary companies, and after the American
92 Gordon E. Kershaw, "Gentlemen o f Large Property & Judicious Men": The Kennebeck Proprietors. 
1749-1775 (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1975).
93 Kennebec Purchase Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me., box 1, folders 4-18.
94 Peter E. Russell, Provincial Society and the Superior Court in Massachusetts. 1692-1774 (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1990), 27-35; Appendix 1, Table 2. These figures are based on a generous estimate of 
York County's population in 1750. According to the census o f 1765, Maine's population stood at a little 
under 23,000, while Massachusetts's total population was estimated at about 240,000: Maine accounted for 
about one-tenth of the population. But the rate o f population growth between 1750 and 1765 was much
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Revolution many became involved in what amounted to an open revolt against the 
proprietors.95
But in the 1730s, before there was much English settlement east o f Casco Bay, 
Waldo and his colleagues faced a more immediate threat from a different quarter. In 
August 1735, a band of Wabanakis set fire to several bales o f hay that Scotch-Irish 
settlers had cut on the east side o f the Wiscasset River and told an ensign at the St.
George blockhouse that they would to the same to the home o f another settler who lived 
above the falls o f  St. George’s River. Two years later, the Indians threatened to kill the 
sheep and cow of a settler named Thomas Gregg, one o f them leaving a gun flint at the 
house of his wife as a reminder that a war would ensue if he did not leave. Like later 
white settlers, the Wabanakis held their land by custom and depended on it for their 
subsistence. They would not, as Waldo learned, abandon them without a struggle.96
higher in the Eastern parts than it was in the rest of Massachusetts; the proportion was almost certainly 
lower in 1750.
95 Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier. 
1760-1820 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 11-87. Others opposed the 
proprietary companies because their relunctance to sell their holdings before prices rose acted as a brake on 
the advance of settlement. A critic o f the Pejepscot Proprietors wrote in 1715 that absentee landowners, 
like "the Dog in the Fable will neither serve themselves, nor let others be serv'd." Forty years later, a 
Boston merchant living in London sharply criticized absentee proprietors in a 1755 memorandum, 
branding them "Monopolisers of Lands" who were "Imaginary Rich in Waste lands," and called fora tax 
that would force them to dispose of their holdings. See CSP. vol. 28 (1714-15), fol. 521, p. 234; John 
Barrell, "An Account of the Northern Colonies," London, March 6,1755, in Stanley M. Pargellis, Military 
Affairs in North America. 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle 
(New York: Archon Books, 1969), 75-76. There were provincial regulations that required recipients of 
land grants to settle a minimum number of families on their lands within an allotted period of yean, but 
they were usually winked at by provincial officials.
96 Deposition of Nicholas Byram, Jan 17, 1736, in Waldo, Defence of the Title. 37; depositions of Thomas 
Gregg, May 13, 1738, Robert Rutherford, April 10, 1738, William Woodside, May 10, 1738, Jean and 
Anna Woodside, May 1738, letter of Ammi Ruhamah Cutter to Jonathan Belcher, December 3, 1737,
Knox Papen, vol. 50, fols. 11,16, 19,30,31.
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FIGURE 3.1. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES FROM THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA,
1694-95.
Entries. Aug. 1694-Dec. 1695 (N=20)
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Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/968.
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FIGURE 3.2. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES FROM THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA,
1723-25.
Entries, June 1723-Dec. 1725 (N=81)
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Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/967. In Figures 3.1, and 3.2, entries to and from other ports in New England have 
been excluded. The discrepancy between the number of entries and clearances is due in part tot he sale of ships: many 
vessels cleared from Piscataqua's shipyards were sold at foreign ports and never returned. The decline in the 
proportion of entries and clearances to the West Indies also took place in Boston, where vessels from the Caribbean 
accounted for more than half the entries in 1687-88 but only a quarter by 1718-19. The trend was reversed at 
Piscataqua later in the century; by the 1750s, vessels to and from the West Indies accounted for over half the port's 
traffic once again. This change reflected a shift in the center of the timber trade from Boston to New Hampshire and 
Maine; Boston assumed the role of a regional entrepot that organized the shipment of commodities to and from other 
parts of greater New England. See Ian Steele, The English Atlantic. 61-62.
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FIGURE 3.3. CLEARANCES OF COASTING VESSELS FROM PISCATAQUA FOR 
BOSTON, AUG. 1694-SEPT. 1695.
Clearances for Boston, 1694-95
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Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/968.
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FIGURE 3.4. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES AT THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA,
JAN.-DEC. 1755.
Entries and Clearances by Month, Port of Piscataqua. 1755
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FIGURE 3.5. DESCRIPTION OF LOT NO. 61 IN A TOWNSHIP BELONGING TO 
THE LINCOLNSHIRE COMPANY, 1738.
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The surveying of townships before settlement made it possible for proprietors to allocate their holdings as shares. The 
lot described above was recorded in the proprietors’ record book in 1738. Photocopied from the Henry Knox Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 50, fols. 23-27.
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CHAPTER IV 
A SWEET MOUTH BUT A BITTER HEART
As I  said before, so I  now say, that the Lands we own let us enjoy, and no 
Body take them from us. We said the same to those o f  our own Religion 
the French; altho we are a Black People yet God hath planted us here: 
God gave us this Land, and we will keep it, God Decreed all things, he 
Decreed this Land to us; therefore neither shall the French or English 
Possess it but we will.
--Colonel Louis, Penobscot sagamore, 1752
Formal conferences between Wabanaki and English leaders never failed to attract 
an audience, for they offered one o f the few great spectacles to be seen on the Maine 
frontier in the eighteenth century. Sagamores arrived in ruffled shirts and cocked hats, 
with strings of wampum wrapped around their necks. They were accompanied by as 
many as six hundred followers, many of them warriors with painted faces. Colonial 
commissioners, resplendent in fine clothing and powdered wigs, also arrived with pomp 
and ceremony and made a show of treating the sagamores with presents and refreshments. 
A cannon blast in the morning announced the beginning of the meeting and sagamores 
arrived in a flotilla o f canoes with a Union Jack at the helm. The meetings, which usually 
lasted for a week or more, were conducted with a high degree o f solemnity and concluded 
by an exchange of toasts and a dance performed by the young men o f the Wabanaki 
delegation. Following two conferences with the Norridgewocks and Penobscots in June
236
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and July 1754, the Reverend Thomas Smith o f Falmouth remarked that the "summer's 
scene" was "of as much bluster as a Cambridge Commencement."1
The conferences were remarkable not only for their spectacle but in the degree to 
which their protocol was a compromise between European and Indian styles of 
diplomacy. The procedure for formal conferences was gradually established in the last 
quarter o f the seventeenth century and had become regularized during the long period of 
imperial wars, as the conclusion and ratification of peace treaties required colonial 
governments to meet with the Wabanakis more frequently. Although the meetings took 
place in English towns or forts, New England's officials made many concessions to 
Wabanaki custom. The commissioners conformed to the Indian practice o f tum-taking, 
with each delegation alternately talking while the other sat quietly. They also adopted the 
vocabulary o f Eastern Woodlands diplomacy, speaking o f the Wabanakis as their 
brothers, their alliance as a path, and peacemaking as a matter o f burying the hatchet.2 
The Wabanakis, for their part, opened the conference by toasting the British monarch and 
closed their treaties by signing or ratifying a written document. Wabanaki speakers gave 
weight to their words by laying beaver pelts or wampum belts on the ground after their 
speeches, but they also requested written minutes o f the meetings from the English 
delegation.
The compromises made by both sides were a testament to the delegates' sincere 
desire to find common ground and to establish a lasting peace. The English hoped to
'William Willis, ed., Journals o f the Rev. Thomas Smith and the Rev. Samuel Deane. Pastors of the First 
Church in Portland (Portland. Me.: Joseph S. Bailey, 1849), 156.
2Some English officials incongruously used Iroquois diplomatic imagery, referring to the Anglo-Wabanaki 
alliance as a "covenant chain" that was "shined" by their words. In a 1714 meeting at Portsmouth, the 
governor of Massachusetts proposed that a peace agreement be commemorated by covering a hatchet with 
a kettle in the Iroquois manner. Querrebuit, the Wabanaki speaker, told him "I never saw how they put the 
Hatchet under the Kettle," but gave assurances that "I have put my Hatchet away." See DHSM. 23:71.
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persuade the Wabanakis to renounce their alliance with the French and cease their attacks 
against northern New England. Wabanakis tried to convince the English that their 
encroachments on Indian lands threatened the peace. But their collective efforts failed to 
create a lasting alliance, and the English could not prevent Wabanakis from joining arms 
with the French in every imperial war. Worse still, the conferences themselves bred 
hostility between the two groups, with each side feeling that the other had not spoken 
honestly. At a July 1713 meeting in Portsmouth, Governor Joseph Dudley flashed copies 
of seven treaties before the Wabanaki delegates, accusing them of breaking the terms o f 
every single one. Later governors repeated these charges and blamed the Wabanakis for 
their alleged treason and bad faith. Many Wabanakis, for their part, distrusted the 
English and often suspected that beneath a veneer o f friendliness the English were filled 
with greed and ill will. In 1721, several sagamores from Norridgewock, complaining that 
colonial leaders had twisted their words, declared that the English were "thieves and 
usurpers who wanted to unjustly invade their lands."3
Recent historians have placed most of the blame for these conflicts on the 
shoulders of English officials. According to the prevailing view, colonial leaders 
willfully broke treaties and produced sham deeds in a thinly-veiled attempt to legitimize 
the seizure of Wabanaki territory. In a recent article, historian David Ghere has argued 
that the government o f Massachusetts "conducted a policy o f deception" with respect to 
land ownership, leading the Indians to be "deceived by misleading rhetoric." Reproving 
English governors and interpreters for their incompetence and bad faith, he concludes that
3DHSM 23:40-43; Vaudreuil and Begon to Minister, October 8,1721, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 43, fol. 
374; Vaudreuil and Begon to the King, June 8,1722, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1 A, vol. 44, fol. 303v. (My 
translation; original reads: "des voleurs et des usurpateurs qui vouloient Envahir injustement Leurs 
Terres.1')
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Massachusetts officials engaged in the "deliberate and systematic use o f  mistranslations 
and misinformation" to mislead the Indians. At the root o f the English failure to establish 
peaceful relations with the Wabanakis, Ghere argues, was their unwillingness to 
communicate truthfully. Colonial officials obfuscated or glossed over contentious treaty 
provisions and stubbornly refused to listen to Wabanaki objections to English policy. If 
the Indians failed to adhere to the terms o f written treaties, it was because English leaders 
deliberately mistranslated or misrepresented their contents. In short, Ghere shares 
Francis Jennings's belief that English officials shrouded their aggressively expansionist 
policies in a "cant o f conquest" that legitimated unscrupulous land grabs by framing them 
in falsely contractual terms.4
Like the work o f Jennings, Ghere's article forces us to view the self-serving 
rhetoric of colonial officials with a skeptical eye and has left the validity o f colonial 
treaties open to question. But in dwelling on hidden motives and tampered documents, 
these historians have tended to caricature the English as venal charlatans and the Indians 
as hapless victims. That a complex history should be reduced to such simplistic terms is 
unfortunate, for the transcripts o f frontier conferences provide rich documentation o f a 
century-long debate between Indians and colonists over questions o f land ownership, 
social obligations, and the just exercise o f political power. Since conferences were 
focused on the specifics o f peace making, many historians have seen their transcripts as 
nothing more than a tedious record o f endless squabbles over the price o f beaver pelts and 
the redemption o f war captives. But if they scraped beneath the surface o f these disputes,
4David L. Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation: Diplomacy on the Maine Frontier, 1725 to 1755," 
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 8 (1984): 3-24; Francis Jennings, The Invasion o f America: 
Indians. Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press,
1975).
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they would uncover a struggle between two opposing moralities, each rooted in the daily 
interaction of people with their natural and social environments.
The immediate context o f this struggle was the migration o f English colonists into 
lands that had traditionally belonged to Wabanakis. But New England's eastward 
expansion was only one chapter in a larger story o f Europe's encounter with a wider 
world. Since the fifteenth century, Europeans had migrated to the Americas in search of 
wealth, whether for the riches o f Potosi or the hardscrabble independence o f a fifty-acre 
farm. The movement of people across the Atlantic was both a consequence and a cause 
of the economic growth of the West from the fifteenth century onward. While many 
economic historians blithely refer to this period of growth as Europe's "take-off' to 
industrialization, it entailed many wrenching social changes, particularly in the English- 
speaking world, where commercial expansion occurred earlier and more rapidly than 
anywhere else. Economic change produced fortunes for some and a steady rise in income 
for many, but others were stripped o f their land and thrown into lives o f destitution.
One of the most important consequences of economic "development" in England 
was the transformation o f communally owned resources into privately owned land, 
through the enclosure of common fields and the introduction o f stringent game laws that 
abridged customary rights to forests and rivers. The beneficiaries o f these changes found 
advocates in political economists such as Adam Smith and Bernard Mandeville, who 
argued that the untrammelled pursuit o f economic self-interest created greater aggregate 
wealth, paradoxically serving to benefit the general good. The victims o f  economic 
expansion, meanwhile, expressed themselves in the language o f the "moral economy," a 
term that gained currency in the late eighteenth century. Placing the demands of
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communal obligation above those o f economic self-interest, many English cottagers and 
wage laborers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mounted a sustained defense of 
manorial custom, common rights o f ownership, and the just price. Less educated and not 
as well-connected as political economists, the defenders o f the moral economy articulated 
a vision o f society in which the wealthy had a moral obligation to provide for their less 
fortunate neighbors in times o f dearth and hunger.5
The debate between English and Wabanaki leaders at treaty conferences was a 
distant echo o f the struggle between the moral and political economies in Britain. As in 
England, a group of people claiming customary rights to the land stood in the way of 
those who wished to convert it into private property. And as in England, conflicts 
between these two interests sometimes erupted into violent confrontation. But the 
similarities ended there, for the terms of the debate were framed by the particular 
circumstances o f the Maine frontier. Unlike those who enclosed common fields in 
England, colonists in New England had few social or cultural ties with the people whose 
lands they sought to possess. They were also members o f a settler society in which a 
relatively high proportion of the population owned land. The Indians whose lands they 
encroached upon, furthermore, bore little resemblance to the cottagers o f Great Britain. 
While farmers in England worked their fields with plow and oxen, Wabanakis subsisted 
on fishing, gathering, hunting, and swidden agriculture. They based their defense of 
customary right not on manorial traditions but on the moral imperatives o f a society of 
hunter-gatherers. While the Old World's moral economy was rooted in the realities of 
social class, the Wabanakis belonged to a society in which all social relationships were
5E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present 50 
(1971): 76-136; idem. Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: New
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described in the terms of kinship. Seeing their close neighbors as members o f an 
extended family, they were both strongly egalitarian and unbendingly individualistic, 
objecting to actions that threatened social harmony or compromised the autonomy of 
individuals. This point o f view — typical o f foraging societies -- was eloquently 
expressed by sagamores who discussed matters o f land ownership, trade, treaties, and 
sovereignty with the English.
The Language o f Land
At eighteenth-century conferences, English and Wabanaki delegates ritually 
danced a verbal minuet whenever the discussion turned to questions o f land ownership. 
Wabanakis usually took the lead, informing the governor that they were uneasy with the 
rapid advance o f English settlement. The Indians then proposed a boundary line that 
would mark the limits of English towns. Colonial representatives praised the Wabanakis 
for their openness but also reminded them that British subjects were entitled to settle all 
the lands they had legitimately purchased. A clerk would present parchment copies of 
seventeenth-century deeds, showing the Wabanaki delegates the totems o f long-dead 
sagamores who had ceded their lands to English buyers. The Wabanakis responded that 
they knew nothing o f the purchases, that the sagamores had been drunk when they signed 
the documents, or that Indians had been insufficiently compensated for their lands. 
Invariably, the governor dismissed these objections out o f hand and reminded the 
Wabanakis o f their treaty obligations.
No matter how many times they went through these paces, the two sides never 
found any basis for agreement. Several articles o f a 1678 treaty were devoted to
Press, 1993).
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questions o f land ownership, and all the written treaties signed in the ensuing century 
included some mention o f the issue. From the 1713 Treaty o f Portsmouth to the 1749 
Treaty o f Falmouth, the documents used roughly the same wording: the English were 
permitted to settle all the territories they owned before the outbreak o f war, while the 
Wabanakis retained their inland hunting grounds as well as fishing, hunting, and fowling 
rights on English lands. Yet when English and Wabanaki leaders spoke about these 
matter at conferences, it was clear that they were talking at cross-purposes. These 
misunderstandings hinged on differing beliefs o f what it meant to own the land.
The colonial view of land ownership was colored by the changes that had taken 
place in English society since the sixteenth century. In the Middle Ages, European estate 
surveys had been carried out by manorial officials, who made a perambulation -  a walk 
around the perimeters -  of the manor, making note o f the boundary markers of the 
tenants' holdings. The bailiff then summoned the tenants and asked them to testify as to 
the size o f their fields, as well as the rents, fines, and services they owed the lord.
Tenants renewed pledges of homage and fealty to their lords at these occasions. These 
surveys were undertaken not so much to determine property rights as to reaffirm the 
bonds of loyalty and deference that characterized the social world of the manor.
Although the lord of the manor recorded the location o f his tenants' holdings, the 
boundaries of their lands were generally determined through customary use and common 
agreement. Knowledge of these boundaries ultimately rested with the tenants, who 
learned them through daily activities and confirmed them at regular intervals by "beating 
the bounds" -- making a collective perambulation o f the limits o f  their parish or manor.6
6A. W. Richeson, English Land Measuring to 1800: Instruments and Practices (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Society for the History of Technology and the M. I. T. Press, 1966), 30-1.
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The estate survey was transformed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as it 
increasingly became the province of paid professionals commissioned by the lord o f the 
manor. This change first occurred in the more commercialized countries o f Europe, 
particularly England and the Netherlands, where landowners showed an active interest in 
the efficient management o f their estates. In England, the professionalization o f 
surveying began in the sixteenth century as inflation and rising population caused land 
values to soar. Because tenants under customary forms o f tenure typically held their 
lands at fixed rents for their entire lifetimes, inflation ate into the income of landlords, 
causing the real value o f their rents to drop. Faced with the threat o f falling income, 
landlords, yeomen, and ambitious tenants sought to acquire tighter control of their lands 
and thereby gain a freer hand in their disposal. Clearer title to the land made it possible 
for owners to raise rents, evict tenants, engage in land speculation, or experiment with 
new agricultural methods. Professional surveyors were important allies o f landowners, 
for a lord could scarcely hope to sell or improve a tract o f land without knowing its size, 
boundaries, and soil quality. By rendering an entire estate on paper, a surveyor undercut 
the authority o f tenants’ customary knowledge and freed landlords from the need to 
consult with their rentiers about the location and value o f holdings. As lords and tenants 
gained a clearer knowledge of their property rights, Andrew McRae has written, a 
worldview "dominated by moral standards and interpersonal relations gave way to a 
discourse which facilitated economic individualism and competition."7
This modem view of property rights was reinforced by the colonial experience o f 
New Englanders. The majority o f families who arrived in New England in the
7Ibid., 89, 144-5; Andrew McRae, 'To Know One's Own: Estate Surveying and the Representation of the 
Land in Early Modem England," Huntington Library Quarterly 56 (1993): 333-57, quote on 352; E. P.
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seventeenth century were wealthy enough to purchase real estate, as well as the draught 
animals and tools necessary to start a farm. Because land was abundant in the New 
World, many families were able to acquire a few hundred acres for their own use and 
depended very little on the town commons. Once they had acquired a parcel o f  real 
estate, colonists invested heavily in its improvement. A successful farm depended on the 
unstinting labor of an entire family working together year-round. The early years o f a 
farmstead were the most difficult, as colonists devoted years o f hard effort into cutting 
trees and plowing the soil, converting forested areas into arable land.8
These investments brought abundant returns, particularly as the development of 
regional and trans-Atlantic transportation networks opened up markets for agricultural 
surpluses. A successful family could subsist on its own farm produce and acquire 
manufactured goods with the money earned from selling grains and livestock at market. 
The strenuous work of agricultural life, and its attendant returns, gave English settlers a 
strong proprietary interest in their lands. Settlers wanted the benefits o f their labor to 
accrue both to themselves and their children, since they knew it took a lifetime to 
establish a farm. They fully expected that their deeds o f purchase would be confirmed 
and protected by the county courts and that the ownership o f land could be passed from 
one generation to the next. Merchants and gentlemen who purchased land titles with 
commercial profits also assumed that their hereditary rights o f ownership would be 
protected by provincial authorities. Both merchants and settlers in the eighteenth century 
depended on the primacy o f written contracts as a basis for land ownership, and feared
Thompson, "Custom, Law and Common Right," in Customs in Common. 97-184.
8Howard S. Russell, A Long. Deep Furrow: Three Centuries of Farming in New England (Hanover, N. H.: 
University Press of New England, 1976), 18-207; Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries 
of Work in Essex Countv. Massachusetts. 1630-1830 (Chapel HiU, N. C.: University of North Carolina
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anything that undermined the validity o f their legal title to the land. "Taking away Men's 
Estates," Governor Jonathan Belcher reminded the Wabanakis at a 1732 conference, "is 
like taking away their Lives."9
Because they were answerable to an electorate o f property holders, colonial 
representatives at frontier conferences always upheld the validity o f registered deeds to 
Maine's lands. In the negotiations o f the 1725 treaty with the Penobscots, Lieutenant 
Governor William Dummer balked at a Wabanaki proposal to limit settlement near St. 
George River since such a promise would have abridged the rights o f English 
landholders. "Those Lands are the Property o f particular Persons who have the Indian 
Right by fair Purchase," he said after presenting the deeds o f sale, "you cannot reasonably 
expect that the said Proprietors should be hindred o f making Improvement o f what is 
their own." In 1726, Dummer again rejected a proposal to limit English settlement to the 
area west of Pemaquid and south o f Arrowsick Island in Casco Bay. Claiming that titles 
to the disputed lands had been purchased from Wabanaki sagamores and confirmed by 
later treaties, he reminded the Wabanakis that since the lands were "for a long Time since 
purchased by His Majesty's Subjects, and the Property vested in them, the Government 
cannot Disclaim them." Dummer reasoned that the government was being impartial in 
recognizing the titles, since as British subjects the Wabanakis were also given the benefit 
of the law.10
Press, 1994), 13-83.
9Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Conference o f His Excellency Jonathan Belcher. Esq... with Wewankenk. 
chief sachem of the Penobscut Tribe: Loron. one of the chief captains of the same tribe: Lorus. chief 
sachem of the Norridgewock tribe: Adiawando. chief sachem o f the Pigwacket tribe: and Medaeanesset. 
chief sachem of the Amerescoggin tribe... at Falmouth in Casco-Bav. July 1732 (Boston: B. Green, 1732), 
Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 3554,15. Belcher's statement was made in reference to an incident 
in which Wabanakis killed several cows from a Casco Bay farm.
*°DHSM 23: 201; Massachusetts Bay (Colony), The Conference with the Eastern Indians... at Falmouth... 
in Julv-Aueust. 1726 (Boston: reprinted by S. Kneeland, 1754), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no.
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English opinion on this question was not unanimous. Some critics o f provincial 
Indian policy argued that clear boundaries were necessary to preserve the peace. In 
September 1721, Council member Samuel Sewall issued a printed broadside in which he 
explained his disapproval of a proposed military expedition against the Norridgewocks. 
He noted that at a 1717 meeting with Governor Samuel Shute at Arrowsick Island, the 
Indians had objected to the construction of forts on the Kennebec River and, fearing a 
rapid influx of new settlers, suggested that a line be run between the English settlements 
and the Indians. The governor rejected the proposal, but Sewall, who had himself 
dabbled in surveying, felt that their suggestion was eminently reasonable. "Without 
doubt," he declared, "Boundaries are necessary for the preservation o f  Honesty and Peace 
among those that border one upon another." The wisdom o f this policy, Sewall 
continued, was evident from the Massachusetts law that required townships to run their 
boundaries once every three years.11
Sewall's case for a boundary line was grounded in the belief that clearly 
understood property rights were a cornerstone o f civil society. If Wabanakis and English 
people had an exact knowledge o f the boundaries o f their lands, he contended, they would 
have no reason to fight. Although Wabanakis shared Sewall's desire for boundary 
markers, their position was rooted in a rejection rather than an embrace o f formal 
property rights. Because they lived in a small-scale society in which disputes could be 
resolved through face-to-face mediation, Wabanakis had little need or understanding of 
formal land titles. They also had less proprietary interest in the land than the English. 
While families in New England drew their living from farms as small as a hundred acres,
7216, 8-9.
"Samuel Sewall. A Memorial Relating to the Kennebeck Indians (Boston. 1721), Early American
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Indians used the land more extensively, subsisting on the ecosystems o f entire rivers, 
lakes, and estuaries. Although they raised crops and managed forest resources by setting 
fires and limiting hunts, Wabanakis did not alter the natural environment to the same 
extent that European colonists did. The tendency among Indians was to base their 
seasonal movements on the patterns o f natural abundance rather than to rearrange the land 
to suit their needs. Because they expended less effort in working the land, Indians had a 
weaker sense o f land ownership than the English. Though their emotional attachment to 
the land may have been stronger, they suffered less o f an injury if someone trespassed on 
their territories.12
This distinction held for the products o f the land as well as the land itself. While 
settlers assumed that farm produce belonged exclusively to the owners o f the land, 
Wabanakis always shared their food with neighbors. As in other foraging cultures, 
sharing was a social imperative among the Wabanakis, a custom that could not be broken. 
Early European visitors such as Father Biard were often struck by the extent o f their 
generosity. "No one would dare refuse the request o f another," he remarked, "nor to eat 
without giving him a part o f what he has." Wabanakis were often contemptuous of 
Europeans' unwillingness to reciprocate this liberality; one Indian told Biard that "you are 
thieves and deceivers; you are covetous, and are neither generous nor kind; as for us, if 
we have a morsel of bread we share it with our neighbor."13
Imprints, 1st ser., no. 2292, I.
12 Anthropologist James Woodbum has argued that "delayed-retum" foragers who make significant 
investments of time and labor in procuring their food tend to have more defined notions of property and 
territoriality than "immediate-retum" groups who do not use storage or traps. The difference is even more 
pronounced when comparing foragers with agricultural societies, whose return on their investments of 
labor, time, and capital is often delayed over a course o f years. See James Woodbum, "Egalitarian 
Societies," Man. n. s., 17 (1982): 431-51; idem, "Hunters and Gatherers Today and the Reconstruction of 
the Past," in Ernest Gellner, ed., Soviet and Western Anthropology (London: Duckworth, 1980): 95-117.
i3JR 3:95, 1: 173. See also, JR 2:79. The practice ofsharing has even been confirmed archaeologically;
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The imperative o f sharing and a weak sense o f proprietary interest were two sides 
of the same coin. When English families claimed ownership o f the land, they announced 
their refusal to share its resources without some form o f material compensation. Lacking 
the same sense o f ownership, Wabanakis were more willing to give their wealth to others. 
This is not to say that their generosity was reducible to a lack o f proprietary interest; 
sharing served a valuable social purpose. The practice o f enjoying food and other 
necessities in common fostered a sense o f mutuality in families and villages and created a 
web of interdependency that sustained individuals in times o f hardship. Kin and friends 
provided each other with material and political support, ensuring that no one would go 
hungry or suffer injuries without revenge or compensation. To Wabanakis, social 
investments in kinship and alliances mattered a great deal more than material investments 
in the land. Because they depended on others for their survival, people lived well when 
they cultivated harmonious relationships with their neighbors. The pursuit o f  private 
property threatened this ethic o f mutual support because it limited sharing and tore apart 
the bonds of interdependency among extended kin groups.14
at one Ceramic period site on the St. Croix River, the bones of large animals such as bears and moose were 
spread throughout different hearths and were almost certainly shared among the settlement's various 
households. Archaeologists have discovered some possible evidence of social inequality in the distribution 
of "status" items such as jewellery, copper, and exotic lithics in late Ceramic and early contact burial sites 
in Maine. But there is no evidence, either archaeological or ethnographic, that this inequality extended to 
the distribution of food or other necessities o f life. See David Sanger, The Carson Site and the Late 
Ceramic Period in Passamaquoddv Bav. New Brunswick. Archaeological Survey o f Canada, Paper No. 135 
(Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1987), 65-67; Arthur E. Spiess, Bruce J. Bourque, and Stephen 
L. Cox, "Cultural Complexity in Maritime Cultures: Evidence from Penobscot Bay, Maine," in Ronald J. 
Nash, ed., The Evolution of Maritime Cultures on the Northeast and the Northwest Coasts o f  America. 
Publication No. 11, Department of Archaeology (Vancouver Simon Fraser University, 1983), 91-108; 
Bruce J. Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric Exchange on the Maritime Peninsula," in Timothy G. Baugh 
and Jonathan E. Ericson, eds., Prehistoric Exchange Systems in North America (New York: Plenum Press, 
1994), 23-46; Robert G. Doyle, "Analysis o f Lithic Artifacts: The Identification, Petrologic Description, 
and Statistical Analysis o f the Lithic Artifacts Recovered from the Turner Farm Site," in Bruce J. Bourque, 
Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies: A Gulf o f Maine Perspective (New York: 
Plenum Press. 1995), Appendix 6,297-316.
I4The ethic of sharing did not come naturally, and many Wabanakis probably had moments when they did 
not want to share their possessions with others. Biard reported an incident in which a group of hungry
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The intransigence o f English leaders on questions o f  land ownership seemed to be 
a violation of the Wabanaki ethic o f sharing. Norridgewocks and Penobscots saw many 
advantages to peaceful co-existence with the English and frequently invited the colonists 
to establish trading posts near their villages. But Wabanakis were only willing to support 
an arrangement that was mutually beneficial to both sides; all too often the English built 
mills or set nets that disrupted Indian fishing, went trapping without permission on 
Wabanaki hunting grounds, or erected fences that interfered with the migratory patterns 
of game animals. Although they officially retained fishing and hunting rights on 
unfenced English lands, the establishment o f English towns in Maine inevitably ate into 
Wabanaki territories and made it increasingly difficult to for the Indians to provide 
themselves with the necessities o f life.
Wabanaki delegates frequently made this point at treaties, reminding the English 
that an aggressive policy o f colonial expansion would undermine their friendship. At a 
1753 conference, the Norridgewock orator Quenois pleaded for a limit to English 
settlement along the Kennebec River, arguing that the growing influx o f colonists 
threatened to bring the Norridgewocks to the point o f starvation. The Plymouth 
Company had recently erected a fort on the east side o f the Kennebec River above Swan 
Island and had plans to build two more further upriver. It had also sponsored the 
settlement of two tracts near the mouth o f the river that would receive town charters a 
year later. Quenois began his plea by offering a boundary for English settlement. "Here
women hid in the woods to avoid sharing a kettle of fish with a party of people passing nearby. (See JR 3: 
95-97.) Selfish tendencies were curbed by powerful social sanctions that rewarded the generous and 
punished the stingy. Those who shared were regarded with affection by others, but selfish or miserly 
individuals inevitably became the subject of gossip and, if their behavior was persisted, witchcraft 
accusations and social avoidance. Similar social sanctions existed in neighboring societies: see, for 
example, Bruce G. Trigger, "Maintaining Economic Equality in Opposition to Complexity: An Iroquoian 
Case Study," in Steadman Upham, ed., The Evolution o f Political Systems: Sociopolitics in Small-Scale
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is a River belonging to us," he said, "[y]ou have lately built a new Garrison here; we wish 
you would be content to go no further up the River than that Fort." He then remarked that 
governors Dudley and Dummer had promised many years before that English settlement 
would not go beyond Fort Richmond, a garrison on the west side o f the river. "We live 
wholly by this Land," he told the English, "and live but poorly; the Penobscotts hunt on 
one Side of us, and the Canada Indians on the other Side; therefore do not turn us off this 
Land."15
Later in the conference, Quenois returned to the subject o f lands and rehearsed the 
promises English governors had made at the treaties of 1713,1717, and 1726. At the 
1713 treaty, the English promised to settle no further than Brunswick, North Yarmouth, 
and Casco Bay; the Norridgewocks were told that if the governor would forcibly remove 
any settlers who went further than these townships. For the sake of peace Norridgewocks 
gave ground in 1717, allowing the English to settle as far as Fort Richmond. Quenois 
offered another compromise, whereby English settlement would be limited to the area 
downriver of the new fort. The orator appealed to English consciences, telling them that 
the advance of settlement beyond the fort would threaten the Norridgewocks' livelihood 
and jeopardize the peace. Allowing that the English "should settle all the Lands below 
the New-Fort... with Courage and a good Spirit," he told them that "You have Land 
enough below the New-Fort, without going any further up." In making this demand, the 
orator continued, "We have told you our Hearts; we hope you will not settle any further
Sedentary Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 119-45.
^Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Conference held at St. Georges in the Countv of York on the twentieth 
dav of September... 1753 (Boston: S. Kneeland, 1753), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 7025,15.
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up the River; the Indians hunt on both Sides o f us; we have but a little Space; we desire to 
live as Brothers."16
No doubt Quenois intended to shame the English into softening their rigid stand 
on questions of land ownership. Using more land than was necessary was a violation o f 
the ethic o f sharing, particularly when allies depended on the same territory for their 
survival. Wealthy as they were, the English did not need the lands further up the 
Kennebec, and their insistence on taking them seemed particularly reprehensible given 
the Norridgewocks' dependence on the river for their survival. In Wabanaki society 
selfish behavior o f this kind would have been unimaginable among kin and allies, and it 
is no coincidence that Quenois stressed the fictive bonds o f kinship that bound the 
English to the Norridgewocks. The Wabanaki orator hoped -- vainly, as it turned out — 
that the English would relent if they were made aware o f the deleterious effects o f their 
expansion on their Indian allies. "It would hurt us," he reminded them, "for you to settle 
higher up the River than the New-Fort."17
The Penobscot orator Loron Sauguaaram had made a similar point during the 
1726 conference with Lieutenant Governor Dummer. Disputing Dummer's insistence 
that seventeenth-century land purchases were still valid, Loron remarked that "we have a 
Number o f young People growing up who never were acquainted o f the Lands being 
Sold." Massachusetts was "a Great and Rich Government," and could easily purchase the
16Ibid., 20-21. The Norridgewocks had made the same plea in a letter to the governor written seven 
months earlier. See DHSM. 23:445.
^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference held at St. Georges... September 1753. 21. Western Abenakis also 
criticized the English for the same reasons; in March 1753/54, a number of sagamores told a fort 
commander that they objected to English settlement at Cowass on the Upper Connecticut River Valley, 
informing him that "the English had no need of that land, but had enough without it... the English had a 
mind for war, if they should go there.” See letter of Spencer Phips to Benning Wentworth, March 19,
1753. Jeremy Belknap Collection, 1685-1790, Peter Force Collection, Library o f Congress, Series 7E, Item 
8.
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lands on the Penobscots' behalf, since they were sold for a small sum and cost very little. 
The importance o f hereditary title paled in comparison to the immediate needs o f the 
present, and the English insistence on recognizing the validity o f land deeds seemed 
contrary to the spirit of peaceful friendship. Like Quenois, Loron tried to prick English 
consciences by reminding the settlers o f their moral obligations as allies.18
But Dummer refused Loron's request, just as the commissioners o f Massachusetts 
dismissed Quenois's plea out o f hand. Since English officials placed greater stock in the 
protection o f private property than in the renewal o f Indian alliances, the sagamores' 
words did not have their intended sting. Land ownership in English society was based on 
objective considerations o f customary use and written title rather than subjective notions 
of need. Because they invested heavily into their lands, property owners needed 
assurances that their estates would be protected against trespass or arbitrary seizure. The 
court system accommodated this demand by basing its rulings on an ostensibly impartial 
consideration of documentary title and customary right. Whether other families needed 
the land was immaterial to judges and juries: what mattered was the strength o f their legal 
case for ownership.
The Wabanaki conception o f land ownership, by contrast, gave greater weight to 
subjective considerations of social obligation. Wabanaki orators consistently rejected 
seventeenth-century deeds as a legitimate basis for the ownership o f land. Quenois 
claimed that the deeds were no longer valid, offering several reasons: elders at 
Norridgewock had never heard o f the purchases, the Indians who signed the deeds were 
drunk, the agreements were made before the Norridgewocks became Christians, the 
sellers had not been paid enough for their lands. Quenois and his fellow orators did not
^Massachusetts Bay, Conference at Falmouth. Julv-Auyust 1726.8.
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claim that the deeds were forgeries — they recognized the names o f the sagamores who 
signed them -  but they argued that agreements made in the distant past had no relevance 
to the circumstances o f the present.19 Far more important was the need to maintain a 
peace between English and Wabanakis by removing the threat o f English expansion. If 
settlers continued to migrate to the Kennebec River Valley, the Norridgewocks would be 
forced to take up arms against them. Norridgewock leaders had made this point many 
times in the past: in 1717, the noted sagamore Wowuma told the English that the 
Norridgewocks wanted "no further Settlements" because ”[w]e shan't be able to hold 
them all in our Bosoms, and take care to Shelter them, if  it be like to be bad Weather, and 
Mischief be Threatned." Foul weather, as the English undoubtedly knew, was a metaphor 
for conflict.20
Even if the Norridgewocks' livelihood had not been threatened by colonial 
expansion, they would not have seen the deeds in the same light as the English. On 
several occasions, Wabanakis seemed to suggest that all Maine's lands — including those 
that had been cleared and fenced by English colonists -  belonged to the region's native 
inhabitants and that English settlers held their lands at their sufferance. As Wowuma put 
it in 1717, "We can't understand how our Lands have been purchased, what has been 
Alienated was by our Gift." Wowuma's comments rankled the governor, who told the 
Indians that they "must not call it their Land, for the English have bought it of them and 
their Ancestors."21 The governor’s understanding o f the matter was rooted in the belief 
that land was an economic good that could be bought and sold like any other. English
^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference held at St. Georges... September 1753. 22.
20"Conference between Governor Shute and the Eastern Indians at Georgetown on Arrowsick Island, 
August 9,1717,” Collections of the Maine Historical Society, ser. I, vol. 3,367.
21 Ibid., 369,367.
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deeds spelled out the exact location and dimensions of parcels o f land, assigning them to 
individuals or companies in perpetuity. This practice objectified the land, removing it 
from the domain of social relations and treating it as an alienable commodity. Once a 
tract o f land was sold, it became the exclusive possession o f a single person, to be used or 
disposed of as he or she saw fit.
Wabanakis were more likely to see the land as a host o f natural actors who were 
part o f the social world o f human beings. The natural environment was an extension of 
the human community, an active part o f people's lives. Wabanakis treated animals as 
their kin and believed that spirits dwelling in rocks and rivers could bring them good or 
bad fortune. Without a rigid boundary between the human and natural words, they 
extended the circle of sharing to include animals and spirits, offering prayers and 
sacrifices in return for prey and harvests.22 The attachment between people and their 
environment was so strong that orators could only express their relationship to the land in 
spiritual terms. At a 1752 conference at Fort St. George, Penobscot orator Colonel Louis 
argued that Wabanakis possessed the land by divine sanction: "God hath planted us here: 
God gave us this Land, and we will keep it. God Decreed all things, he Decreed this 
Land to us; therefore neither shall the French or English Possess it but we will."23
Because the stewardship o f the land was based on social relationships between 
people, animals, and spirits, it was no more possible to exchange territories than it was to 
buy and sell friendships. As the Penobscot orator Captain Job informed Samuel Waldo in
220 n  sharing between foragers and their natural environment, see Nurit Bird-David, "Beyond The Original 
Affluent Society': A Culturalist Reformulation," Current Anthropologist 33 (1992): 25-48.
^Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal of the Proceedings o f the Commissioners from New England to 
Treat with the Eastern Indians. October 1752 (Boston: Draper, 1752), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., 
no. 6861, 7. See also the letter of Abenakis and their allies to the English, July 28, 1721, in James P. 
Baxter, The Pioneers of New France in New England (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1894), 112-15.
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1735, the Indians "could not dispose o f the Land, which God had given to them." Groups 
could share their lands with others, which is what Wowuma probably meant when he said 
that the Norridgewocks gave their lands as a "gift" to the English. Sharing the land in 
this fashion was a kind o f material exchange that helped cement the friendship between 
the English and the Norridgewocks. Of course, English people did not see things the 
same way; as Waldo told Captain Job, "the English Constitution was different from the 
Indians, and... English Men had a Right to Settle their own Lands as they pleas'd."24 
Treated as a gift, the land was part o f a web of reciprocal obligations that tied people to 
God and one another; seen as property, the land was a factor o f  production that could be 
possessed as a matter o f right. Implicit in these points o f view was a different 
understanding of the social consequences o f land ownership. For English people, the 
acquisition o f legal title allowed landowners to dispose o f their holdings as they wished, 
and freed them from the need to consult with their neighbors before using their lands.
But among Wabanakis, the possession of the land had the opposite effect: it entered 
people into a world o f social obligations and forced them to treat neighboring people and 
animals with respect.
The Language o f  Trade
If disputes over land ownership drove English and Wabanakis apart, a shared 
interest in the fur trade brought them together. Since the earliest years o f  contact, English 
people had traded with Indians for furs, hides, and feathers, obtaining the fruits o f the
24Samuel Waldo. Whereas since mv Return from St. George's River.... (Boston. 1735), Early American 
Imprints, 1st ser., no. 40087, 1-2; Samuel Waldo, A Defence of the Title o f the late John Leverett. Esq.: to 
a Tract of Land in the Eastern Parts o f the Province of the Massachusetts Bav. commonly called 
Musconeus Lands. Ivine unon St. Georye’s. Muscongus. and Penobscott Rivers (Boston. 1736), 36.
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land through peaceful exchange instead o f violent conflict. Although the value of the 
trade declined over the course o f the seventeenth century, it remained the primary point o f 
contact between colonists and Indians. By the eighteenth century, Wabanakis were 
dependent on the fur trade for many of their material needs. Men needed rifles, 
gunpowder, and shot for their hunting expeditions and had grown accustomed to metal 
knives, axes, and other manufactured implements. Women had come to prefer European 
textiles over animal skins, since cloth was lighter and easier to sew. Families had also 
grown accustomed to pork, peas, biscuits, and other dried goods that tided them over 
during the starving time of late winter and early spring. While some of the demand for 
European merchandise was satisfied by presents and trade goods from Canada,
Wabanakis living in present-day Maine preferred to trade with the colonists o f New 
England, who sold their wares at lower prices in forts and ships much closer to the 
Indians' villages. French officials in the late seventeenth century often fretted over the 
possibility that New England's advantageous terms o f trade would draw the Wabanakis 
into an alliance with the English. This prospect caused them far less worry as Wabanakis 
repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty in imperial wars, but trade remained the chief 
advantage of the English in negotiating an alliance with the Wabanakis.
In the early seventeenth century, Wabanakis living near the Atlantic coast found 
several outlets for their furs. Private traders and companies from Acadia and New 
England established trading posts at places such as Cushnoc, Arrowsic Island, and 
Machias, which were close to Wabanaki settlements and offered the most reliable market 
for pelts. Indians could also find purchasers at garrisoned forts such as Pentagoet and 
Pemaquid, which also served as trading posts. Wabanakis found a third outlet o f trade in
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shipmasters from southern New England who plied the Maine coast, selling alcohol and 
manufactured goods to fishermen and Indians in exchange for fish and furs. Although 
companies and colonies held nominal trade monopolies for large portions o f Maine and 
Acadia, their exclusive rights were often contested and the trade was largely unregulated. 
Any colonist with a boat and a small stock o f goods could sail along the coast and trade 
with Wabanakis for pelts and hides. Because many traders viewed these exchanges as 
short-term ventures, they were inclined to cheat the Indians as much as possible, even to 
the point of robbing them of their furs. On several occasions in the early seventeenth 
century, unscrupulous traders brought Wabanakis and English colonists to the brink of 
war. When warfare finally did break out in 1675, disputes over trade were sorest point o f 
contention, particularly the kidnapping o f several Indians at Machias by a Massachusetts 
trader and the refusal of English authorities to provide powder to starving Wabanaki 
hunters.25
After the war, New York's government at Pemaquid introduced stringent trade 
regulations that prohibited the sale o f liquor to Indians and limited trading to daytime 
hours. Massachusetts followed suit in 1694, placing the fur trade under government 
control. Following the signing of a peace treaty between Governor William Phips and 
several Wabanaki sagamores in 1693, the General Court passed an act designed to 
continue the Indians' "dependance upon the English for supplies o f clothing and other 
necessaries," while ensuring that "the Christian religion be not scandalized, nor any
250n  threats of war in the 1640s, see letter of Thomas Gorges to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, September 19, 
1642, in Robert E. Moody, ed., The Letters of Thomas Gorges. Deputy Governor of the Province of Maine. 
1640-1643 (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1978), 120; Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, and 
Laetitia Yeandle, eds., The Journal of John Winthrop. 1630-1649 (Boston: Harvard University Press,
1996), 313-14,395. On trade conflicts and the outbreak of the 1675-78 war, see Frank T. Siebert,
"Incident at Machias," in William Cowan, ed- Actes du auatorzieme congres des Algonouinistes (Ottawa: 
Carleton University Press, 1983), 137-56.
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injustice done to the Indians, in the taking of unreasonable and excessive prices for the 
goods and supplies sold unto them." The 1694 act laid the foundation for Massachusetts's 
"truck house" system, which banned private trade with Indians and established 
provincially run trading posts at Fort Richmond and Fort St. George. A more 
comprehensive law was passed in 1699, making it clear that the purpose o f the truck 
houses was to "undersell the French" and supply Wabanakis "at such easy rates and prices 
as may oblige them to adhere firmly to the English interest."26
Although they continued a modest clandestine trade with private shipowners, 
Wabanakis in the eighteenth century seem to have conducted most of their trade with the 
truck houses, and total annual receipts at the posts climbed as high as £20,000 by the 
early 1750s.27 Yet Wabanaki leaders frequently criticized the English conduct of the 
trade at conferences, complaining that the English were poor trading partners. Some of 
their criticisms -- particularly their pleas for higher quality goods at lower prices — were 
not really criticisms at all but part o f a bargaining strategy that couched demands for 
favorable terms of trade in the language o f diplomacy. Like other North American 
Indians, Wabanakis tried to obtain preferential rates o f exchange from their allies by 
combining pleas for pity with threats to go elsewhere with their furs.28 But on other
26Edmund Andros, "Orders and Directions fo[r the] Commander att Pemaquid," September 22,1677, in 
Peter R. Christoph and Florence Christoph, eds., Books of General Entries o f the Colony of New York. 
1674-1688 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1982), 176-77; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. I: 
172, 384-85; Proposal of the Committee of the Board, March 19,1699, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119 
(Trade), fol. 167; Ronald Oliver Macfarlane, "The Massachusetts Bay Truck-Houses in Diplomacy with the 
Indians," New England Quarterly 11 (1938), 48-51; Neill DePaoli, "Anglo-Native Trade at Pemaquid," in 
Robert L. Bradley, ed., The Forts of Pemaauid. Mainer An Archaeological and Historical Studv.
Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, no. 10 (Augusta, Me.; Maine Historic Preservation 
Commission, 1994), Appendix D, 254-57.
27Macfarlane, "Massachusetts Bay Truck-House Trade,” 58n; Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier,
1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 353.
280 n  Indian harangues as a bargaining strategy, see Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, "Give Us Good 
Measure": An Economic Analysis of Relations between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 
1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 66-69.
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occasions, Wabanaki orators were clearly exasperated by the failure o f English officials 
to conform to Indian trading practices. Although their complaints usually concerned 
narrowly economic matters of price and inventory, they related to broader social 
questions o f mutual obligation and proper conduct. Above all, Wabanaki grievances 
were rooted in a dissatisfaction with the impersonal manner in which the English carried 
on the trade.
At eighteenth-century conferences, Wabanaki delegates generally began 
discussions of trade by complaining that the English had not lived up their promise to 
give the Indians preferential rates at truck houses. Itemizing the rates o f exchange for 
various trade articles, they suggested that cost o f European goods continually rose while 
the price o f furs always fell. "We have not above half so much for our beaver as 
formerly," the Wabanaki delegation told Governor Dudley at a 1702 meeting at Casco 
Bay. When the Governor explained that the price o f beaver had plummeted in Europe, 
they responded, "We are always promised beaver will rise but we think never."
Wabanakis made similar complaints at the 1713 Treaty o f Portsmouth and later 
conferences. Even after the conquest o f Canada, Passamaquoddy Indians arrived at the 
Council chambers in Boston with a long list o f grievances, ranging from the dearth o f 
cloth and provisions at the St. George's truck house to the use o f new weights and 
measures by the fort's truckmaster.29
Governor Dudley, like other English representatives, expressed a willingness to 
extend favorable terms of trade to the Wabanakis, but stopped short o f promising them 
goods at lower prices than the market would bear. His exchange with the orator
29Govemor Dudley to Board of Trade, Boston, August 5,1702, CSP. vol. 20 (1702), fol. 810, p. 504; 
DHSM. 24, 116-20.
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Franxwaxer (Francois Xavier) was typical o f discussions o f trade at Anglo-Wabanaki 
conferences. "I am no merchant, and get nothing by it," he told the orator, "but am 
Governor o f the merchants, and will see they use you kindly." F rancis Xavier replied, 
"You can govern the matter better than it used to be," and asked for the same rates of 
exchange as were current when the peace was first made. Dudley answered that he would 
allow the Wabanakis to "have goods as cheap as may be," but at prices that would let "the 
merchants live."30
The governor's point o f view was shared by later colonial representatives: they 
would tell their truckmasters to sell goods to Wabanakis at retail prices that were current 
in Boston, but would not go so far as to divorce truck house prices from the workings of 
the market. While colonial leaders promised to protect Wabanakis against extortion and 
price-gouging in trade, they refused to fix the prices o f trade articles at permanent levels. 
Instead, they assumed that prices would fluctuate according to the laws o f supply and 
demand. In response to Wabanaki complaints concerning trade, Lieutenant Governor 
Dummer told them in 1727 that changes in exchange rates "proceed[ed] only on the 
Account of the Price of Beavers falling at the Market and not from any Rise on the Cost 
of our Goods." Assuring them that "the English Government scom to raise one farthing 
on the true Cost of the Goods," he repeated the explanation, made a year earlier, "that the 
Prizes of all Goods would be sometimes higher and sometimes lower at the Markets, and 
that no Body could help it."31
30Dudley to Board of Trade, August 5, 1702, CSP, vol. 20 (1702), fol. 810, p. 504.
31 Massachusetts Bay (Colony), The Conference with the Eastern Indians at the Further Ratification of the 
Peace. Held at Falmouth in Casco-Bav. in July 1727 (B. Green and S. Kneeland, 1727), Early American 
Imprints, 1st ser., no. 2885,20. See also, Massachusetts Bay, The Conference with the Eastern Indians... 
Julv-August. 1726. 11-12.
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When Dummer spoke o f "the Market", he was referring not to a physical place but 
to an abstract commercial sphere. Like other educated English people o f his time, he 
believed that this market operated according to natural laws that were beyond the control 
of any single individual. And like other colonial leaders, Dummer assumed that 
government interference in the market was necessary only in cases where merchants 
gouged or cheated their customers.32 This point o f view puzzled many Wabanakis, who 
suspected that the English varied their prices to hoodwink their Indian customers. In 
1732, Loron speculated that Dummer’s promise was not made in good faith: "the 
Govemour told us that Goods would be govern'd by the foreign Markets, sometimes 
cheaper and sometimes dearer; but the Goods have always risen in their Price."33 The 
existence of a provincial monopoly in the fur trade fed these suspicions; Wabanakis often 
complained that truck house prices compared poorly with the rates offered by Boston and 
Albany retailers, or with the prices of goods sold on ships trading illegally along the 
coast. The Wabanakis probably also knew that the holders of the beaver monopoly in 
Canada kept prices constant at their trading posts regardless of whether the value o f 
beaver rose or fell in Europe.34
The notion of an abstract market governed by fluctuations in supply and demand 
was an alien concept to Wabanakis, who had a difficult time understanding how events in 
Europe might affect the price of cloth and gunpowder in Maine. While English officials 
assumed that prices were set by the self-regulating mechanism o f the market, Wabanakis
320n  early American attitudes toward the market, see Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The 
Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New York: Norton, 1995), 160-91; Daniel Vickers, 
"Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America," William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd 
series, 48(1990): 15-17.
^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 11.
34Matthew R. Laird. "The Price of Empire: Anglo-French Rivalry for the Great Lakes Fur Trades, 1700-
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were more inclined to view changes in the terms o f trade as an index o f the degree o f 
friendship between trading partners. This is not to say that they were oblivious to 
questions o f profit and advantage; they always told the English that "the Custom is where 
persons sell the Cheapest there we go to trade."35 But Indian leaders repeatedly asserted 
that a firm alliance went hand in hand with an amicable trading relationship. "[T]hey that 
are loving to each other will trade together," the Penobscots reminded the governor in 
1755. Five years earlier, a Penobscot named Sebaooset remarked that "Cheapness of 
goods increase[s] love and friendship." Wabanakis presumed that trade was embedded in 
social relationships and that the terms of trade were set by people rather than impersonal 
market forces.36
The English were well aware of the connection between trade and diplomacy, 
having established the truck house system as a way o f luring the Wabanakis away from 
the French. In their conference speeches, English officials often reminded the Indians 
that the attractive prices offered at the truck houses were a compelling reason to join them 
in an alliance against the French. English speakers usually made this point as an appeal 
to the Wabanaki "interest," as when Governor Belcher told the Penobscots, "It is greatly 
for your Interest to keep with Us, because We are nearer than the French, and can supply
1760" (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1995), 149.
^Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal o f the Proceedings of Jacob Wendall. Samuel Watts. Thomas 
Hubbard, and Chambers Russel. Esqrs.: Commissioners Appointed by the Honorable Spencer Phips. Esq. 
to Treat with the Several Tribes of Eastern Indians, in Order to Renew and Confirm a General Peace 
(Boston: J. Draper, 1752), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 6881,8. See also, DHSM. 23:322.
36DHSM. 24: 56, 23:374. Among historians of the fur trade, there has been a long-standing debate over 
whether Indians engaged in trade for its material advantages or as a means of cementing alliances. The 
current consensus is that the two motives were not mutually exclusive; Indians used diplomacy to 
strengthen their bargaining position in trade and attracted allies by offering favorable terms of exchange. 
For a succinct recapitulation of this debate, see Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's 
"Heroic Age" Reconsidered fMontreal: McGill-Oueen's University Press. 1985), 183-94.
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you cheaper."37 Like other educated men o f his time, Belcher subscribed to the oft- 
quoted maxim "interest governs all": every person was motivated by a desire for personal 
betterment, particularly through the acquisition o f riches. Eighteenth-century thinkers 
believed that the pursuit of pecuniary interest was a means o f restraining the passions, 
particularly the thirst for glory through military conquest. Belcher and other colonial 
leaders hoped to harness the military threat posed by the Wabanakis by offering them 
incentives to trade peacefully with the English.38
Wabanakis did indeed appreciate the favorable prices offered at truck houses, 
knowing that better exchange rates would make it easier for them to provide themselves 
with their necessities. But their eyes were not fixed solely on the bottom line and they 
expected the trade to be conducted in a spirit o f friendship, with each party treating the 
other as kinfolk. Commerce was one o f the paths that fostered alliances, creating ties 
mutual dependence between trading partners. As Loron said in 1740, it was important to 
take "great care" in regulating the trade, for "it is the great means o f keeping the Peace."39 
The self-seeking behavior o f profitable trade needed to be counterbalanced by the 
generosity o f gift-giving, which reassured trading partners that they could trust one 
another and had a genuine concern for each other’s welfare.
Wabanaki trading parties at frontier forts expected to be treated with the same 
lavish hospitality as diplomatic delegations at treaty conferences. Captain John Gyles 
remarked in 1726 that Indians were "disgusted" unless they were allowed to trade in 
"great Numbers," and had an "abhorrence o f Restraint in Coming to a Trading House."
37DHSM. 23,269. See also, Massachusetts Bay, A Conference Held at St. Georges... September 1753.8.
38 Albert 0 . Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its 
Triumph (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 7-66.
39DHSM. 23: 269.
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Before and after they traded their furs with truckmasters, Wabanakis also exchanged 
small gifts such as paddles and game birds to soldiers for pork, peas, and other 
provisions. They also expected truck masters to treat them with rum and tobacco, and 
saw the refusal to provide such refreshments as a sign of unfriendliness. "When we have 
been absent two or three Months and visit the Truck House we shou'd be glad that the 
Truck Master wou'd give us a pipe and a little Tobacco and a Dram especially when we 
have no Truck to purchase withal," Loron told Governor Belcher in 1740, complaining 
that many truckmasters "have exacted every Pennyworth." Such stinginess was contrary 
to the spirit of alliance: "If we were used as Friends and Neighbours, as we are at other 
Trading Places, when we are on a Visit, it wou'd be a Means to preserve Peace and 
Friendship." Friendliness was also a spur to trade, for as the Penobscots told the 
government in 1763, "If we had a good humor'd man to trade with We should bring more 
Beaver into the Fort."40
Wabanakis repeatedly informed the English that they preferred to trade with men 
who were familiar to them and were particularly fond of those who spoke their own 
language. Captain Gyles, who was taken captive by Wabanakis as a child and spent six 
years with a Maliseet family, was frequently praised at treaty conferences for his service 
as interpreter at St. George's truck house. Soon after his return to English society in 
1698, Gyles interpreted several conferences between Massachusetts officials and 
Wabanakis and became a fixture at Anglo-Wabanaki conferences until his death in 1755.
40Petition of John Gyles and Edmund Mountfort to General Court, Boston, October 12, 1726, 
Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119 (Trade), fol. 280; DHSM. 23:228,264-65,24: 120. In 1725, Wabanaki 
elders complained that a former truck master was "a Rogue" who mismeasured cloth sold to the Indians, 
giving "many of them a Disgust against the Government." See letter of John Minot to William Dummer, 
Portsmouth, April 20,1725, in William Blake Trask, ed., "Letters of Col. Thomas Westbrook and Others 
Relative to Indian Affairs in Maine," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 46 (1892): 362- 
63.
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"I respect him as my own Child," the Penobscot sagamore Wenemouet told the English in 
1713, approving o f his service as interpreter. Another Indian representative in 1727 
remarked that "[w]e look upon Captain Gyles as a Captain o f the Tribes in our Parts." 
When Gyles took sick in 1738, Loron told Governor Belcher that "we know not what we 
should do if he should die, we like him very well and believe it would be an hard matter 
to find such another man."41
The lavish praise extended to Gyles was in stark contrast to the sharp criticism of 
truck masters who dealt with Wabanakis in a brusque or penny-pinching manner. 
Conference speakers often complained of poor treatment at the truck houses and on 
several occasions they demanded the removal of truck masters from their posts. In 
December 1727, a number of sagamores presented complaints to Lieutenant Governor 
Dummer against Captain Thomas Smith, truck master o f St. George's at the time, asking 
for his dismissal. Smith had underpaid Indians for their furs and overcharged them for 
cloth, and his unorthodox trading practices -- particularly his habit of paying the same 
price for spring and fall beaver -- led many Wabanakis to believe that he was deliberately 
cheating them. Worse still, Smith abandoned his post for long periods, which "much 
offended" the Indians who needed goods from the truck house. "It is very strange to us," 
Loron told the Lieutenant Governor, "that now the Truck Master is come away, the Door 
is fast, the Key is turned on the Lock, and we cannot get any thing now, nor can our 
Wives and Children get the Necessaries of Life." The provincial Council, mindful of the 
need to avoid a rift with the Wabanakis, removed Smith from St. Georges and offered the 
Indians £77 in reparations.42
41DHSM- 23: 61,228,242.
42DHSM. 23:220-29; Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119 (Trade), fols. 297,302-07; Massachusetts Bay,
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The House o f Representatives later cleared Smith o f all charges and he was 
transferred to Saco Fort, where Wabanakis once again complained o f his suspicious 
conduct. In 1731-32, Smith had abandoned his post for several months, leaving his slave 
to conduct the trade with the Wabanakis. Speaking on behalf o f a Pigwacket sagamore, 
Wahway o f Androscoggin informed Governor Belcher that "Adiowando and his People 
are dissatisfied that a Negro has the Ordering o f the Trade at Saco-River. We did not 
know that King George was served by Negroes." Belcher responded that the slave was "a 
very honest Man," and chastised Wahway for his racial prejudice: "God made us of 
different Colours, the Negros black, the Indians not so black, and the English white; and I 
don't despise the Indians because they are not so white as the English, for they are as God 
made them." But Wabanaki delegates were bothered by Smith's shady business practices 
rather than the color o f the slave's skin: Smith and his slave overcharged and double- 
charged Indians for goods, sometimes forcing hunters to pay both master and servant for 
a single item. Wabanakis were also uncomfortable with strangers who did not understand 
their way o f trading; in 1736, Penobscot representatives expressed a preference for 
English over Irish settlers, explaining that Wabanakis and the English "fell out as boys do 
at play, yet afterwards we were reconciled and got friends again, but as to foreign men we 
were not acquainted with their manners and did not know their customs."43
The most persistent criticism of truck masters such as Smith was that they seemed 
to be indifferent to the Wabanakis' welfare. Not only did they charge high prices for their 
goods, they also failed to show sympathy for the Indians when they were in need. Loron
The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bav. in July 1727.23. Loron's complaint was made in 
the summer of 1727 against Smith's predecessor, Edmund Mountfort
■^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth. 12.20; DHSM. 23: 
240.
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complained in 1738 that Smith's successor at St. George's "do's not treat the poorer Sort 
o f Indians kindly if they come with a few feathers and to truck he will throw them away 
and bid them go trade with the French." Four years later, Loron told Governor Shirley 
that the Penobscots "now are kept much in the dark as to our trade," since the truck 
master was a Protestant minister and "understands verry little as to our Language or 
trade... we a little wonder at his comming to trade here." He added that, contrary to treaty 
agreements, there was not a full stock of goods at the truck house and Penobscots lacked 
"Provissions and many other nesessarys and have a long time bin without them and in the 
middle of Winter the most nessesary time we would want them in." Were the English 
sincere in their desire to live as brothers, sagamores repeatedly told colonial officials, 
they would offer them a steady supply o f goods at prices they could afford. If prices rose 
too high, Indians would be unable to acquire the necessities o f life and would go hungry 
or suffer from want. Toxus, a sagamore from Norridgewock, made this connection 
directly when he complained that high prices and a scarcity of beaver made it nearly 
impossible for hunters to provide for their families: "what one Man can get till Winter" -  
he was speaking in July — "will hardly procure a Pair o f Stockings."44
Unwilling to interfere with the workings o f the market, New England’s governors 
turned a deaf ear to these complaints and insisted that the Indians would be better off if 
they weathered fluctuations in the price o f beaver. Quite accurately, they argued that 
Wabanakis would profit more in the long run if they allowed prices to rise and fall 
according to the vagaries o f supply and demand. What they failed to realize was that the 
long run matters very little to people faced with pressing short-term needs. The
^ DHSM. 23: 244,285-86; Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at 
Falmouth. 18.
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Wabanakis' way of life made them susceptible to occasional periods o f hunger and dearth, 
and during these times they looked to their friends and neighbors for aid. It was assumed 
that trading partners would treat their opposites generously when they were hungry and 
that this generosity would be reciprocated in the future. Favorable terms o f exchange in 
such instances were a sign o f respect, an indication that trading partners were close 
enough to provide for each other in times o f hardship. When English leaders claimed that 
they were unable to alter the terms of exchange -  telling the Indians that the market, not 
the government, set the price o f beaver — Wabanakis tended to think that governors were 
ineffectual or, worse yet, that they were insincere in their offers o f friendship.
The Language o f  Treaties
The exchange of views over questions of land ownership and trade was not an idle 
exercise but was meant to clear the air o f lingering resentments between the English and 
Wabanakis. The purpose o f treaties, as both delegations understood them, was to put an 
end to wars and build a lasting peace between their respective peoples. But even in this 
respect, Indians and colonists did not see eye to eye. Both parties hoped to dispel 
hostilities through diplomacy, but neither side could find the words necessary to placate 
the other. This failure was a consequence o f substantive disagreements over issues of 
sovereignty and land ownership, but also o f differences in conference etiquette. Though 
they adopted many of the customs o f their counterparts, Wabanaki and English 
representatives continued to use two different styles o f formal speaking at their 
conferences and were irritated when their counterparts failed to follow their respective 
rules of verbal etiquette. Although this difference hinged on seemingly minor questions
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of politeness and frankness, it was neither trivial nor superficial. The linguistic rules 
followed by conference speakers were also social rules: when to be voluble and when to 
be quiet, how to address social superiors and subordinates, how to broach delicate 
subjects without hurting the feelings o f others. Violations o f these tacit rules were often 
interpreted in moral terms, as personal flaws in the speaker.
Such differences were painfully apparent at a 1732 parley between Governor 
Jonathan Belcher and several Wabanaki sagamores at Fort St. George's. Belcher began 
the meeting by reprimanding the Indians for their abuse o f rum and demanding to know 
what measures they would take to prevent it. Loron, the Penobscot speaker, avoided the 
question and remarked that since it was peacetime there was little to be discussed.
Belcher ignored Loron's remark and returned to his original subject, treating the 
Penobscots to a temperance lecture and asking them to stop purchasing rum from private 
traders. Loron once again gave a noncommittal answer, saying ”[w]e will think o f what 
your Excellency mentions to us." Belcher then asked that the Wabanakis accept 
Protestant ministers and send their children to English schools. The Penobscots again 
promised to consider the matter. The next day, Loron disclaimed responsibility for the 
abuse of rum and refused to address the other two subjects, reminding Belcher that 
Dummer's treaty promised no interference in religion. The governor denied that he was 
trying to bully the Wabanakis, but then suddenly declared his intention to build a 
settlement near Cushnoc along the Kennebec River. He told Loron he expected an 
immediate answer from the Wabanakis: "When I propose any thing, and you don't object, 
I suppose you consent. If there should be a Town, you shall have Lands there, and live
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with the English." Taken aback by the governor's abrupt ultimatum, Loron responded, "It 
is not our Way to give a sudden Answer to what is proposed."45
Belcher learned his lesson and a year later he wrote that the Wabanakis "are a 
humersome [i.e., temperamental] people, and must be tenderly treated."46 Although the 
Governor's prickly personality may have exacerbated differences between the two groups, 
his standoff with Loron was not atypical. Similar exchanges took place whenever 
English delegates pressed Wabanakis to fulfill contentious treaty obligations, such as the 
return of war captives or the abandonment o f their alliance with the French. Colonial 
officials usually stated their demands directly and bluntly, with the Wabanakis making an 
evasive or noncommittal answer. Rather than dropping the subject, English speakers 
continued to badger the sagamores until they obtained a satisfactory answer. Wabanaki 
delegates usually tried to sidestep the issue or offer a face-saving compromise. Both 
sides inevitably became exasperated by the poor manners of their counterparts and left the 
conference irritated and resentful.
For English officials, a sense o f  frustration arose from the inability or 
unwillingness of Wabanakis to make good on their treaty promises. To colonial leaders, 
a treaty was synonymous with its end result: a binding written document signed by the 
participants. Treaties, in other words, were a class o f contracts that related to diplomatic 
affairs. Like civil contracts, they required some means o f enforcement and needed to be 
spelled out in clear and objective language. Because they were put down in writing, their 
terms were fixed and could be consulted and examined long after their signatories had 
passed away. To be effective they required a degree o f trust between delegates, based on
■^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 6-11
46Belcher to David Dunbar, Boston, July 17, 1733, in Massachusetts Historical Society. Collections. 6th
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a shared belief that both parties were acting in good faith and would uphold their end of 
the bargain. English officials repeatedly made this point at conferences, underlining their 
determination to adhere to treaty articles while chastising Wabanakis for their failure to 
do the same. "When the English Promise," commissioner William Pepperrell remarked at 
a 1753 conference, "they religiously comply with it."47
If a party failed to comply with the terms of a contract, English people usually 
tried to enforce them through the courts. Colonial officials assumed that if  Wabanakis 
were brought under the sovereign authority o f the British crown, they would be legally 
obligated to make good on their treaty promises. In 1693 and at every succeeding treaty, 
English officials inserted a provision that declared the subjection o f the Wabanakis to the 
crown of Britain. This article allowed colonial representatives to act as the judicial 
representatives of the crown, ensuring that the Wabanakis' contractual agreements would 
be enforced. English delegates often adopted the tone of judges at a conferences, 
speaking to the Indians in a manner that was by turns inquisitorial, solemn, 
magnanimous, and authoritarian. This way o f speaking was acceptable in colonial 
courtrooms because settlers had invested the state with the ability to examine and punish 
people who broke contracts or threatened the civil order.
But to Wabanakis, who frequently denied their subjection to the crown, the 
officials' tone o f voice was bullying and unfriendly. The purpose o f treaties from the 
Wabanaki point o f view was not to draw up contracts but to form and continue alliances 
and friendships. Treaties took place when groups wanted to "cover the blood" (forgive 
and forget wartime deaths and injuries), recruit military allies, or "clear a path" o f alliance
ser., vols. 6-7 (Boston, 1893-94), Belcher Papers. 1,330.
•^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 16.
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through an exchange of views. A treaty, in other words, was a declaration o f amity rather 
than a binding contract. The many cordial greetings and compliments exchanged at the 
beginning of conferences, as well as the lavish banquets and frequent toasts, were more 
than empty formalities and constituted an important part o f the process o f treaty-making. 
The actual contents o f the written agreements, on the other hand, were less important the 
sense of love and unity that was created through exchanges o f words and gifts. While the 
English considered treaty articles to be an end in themselves, Wabanakis saw the points 
discussed at conferences as a means to an end: "obstacles" to be "cleared" in order to 
open the "path" of alliance.48
Once again, a matter that English delegates saw in objective terms, as a written 
document, Wabanakis treated as a subjective question o f human relationships. Treaties 
were a way of quelling hostilities and fostering a sense o f unity between groups. 
Confrontation or direct contradiction were to be avoided at conferences because they 
threatened the very harmony that the meetings were supposed to achieve. Participants 
handled grievances delicately to avoid giving offense to the opposite party. Where 
English speakers tried to make their meanings as clear as possible, Wabanaki orators 
often spoke in elaborate metaphors, stating their points o f view indirectly or obliquely49 
In some cases, they merely responded with silence. Their style o f speech, which linguists 
call "negative" or "deference" politeness, showed a high degree o f respect for the feelings 
and autonomy of listeners. Sagamores did not force their opinions on others but tried to 
convince them of their good sense through persuasive speaking. This approach was
48For Wabanaki explanations of the concepts of "clearing a path" and "covering the blood", see DHSM.
23: 32,365-66.
49The most admired Wabanaki orators were called neba'ulinowak, or "riddle men", because of their ability 
to devise impenetrably recondite metaphors. See Frank G. Speck, Penobscot Man: The Life History of a
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typical of the Wabanaki style o f leadership, which was based on a form of authority that 
was, in the words o f Father Biard, "most precarious, if, indeed, that may be called 
authority to which obedience is in no wise obligatory."50
Lacking the ability to command or interrogate others, Wabanaki leaders expected 
that treaty participants would make good on their promises out o f a sense o f personal 
good will rather than a fear of punishment. It was necessary to cultivate a sense o f trust 
between speakers so that each would feel a personal sense o f obligation to the other. 
Wabanaki speakers built this trust by making constant protestations o f love and fidelity. 
Orators frequently claimed to speak from their hearts, a turn o f phrase that expressed 
openness ("Our hearts ar open if  they wear to be seen they ar all truth and Sincerity"), 
good will ("our Hearts are good," "we Salute you with a Friendly Heart"), honesty ("What 
we now say and do proceeds from our hearts"), affection ("I am glad from my Heart to 
see your Excellency in good health"), loyalty ("this Belt we Present to you as a Plegg of 
our fidelity and faithfulness to your Self, Pray [ac]cept it the same, we now Lay open our 
hearts to you"), and commitment to memory ("what we have heard we will keep it in our 
hearts to spread it abroad among our People"). Those who spoke from their hearts could 
be counted on to keep their word. When Governor William Shirley asked
Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 269.
50JR 2: 73; Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, Politeness: Some Universals o f Language Usage 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 129-211; Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon, 
Intercultural Communication: A Discourse Approach (Oxford: Blackwell. 1995), 36-42. Powerful 
sagamores generally remained silent at conferences, allowing their juniors to act as orators in their place. 
When David Dunbar first encountered the Penobscots in 1729, he noted that their leading sagamore, 
Wenemouett, seemed "grave and reserved," and he asked him why he was not more voluble. Wenemouett 
answered that "it was in great respect to [Dunbar] that he was so, and when he was better acquainted, he 
would be as merry as I pleased." Col. Dunbar to the Duke of Newcastle, Boston, December 10,1729, CSP. 
vol. 36 (1728-29), fol., 1019, p. 553.
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Norridgewock's delegates to a 1749 meeting in Boston whether they had "any 
credentials," they replied that "[w]e have brought no other than our hearts."51
This manner o f talking reflected a worldview in which the import o f  words was 
inseparable from the spirit in which they were said. Because the fulfillment o f promises 
depended on mutual trust, words were believable only when they were spoken between 
people who had formed a personal bond o f allegiance: truth was inextricably tied to troth. 
While English leaders sought adherence to the letter of the law, Wabanakis were more 
concerned with preserving the spirit o f friendship. Having a "good heart" -  being filled 
with honesty, sincerity, and good will — was as important as the formal observance of 
treaties. When New England's conference speakers dourly demanded the fulfillment o f 
treaty articles, Wabanakis wondered if the English were filled with a "secret hatred" for 
the Indians. The bullying manner o f colonial representatives belied their professed desire 
to live harmoniously with their Wabanaki neighbors, leading many Indians to believe that 
English offers of friendship were not sincere. "It is in vain that you accuse us having a 
bad heart," the orator Artiwaneto told Captain Phineas Stephens in 1752, denying his 
charge that Wabanakis had broken the peace by attacking English farms. "It has always 
been you, our brothers, who have attacked us; you have a sweet mouth, but a bitter 
heart."52
In 1695, two Wabanakis from Androscoggin, Ouranmikoues and Eskambamet, 
responded in similar fashion to an offer o f amnesty from Massachusetts Governor
5IDHSM. 23: 32,45,62, 88, 254, 308; Massachusetts Bay, A Conference Held at St. Georyes... September 
1753. 14; Massachusetts Bav. The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bav. July 1727. 1.
52Letter of "l'abnaquis” to Louis XIV, [1715?], PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 1, fol. 267v (my translation; 
original reads "secrette haine"); Speech o f St. Francois Abenakis to Captain Stevens, 5 July, 1752, in 
CDRH- vol. 3, 509 (my translation; original reads: "C'est en vain qu’on nous taxe d'avoir le coeur mal fait, 
c'est toujours vous nos freres qui nous ont attaque; vous avez une bouche de sucre, mais un coeur de fiel.")
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
276
William Stoughton. The governor had accused the Androscoggins and other Wabanakis 
of treason and rebellion for their raids against English settlements, but had offered to send 
presents to those sagamores who opposed the assaults to show the government’s good 
faith in the face of Wabanaki treason. Ouranmikoues and Eskambamet remarked that the 
governor would recognize the tone o f their letter, for he had provided it in "writing with 
too much haughtiness." They retorted "in the same manner," saying that the "heart" of 
the English "has always been inclined toward malice and treachery," and pointed to two 
recent instances o f betrayal at English forts in Saco and Pemaquid as proof.53 Stoughton 
had in fact merely acted his role as magistrate, excoriating the Wabanakis for their failure 
to live up to their treaty promises and granting them amnesty if they promised to pledge 
fidelity to the crown. While such judiciousness won praise in courtrooms or the 
chambers of the provincial Council, it ran contrary to the Wabanaki spirit o f treaty- 
making, which was based on personal ties o f affection rather than the impersonal 
enforcement o f the law. In Wabanaki eyes, Stoughton's entreaties were undercut by his 
apparent hardness o f heart, revealed in the authoritarian tone o f his letter and the 
misdeeds o f his soldiers.
Because treaties were built on the subjective notion o f "heart," the written 
contents o f treaties were o f secondary importance to Wabanakis. Like other Indian 
groups o f eastern North America, Wabanakis remembered treaties not in terms o f a 
written document but as the entire verbal exchange between conference participants.54
53Report of Frontenac to Minister, 1695, CDRH. 2:196 (my translation: original reads: "Tu reconnoistras 
aysement mes parolles, et comment ne les reconnoistras tu pas? Cest toy, pour ainsy parler, qui me les
foumis, m'escrivant avec trop de hauteur, tu m'obliges a te repondre du mesme style  II faut bien que ton
coeur ayt este porte de tous terns a la mechancete e ta  la fourberie.")
54For similar American Indian perspectives on treaties, see Michael K. Foster, "On Who Spoke First at 
Iroquois-White Councils: An Exercise in the Method o f Upstreaming," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, 
eds., Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroauoian Studies (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY
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Conferences were treated not as a single text but as a conversation in which speakers
exchanged different points of view. Treaties were binding in the sense that speakers were
honor-bound to keep their word, but there was no authoritative version of a treaty that all
participants were expected to follow. Father Biard observed early in the seventeenth
century that Wabanakis often failed to conclude any agreements at their councils, with
sagamores departing "more confused and disunited than when they came." As in other
small-scale societies, political talk in Wabanaki communities did not usually result in
decisive action. Without the apparatus o f a state -- courts, legislatures, police — leaders
could not force their views on others and had to live with a degree o f  factionalism in their
communities. For the sake of social harmony it was important to have an appearance of
consensus, but respect for their fellows' personal autonomy prevented sagamores from
demanding adherence to the letter of their agreements. Council speakers generally agreed
to disagree, knowing that they could not coerce others into sharing their beliefs.55
But conferences were not an empty exercise, nor were council speakers as
confused as Biard presumed. When leaders talked at treaties, they put their points of
view on record and staked their personal honor on their promises and opinions. Their
words could convince others o f their wisdom and good intentions and might be held
against them in the future. As New Hampshire councilman Samuel Penhallow noted in
%
the 1720s, Wabanakis kept oral accounts o f their meetings and customarily had "the 
whole o f their tribes present" at treaties, "having no other record o f  conveying to
Press, 1984), 183-207; idem, "Another Look at the Function of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils," in 
Francis Jennings, ed., History and Culture o f Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the 
Treaties of the Six Nations and their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 99-114; Treaty 7 
Elders and Tribal Council, with Walter Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider, and Sarah Carter, The True Spirit 
and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).
55JR 3:91; Karen J. Brison, Just Talk: Gossip. Meetings, and Power in a Panua New Guinea Village 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Donald Brenneis and Fred R. Myers, eds., Dangerous
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posterity, but what they communicate from father to son, and so to the son's son."56 
Orators were self-consciously aware that their words would be committed to memory. At 
a 1720 conference on Arrowsic Island, Kennebec speaker Mogg held a belt o f wampum 
above his head and declared that "we are all upon a Hill in Vew of all the Indians, who 
see and know that we are here to act for them, and this Belt is a Token o f it."57
Speakers were also aware that contending versions o f the truth would circulate 
after the meetings. Following the ratification o f Dummer's treaty in 1727, the 
Arresaguntacook representative, Auyaumowett, warned the governor that their agreement 
might be undone by gossip: "As I have shaken Hands with my Brother there is no doubt 
but that many Stories will arise on it, that your Honour as well as our Selves will be told 
Stories." Assuring the governor that such rumors would "have no ill Effect on either side 
for we are all as one," Auyaumowett declared that the true meaning o f the treaty consisted 
of the words spoken on the record between the participants. "As we are here now in this 
Place where the Peace has been Concluded," he told his audience, "we desire that nothing 
which may be spoken out o f Doors or transiently be taken notice of." He asked them to 
remember only "what has been said here to one another in this Place," adding that "this is 
what is to be observed... it is the Conclusion o f the Peace."58
Although he addressed it to the governor, Auyaumowett's pronouncement was 
clearly intended for his fellow Wabanakis. By the eighteenth century, "Arresaguntacook" 
was an ambiguous term that referred to Wabanakis living along the travel corridor formed
Words: Language and Politics in the Pacific (Prospect Heights, 111.: Waveland Press, 1984).
56Samuel Penhallow, The History o f the Wars o f New-Enyland with the Eastern Indians... (Boston: T. 
Fleet, 1726; reprint, Cincinnati: Dodge and Harpel, 1859), 82.
57DHSM- 23:98.
^Massachusetts Bay, Conference with the Eastern Indians... July 1727. 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
279
by the Androscoggin and St. Francois rivers, and often included the village o f Odanak.59 
Like other Wabanaki communities of the time, the Arresaguntacooks were riven by 
factionalism, with some leaders remaining resolutely loyal to the French, others more 
inclined toward the English, and still others favoring neutrality. At Odanak and other 
settlements close to Canada, the pro-French faction was more numerous. Grey Lock, a 
Missisquoi sagamore who had since 1723 led a campaign against English settlements 
along the Connecticut River, wanted to continue the war and refused to meet with 
colonial authorities from New England. Sagamores from Odanak had turned down 
several requests to ratify the 1725 peace between Massachusetts and the Penobscots, and 
many people still wanted to take revenge for the deaths o f their relatives at the hands of 
the English. Auyaumowett, who lived along the Androscoggin, risked his reputation in 
meeting with English authorities, for in making concessions to the Wabanakis' longtime 
enemies he opened himself to charges of betrayal and cowardice. Knowing that the pro- 
French party would inevitably spread malicious gossip about his meeting with Dummer, 
Auyaumowett preemptively put his own version o f the treaty on record.60
The significance o f the words spoken at treaties, as Auyaumowett knew, was 
inextricably tied to judgments of the person who spoke them. Loron remarked at the 
same conference that Wabanaki sagamores who signed the treaty staked their reputations 
on the benefits o f a peace with the English. If the English failed to uphold their part of
59 Gordon M. Day, "Arosagunticook and Androscoggin,” in William Cowan, ed., Papers of the Tenth 
Algonauian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University Press. 1979), 10-15.
60Colin Calloway, The Western Abenakis of Vermont. 1600-1800: War. Migration, and the Survival of an 
Indian People fNorman. Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press. 1990), 113-31. On factionalism in 
Wabanaki communities, see Kenneth M. Morrison. The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive [deal of Alliance 
in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations fBerkelev: University of California Press. 1984), 173-74, 186-87; David 
L. Ghere, "Abenaki Factionalism, Emigration and Social Continuity: Indian Society in Northern New 
England, 1725 to 1765” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maine, 1988); Fannie H. Eckstorm, "The Attack on 
Norridgewock, 1724." New England Quarterly 7 (19341:541-78.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
280
the bargain, sagamores such as Auyaumowett and Loron would lose face in their 
communities. Observing that the terms o f trade at truckhouses had recently become 
unfavorable to the Indians, Loron remarked that "this turns out to our shame, when we 
told the Tribes how the Trade was to be carried on, and it proves otherwise, it makes us 
Lyars." He added that the "there are a great many that talk to us in another Language" -  
an allusion to the French -- "and tell us this Trade is but for a little while, it is to draw us 
in for a small time, and then it will fall, and we shall be laughed at." A few months 
earlier, Loron had sent Dummer a letter asking to be paid an annual gratuity and "some 
tokens of special respect" at English forts in return for his efforts on behalf o f the peace. 
Because he had risked his personal honor in supporting peace with the English, Loron 
wanted assurances that colonial authorities would reward him for his service.61
While the English recognized the importance o f cultivating ties with Wabanaki 
leaders such as Loron, they demanded more o f them than loyalty. English delegates 
wanted treaty agreements to be binding for all the Wabanakis represented at the 
conferences and always began treaties by asking Indian delegates if they represented their 
whole tribes. The English in this respect wanted to treat tribes as mirror images of 
European polities: as clearly-defined territorial jurisdictions whose leaders had executive 
authority over their subjects. Imagined in this way, Wabanaki sagamores would be able 
to enforce contracts with the decisiveness o f governors or courts. But the reality was that 
Wabanaki leaders were unable to force their opinions on others, and their authority 
extended only as far as their persuasive powers. All the promises they made at
61 Massachusetts Bay, The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bav. in July 1727.19; Benjamin 
Colman, "Some Memories for the Continuation of the History o f the Troubles of the New-English 
Colonies, from the Barbarous and Perfidious Indians..." in Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections.
1st ser., vol. 6, (1797), 116. During treaty negotiations, Loron had criticized the English for
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conferences were consequently personal in character and rested on the honor o f the 
speaker and his influence over others. When colonial officials pressed Wabanaki leaders 
to do more than they were able -- insisting that they prevent all Wabanakis from siding 
with the French or that they retrieve war captives who had been adopted by Indian 
families -- sagamores inevitably felt that their fidelity to the English was insufficiently 
rewarded and that English leaders had little regard for their personal honor. In 1751, 
Loron angrily responded to charges that the Penobscots had not done enough to prevent 
other tribes from attacking the English. "I have been the Man that has been the first in all 
Treatys," he told the English representatives, "but you think I am not capable to manage 
for the other Tribes. - - 1 have been the Man that has quell’d all the rest."62
Underlying such misunderstandings were differences in the way power was 
exercised among the Wabanakis and the English. New England's governments were 
invested with the ability to act on behalf o f society as a whole and to coerce others into 
accepting their rulings. Orders issued by political leaders carried great weight because 
they had the backing of the state, and those who disobeyed them could expect to be 
punished. Wabanakis, on the other hand, rejected the notion that any person was owed 
obedience as a matter of right. Political relationships were formed through continual 
negotiation, with each person showing respect for the personal autonomy of others. 
Wabanaki criticisms o f the English way o f speaking were at their heart a denial o f the 
legitimacy of state power, and were rooted in the belief that social harmony was more 
important than adherence to the letter o f the law.63
misinterpreting his statements. See Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation," 8-11.
62D H SM . 2 3 :4 2 0 .
630 n  the differences between between speech in state and stateless societies, see Pierre Clastres, Society 
Against the State: Essavs in Political Anthropology. Robert Hurley, trans., in collaboration with Abe Stein
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The Language o f  Status and Obligations
Although Wabanakis and colonists had differing understandings o f  power, they 
established a political relationship that began in the seventeenth century and has persisted 
to the present day. But the two sides had different understandings o f the nature of the 
relationship and the obligations each party owed the other. From 1693 to the American 
Revolution, English leaders insisted that the Wabanakis were subjects o f the British 
crown and that their territories lay within the jurisdiction o f the British empire. This 
point of view was bolstered by the cession o f Acadia to Great Britain under the terms of 
the Peace of Utrecht, which weakened New France's claims to suzerainty over Wabanaki 
lands. As subjects o f the British crown, rather than citizens o f Massachusetts, Wabanakis 
were not obligated to pay taxes to the province, nor were they expected to perform militia 
duty, or even try their internal disputes in provincial courts. But colonial leaders 
demanded that Wabanakis demonstrate their allegiance to the crown by renouncing their 
alliance with the French, forswearing future attacks against the English, and promising to 
settle disputes with colonists by applying to the governor for redress.
This policy was aimed at giving English colonies the upper hand in the imperial 
struggle with the French. Knowing that Wabanakis played an important role in the 
Canadian system of military defense, English officials sought to bring them to heel by 
claiming exclusive jurisdiction over their lands. Although most Wabanakis saw no 
contradiction in forming alliances with both the English and the French, colonial 
authorities at Boston and Quebec insisted that the Indians choose sides. English leaders 
were determined to establish exclusive military authority within their own boundaries,
(New York: Zone, 1987), esp. 152-55.
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and to reach this goal they needed to cut the Wabanakis’ ties with the French. In a 1722 
letter to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Governor Samuel Shute o f Massachusetts insisted that 
the Norridgewocks, who were on the verge o f war with Massachusetts, had subjected 
themselves to the British crown and that their lands belonged to the English under terms 
of the Peace o f Utrecht. "If they chuse the Allyance and Protection o f the French," he 
wrote, "In Gods Name, let them move into the Confines o f the Government o f Canada; I 
am very sure the place of their residence at present Vizt Norridgewock is within the 
Territory of Great Britain." By virtue o f the crown's sovereignty over their lands, royal 
representatives claimed absolute military control over the Wabanakis. When 
Norridgewocks objected to the construction o f a fort on the Kennebec River in 1754, 
Governor William Shirley answered, "I did not ask your Consent... King George, nor any 
other Prince, ever asks the Consent of any Person to build Forts within their own 
Territories." As subjects o f the king, Wabanakis owed complete obedience to the crown 
in all military matters.64
Wabanakis saw things differently, as they made clear at several treaty 
conferences. The notion o f monarchical government was alien to them; the Wabanaki 
word for "king", kinjames, had its origins in the early seventeenth century, when 
Wabanakis first began to meet subjects o f King James I. Governor Francis Bernard 
speculated in 1763 that the word referred to James II and was a Jesuit-inspired "system of 
verbal Jacobitism," but Wabanakis even addressed Louis XIV as nekintsemesem, "my 
King James," a twist of historical irony that apparently eluded the missionaries
^Samuel Shute to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Boston, April 23,1722, in Baxter, Pioneers of New France. 
307; Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal of the Proceedings at Two Conferences Begun to Be Held at 
Falmouth in Casco Bav... on the Twenty-Eighth Dav of June 1754— and on the Fifth Dav o f July 
Following (Boston: J. Draper, 1754), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 7222,17.
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transcribing their letters.65 Wabanakis preferred to describe political relationships in 
kinship terms and treated the language o f sovereignty as a foreign innovation. While 
English and French governors rancorously debated whose crown had authority over the 
Indians, Wabanakis described themselves as brothers of the former and children o f the 
latter. "All the French are our fathers, that is what we call them, the others are only our 
brothers," a Wabanaki soldier named Colonel Louis told Pierre Duponceau, a French 
interpreter at Valley Forge in 1778. The English "also wanted them also to call them 
fathers," he continued, "but the Indians would not consent; the French alone were their 
fathers."66
Colonel Louis's account was correct: with the exception o f a 1701 conference in 
which they called King William their uncle, Wabanakis had always referred to the 
English as "brothers," a term memorialized by the "Two Brothers" stone cairns at Casco 
Bay. Throughout the eighteenth century, Wabanakis had spoken of French governors as 
their "fathers," also referring to them as Onontio or "great mountain," a literal Iroquois 
translation o f the name of New France's second governor, Charles Huault de Montmagny. 
Such precise distinctions were o f great importance to the Wabanakis, for fraternal and 
filial relationships entailed two different sets o f obligations. Among Wabanakis, a father 
was a provider, a man who saw to the material needs of his family. Children owed
65DHSM. 13: 371; letter of Tabnaquis" to Louis XIV, [1715?], PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 1, fol. 266. By 
the nineteenth century, Wabanakis had devised compound words such as kinjameskua (queen, using the 
feminine suffix-skua), kinjamessis (prince, using the diminutive suffix-sir), and kinjamesigamigw (palace, 
with the word gamigw, or wigwam). See Joseph Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues 
(Quebec: Leger Brousseau, 1884), 40,48.
66James L. Whitehead, ed., "The Autobiography of Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, I-m," Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography 63 (1939): 222.
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obedience to their father, but only so long as he generously provided them with food, 
clothing, and other necessities o f life.67
French authorities had established themselves in this role by the last quarter o f the 
seventeenth century, lavishing gifts upon loyal sagamores and establishing mission 
villages for Indian refugees. In return, they expected Wabanakis to support them in 
imperial wars and to serve under French officers in Acadia. Their relationship was not 
based on treaties -  Maine's Wabanakis never made any written agreements with the 
French -- but was created through a continuous flow of gifts and favors.68 After the 
Treaty of Utrecht, the French continued to provide for their allies in a more roundabout 
manner, giving gifts to Wabanakis visiting Quebec or distributing them through Jesuit 
missionaries and Acadian families such as the Sieurs de St. Castin. In 1716, the 
government of New France established an annual fund of 4000 livres for their Wabanaki 
allies, to be paid out in the form of presents at Quebec and Isle Royale (Cape Breton). 
French authorities also helped to fund the construction of churches at Norridgewock and 
Medoctec. The generosity o f the French won them the allegiance o f most Wabanakis; as 
the Penobscot orator Meskouadoue said in 1700, "I have no other hatchets but that of 
Onnontio... I have no other will but your own, I will do exactly as you wish."69
Although the Wabanakis filled the subordinate role in this relationship, the burden 
of obligation lay on the shoulders o f their French fathers. The obedience o f the Indians
67 Gregory Evans Dowd, "The French King Wakes Up in Detroit: 'Pontiac's War1 in Rumor and History," 
Ethnohistorv 37 (1990): 254-78.
68 A Penobscot delegate signed the Great Peace o f Montreal in 1701, but was essentially a witness to an 
agreement between the Iroquois, the French, the Ottawas, and the Hurons.
69Catherine M. Desbarats, "The Cost o f Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric,” 
William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 52 (1995): 609-30; Vaudreuil and Begon to Ministre, Quebec, 
October 14,1716, PAC, AN, Serie C llA , vol. 37, fols. 27-29; "Parolles des Iroquois... le 3e septembre 
1700," PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 18, fol. 87. (My translation; original reads: "je n’avoit point dautres 
Haches que celle d’onnontio... je n’ay point d’autre volonte que la sienne, je suiveray exactement tout
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was limited to military affairs and during peacetime they owed nothing to the French.
But when Wabanakis brought grievances or demands to the French governor during 
peace or war, he was morally obliged to provide for them. Indians usually made their 
requests to French authorities as pleas for pity. "It is true that I am altogether poor," a 
delegation from Panawapskik told Governor Frontenac in 1691, in a request for trade 
articles. "I am without a hood, without blankets, without shirts, without leggings, without 
a cap, without shot, without powder, without peas and without tobacco, so that if I want 
to smoke a bit to ease my sorrow, I have to use tree leaves and wood chippings." 
Admitting they were "denuded o f everything," they assured the governor that they "think 
at present about nothing but making war," and if they were not sent powder and shot they 
"would use kettles and the bones o f game animals to make arrows." In exaggerating both 
their destitution and their devotion, the Penobscots appealed to the governor’s moral duty 
as a father to provide for his children, making it impossible for him to deny their request. 
Frontenac gladly played the role demanded o f him and ordered a shipment o f powder and 
shot as well as a canoe o f trade articles to be sent from Quebec.70
Frontenac and other French officials won the loyalty o f Wabanakis because they 
were consistently able to take care o f the Indians' needs. In Wabanaki society, leaders 
attained a dominant social position only if they were able to provide for others, and their 
authority was precariously tied to their liberality. When French officials showed 
stinginess or tried to compel obedience, Wabanakis acted angrily and refused to do their
Cequel Souhaitera.1')
70CDRH- 2: 34-38. (My translation; original reads: "II est vray que je  suis tout a faict pauvre. Je suis par 
exetnple sans capotte, sans couverte, sans chemises, sans bas, sans bonnet, sans plomb, sans poudre, sans 
feves et sans tabac, en telle sorte que sy je veux fumer quelques fois pour dissiper mon chagrin, je suis 
oblige de me servir de feuilles d'arbres, de bois et de tondre." "n'importe que je soys ainsi denue de tout” ” 
j ’employeray mes chaudieres et les os des bestes que je tueray a faire des fleches.")
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
287
officials' bidding.71 In August 1751, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, governor o f New 
France, learned that French authority over the Wabanakis had its limits. In his annual 
meeting in Quebec, a representative from Panawapskik expressed concern over recent 
attacks Odanaks had made against the English in retaliation for a murder o f one o f their 
kinsmen. Observing that the French had failed to provide for his village in recent years, 
the sagamore explained that the Penobscots were dependent on trade with the English and 
would be cut off from supplies if war broke out between the two groups. The governor 
was rumored to have supported the attacks and the sagamore chided him in a roundabout 
way for his complicity. Jonquiere sharply reprimanded the delegate, telling him that the 
Penobscots were "poor subjects, corruptible by a dram of drink." Accusing them of 
taking orders from the English, he reminded them that though they were a "blazing fire" 
he would "reduce them to ashes" if they disobeyed his orders. Only if  they were to "beg 
and Repent" for their infidelity could he forgive them. The Penobscot sharply retorted, 
"We dont like any that go to fright us. The Penopscots are not to be frightn'd. We [djont 
beg of any. We live on our own Rights what God has given us and where we live wele 
die." Even in the face of the governor's threats, members o f the pro-English party 
continued to work toward peace with their neighbors from New England. A father could 
not command obedience, but had to earn it: officials like Jonquiere who tried to stretch 
their authority too far tended to lose the allegiance o f their followers.72
7’Denys Delage, "Les Iroquois chretiens des ’reductions', 1677-1770:1 - Migration et rapports avec les 
Francais." Recherches amerindiennes au Quebec 21 (1991): 64-65.
72"Abenakis de Panna8anske, Parolles d'un chef qui s’est noye," August 27,1751, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, 
vol. 97, fols. 62-63; DHSM. 23:425-26. (My translation; original reads: "vous etes des mauvais sujets, 
qu'un coup de boisson en capable de corrompre”; "je vous reduiray en cendres.") Pro-French factions at 
Panawapskik later expressed assurances of their loyalty to the governor and their willingness to prosecute 
war against the English: see "Parolles des Abenakis fidels au Village de Panna8amske," September 19, 
1751, PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 97, fol. 78.
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If French officials occasionally stumbled in their efforts to win the obedience of 
the Wabanakis, the English failed altogether. Like their French counterparts, New 
England's leaders were relentless in their diplomatic pursuit o f the Wabanakis’ favor. In 
the language of European diplomacy, they sought to establish the sovereignty o f the 
British crown over the Indians and their lands. This translated into a desire to become the 
Wabanakis' "fathers," since English officials wanted to command absolute obedience 
from the Indians in military affairs. But Wabanakis consistently rejected the paternalist 
claims of the English, and treated them as mere "brothers": equal allies whose 
relationship was structured through trade rather than gifts. The relationship o f father and 
son involved a set o f reciprocal duties, and if one party failed to fulfill its obligations the 
relationship was dissolved. While the English demanded obedience from Wabanakis, 
they failed to show the generosity necessary to command their loyalty. English leaders 
rarely responded to Wabanaki requests with the alacrity o f the French; instead, they 
questioned the sagamores' wisdom and pushed their own ultimatums back at the Indians. 
To the Wabanakis, it seemed that English governors lacked the magnanimity necessary to 
be fathers. "Govemour Dummer was a good man," Penobscot sagamore Wenemouett 
said in 1729, "but he had not power like the Govemour o f Canada to performe what he 
promised."73 Wabanakis preferred to see their relationship with the English as one o f 
equals: brothers who were bound together by trade and friendship but did not owe each 
other allegiance in war.
73Col. Dunbar to Mr. Popple, Boston, December 10,1729, CSP. vol. 36 (1728-29), fol. 1018, p. 553. In 
English political culture, petitioners were expected not only to state their grievances, but to make their case 
convincing to the authorities. The government then decided whether the petition had sufficient merit to be 
granted. But among Wabanakis, followers merely had to state their needs to their leaders: the onus was on 
the father to provide for his children. This difference has been a persistent source o f misunderstandings 
between Indians and whites, even to the present day. For an illuminating contemporary example, see Ron 
Scollon and Suzanne B. K. Scollon, Narrative. Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication (Norwood,
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Although English treaty speakers called Wabanakis their brothers, they had little 
understanding o f what such kinship terms involved. New England's officials were more 
inclined to think according to the principles o f sovereignty, and in these terms they owed 
Wabanakis little. The crown had gained jurisdiction over the Indians under the terms of 
Phips's Treaty of 1693 and had taken control over their lands by the Peace o f Utrecht. 
From the English point o f view, these documents gave English governors authority over 
the Wabanakis whether this pleased the Indians or not. As in their defense o f private 
property, English people clung to the belief that the possession o f land was a right that 
entailed no social obligations.
Wabanaki leaders gave voice an alternative perspective, one that emphasized the 
need to maintain harmonious relations among people, and between human beings and 
their natural environment. The Wabanaki moral economy emphasized the obligation o f 
kinfolk to provide for each other and to ensure that the land would sustain their 
descendants in the future. Rejecting formal notions of justice, property, and trade, 
Wabanakis were intensely concerned with the personal and immediate effects o f social 
interaction, and saw that the recognition o f English land claims — whatever their legal 
merits — would threaten their traditional way o f life.
Although representatives from both sides sought to slacken the tension between 
these two points of view, they often failed and the inevitable result was violence. The 
threat of warfare hung over the heads o f conference delegates, particularly as Anglo- 
Wabanaki conflicts became entangled with a larger imperial struggle between the French
N. J.: Ablex, 1981), esp. 17-23.
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and the British. If words failed, weapons would ultimately decide who possessed the 
lands of Maine.
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CHAPTER V
THE WAGES OF WAR
"You've lived in England; are they as crazy there as in France?"
"It's a different kind o f  madness," said Martin. "You realize that 
these two countries are fighting a war over a few  acres ofsnow near 
Canada, and they have spent more on this fine war than all o f  
Canada is worth."
-Voltaire, Candide
Without supplies no army is brave.
—Frederick II o f Prussia, 1747
In February 1764, Samuel Holland, a Dutch-bom military engineer and veteran of 
the sieges of Louisbourg and Quebec, received a royal commission to launch a large-scale 
survey of the northern half of British North America. At Holland's suggestion, the Board 
of Trade divided the mainland colonies into northern and southern districts, assigning the 
region north o f the Potomac River to Holland and leaving the southern portion to William 
De Brahm, surveyor-general o f Georgia and South Carolina. Soon after receiving his 
commission, Holland appointed a deputy to assume his duties as surveyor-general of 
Quebec, and organized a number o f surveying parties to prepare maps o f uncharted areas 
of the northern colonies.1
1 Order of King George III, Court at St. James, February 10,1764, Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fols.
10-11; Captain Samuel Holland to the Lords Commissioners forTrade and Plantations, March 12, 1764, 
Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fols. 38-41; F. J. Thorpe, "Holland, Samuel Johannes." in Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, vol. 5 (1801-1820), 425-29; J. B. Harley, "The Contemporary Mapping of the
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One of the leaders o f the parties was an officer o f Holland's regiment named 
Joseph F. W. Des Barres, who undertook hydrographic surveys o f Cape Breton Island, 
Nova Scotia, and the coast o f Maine. Des Barres and Holland hired several assistants and 
some twenty or thirty laborers each and, with the aid o f theodolites, telescopes, and other 
surveying instruments, took soundings o f  harbor depths, measured degrees o f latitude and 
longitude, and made exact calculations o f area and distance. By 1775, the surveyors had 
produced several dozen plans, nine o f which illustrated the coastline between the Saint 
John and Piscataqua rivers. Artistically polished and remarkable in their technical 
sophistication, the maps were compiled into a single atlas the same year, published under 
Des Barres's name as the Atlantic Neptune [Fig. 5.1].2
The Holland-Des Barres surveys were the latest o f a series o f reconnaissance 
expeditions that rode the wake o f British victories in the Seven Years War. In May 1759, 
Massachusetts governor Thomas Pownall had ordered military engineers to survey 
Penobscot Bay and the lower part o f Penobscot River, with a view to building a fort at its 
headwaters. Captain John North and Lieutenant Joseph Small presented the governor 
with a map of the region, with water depths, portages, and levels o f elevation marked at 
strategic locations [Fig. 5.2].3 Seven months later, Lieutenant John Montresor embarked 
on the first of two voyages between Maine and Quebec following the conquest o f the
American Revolutionary War," in J. B. Harley, Barbara Bartz Petchenik, and Lawrence W. Towner, 
Mapping the American Revolutionary War (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1978), 25-29.
2 List o f Plans sent to Government, from the General Survey of the Northern District of North America, 
February 14, 1776, Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fols. 60-61; R. J. Morgan, "DesBarres, Joseph 
Frederick Wallet," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 6 (1821-1835), 192-97; Joseph F. W. Des 
Banes, The Atlantic Neptune: Published for the Use of the Roval N aw  of Great Britain.... 4 vols., 
(London, 1780; reprinted, Barre, Mass.: Barre Pub. Co., 1966-69).
- "Journal of the voyage of his Excell'y Thos. Pownall, Esq— to Penobscot, and o f his Proceedings in 
establishing possession of his Majesty’s Rights there in behalf o f said Province," Maine Historical Society 
Collections, ser. 1, vol. 5,365-85; William Otis Sawtelle, "Thomas Pownall, Governor,” Massachusetts 
Historical Society Proceedings, vol. 63 (1929-30), 254-81.
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French capital. Leaving in the dead o f winter with a party o f thirteen men, Montresor 
travelled by canoe down the Chaudiere River to Lake Megantic, then made his way to the 
head of the Androscoggin River by a series o f portages. Lacking provisions and 
debilitated by frostbite, MontresoPs rangers were forced to eat their moccasins and 
leather pouches to survive. The next year Montresor embarked on a second journey from 
Quebec to Maine, this time wisely choosing to leave in mid-June. Once again he canoed 
down the Chaudiere, but portaged to Moosehead Lake and then travelled on the 
Penobscot River until it wound close to the Kennebec, which he followed until he 
reached Fort Halifax. On both occasions, Montresor recorded his findings in pen-and-ink 
maps of the travel corridor [Fig. 5.3].4
The surveys carried out in Maine between 1759 and 1775 were one element o f an 
imperial inventory of conquered lands following the Seven Years War, which included 
James Rennell's surveys of Bengal and James Cook's charts o f Newfoundland and the St. 
Lawrence River.5 The purpose of such surveys went beyond mere stock-taking; maps 
were intended to be a blueprint for territorial expansion. At the Penobscot River, 
Governor Pownall informed the Indians he met that he would "make the land English," 
truculently reminding them that "I am able to do it -  and I will do it." The immediate 
end of Pownall's expedition was to build a fort, but in the long run, "making the land 
English" meant parcelling it out to British subjects protected by English-speaking courts. 
This point of view was shared by the commissioners o f the Board o f Trade, who told
4 G. D. Scull, ed., "Lt. John Montresor’s Journal o f an Expedition in 1760 across Maine from Quebec," 
New England Historical and Genealogical Register 36 (1882), 29-36; "Montresor’s Journal," Maine 
Historical Society Collections, ser. 1, vol. 1 (1831), 342-57.
5 On Captain Cook’s charts, see R. A. Skelton and R. V. Tooley, The Marine Surveys of James Cook in 
North America. 1758-1768: Particularly the Survey ofNewfoundland: A Bibliography of Printed Charts 
and Sailing Directions fLondon: Map Collectors' Circle, 1967); on Rennell, see Matthew H. Edney, 
Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India. 1765-1843 (Chicago: University of
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King George that Holland's maps were necessary to devise measures for "the dividing, 
laying out and settling such parts o f your Majesty's American Dominions," adding that it 
was advisable to grant the lands "as soon as possible" because o f the "advantages which 
such Settlement will produce to the Trade, Navigation and Manufactures o f this 
Kingdom."6
The people o f New England did not need encouragement from the crown, for they 
had already set out to make the land English. Provincial speculators leapt at the 
opportunity to survey and map the newly acquired territories after 1759, and in the 1760s 
and 1770s, land companies from Massachusetts dispatched dozens o f surveyors to Maine 
to prepare plats for proprietors and lay out holdings for settlers. Their efforts barely kept 
pace with the flood of land-hungry settlers who migrated eastward in the 1760s and 
1770s. In the two decades after the fall of Quebec, English settlement expanded rapidly 
along the coast as far as Machias and pushed inward toward the interior along the valleys 
of the Penobscot and Kennebec.7
Just as the surveys opened a new chapter o f Maine's history, they closed another. 
More than in any other part of North America, the inhabitants o f the region had suffered 
the depredations o f nearly a century o f imperial warfare, losing lives and property on an 
alarming scale, given their small numbers. Northern New England had been the site o f a 
bloody Anglo-Wabanaki war between 1675 and 1678 and was one o f the focal points o f a 
long period o f intermittent imperial warfare between 1688 and 1713. An Anglo-
Chicago Press, 1997), 1-36.
6 "Journal of Pownall," 376; Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations to King George HI, December 
21, 1763, Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fol. 27.
7 I have located over fifty maps prepared by surveyors from the Kennebec and Pejepscot proprietors 
between 1759 and 1776 at the Maine Historical Society in Portland. The plats represent only a small 
proportion o f the total number of surveys undertaken in Maine during this period.
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Wabanaki conflict flared up again between 1722 and 1725, and was followed after 1745 
by two wars between the French and British crowns for control o f the continent, in which 
the region's inhabitants once again suffered greatly. If the terms of the peace were to 
shape Maine's future, the realities of war had defined its past.
With few exceptions, historical treatments o f colonial warfare in Maine have 
consisted of accounts of battles and dissections o f strategy.8 The interest o f historians in 
these subjects is understandable, for the rise and fall o f military fortunes makes for 
gripping narratives.9 But military studies that focus solely on events on the battlefield 
tend to remove war from its social and political context, making it seem as if conflicts are 
decided solely by the valor o f soldiers. As Michael Mann has put it, military power is 
"promiscuous," in the sense that war-making depends on economic and political supports 
from the civilian world while at the same time serving to advance the aims o f civilian 
leaders. Military force was the means by which the British gained control over Maine, 
but the army's power rested in turn on the pillars o f civilian society: wealth generated
8 An important exception is Stephen C. Eames, "Rustic Warriors: Warfare and the Provincial Soldier on the 
Northern Frontier. 1689-1748," Ph.D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1989.
9 The volume of materials that have been written on colonial warfare is dauntingly large. In addition to 
contemporary histories by Benjamin Church, Cotton Mather, and Samuel Penhallow, there were several 
lengthy treatments of Anglo-Wabanaki warfare in the nineteenth century. Francis Parkman's multi-volume 
France and England in North America is the best-known, although Parkman wore his whiggish prejudices 
on his sleeve and his Victorian brand of racism is offensive to modem readers. Herbert M. Sylvester’s 
Indian Wars of New England. 3 vols. (Boston: W. B. Clarke, 1910) is written in the spirit o f Parkman and 
provides a detailed account of battles from the early seventeenth century to the fall of New France; equally 
useful is Samuel A. Drake’s The Border Wars o f New England. Commonly Called King William's War and 
Queen Anne's War (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1897) and A Particular History of the Five Years 
French and Indian War in New England and Parts Adjacent (reprint. Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries 
Press, 1970). More recently, the work of Douglas E. Leach has become an invaluable point o f reference, 
particularly his Arms for Empire: A Military History o f the British Colonies in North America. 1607-1763 
(New York: Macmillan, 1973) and Northern Colonial Frontier. 1607-1763 fNew York: Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston, 1966). Recent treatments o f colonial warfare with an ethnohistorical slant include Armstrong 
Starkey, European and Native American Warfare. 1675-1815 (Norman, Okla.: University o f Oklahoma 
Press, 1998); Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994); Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns. Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in 
America fNew York: Norton, 1988).
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from labor and trade, revenues drawn from taxes, technology devised by industry, and a 
burgeoning population that filled the ranks of armies with a steady flow of recruits.10
The surveys carried out following the Seven Years War offer a telling illustration 
o f this intermingling of military and civilian power. Carried out by military men under 
the employ of the imperial and provincial governments, the projects were intended to 
prepare newly conquered lands for settlement by colonists. But the conquest o f these 
lands had depended in turn on the cooperation o f these same colonists, working in concert 
with the metropolitan and colonial governments and serving as soldiers, taxpayers, and 
sutlers. Military victories had secured civilian aims — the protection and acquisition of 
lands for farmers, loggers, and land speculators — yet military successes had depended on 
the human and material wealth o f New England and its metropolitan backers.
The contours of the political map of Maine, both before and after the Seven Years 
War, were shaped by this intersection o f the military and civilian worlds. Military might 
was a source o f power for the English, French, and Wabanakis who had strategic and 
material interests in the region. The extent of this power was not merely a matter o f brute 
force but depended on the array o f supports that each society lent to its fighting men. 
Armed conflict in Maine was more than a matter o f rival soldiers meeting in the 
battlefield; it was also a contest between neighboring societies, each having a different 
vision o f how the land was to be used.
10 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power A History o f Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 17-22.
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The Geography o f War
Voltaire had the Ohio Valley in mind when he quipped that the Seven Years War 
was fought over "a few acres o f snow near Canada," but his observation would have 
applied with equal force to Maine. By comparison to much o f North America, Maine 
was a barren place, with a cold climate, dense forests, and acidic soils unsuited to wheat 
cultivation. Yet both sides in the imperial struggle sacrificed hundreds o f lives and spent 
untold sums for its possession. Meanwhile, places that were far more fertile and 
prosperous, such as Boston or Rhode Island, emerged largely unscathed from the wars, 
without suffering even a single attack. This paradox forces us to consider what might be 
called the geography of war. Why was conflict concentrated in some places, but not 
others? Why was Maine a cockpit while nearby regions -  o f far greater economic and 
political value -- enjoyed peace?
Modem geographers have traditionally paid scant attention to military history, and 
a search through the index o f any textbook on human geography would be lucky to yield 
more than one or two references to the subject. With their sights trained on the 
interaction between people and their environment, students o f human geography have 
traditionally been interested in patterns o f subsistence, trade, and residence, rather than 
the ephemeral, event-driven world o f war. But like any other human activity, war has a 
spatial dimension and is shaped by contingencies o f climate, terrain, vegetation, and 
transportation.
Throughout most o f human history, distance has imposed rigid limits on the 
extent of military power. In the ancient world, armies could march only for three or four 
days -  one scholar estimates an equivalent distance o f about 90 kilometers — before
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
298
depleting the provisions they carried with them. Even with horse-drawn transport, few 
armies could travel further than this distance without requiring more supplies. To 
continue their march, they would have to requisition food, fodder, and other supplies 
from friendly settlements or plunder the same from their enemies. A similar dilemma 
was confronted by military commanders in medieval and modem times. Until armies 
developed dependable supply lines that connected political centers with troops in the 
field, the need for provisions would take precedence over other military objectives:
Martin van Creveld has termed this problem the "tyranny o f plunder," arguing that its 
chains were not fully broken until the twentieth century.11
As long as transportation networks were inadequate to the task o f supplying 
armies over long distances, the military power of political capitals was limited. The 
dependence of armies on plunder as a source o f supply meant that the aims o f the state 
were often subordinated to material needs o f soldiers. In the ancient and medieval world, 
military expeditions were undertaken as much to win booty as they were to extend the 
influence of political leaders. The difficulties of supplying and controlling long-distance 
campaigns meant that states ruled more through threat o f military force than its actual 
use, presiding over networks of tributaries who made periodic payments to avoid attack. 
Even when armies conquered surrounding areas militarily, the conquest generally 
entailed a degree o f political decentralization. Since most states did not have the
11 Mann, Sources of Social Power. 138-42; Martin van Creveld, Supplying Wan Logistics from 
Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), esp. 5-39. John Lynn has criticized 
Creveld for underplaying advances in European logistics before the nineteenth century, pointing out that 
armies did not depend on plunder and foraging as their sole source of supplies. Soldiers in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries drew their provisions from a variety of sources, including purchases from local 
merchants, forced contributions, etapes (stores of food maintained by local merchants) and magazines 
(stores of food and arms maintained by the army). See "The History o f Logistics and Supplying War." in 
John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present 
(Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), 9-27.
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revenues necessary to pay wages to their armies, they compensated them instead with 
rewards of plunder, land, or political office, installing officers as the lords or governors o f 
the regions they subjugated.12
This system of rewards, o f which feudalism was one variation, continued to 
characterize war in Europe in the Middle Ages. But the conduct o f war was gradually 
transformed between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, as the introduction o f new 
tactics and technologies, the growing power o f monarchies, and the increasing scale of 
commerce raised the stakes o f military conflict. One by one, European states replaced 
feudal levies with paid mercenaries, built bastioned forts, and outfitted their armies and 
navies with cannon and muskets. Collectively, these innovations dramatically increased 
the expense o f war, both in expenditures and human lives. Smaller city states and 
principalities that could not bear these costs were pillaged or absorbed by their larger 
neighbors. Powerful monarchs, meanwhile, found themselves in an arms race with their 
rivals, with constant pressure to find new sources o f  revenue for their armies. The lion's 
share of royal budgets were devoted to financing wars or servicing debts incurred by war. 
As the cost o f campaigns mounted, governments became more intrusive in the lives of 
their citizens, devising new methods o f extracting taxes and obtaining loans, and 
demanding military service from a growing share o f  the male population.13
This system of warfare favored territorial states over other forms o f political 
organization because they generated more revenues than city states and were more
12 Mann, Sources of Social Power. 130-77.
13MichaeI Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," originally delivered as a lecture at Queen’s 
University, Belfast, 1955, reprinted in Essavs in Swedish History (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1967), 195-225; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the 
West. 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Jeremy Black, European Warfare. 
1660-1815 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: 
Technology. Armed Force, and Society since A. D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982);
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compact, and hence easier to defend, than dynastic empires. In the Middle Ages, the 
countryside o f Europe was dotted by hundreds o f castles, which acted as the strongholds 
of local magnates. These magnates were allied with princes, Icings, and pontiffs, whose 
dynastic estates were often noncontiguous and scattered throughout the continent. As the 
political fortunes of magnates waned and the strength o f monarchs waxed, the castles 
became increasingly unnecessary and were replaced by a ring o f frontier fortifications 
that protected the outer edges o f states. Under the direction o f Louis XIV's chief military 
engineer, Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 133 strongholds at the fringes o f France were 
built or rebuilt, while the fortifications o f Paris were tom down. Vauban's projects were 
emulated by monarchs in other parts o f Europe and the result was a military landscape in 
which violence was pushed out toward the frontiers of the state, with its territorial core 
acting as a supply center for the peripheries.14
This pattern was duplicated in Europe's colonies. In the early years o f settlement, 
violent conflicts were relatively small in scale and geographically diffused: in early 
seventeenth-century New England, few places were entirely free from the threat o f piracy 
or Indian raids. But as colonies developed economically, they became increasingly adept 
at providing military protection for the more densely settled seaboard towns. Because 
cities such as Boston or Providence were also commercial centers with large populations, 
it was easy to recruit and provision large armies for their defense and the protection of 
nearby areas. The more sparsely populated regions at the edges o f colonies were far less 
able to defend themselves and were consequently more likely to be chosen as military 
targets. Places such as Maine and southern Acadia, which had small populations and
Richard Bean, "War and the Birth of the Nation State,” Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 203-21.
14 Parker, Military Revolution. 42-43.
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were claimed by rival crowns, became militarized frontiers that depended on supplies and 
troops sent from colonial capitals. Because no side was able to gain a decisive advantage 
over its rivals in these frontier regions, their inhabitants were constantly vulnerable to 
attack.
The successful prosecution o f war in a frontier area in Maine depended on the 
ability o f colonial officials to establish an umbilical cord o f supply and troops that linked 
the peripheries with commercial and political centers. Logistics, more than strategy or 
tactics, was the central problem faced by military commanders leading campaigns in 
Maine. Unless they managed to recruit, transport, fortify, provision, and supply troops on 
the frontier, political leaders could not gain control over the land. For much o f the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonial leaders had mixed success in this regard. 
The English oversaw a steady increase in the number o f forts, garrison houses, and 
soldiers in Maine throughout the eighteenth century, but before the 1750s the numbers 
were not large enough to overwhelm their enemies.
Lacking the funds or the transportation networks necessary to launch large-scale 
campaigns, English, French, and Wabanaki forces all adopted military styles that 
departed from European convention. By the eighteenth century, warfare in Europe was 
typically conducted according to a set of unwritten rules: by and large, war was fought by 
professional armies, acting on behalf o f states, seeking decisive military victories that 
resulted in territorial conquest or diplomatic concessions. These rules were put into 
writing in the nineteenth century by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, 
who called war "the continuation o f policy by other means." The modem form o f warfare 
described by Clausewitz was built on the assumption that armed force is monopolized by
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states, and that the soldiers hired by the states have a disinterested determination to 
advance their policies.15
In Maine, as in the ancient and medieval world, these assumptions did not apply.
It may be helpful in this respect to imagine warfare in terms of a spectrum of organized 
violence, running from small raiding bands to large-scale professional armies [see Fig. 
5.4], Because modem states have substantial revenues and highly developed 
transportation networks, soldiers are adequately paid and supplied by their governments 
and do not have to resort to plunder. Instead, their attention is devoted exclusively to 
following orders and serving the interests o f the state. Armies o f a smaller scale, on the 
other hand, tend to be less well funded and more oriented toward the pursuit o f plunder 
and the individual interests of soldiers. While far less costly than professional armies, 
they also are less effective at advancing state interests.
None of the groups fighting in Maine conformed to the image of a professional 
army, although some came closer than others. Soldiers on all sides went to the battlefield 
in search o f plunder and personal profit, and few were wholly dedicated to the interests of 
the state. Their tactics, as often as not, were designed to bring home captives and booty 
rather than to advance the policy aims of their leaders. The tyranny of plunder still held 
sway in colonial Maine, although the degree to which soldiers remained committed to its 
pursuit depended on many things: political circumstances, the wages and supplies offered 
by governments, inherited traditions o f warmaking, and cultural assumptions regarding 
military honor and the legitimacy o f violence. English, French, and Wabanaki soldiers 
received different kinds o f support from their respective governments, and understood the
15 John Keeean. A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage, 1991), esp. 3-60: Martin van Creveld. The 
Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), esp. 33-94; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
303
aims and conduct of warfare in divergent ways. The result was a confluence o f different 
styles of warfare, which grew from separate cultural traditions and evolved under the 
press of events. How these styles differed and how they determined the balance of power 
in Maine are questions that bear further examination.
The Sociology o f Scalping
French entrepreneurs and administrators had claimed possession o f Acadia since 
the first decade of the seventeenth century, but their rights to the province -  particularly 
its southern reaches ~  had little practical backing. English and Scottish forces claiming 
the territory on behalf o f the colony o f Nova Scotia captured the capital o f Port Royal in 
1629 and again in 1654. When French authorities regained possession o f the colony in 
1670, they ruled the southern portion through a handful of military garrisons, which lost 
the colony’s most important trading posts to Anglo-Dutch privateers in 1675 and its 
capital to English soldiers in 1690. The inconsiderable French population o f Acadia, 
which numbered only a few hundred in the seventeenth century, was incapable of 
mounting a sustained defense of its settlements. The more substantial population of the 
St. Lawrence River Valley was itself vulnerable to Iroquois and English assaults and was 
in any case too far removed from Acadia to lend it any assistance. Regulars from France 
were expensive to transport and even costlier to maintain after they had crossed the 
Atlantic. French administrators recognized very early that they could not defend their 
North American footholds alone and would have to look to native allies for assistance.
Indians were a unique class o f soldiers, very different from Canadian militiamen 
or French regulars. They had their own assumptions about the proper conduct and aims
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), esp. 75-123.
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of war, and their unwillingness to conform to Old World standards o f  military discipline 
exasperated many colonial military commanders. But the colony's desperate need for 
military assistance forced French administrators to adopt tactics, rewards, and methods of 
recruitment that were familiar to the Indians and bore little resemblance to standard 
European practice. Although New France's governors acted as the warriors' commanders- 
in-chief, the terms o f their employment were determined more by the Indians than by the 
French. In this respect, Wabanakis were similar to Cossacks, Highland Scots, and other 
"nomadic" groups who were induced to serve on behalf o f European states in eighteenth- 
century wars. Like these other peoples, Wabanakis negotiated an alliance with a 
European power which allowed them to retain a degree o f independence -- specifically, in 
the Wabanaki case, the right to enjoy their lands without intrusion by Europeans -- in 
return for military service.
The Franco-Wabanaki military alliance came to fruition in the last quarter o f the 
seventeenth century, but its roots extended as far back as the earliest years o f 
colonization. The French had established themselves at the head o f a continental system 
of native alliances by insinuating themselves into diplomatic networks that had existed 
before their arrival. Because the main points o f French interest in North America were 
the Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system, they naturally gravitated 
toward the Indian groups who controlled access to these regions. The groups first 
encountered by French colonists in Acadia were known as the Souriquois (Mi'kmaq), the 
Etechemins (whose villages extended from the Saint John to the Kennebec rivers), and 
the Almouchiquois (whose villages lay to the south o f the Kennebec). As elsewhere in
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the Northeast, these groups were tangled in a web o f alliances and enmities that included 
dozens of villages and bands sometimes hundreds o f miles apart.
In the first decade of the seventeenth century, there was sporadic warfare between 
the Mi'kmaq and Etechemins, although it was mitigated by a constant flow of trade and 
diplomacy between factions on both sides. Mi'kmaq had also launched attacks against 
the St. Lawrence Iroquoians in the sixteenth century and had contacts with Montagnais 
living at Tadoussac on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River. Etechemins were also 
allied with the Montagnais and carried on trade with corn-growing villages from Saco 
southward. Tensions sometimes existed between neighboring villages; Captain Robert 
Davies in 1607 was informed o f a war between two groups living at the headwaters of the 
Kennebec River.16
The exotic origins of trade goods uncovered by archaeologists in Maine gives 
some indication of the geographic extent o f this system o f trade and alliances. Objects 
dated toward the end of the Ceramic period include a Norse penny, a Labrador Inuit tool, 
copper and chalcedony from Nova Scotia, and quartzite from Lake Mistassini in northern 
Quebec. Documentary evidence also indicates a far-flung range o f alliances: three 
separate European authors in the first decade o f the seventeenth century described 
contacts between the Montagnais leader Anadabijou and the coastal population of Acadia. 
In 1603, he was seen by Samuel de Champlain at his home in Tadoussac, hosting a feast 
to celebrate a recent defeat o f the Iroquois with an army o f warriors that included many 
Etechemins. Four years later, he gave his blessings to a raid on Saco led by the renowned
16 Laurence Johnson and Charles A. Martijn, "Les Malecites et la traite des fourrures," Recherches 
amerindiennes au Quebec 24 (1994): 25-44; Philip L. Barbour, ed., The Complete Works o f Captain John 
Smith (1580-16311.3  vots. (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 328-29,338-41;
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Mi'kmaq sagamore Membertou. And in the first decade o f the century, Indians from 
Penobscot Bay informed the English that they sometimes travelled to the St. Lawrence 
Valley to trade with him because he had access to European goods through the French.17
Wabanaki armies rarely if ever numbered over a thousand men, placing them at 
the low end of the military spectrum. But they still required a considerable degree of 
organization, both in the recruitment o f warriors and the planning o f battles. Native 
leaders spent much o f their time cultivating alliances with neighboring groups, recruiting 
warriors from nearby areas, and compensating recruits for their services. Although 
persuasive speaking was a necessary part o f their efforts, sagamores were unlikely to gain 
much support unless they backed their words with gifts, food, and other displays of 
largesse. In general, military organization in the Northeast was structured by four kinds 
of material exchange: tribute, feasts, trade, and competitive gift-giving. Each form of 
exchange fostered the social relationships necessary to mobilize armies.
Most Wabanaki commoners at the beginning o f the seventeenth century paid 
tribute to their sagamores in the form o f pelts, com, or other valuable items. In return, 
sagamores acted as the leaders and representatives o f their kin and allies in peace and 
war. They served as war captains, mediated disputes, and provided dogs, canoes, and 
supplies to hunters. The more powerful sagamores had retinues o f unmarried young men 
who presented their leaders with all their furs and served under them as warriors. The 
payment o f tribute was a recognition o f sagamores' skills as military and political
"The Davies Journal of the 1607 North Virginia Voyage," in David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, eds., 
The English New England Voyages. 1602-1608 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1983), 433.
17Bruce J. Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric Exchange on the Maritime Peninsula," in Timothy G. Baugh 
and Jonathan E. Ericson. eds., Prehistoric Exchange Systems in North America (New York: Plenum Press, 
1994), 34-35; H. P. Biggar, ed., The Works o f Samuel de Champlain. 6 vols. (Toronto: Champlain 
Society, 1922), 1:98-103 ; Marc Lescarbot, History of New France, ed. and trans. W. L. Grant (Toronto:
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organizers: because powerful men could convince hundreds o f warriors to take up arms 
against their enemies, they guaranteed a degree o f safety to their followers. Families who 
gave gifts to their sagamores were sure to receive military backing if  they were injured by 
outsiders. Those who failed to align themselves with an influential strongman left 
themselves vulnerable. In a sense, the relationship between sagamores and their 
followers was a protection racket in which military security was exchanged for tribute.18
Sagamores did not usually keep tribute for their own use, but put furs and other 
valuables back into circulation to recruit more military support. Early European visitors 
were impressed by the size and frequency o f feasts hosted by Wabanaki sagamores. "As 
long as they have anything," Pierre Biard wrote, "they are always celebrating feasts and 
having songs, dances and speeches; if  there is a crowd of them you need not expect 
anything else." Although some banquets were attended merely for pleasure, others had a 
decidedly political tone. Sagamores did not give their wealth away piecemeal but 
stockpiled it so they could make an ostentatious display at feasts.19
By the last quarter of the seventeenth century and probably earlier, sagamores 
prepared for war by hosting a dog feast for the warriors about to go into battle. Several 
dogs belonging to the sagamore — typically his favorite ones — were slaughtered, boiled 
in kettles, and served to the warriors. One by one, the sagamores attending the feast
The Champlain Society, 1907), 499-500; "The Description of the Countrey of Mawooshen," in Quinn and 
Quinn, English New England Voyages. 471.
18 JR, I: 75-77, 3: 87-89. On the protection racket as an organizing military principle in small-scale 
societies, see Timothy Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power The Political Economy in Prehistory (Stanford, 
Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 105-109. On the nature of Wabanaki leadership in the seventeenth 
century, see Alvin Morrison, "Dawnland Decisions: Seventeenth-Century Wabanaki Leaders and their 
Response to Differential Contact Stimuli in the Overlap Area of New France and New England" (Ph.D. 
diss., State University of New York, Buffalo, 1974).
19 JR, 3: 107. See also, Sieur de Diereville, Relation of the Vovage to Port Roval in Acadia or New France 
[1708], trans. Mrs. Clarence Webster, ed. John Clarence Webster (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933),
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would throw their hatchets onto the coals beneath the kettles and announce their intention 
to join the expedition. The feast emboldened its participants to go to war and also served 
as a token of the sagamore’s esteem for his warriors and allies. This practice acted as a 
ritual o f alliance in which warriors and their leaders paid respect to one another.20
Other feasts were held during peacetime to solidify alliances or cultivate 
friendships. The feasts usually served as an occasion for trade or gift-giving between 
sagamores of allied groups. After they had eaten, leaders distributed large quantities of 
gifts to their allies -- typically prestige goods such as furs, exotic cherts, copper, 
wampum, hunting charms, or European merchandise. The gifts symbolized the 
sagamores' respect for their allies while also advertising their ability to gather tribute 
from their own followers. While it was conducted in a spirit o f generosity, gift-giving 
often had a competitive edge: if a sagamore's gifts were not reciprocated by his partners, 
it was likely that one or the other would lose face. When the Mi'kmaq sagamore 
Messamoet presented Saco River leader Olmechin with a large gift o f French 
merchandise in 1605, preceded by an hour-long speech proposing an alliance between 
Saco and the Mi'kmaq, he became resentful when Olmechin did not return the favor. An 
unreciprocated gift was equivalent to a payment of tribute and implied the submission of 
Messamoet to Olmechin. Messamoet recoiled from such an interpretation and, according 
to French observers, planned to make war on Olmechin.21
153-57; Thomas Pichon, Lettres et memoires oour servir a 1'histoire naturelle. civile et politique du Can 
Breton... (La Haye: Pierre Gosse, 1760; reprinted ed., New York: S. R. Publishers, 1966), 105-113.
20 Diereville, Relation. 153-55; John Gyles, Memoirs of Odd Adventures. Strange Deliverances. &c. in the 
Captivity of John Gvles. E s q . (Boston: S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1736), 28; "Relation par lettres de 
l'Amerique septentrionalle, 1710," PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1 A, vol. 122, fols. 303v-304v; JR, 67:203; 
Deposition of Hezekiah Miles, May 31, 1695, in "Statements o f Grace Higiman and Others in Relation to 
Being Taken Captive by the Indians," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 18 (1864), 163.
21 Biggar, Works of Champlain. 1:395-96; Lescarbot, History of New France. 323-25.
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Mi'kmaq sagamores such as Messamoet were placed in a position o f advantage in 
the late sixteenth century because o f their privileged access to European goods. The 
coastal areas o f Cape Breton, Acadia, and Gaspe that were frequented by European 
fishermen in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries belonged to the Mi'kmaq, who 
were able to monopolize the occasional trade that complemented fishing expeditions. 
Acting as middlemen in the trade between Indians and Europeans, Mi'kmaq travelled 
along the coast and into the interior, exchanging European goods for furs and food and 
using the trade to cement alliances with other native groups. Some scholars have 
suggested that the wars between Mi'kmaq and neighboring groups in the early 
seventeenth century were occasioned in part by struggles over control of the trade.22
Yet it is difficult to untangle the motives that led people to go to war. Certainly, it 
would be a mistake to assume that Wabanakis operated under the Clausewitzian 
assumption that war is a continuation of policy by other means. Kinship, rather than the 
state, was the organizing political principle o f their society, and sagamores did not 
formulate or enforce "policy" directives. Violent conflict arose from personal disputes 
between individuals, who drew on their kin and friends for support. Smaller 
disagreements were resolved by mediation or by a form of ritualized combat in which two 
rivals stood face-to-face, wrestling and pulling at each other’s hair. More serious 
offenses, such as murder or wife-stealing, were more likely to give rise to raids, 
ambushes, and other violent reprisals that resulted in death. The most common cause of 
wars was a desire to revenge the murders o f kinfolk, a form o f conflict Daniel Richter, 
following Marian Smith, has called the "mourning war". Relatives o f the victims took to
22 Bruce J. Bourque and Ruth Holmes Whitehead, 'Tarrantines and the Introduction of European Trade 
Goods inthe Gulf of Maine," Ethnohistorv 32 (1985): 327-41; Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric
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the warpath after their death, to assuage their grief, retaliate against their enemies, and 
bring home captives to replace their loved ones.23
The kin o f the deceased were naturally inclined to seek vengeance, but raids often 
involved warriors who had no direct relationship to the victim. These warriors were not 
simply following orders — sagamores did not have that power over their followers — but 
were impelled to fight for their own interests or to please their families and friends. Since 
sagamores led by consensus, the organizing o f a war party required them to recruit 
followers through speeches, dog feasts, and presents. But the greatest attraction o f the 
warpath was the opportunity to fight, since warfare brought men many rewards: plunder, 
captives, scalps, glory, and honor. War in this sense was not simply a means to an end 
but an end in itself.
Unmarried men were customarily the most bellicose element in Wabanaki society, 
largely because they occupied a precarious position in their communities. Before they 
were married, they could not keep their own dogs or hunting sacks and were subordinate 
to their parents and sagamores. Nor could they marry until they proved to the fiancee's 
parents that they were able hunters and providers and had procured enough goods to pay 
her brideprice. Warfare provided young warriors with opportunities to fulfill all these 
requirements. A man won respect in his community by returning home with scalps, 
prisoners, and other war trophies that proved his valor and certified his ability to act as a 
protector. Any plunder he could find — usually furs, wampum, and copper -- could be
Exchange," 23-46.
23JR. 3: 93; Daniel K. Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," William and Mary Quarterly. 
3rd ser., 40 (1983): 528-59; Marian W. Smith, "American Indian Warfare," New York Academy of 
Sciences, Transactions. 2nd ser., 13 (1951): 348-65; Thomas S. Abler, "Beavers and Muskets: Iroquois 
Military Fortunes in the Face of European Colonization," in R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, 
eds., War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare (Santa Fe, N. M.: School of
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distributed to friends and family or used toward the payment o f  brideprice, although few 
accounts of Wabanaki warfare mention plunder as an important object o f war.
Another method of finding a wife was to capture her in battle. European accounts 
of Wabanaki battles suggest that warriors specifically looked to take their enemies' 
women as captives. When the Penobscot River sagamore Bashabe was killed by 
Mi'kmaq raiders in 1615, Ferdinando Gorges reported that the raiders took his wives, 
daughters, "and such other matters as they thought o f value." Pierre Biard noted that the 
theft of wives was an occasional cause o f war among Wabanakis. And in his poetic 
account of a 1607 Mi'kmaq raid on Saco, Marc Lescarbot mused that the warriors 
planned to take the village's stores o f com, "and if  we want their women as plunder/We 
will have them as well."24
Although wife-stealing may have involved jealousies and other romantic 
entanglements, the value of female captives lay above all in the importance of their labor. 
Much of the daily work in Wabanaki society was performed by women, and no man 
could reach a position of status unless he was married. The most powerful sagamores of 
the region generally had more than one wife and some, like Cacagous o f the Saint John 
River, had as many as eight. The sagamores explained to Pierre Biard that this practice 
not only multiplied the numbers o f their kin and offspring, but gave them control over the 
labor of their wives. Their work was highly valued because, as Biard put it, "they have
American Research Press, 1992), 151-174. The violent death of kin did not necessarily lead to war, since 
murders could be absolved through the payment o f condolence gifts.
24 Ferdinando Gorges, A Briefe Narration of the Originall Undertakings of the Advancement o f Plantations 
in the Parts of America. Esnecialv. shewing the Beginning. Progress and Continuance of that of New 
England [1658] (Boston: Publications of the Prince Society, 1890), 90; JR, 3:93-95; Lescarbot, History of 
New France. 502. (My translation; original reads: "Et si voulons avoir leurs femmes au pillage/Nous les 
aurons aussi"). In a 1605 raid against the Etechemins, the Mi'kmaq sagamore lounescou and his followers 
carried away women from the battle, although the captives were later put to death: see Biggar, Works of 
Champlain. 1:435-36.
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no other servants, slaves, or mechanics but the women." Pressed by the need to organize 
a continual round of feasts for their kin and allies, sagamores prized the additional work 
of female captives and treated them as a valuable reward of battle.25
While the desire for scalps, plunder, and captives has been well documented, there 
is no evidence that Wabanaki leaders ever sought the conquest o f territory. European 
observers remarked that sagamores had authority over particular river drainages, but this 
way of talking was likely a shorthand description o f the geographical extent o f their 
tributary networks. The basis of sagamores' power lay in their influence over other 
people rather than their ability to control resources -- or more precisely, the control of 
resources was embedded in social relationships, and sagamores came to power through 
their capacity to mobilize kin and allies in the defense o f group interests. Human rather 
than material wealth was the object of wars: sagamores and young men went on the 
warpath to take captives and scalps, to awe their allies and intimidate their enemies, or to 
win tribute and honor. If wars were ever turf battles, they were struggles over personal 
authority and the collection o f tribute and had nothing to do with the permanent 
occupation of villages or river basins. The tactics used by war captains were unsuited to 
territorial conquest; raids and ambushes may have been effective in securing booty and 
prisoners, but they did not give the attackers political control over their enemies.26
25JR, 3: 99-101.
26Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Wav of Wan Technology and Tactics among the New England 
Indians (Lanham, Md.: Madison, 1991), 26-31. These remarks apply specifically to the Wabanakis: the 
more sedentary groups living in the densely populated parts o f southern New England had a stronger sense 
of territoriality and may have fought over land. But even in these regions the collection o f tribute and the 
taking of vengeance seems to have weighed heavier in the minds of war captains.
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Onontio's Children
The conquest and defense o f  the land did not become an issue until the 
demographic expansion o f New England and the growing strength ofNew France forced 
Wabanakis to take sides in the imperial wars o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Most Wabanakis leaned toward the French in these conflicts, having forged a tentative 
military alliance with New France during the Iroquois wars o f the mid-seventeenth 
century. The partnership between the French and Wabanakis was part o f a wide-ranging 
defensive alliance that included Hurons, Algonquins, Montagnais, and other groups 
threatened by Iroquois raids. Elements of the alliance had been formed at least as far 
back as the sixteenth century, but the growing influence of European powers, combined 
with the increasing frequency and scale o f Iroquois attacks, led these disparate groups to 
form closer diplomatic contacts in the seventeenth century.27
New France's earliest trading contacts outside of Acadia were with the 
Montagnais and Algonquins north o f the St. Lawrence River and with the Hurons of 
Georgian Bay, all of whom were engaged in occasional warfare with the Iroquois. The 
French alliance with these groups, and their closely related desire to control access to 
trade with the Great Lakes region, drew them into conflict with the Five Nations. 
Epidemic disease, which depleted native populations and gave rise to a desire for war 
captives, and competition for furs led to a sharp increase in the intensity o f Iroquois raids 
in the 1630s. The victims of the attacks included Wabanaki villages along the upper 
Connecticut River, who in the 1640s were drawn into war against the Iroquois and a 
tentative alliance with the French. In 1650, French authorities dispatched Father Gabriel
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Druillettes and Noel Tekwerimat to Norridgewock and surrounding communities to enlist 
eastern Wabanakis and English colonists in the defense o f Connecticut River villages. 
Some Christian Wabanakis, already allied with Algonquin and Montagnais converts, 
gladly joined. In the 1660s, hostilities worsened as Mohawks, the easternmost Iroquois 
tribe, launched a prolonged campaign against native villages and European outposts as far 
as the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers.28
The defensive alliance o f the Iroquois wars was translated into a French- 
dominated system of military defense during the colonial wars o f the next century. New 
France's most reliable Wabanaki allies in these conflicts came from the Canadian mission 
villages of Odanak (St. Francis) and Wolinak (Becancour), which were established in 
the last quarter o f the seventeenth century to accommodate the growing number of 
Wabanakis at Sillery and the influx o f Indian refugees from King Philip's War in New 
England. Devoutly Catholic and loyal to their French protectors, the domicilies, as they 
were known, provided a steady supply o f auxiliary troops for French wars. Warriors 
from Odanak fought in every conflict against New England from 1688 to 1763 and also 
saw service in New York, the Great Lakes, and Louisiana. French officials exerted their 
influence to a milder degree among the Wabanakis remaining in Acadia, largely through 
Jesuit missionaries in villages such as Norridgewock, Panawapskik, and Medoctec in the 
last quarter of the seventeenth century.
27 On the creation of a French-led defensive alliance in the west, see Richard White, The Middle Ground: 
Indians. Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region. 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 1-185.
28 Jose A. Brandao, "Your Fvre Shall Bum No More": [roauois Policy toward New France and Its Native 
Allies to 1701 (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the 
Lonehouse: The Peonies of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, N. C.: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 1992); Gordon M. Day, "The Ouragie War: A Case History in 
Iroquois-New England Relations," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, Marianne Mithun, eds., Extending 
the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroauoian Studies (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), 35-50.
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Wabanakis did not merely follow the French lead in these wars but were drawn 
into an alliance through shared interests. In the earliest stages o f the War o f the League 
of Augsburg, western Wabanaki antipathy toward the English and the Iroquois tended to 
feed into each other, since Mohawk leaders were allied with New York and depended on 
the English for supplies o f arms and ammunition. New France had begun a war against 
the Iroquois in the summer o f 1687, two years before the formal declaration o f war 
between the British and French crowns. Wabanakis from Odanak had assisted in a raid 
against the Senecas, the westernmost Iroquois tribe, and had returned with Iroquois and 
English scalps. The Senecas were allied with New York, which officially had jurisdiction 
east of the Kennebec River in the 1680s, and the Iroquois looked to their English allies 
for succor. A dispute was already brewing between the English and eastern Wabanakis, 
who had fought a war between 1675 and 1678 and whose relations were strained in the 
decade that followed. In 1686 and 1688, English officials sponsored expeditions against 
the trading house of the Baron St.-Castin, a veteran o f the Iroquois wars who had set up 
shop as a fur trader in Penobscot Bay, marrying the daughter o f Madockawando, the most 
powerful sagamore of the region. These attacks exacerbated tensions between the 
Wabanakis and the English, which had already been aroused by trading abuses, the 
encroachment of settlers on Wabanaki fishing spots and planting grounds, and the failure 
of the English to pay tribute to the sagamores who claimed suzerainty over their lands.29
29 CDRH. 1:439; Kenneth M. Morrison, The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in 
Abenaki-Euroamerican Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 115-22; Steele, 
Waroaths. 137-41; John G. Reid, Acadia. Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth 
Century (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1981), 178-83; Cotton Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 
in Charles H. Lincoln, ed., Narrarives of the Indian Wars. 1675-1699 fNew York: Bames and Noble, 
1941/New York: Scribner, 1913), 186. The French also supported Wabanakis in their 1675-78 war against 
the English, albeit on a much smaller scale: see Emerson Baker, "New Evidence on the French 
Involvement in King Philip's War,1' Maine Historical Society Quarterly 28 (1988): 85-91.
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Wabanakis entered the war for self-interested reasons, but they gravitated toward 
an alliance with the French, deferentially calling governors their "fathers" and accepting 
the guidance of French officers in the battlefield. Far from being instinctive, this 
deference was the result of a calculated strategy on the part o f the French to win the 
loyalty of their Indian allies through the distribution o f presents. Like sagamores, 
governors gained the allegiance o f  their military followers by providing for their needs 
and making ostentatious displays o f generosity. But French authorities had access to far 
greater quantities of presents than any sagamore, and the flow of revenues from royal 
coffers enabled them to mobilize and command a network o f military allies o f a 
continental scale. Needless to say, the allegiance of Wabanakis to the French crown was 
not simply a matter o f pecuniary interest, and owed much to a shared devotion to 
Catholicism, ties of kinship, and a common distrust o f the English. But according to 
Wabanaki custom, the exchange o f gifts fostered political relationships, acting as a social 
lubricant that brought allies closer together. The lavish distribution o f royal presents 
offered tangible proof of French goodwill and bolstered their claims to paternal authority 
over Indian allies.30
In the first o f the imperial wars, the recruitment and payment o f  Wabanaki troops 
was split between Quebec and Port Royal, although the Acadian government played a
30 For a contrary view, see David L. Ghere, "The Maine Experience During the French and Indian War," in 
William Cowan, ed., Papers of the Twenty-Fourth Aleonauian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University 
Press, 1993), 188-98. Ghere argues that "the utility of gifts was minimal on Maine frontier diplomacy," 
and that the "Abenaki-French alliance was based on factors other than gift-giving." He points out that the 
exchange of gifts between 1748 and 17S5 failed to quell hostilities or to induce Indians to switch their 
allegiances. But by choosing to limit his discussion to the final years of the colonial wars, Ghere skews his 
evidence to suit his conclusions. The Franco-Wabanaki alliance developed over generations and, 
according to statements by both Wabanakis and the French, it had been solidified by the exchange of 
presents. By the 1750s the English were offering the Wabanakis presents of equal or greater value than the 
French, but the fact that these offers did not bring a reversal in their allegiances does not discount the 
importance of gift-giving in Wabanaki diplomacy.
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more significant role. The leadership o f Acadia was dominated by military men — 
governors Hector de Grandfontaine, Jacques de Chambly, and Joseph Robinau de 
Villebon were all military officers and veterans of the Iroquois wars — but the military 
strength of the colony was negligible. William Phips's 1690 expedition against Port 
Royal, followed by the depredations o f Leislerian vessels from New York, had levelled 
the provincial capital and forced the colony's government to relocate to the St. John 
River. In October 1699, Governor Villebon reported there were only seventy-seven 
regular soldiers in Acadia, about the same number stationed there ten years earlier. 
According to a 1703 report, the colony's military strength had increased to four 
companies o f fifty men each, all o f them garrisoned at the recently rebuilt capital o f Port 
Royal. A half dozen smaller militia companies were added to this total, although the 
militiamen were used primarily in the defense of their own communities. The military 
establishment was inadequate unless bolstered by Wabanaki warriors, and Villebon and 
other officials were frankly aware o f their dependence on native allies. With the 
exception of privateering expeditions, every French victory in New England during the 
War of the League o f Augsburg was scored with the assistance o f  Indian troops.31
The price of this service was paid in presents, distributed first by French 
missionaries or military officers to sagamores and then from the sagamores to their 
followers. The presents accounted for a little less than half o f Acadia's wartime budget 
and generally ranged between 2,000 and 6,000 livres annually. The staple items o f gift- 
giving were the tools o f war: muskets, pistols, powder, shot, flints, bayonets, and
31 John Clarence Webster, ed., Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Centurv: Letters. Journals and 
Memoirs of Joseph Robineau de Villebon. Commandant in Acadia. 1690-1700 and Other Contemporary 
Documents (Saint John, N.B.: The New Brunswick Museum, 1934), 125; Delabat, letter to Monsieur de
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hatchets. French authorities also provided their allies with a wide array o f provisions and 
other trade goods, such as bread, flour, rice, brandy, tobacco, shirts, leggings, blankets, 
hats, yam, thread, and cloth. The range of goods was similar to the merchandise 
available at English trading houses, although munitions rather than provisions were the 
mainstays of French gifts. While miscellaneous items such as chocolate, buttons, 
molasses, sails, seeds, and paddles were occasionally added to this list, the basic packet of 
goods remained the same in later wars.32
Warriors also expected to earn further rewards through battle, over and above the 
presents distributed at war feasts and by missionaries. The gifts covered the cost o f arms 
and the support o f their families, but the real profits o f war came from the battles 
themselves. Warriors regularly took plunder from the houses o f English settlers, 
although the booty was limited to easily portable items such as coins and guns. They also 
returned home with captives: some were adopted by Wabanaki families while the less 
fortunate were summarily killed or tortured to death. Warriors sold most o f their 
prisoners to the French, who kept them as servants until they found an opportunity to 
exchange or sell them back to the English. During the War o f Spanish Succession, 
governor Joseph Dudley o f Massachusetts resolved "never to Set up an Algier Trade" o f 
war prisoners with the French, but most New England families went to great lengths to 
redeem their loved ones from captivity, and paid the French accordingly. French 
authorities also purchased scalps; according to one English captive, Wabanakis who
Villermont, Port Royal, November 20,1703, in William Inglis Morse, ed., Acadiensia Nova (1598-1779).
2 vols. (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1935), 2:1-2.
32 CDRH. 1:447,471,474; 2: 73-74, 111, 129-30, 178,201, 203,206-7,291-92. Records of presents 
dispensed to Wabanakis by the royal storehouse in Montreal during the War of Austrian Succession 
indicate a similar variety of goods, including a cow given on the occasion of a war feast. The gifts were 
distributed at feasts, rewarded to warriors returning from battle, or given to their wives and children while
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visited Quebec in 1692 were paid £10 for a captive and £5 for every scalp. Joseph 
Dudley reported in 1709 that the going rate for scalps in Quebec fluctuated between 20 
shillings and £5. Scalps continued to fetch an attractive price in later conflicts: at the 
beginning of the Seven Years War, Wabanaki warriors were paid 40 to 50 livres (about 
£3 or £4 sterling) for each English scalp brought to the French. For young Wabanaki 
men, the possibility o f such spoils was the greatest material incentive for going on the 
warpath, while the distribution o f presents before the battle guaranteed them a minimum 
reward for their service.33
When added to the expense o f war feasts and presents, scalp bounties could 
amount to considerable sums. But the costs o f recruiting and provisioning Wabanaki 
troops remained far lower than the expense of maintaining regular soldiers. According to 
Villebon's 1692 budget, the total value o f Indian presents for the year amounted to 2950 
livres. The presents were distributed among Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, and Abenaki warriors as 
far south as the Kennebec River, who together could muster some 500 warriors. Under 
the conservative assumption that only half o f all adult male Wabanakis fought against the 
English, and that only half o f the latter received presents from Acadia, the cost o f a year’s 
service for each warrior would have been about 24 livres. Regular soldiers, by contrast, 
were paid a salary o f 9 livres per month, or 108 livres annually; high-ranking officers 
received monthly salaries as high as 90 livres. Wabanaki troops also had several practical 
advantages over their French counterparts: they did not have to be paid or garrisoned 
year-round and could be recruited for particular campaigns and released immediately
they were off at war. See "Depenses a l'occasion de la Guerre, 4 demiers mois 1746," PAC, AN, Serie 
Cl 1A, vol. 86, fols. 178-231. See also, vol. 87, fols. 2-21.
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afterward. The costs o f provisioning and arming them, furthermore, were subsumed 
under the expenses o f presents, which always included guns, powder, shot, and food. By 
any accounting measure, Wabanaki warriors were a better buy than French regulars.34
But in purchasing military protection at such a low price, French authorities 
forfeited a degree o f military control. Wabanaki troops lacked the discipline o f their 
European counterparts and on several occasions refused to continue fighting when they 
encountered bad omens. Wabanaki leaders also proved to be fickle allies, who attacked 
the English ferociously when the desire for vengeance ran hot, but made entreaties of 
peace if material deprivation or heavy losses cooled their ardor. After suffering some 
painful defeats in Dummer's War (1722-25), most Wabanakis in Maine pursued a policy 
of neutrality, although English intransigence usually pushed them onto the French side. 
Even during Dummer's War, Indians from Maine were more inclined to take prisoners 
than to kill settlers, a fact noted with disapproval by Huron warriors from Canada, who 
said the Norridgewocks "were but women in the war."35 During the War o f Austrian 
Succession, twenty Pigwackets took refuge with the English, some o f them even serving 
as soldiers in the English army. The Penobscots, who lived further from English 
settlements, attempted to remain neutral in 1755 and were forced to choose sides only 
because the English demanded their exclusive allegiance.36
33 "Statements of Grace Higiman and Others," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 18 
(1864): 161-62; DHSM. 9: 259, 294. Presumably both Higiman and Dudley were speaking of English 
pounds, and not French livres.
34 Webster, Acadia. 203. Catherine M. Desbarats has made a similar calculation for the comparative costs 
of French and Indian troops in the mid-eighteenth century, finding that Indian warriors cost less than half 
as much as French Regulars. See "The Cost of Early Canada’s Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's 
Rhetoric," William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 52 (1995): 609-30.
35 CSP, vol. 34 (1725), foi. 741,430.
36 Boston Gazette. July 10, November 30, and December 4,1744; DHSM. 24:11-62.
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Wabanakis in Maine were inspired to fight over local issues: the protection of 
their lands, vengeance o f dead relatives, retribution for trading abuses. In many cases, 
their acts of aggression -- particularly the killing o f livestock — were simply intended as a 
protest against English encroachments on their territory. Whenever it became clear that 
warfare might cost them their lives or their homes, they were inclined to negotiate a peace 
with the English. Warriors were willing to take risks to capture scalps and prisoners, but 
they did not engage in foolhardy campaigns that endangered the lives o f their wives and 
children. This reluctance did not please the French, who depended on Wabanakis to 
defend their territorial claims in Maine. French officials lent their support to warriors 
because they trusted the Indians to defend their lands against English armies. From a 
French point o f view, warfare was meant to advance the strategic interests o f the French 
state, and Wabanakis had value only insofar as they served this cause. But Wabanaki 
warriors failed to fit the model of a professional army and remained committed to their 
own interests, fighting for the French only so long as the alliance was beneficial to their 
communities.37
Even when they were loyal to the French, Indian auxiliaries fought in a way that 
limited the military options o f French commanders. Wabanaki tactics and strategies were 
designed with an eye toward taking as many captives and scalps as possible, without 
suffering significant losses themselves. Conquest or permanent occupation did not figure 
in their plans. Typically, non-Christian Wabanakis consulted with a shaman before
37 The villages of Odanak and Wolinak were not threatened by English armies until 17S9, and their 
warriors were generally more eager to fight than the Wabanakis of Maine. By the 1720s, a large 
proportion of the attacks on English settlements in Maine were made by Indians from Canada. Included 
among these Indians were Wabanakis, but also other domicilies and allies of the French: in addition to the 
ISO warriors raised from Odanak and Wolinak during Dummer’s War, French and Wabanaki leaders 
recruited about 200 Mohawk, Huron, Nipissing, and Algonquin warriors. See Rapport de Longueil et 
Begon, Oct 31, 1725, PAC, AN, Serie Cl IA, vol. 47, fol. 67.
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setting out to battle, asking him if omens advised against making a raid or if  any 
ambushes laid in wait. Christians took confession with their priest. Then, if  the signs 
were good, they rendezvoused and divided themselves into companies o f thirty or forty, 
each one choosing a town they would "eat," or attack. The companies approached the 
towns quietly, looking for opportunities to catch their enemies by surprise, and struck 
rapidly. Battles generally only lasted a few hours and rarely continued for more than a 
few days. Warriors almost never tried to storm an armed fort or garrison, choosing 
instead to stand outside its walls, taunting its occupants to come outside to fight.
Warriors took as much plunder and as many captives as they could and beat a hasty 
retreat into the woods. They then bound their captives, loaded their canoes, and began 
the voyage home. This style of warfare suited Wabanaki military objectives and also 
made use of their skills as hunters, since the tactics of the raid closely resembled the 
stages o f the hunt: divination to determine the location o f quarry, tracking to find its 
whereabouts, shooting to kill, and a return home with prey.38
Harrowing as they were to frontier settlers, Wabanaki military actions never 
threatened the existence o f New England as a whole. Although Wabanakis scored 
spectacular victories in raids on Salmon Falls, Fort Pemaquid, and Oyster River, their 
attacks were directed only at outlying communities and never resulted in the conquest of 
territory. As French officials often put it, the effect o f Wabanaki attacks was to harceler 
les Anglois -- to harry the English. Indian raids put English colonists on the defensive, 
forcing them to divert a considerable portion o f their military resources to frontier patrols 
and garrisons. But without greater supplies o f munitions, ships, and disciplined troops, 
French commanders could not hope to launch the kind of large-scale expeditions that
38 JR , 67:203; Diereville, Relation. 156-57; Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 238.
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secured English conquests at Port Royal, Louisbourg, and Quebec. A shortage of 
provisions and arms dashed French plans for assaults against Boston in 1696 and 
Annapolis Royal in 1745, and officials knew that the conquest o f New England was only 
possible if the French crown provided colonial forces with large quantities o f ships, 
ammunition, provisions, and men. This level o f metropolitan commitment was not 
forthcoming until the Seven Years War: the heavy cost o f European wars had left Louis 
XIV and his successors deeply in debt and they were reluctant to empty their pockets to 
defend a marginal and economically insignificant comer o f their kingdom.39
Lacking firepower and men, the French were forced to make a reciprocal 
arrangement with the Wabanakis, who defended the colony's imperial frontiers and 
received presents and other forms o f succor in return. French presents and diplomatic 
support gave Wabanakis leverage in their disputes with the English, and helped to slow 
the incursion o f New Englanders into Indian lands. Wabanakis, for their part, created a 
military buffer between New France and New England and acted as the proxies o f the 
French in imperial disputes. This agreement allowed both sides to make the most out of 
scarce resources, but it also underscored the precariousness o f  their claims to the land.
An underfunded, undermanned army could achieve the limited goals o f capturing 
plunder, prisoners, and scalps but had little ability to topple fortified strongholds or 
conquer large towns. French and Wabanaki forces left New England reeling during the 
1690s, but as English forces became more adept at parrying their opponents' thrusts, the 
weakness o f this arrangement became apparent.
39 Steele. Warpaths. 131-74.
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The Economics o f Scalping
Loosely organized and small in number, French-supported Wabanaki armies were 
apparently a weak match for their English opponents. New England's population was 
several times the size o f New France, its provincial treasuries were filled with substantial 
revenues, and its active commercial life made it possible to supply frontier outposts with 
large quantities of arms and provisions. Yet in every war before 1754, Wabanakis fought 
the English to a standstill, making minor concessions in peace treaties but retaining 
effective control over their territories. The English failure to win a decisive victory 
against the Wabanakis was a testament to both the skill o f Indian warriors and the 
inadequacies o f New England's military system. Although they had more considerable 
forces at their disposal, English commanders in the early eighteenth century labored 
under the same conditions as the French: strapped by insufficient funds, lacking in 
soldiers, suffering from inadequate supply, and confused over strategy and objectives.
These problems were acute in Maine, where the forested environment favored the 
Indians' guerrilla tactics and the local English population had neither the numbers nor the 
wealth to defend itself. York County’s militia was too small to defend its own towns -- as 
the region's inhabitants had painfully discovered during the First Anglo-Wabanaki War — 
and English settlers in Maine looked to the provincial government for soldiers, munitions, 
supplies, and funds in later conflicts. Because Maine was far removed from the 
population centers of the province, the supply o f arms and men to the region was costly.
A week's march separated Maine from Boston and even troops and supplies transported 
by sail took at least a full day to arrive. This distance placed a considerable burden on the 
provincial government, which was responsible for building and supplying forts, recruiting
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and paying soldiers garrisoned at the posts or marching between towns, equipping and 
provisioning troops, and organizing maritime patrols in the Gulf o f Maine to defend 
fishing vessels against privateers.
Although Maine's militiamen and taxpayers contributed substantially to the 
defense of their towns, most of the cost was borne by the inhabitants o f southern New 
England. Military and naval expenditures accounted for as much as 90% of the 
provincial government's budget in wartime -- the percentage reached its peak during the 
War of Spanish Succession -- and even in years o f peace, about half of all public 
expenditures went toward the army and navy. The revenues were raised through a variety 
of methods: bills of credit, the sale o f public lands, paper money, and, after 1749, 
subsidies from the British parliament. But the single largest source o f revenue was taxes, 
whether in the form of excise, customs, polls, or assessments o f property. Because New 
England was hit harder by French attacks than any other English province, its inhabitants 
paid higher taxes than elsewhere in British North America. Although the main 
beneficiaries o f military defense lived on the frontiers, taxes ran highest in Boston and 
other commercial centers, which suffered under fiscal laws that assessed agricultural 
property at lower rates than commercial investments.40
Many townspeople in Boston and central Massachusetts were understandably 
reluctant to loosen their purse strings for military campaigns in Maine. Few would have 
hesitated to pay for the defense o f their own homes, but the protection o f the remote and
40Julian Gwyn, "Financial Revolution in Massachusetts: Public Credit and Taxation, 1692-1774," Histoire 
sociale-Social History. 17 (1984): 59-77; H. Janies Henderson, "Taxation and Political Culture: 
Massachusetts and Virginia, 1760-1800," William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 47 (1990): 90-114; Robert 
A. Becker, Revolution. Reform, and the Politics o f American Taxation. 1763-1783 (Baton Rouge, La.: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 8-41. As Henderson points out, New England also had higher tax 
rates than southern colonies in the 1760s because its provinces spent more heavily on schools and roads.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
326
sparsely populated towns o f York County was o f  secondary importance to most. New 
Englanders were far more willing to support large-scale expeditions against French 
strongholds in Canada and Acadia, which entailed exorbitant costs and high risks but 
promised large quantities of plunder and clear-cut military victories. In the first decade 
o f the eighteenth century, the provincial assembly repeatedly refused to fund the 
construction of a new fort at Pemaquid -- the previous one having been razed in 1696 -- 
claiming that its dubious strategic value did not warrant the expense.41 But even as it 
cried poor over the defense o f the Maine frontier, the House o f Representatives gave 
financial backing to naval and military expeditions against Port Royal in 1707,1709, and 
1710, and Quebec in 1709 and 1711, each campaign costing considerably more than the 
price of rebuilding the fort.
Frontier campaigns also failed to recruit the thousands o f soldiers who signed on 
for expeditions against French capitals. The attractions o f a campaign against Quebec or 
Louisbourg were too great for many young men to resist: a short term of service, the 
possibility of plunder, a chance for military glory. Service in the backwoods of Maine 
was a dismal prospect by comparison. Soldiers spent year after year at frontier garrisons, 
making occasional marches in the biting cold or through swampy marshes in a futile 
search for the enemy. There was little plunder to be won, other than a few packets o f furs 
seized from hunters and the occasional ornament pillaged from a church. Only two years 
after they had recruited some 4,000 soldiers for the expedition against Louisbourg, New 
England's leaders found themselves unable to enlist even 200 volunteers for service in
But before the defeat of the French in the Seven Years War, military spending remained the greatest 
fmancial burden for New England's provincial governments.
41 On opposition to the rebuilding o f Fort Pemaquid, see DHSM. 9 :8 9 ,114 ,117, 125, 130-35, 138, 169- 
72,199-201, 227-228.
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Maine. Most men, they were told, did not want to sign on for a term of three years on the 
eastern frontier. Captain David Cargill, writing from Sheepscot in 1747, told the 
provincial secretary that the country was in a "Deplorable state," with its "Garrisons so 
scattered with so few men In them that we are in no Condition to help one Another, and 
our people Almost worn out with Duty." A year later, James McCobb reported from 
Georgetown on Arrowsic Island that the town was in a "Defenceless Condition," with 
only 50 soldiers in its garrisons, 42 of them local inhabitants.42
The challenge for political leaders in Boston was to entice young men to fight in 
frontier campaigns without putting undue strain on the provincial treasury. Conscription 
was the cheapest and most effective way o f forcing young men into the army and many of 
the soldiers who fought in Maine were impressed into the service by the government.
But the press was unpopular, and many avoided it by paying fines or offering substitutes. 
Government officials were more likely to entice recruits by offering them a carrot -- in 
the form of bonuses and incentives -  than by beating them with the stick o f impressment. 
Although the eighteenth century militia included all able-bodied men between the ages of 
16 and 60, it was in practice a pool o f potential recruits from which "marching troops" -  
the companies o f volunteers who participated in offensives -- could be drawn 43
The troops posted in Maine were a mixture o f militiamen from York County’s 
towns, drawn into the service to defend their own homes, and volunteers from southern 
New England, motivated by patriotism, a lust for adventure, a desire for profit, or a lack 
of alternative employment. Muster rolls from Dummer’s War, which occasionally
42 DHSM. 11:366-67,396-97,401-3.
43 Jack S. Radabaugh, "The Military System of Colonial Massachusetts, 1690-1740," PhD dissertation, 
University of Southern California, 1965,1-17; Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 42-52; Fred Anderson, A
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recorded the soldiers’ places o f origin, indicate that the defense o f Maine depended to a 
large degree on the support of troops from southern New England. Some companies, 
such as the 38 men who served under Captain James Grant in the summer o f 1725, were 
made up entirely o f volunteers from York County. But just as typical was the company 
of Captain Joseph Heath, stationed at Fort Richmond between June and November of the 
same year. Only 5 of the 45 men in the company were from York County: 15, including 
the Captain himself, were from Essex County; another 15 were from Middlesex and 
Suffolk, including 10 from Boston; others were drawn from such places as Barnstable, 
Nantucket, Plymouth County, Connecticut, and Philadelphia. All but 2 o f the 19 privates 
in Captain John Gyles’s company, meanwhile, were Irish — presumably immigrants 
living in northern New England -- while the officers were nearly all residents o f Essex 
County.44
Because most captains did not record the residences o f their soldiers, it is 
impossible to determine the exact percentage of soldiers fighting in Maine who were 
from York County. But the large number o f muster rolls that included such information 
may be treated as a representative if  unscientific sample o f the whole [see Table 5.1]. Of 
the soldiers who were known to have served in companies posted in Maine and whose 
places of residence were recorded, fewer than half in Dummer’s War and King George's 
War came from York County. Over two-thirds o f the soldiers in both wars were from 
York, New Hampshire, and the two Massachusetts counties closest to Maine, Essex and
People’s Armv: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1984), 1-30.
44 William Blake Trask, "Letters of Col. Thomas Westbrook and Others, Relative to Indian Affairs in 
Maine,” New England Historical and Genealogical Register 48 (1894), 439-40; 49 (1895), 184-87. The 
origins of two men in Heath's company are not listed. Gyles' roll listed the sons of two privates, both of 
them from Ireland, not included in this tally.
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Middlesex. In all the wars, York contributed more soldiers to its defense than any other 
county yet depended on troops from elsewhere for the majority of its soldiers.
Admittedly, the data culled from these rolls underrate the extent of York County's 
participation because they do not count unpaid volunteers or the hundreds o f York's 
inhabitants who served at Louisbourg and other offensive expeditions. Yet even if these 
additional numbers are taken into account, there is little denying Maine's dependence on 
troops sent from elsewhere in Massachusetts. The geography o f recruitment in New 
England was not unlike that o f Europe, where soldiers were drawn in disproportionate 
numbers from both cities and frontiers. In per capita terms, York County made a larger 
human contribution to the war effort than other counties, but because o f its small 
population it also needed reinforcements from urban centers in Essex, Suffolk, and 
Middlesex counties.45
Table 5.1: Place of Origin. Soldiers Serving in Maine. 1722-27. 1744-55.
York Essex Middlesex Other MA 
Counties
Other Total
1722-27 115(43.6%) 49(18.6%) 16(6.1%) 51 (19.3%) 33(12.5%) 264(100%)
1744-55 204 (22.7%) 193 (21.5%) 186(20.7%) 286 (31.8%) 30(3.3%) 899(100%)
The onus for recruiting soldiers fell on the shoulders o f captains. Although the 
army in provincial Massachusetts was a public institution, it depended on officers who 
acted essentially as private contractors. Every year during wartime, the governor or
45 Sources: Myron 0 . Stachiw, comp, and ed., Massachusetts Officers and Soldiers. 1723-1743: Dummer's 
War to the War of Jenkins' Ear (Boston: The Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and The New England Historical and Genealogical Society, 1979); Robert E. MacKay, 
comp, and ed., Massachusetts Soldiers in the French and Indian Wars. 1744-55 (Boston: Society of 
Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth o f Massachusetts; New England Historical and Genealogical Society, 
1978). Soldiers with multiple enslistments are only counted once. On European patterns of recruitment, 
see Parker, Military Revolution. 47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
330
lieutenant governor would formally appoint a colonel to command the regiment stationed 
in Maine, sending him a packet o f blank commissions for his junior officers. The colonel 
would then appoint or re-appoint a captain, ensign, and lieutenant for each o f the 
companies in the regiment. Captains and colonels were the point men of this system, 
charged with the recruitment and command o f the soldiers. In most eighteenth-century 
wars, the captains were allowed a recruitment bounty for every volunteer they enlisted, 
which was usually divided between the officers and their soldiers. At intervals of six or 
eight months, the captains would present muster rolls for their companies to the 
provincial treasurer or commissary, who paid them the soldiers' wages in a lump sum.46
Because the wages were paid at the end o f their service, soldiers were advanced 
supplies and provisions by their captains, who deducted the cost from their wages or, if 
necessary, paid them out o f their own pocket. Major Thomas Church, who led an 
expedition to Maine in 1690, complained that delays in the outfitting o f transport ships 
caused him great financial difficulty because his troops "daily expected to be treated by 
him."47 The financial risks o f military expeditions were borne as much by the companies 
as they were by the government. In August 1725, the company from York County led by 
Captain James Grant protested the declaration o f a cease fire by the government, 
explaining that they had gone to great trouble and expense to equip and arm themselves 
for their term of service, which had begun in June. Without the wages gained from a full 
six-month term, the company found itself deeply in debt, and Grant speculated that since 
many o f his soldiers were "very poor men," he would have to cover their debts himself. 
Grant pleaded for ~  and was ultimately given — a chance to make an expedition against
46 Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 323-38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
331
the Wabanakis, which allowed his men wages for an additional three months, as well as 
the possibility o f captives, scalp bounties, and plunder.48
Of these four possible rewards, wages were the most reliable, if  not the most 
lucrative. Nominal wage rates for soldiers did not fluctuate much over the course o f the 
century: in 1703, privates serving in Maine were paid 5s. a week for garrison duty, 6s. if 
they were posted elsewhere; in 1746, they were paid 25s. per month, plus 5s. for billeting; 
in 1755, the monthly wage for marching troops had risen slightly to 26s. 8d. During 
Dummer's War, volunteers were paid 2s. 6d. per day while on duty. These sums 
compared favorably with the going rate for farm laborers, who were paid a higher daily 
wage but were lucky to work more than three days a week. Soldiers, on the other hand, 
were paid for six days o f work a week, and usually finished their term o f service with 
enough money to pay off their debts or purchase a few acres o f land. Officers, who 
ranked higher than their soldiers in both the civilian and military worlds, received higher 
wages: in 1755, captains o f marching companies were paid £4 16s. per month, lieutenants 
£3 4s., and sergeants £1 14s. Id.49
Wage rates for soldiers were an attraction o f military service, but in the eyes of 
many they were not high enough to justify the hardships o f  life in the army. Agricultural 
labor was strenuous and demanding, but farm hands did not suffer the myriad discomforts 
of camp life, much less the possibility o f violent death or dismemberment on the 
battlefield. To many, such risks were only justified if ample plunder was promised as a
47 Benjamin Church, The History of the Eastern Expeditions o f 1689. 1690. 1692. 1696. and 1704 against 
the Indians and French (Boston: J. K. Wiggin and W. Parsons Lunt, 1867), 68.
48 DHSM, 10:318-19.
49 Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 8:35-36; 13:521; 15:347; DHSM. 10:283; Daniel Vickers, Farmers 
and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex Countv. Massachusetts. 1630-1850 (Chapel Hill, N. C.:
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reward. The leaders of expeditions against Port Royal and Louisbourg openly recognized 
the importance o f booty to their troops, and William Phips reported in 1692 that soldiers 
fighting in Maine were "much encouraged" by the distribution o f plunder and captives 
among them. In his study o f the siege of Louisbourg, George Rawlyk opined that a 
desire for plunder was "probably the most important single reason" for soldiers to enlist 
for the expedition. But unlike French capitals, Indian settlements did not have large 
stores of moveable wealth ready to be pillaged, and service on the Maine frontier was 
consequently less profitable for soldiers.50
But the provincial government found a ready substitute for plunder in the form of 
scalp bounties, which were introduced in a 1689 law and revived in every successive war. 
The practice of scalping is reprehensible to modem sensibilities, and many have pointed 
to New England's scalp bounties as evidence of genocidal intentions toward the Indians. 
Even in the eighteenth century, the idea of scalping made some people uneasy, 
particularly those whose understanding o f war was conditioned by Old World experience. 
Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were gradually developing a notion 
of "civilized" warfare: a style o f war carried out under a set o f rules that prohibited 
sadistic forms o f brutality and forced soldiers to act according to an unwritten code of 
honor. Many considered scalping and torture •• two aspects o f pre-contact Indian warfare 
that continued to be practised in the seventeenth century -  as the sort o f behavior 
outlawed by the rules o f "civilized" war. In 1709, governor Joseph Dudley of 
Massachusetts denounced scalping as a "Barbarous" custom and excoriated the French for
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 250-51; Anderson, People’s Artnv. 38-39. See also, Eames," 
Rustic Warriors," 271-75.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
333
placing bounties on English heads. But Dudley's words were betrayed by his deeds, for 
he himself had approved legislation that rewarded soldiers for taking Wabanaki scalps.51
English leaders such as Dudley overlooked their moral qualms over the practice 
because the grim logic o f scalp bounties was too compelling to ignore. In frontier 
campaigns, the English faced two chronic problems: a lack o f funds and an inability to 
deal decisive blows to the enemy. Scalp bounties addressed both problems, creating 
incentives for soldiers without exhausting the treasury. The strategic logic o f scalp 
bounties was the easiest to understand. Because Wabanakis withdrew from their villages 
whenever they were threatened with attack, the challenge o f frontier warfare for English 
soldiers lay more in finding their enemies than in fighting them. English troops might 
raze a Wabanaki village one week only to see its inhabitants build their wigwams 
somewhere else the next. The object of warfare was consequently to kill and capture the 
enemy rather than to seize their territory. In order to defend themselves against Franco- 
Wabanaki raids, English forces would have to adopt guerrilla strategies themselves.52
Not surprisingly, many English commanders recruited soldiers who were familiar 
with guerrilla warfare. A number o f captains drew most or all their soldiers from
50 DHSM. 10: 3; George A. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono, Me.: University o f Maine Press, 
1969), 46; Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 191-92. Plunder taken from Indians was divided among soldiers in 
proportion to their wages: see Massachusetts Archives, vol. 71, fol. 102.
51 James Axtell and William C. Sturtevant, "The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?" William and 
Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 37 (1980): 451-72; James Axtell, "Scalping: The Ethnohistory of a Moral 
Question," in his The European and the Indian: Essavs in the Ethnohistory o f Colonial North America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 201-41; Harold E. Selesky, "Colonial America," in Michael 
Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., The Laws o f Wan Constraints on Warfare 
in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 59-85; Steele, Warpaths. 136; DHSM. 9: 
259.
52 Musing that New England’s Indians may have been descended from the Scythians, Cotton Mather 
repeated Julius Caesar’s observation regarding Asian tribes, Difficilius invenire quam interficere: "It is 
harder to find them than to foil them." See Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 203. Although Mather's 
genealogical speculations were off the mark, his allusion was ap t The Roman frontier in Asia roughly 
corresponded with the limits o f arable farmland, and the groups beyond the frontier were, like Wabanakis, 
mobile tribes who could strike quickly and retreat rapidly.
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Protestant Indian communities in Massachusetts, where there was an abundance of young 
men with tracking skills and a dearth o f alternative occupations. Benjamin Church, who 
led numerous military expeditions to Maine in the 1690s and 1700s, expressed a 
preference for Indian soldiers, remarking that "I know certainly o f my own knowledge, 
that they exceed most o f our English in hunting and sculking in the woods." Church 
asked that at least 300 of the 1,000 soldiers recruited for a proposed mission to Maine in 
1704 be Indians. In 1725,42 o f the 98 men in Captain Richard Bourne's company in 
1725 had identifiably Indian names, a testament to his active recruiting campaign in the 
native communities o f southern Massachusetts.53
But the pool o f Indians available for service was limited, and the soldiers posted 
in Maine were more likely to be men with scant experience in the woods and little 
emotional attachment to the region's towns. War-weary companies saw their numbers 
dwindled by a regular trickle of deserters and the steady attrition o f disease. Finding 
themselves virtually alone in the wilderness, soldiers were undoubtedly tempted to limit 
the possibility o f engagement with the enemy either by staying in their garrisons or by 
making only half-hearted attempts to discover Wabanakis. Scalp bounties gave soldiers a 
compelling reason for venturing into the woods. In placing a high price placed on 
Wabanaki heads -- as much as £300 for the scalp o f an adult male by the Seven Years 
War — the government made it possible for English soldiers to double or treble their 
earnings by finding and killing opponents in battle. The four companies o f soldiers who 
attacked and razed Norridgewock in August 1724 were awarded £405 for 27 Indian 
scalps, £20 for 4 prisoners, as well as £100 for the scalp o f Father Sebastien Rale. The
53 Church, History. 99-103; Trask, "Letters o f Col. Thomas Westbrook," New England Historical and 
Genealogical Register 49 (1895): 183-84.
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total was roughly equal to the wages paid to an entire company for six months of 
service.54
The average reward for Wabanaki scalps taken at Norridgewock was rather low 
compared to the bounties paid to soldiers in other circumstances. From 1706 through 
Dummer's War, the government posted a graded system o f scalp bounties that varied 
according to the age and sex o f the victim as well as the enlistment status o f the soldiers. 
The scalps o f adult male Indians generally earned double the price o f women or children 
and slightly less than the amount paid for captives.55 The government also offered higher 
bounties to the soldiers least dependent on provincial supplies and equipment. According 
to the 1722 law that set scalp rates during Dummer’s War, the bounty for adult male 
scalps was £15 for regular soldiers, £30 for companies defending a town or garrison, and 
£100 for volunteers serving without pay. The latter reward encouraged ordinary 
townspeople to outfit and provision themselves for bounty-hunting missions, which did 
not cost the government a penny unless the volunteers killed or captured the enemy. 
Similar acts passed in the eighteenth century gave preferential terms o f enlistment to 
soldiers able to furnish their own arms and equipment.56
This system of bounties had an economic rationale that benefited both the 
government and its soldiers. If volunteers failed to find any Indians during their marches 
-- as was usually the case -- the government did not lose anything beyond the soldiers'
54 Trask, "Letters of Col. Thomas Westbrook," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 48 
(1894), 187-88.
55 At the beginning of Dummer’s War, the rewards paid for scalps were twice as high as the price of 
captives: see Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 2:258. In the seventeenth century, many o f the Indians 
taken prisoner were sold into slavery; the profits were divided among the soldiers of the company that 
captured them.
56 Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1 :292,530,547,558,594,2:258,8: 38,44-45; Samuel Penhallow, 
The History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians (Boston: T. Fleet, 1726; reprinted
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
336
wages, if  any wages were paid at all. But if  the troops returned with scalps, the 
government had palpable proof o f enemy losses: an immediate return on its investment. 
Like the rewards paid to surveyors o f the woods, scalp bounties were a device that 
allowed the government to pass risk on to its employees. Lacking the funds necessary to 
arm, clothe, and supply a large complement o f soldiers, the province advanced soldiers a 
basic packet o f provisions and reasonably high wages. If these soldiers provided their 
own guns and uniforms, they were given the opportunity to make ample profits through 
scalps or a decent living from their wages. For companies o f vigilantes fighting without 
pay, the rewards were even higher. If companies failed to kill or capture enemy warriors, 
the consequences were bome by the soldiers themselves, who failed to collect the 
bounties and thus gain the most attractive financial reward o f military service.
But if provincial leaders had genocidal intentions toward the Wabanakis, scalp 
bounties did not prove very effective. The deployment of troops on the Maine frontier 
served a purpose that was essentially defensive, and English armies rarely scored 
impressive victories against Wabanakis. In every war from 1702 onward, the provincial 
government assigned the bulk o f its troops in Maine to a string o f forts and garrison 
houses that acted as a line o f first defense for the settlements o f northern New England 
[see Fig. 5.5]. A portion o f the soldiers were stationed permanently in the garrisons, 
ready to come to the defense o f settlers in case o f attack. Other companies were detached 
as scouting parties that roamed the backs o f towns by horse, snowshoes, or on foot. 
Detachments of soldiers were also sent to protect parties o f lumbermen or farmers 
harvesting their crops. The soldiers who were stationed in towns were often billeted by
Cincinnati: Harpel, 1859), 22,48,93,96; James Axtell, The European and the Indian. 142-43; Eames, 
"Rustic Warriors," 170-73,229-30.
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the inhabitants, and according to a 1705 act soldiers serving in garrisons were allowed to 
cultivate farmland belonging the townspeople they protected. During peacetime, soldiers 
devoted much of their time toward farming, fishing, trading, and surveying: so much so 
that settlers sometimes wrote to the General Court to complain that the troops assigned to 
protect them were neglecting their military duties.57
This system of defense gradually brought results, limiting the effects o f Wabanaki 
attacks while failing to disarm the warriors completely. In the War o f the League o f 
Augsburg, combined French and Indian forces had scored devastating victories against 
the English in Maine and New Hampshire: 30 killed in Dover in 1689,30 killed and 50 
taken captive at Salmon Falls in 1690,48 killed and 78 taken prisoner at York in 1692, 
100 killed or captured at Oyster River (Durham, N. H.) in 1694. In the next war, the 
French and Wabanakis picked up where they left off, killing or capturing 165 people at 
Casco Bay, Saco, and Wells in 1703; killing 47 and taking 109 captive at Deerfield in 
western Massachusetts in 1704. But after the Deerfield raid, a more aggressive 
prosecution of the war by the governor, in which garrisons and scouting parties played a 
central role, forced French and Indians to be more cautious, attacking in smaller parties 
and avoiding forts and patrols. Although Wabanakis continued to inflict large numbers 
of casualties in later wars, they never again exacted the punishing defeats that the English 
suffered during the first two imperial conflicts.58
57 Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 296-318; 
Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 8:127; Robert L. Bradley, ed., The Forts o f Pemaquid. Maine: An 
Archaeological and Historical Study. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, no. 10 (Augusta, 
Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1994), 13-15; Petition of inhabitants ofHerrintonand 
Pemaquid to Governor Phips, February 26,1757, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 117, fol. 276.
58 Penhallow, History. 1-21; Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 206,252.
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The English government also took the offensive, sponsoring wartime expeditions 
against Wabanaki strongholds such as Norridgewock, Pigwacket, and Panawapskik. 
Benjamin Church led campaigns against Androscoggin and Pejepscot in 1689-90, 
Panawapskik and Taconic in 1692, and along the coast all the way to Minas in 1696 and 
1704. English troops in Dummer’s War mounted assaults against Norridgewock, 
Pigwacket, and Panawapskik. One party travelled as far as the White Mountains, albeit 
without discovering a single Indian. The expeditions were far more costly than garrison 
patrols, since troops had to be equipped and provisioned for several days'journey, and 
commanders needed to requisition whaleboats and sloops as transports for their 
soldiers.59 Few of the expeditions were unqualified successes; the 1724 attack on 
Norridgewock and Robert Rogers's 1759 raid on Odanak were the only major English 
victories against Wabanaki communities in the eighteenth century. More commonly, the 
English only captured or killed a few people and failed to win enough plunder and 
bounties to cover the expenses o f their expedition. At the end o f his term o f service in 
1689, Church found himself with only 8 shillings in his pocket and was forced to borrow 
money from a friend to transport himself home.60
The high cost of supplying expeditions against Wabanakis made it difficult for 
English people in Maine to gain a clear victory against their enemies. The ability of 
Wabanakis to cover vast territories in a short period allowed them to elude enemy troops 
and forced the English to expend considerable sums on futile search-and-destroy 
missions. The nature of the terrain added to English frustrations. Thick forests slowed 
the progress o f marching companies, prevented the transportation o f large artillery pieces,
59 On the difficulties of supplying armies, see Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 100-102,229-31.
60 Penhallow, History. 66-109; Church, History. 77.
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and provided camouflage for warriors. Large vessels, meanwhile, could not navigate the 
region's rivers beyond the fall line, making it impossible to carry supplies directly to 
Norridgewock and other interior settlements. The pace o f movement could be painfully 
slow: in July 1754, it took five days -- "five days o f the hardest Duty that I ever saw my 
troops employ'd on," according to Captain John Winslow — to transport 600 soldiers and 
several pieces o f heavy artillery 18 miles between Cushnoc and Taconic Falls on the 
Kennebec River.61
The costs o f offensive expeditions were certainly not justified by the results. 
Although Wabanaki migration from Maine to Canada gave English people the impression 
of a steady native population loss, David Ghere has shown that the total Wabanaki 
population o f Canada, Maine, and the upper Connecticut River Valley remained 
remarkably stable in the first half o f the eighteenth century. By Ghere's calculation, only 
26 warriors -- if that many -- were killed by English troops during Dummer’s War. The 
results o f earlier conflicts were not much better: Samuel Penhallow, a chronicler of the 
New England's frontier wars, estimated that every Indian killed in the War o f Spanish 
Succession cost the government of Massachusetts £1,000. At such a high price, the 
prosecution o f war against the Wabanakis hardly seemed worth the effort.62
The English in this respect were similar to other sedentary populations o f farmers 
whose borders were contested by nomadic hunters or pastoralists: the agricultural 
populations faced with invasions by horsemen from the Asian steppe are perhaps the
61 John Winslow to Charles Gould, Boston, December 30,1754, in Stanley M. Pargellis, Military Affairs 
in North America. 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New 
York: Archon Books, 1969), 54-56.
62 David L. Ghere, "Myths and Methods in Abenaki Demography: Abenaki Population Recovery, 1725- 
1750," Ethnohistorv 44 (1997): 511-34; Penhallow, History. 48. Penhallow's figures suggest a higher 
death toll for Dummer’s War: he lists 58 Indians killed at Pigwacket, and 80 killed or drowned at
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most famous example. In both cases, a numerically superior group found itself at the 
mercy o f small bands of raiders whose mobility was their chief military weapon. Like the 
Chinese or the Romans, the English had a relatively well-funded and well-disciplined 
army, but were in no position to fund lengthy expeditions over wide territories in pursuit 
o f their enemy. Instead, they were forced to accept an uneasy equilibrium between the 
two sides, with English patrols giving frontier settlements a measure o f protection but 
failing to extinguish the Wabanaki military threat altogether.63
The English did not manage to tip the equilibrium in their favor until the 1750s, 
when Britain and its colonies stepped up their military effort in North America. In 
Maine, the government of Massachusetts, with the assistance o f land companies, 
established forts up the Kennebec River (forts Shirley, Western, and Halifax, all built 
between 1752 and 1754) and at Penobscot Bay (Fort Pownall, built 1759). The forts 
undercut Wabanaki military strength by cutting off their most frequently used portages 
and dramatically reducing the distance and cost of expeditions against Norridgewock and 
Panwapskik. Not only could the forts hold companies o f soldiers, they also housed the 
provisions necessary for long marches into the interior. At the same time, combined 
British and colonial forces launched a massive military and naval effort against French 
bases in North America, culminating in the conquest o f Quebec in 1759 and the capture 
o f Montreal in 1760. The fall o f the French capital left Wabanakis without a base of
Norridgewock. But the number for Norridgewock is inflated by comparison to all other contemporary 
counts, casting doubt on Penhallow's other estimates.
63 See Owen Lattimore, [nner Asian Frontiers o f China (New York: American Geographical Society,
1940), esp. 53-102; Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier Nomadic Empires and China. 221 BC to 
AD 1757 (London: Blackwell, 1989); Keegan, History of Warfare. 155-217. The most important 
difference between steppe populations and North America's Woodland Indians was the horse, which 
proved to be most terrifying weapon o f the Huns, Vandals, Turks, Mongols and other groups. Horse-led 
charges made these people a far more imposing military force than the Wabanakis, allowing them to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
341
supply and forced them to negotiate a peaceful settlement with their English neighbors, 
closing a long chapter o f violent conflict between the two groups.64
The Territorial Consequences o f  the War
By the Seven Years War, Maine was no longer a central theater o f battle in North 
America, and the extinction o f French claims to its possession was a consequence of 
losses at Louisbourg, Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Quebec, not o f battles fought in 
Maine itself. Fittingly, the military struggle over control o f the region, which had long 
depended on supplies sent from distant political centers, was ended by the siege o f a city 
over a hundred miles away. The causes and consequences o f the British victory at 
Quebec are well known, and it would be redundant to retrace General Wolfe's footsteps or 
to explain how the aftermath o f the Seven Years War led to the outbreak o f the American 
Revolution. But it may be worthwhile to consider how the nature o f the military effort 
set the terms by which the English occupied the conquered lands o f Maine.
The Seven Years War in America resembled a European campaign far more than 
any previous colonial conflict. In the North American version o f the War o f the League 
of Augsburg (1688-98), there were never more than 2,000 men under arms on either the 
French or English side at any time -  a tiny number compared to the 400,000 men who 
fought for Louis XIV in Europe. By and large, the fighting consisted o f raids and 
skirmishes conducted by small companies and Indian warriors, combined with plunder
conquer and rule vast empires. Wabanakis, on the other hand, were dependent on military and economic 
aid from a neighboring state and had difficulty defending even their own territory.
64 On the strategic logic of Kennebec River forts and Fort Pownall, see William Shirley to Lord Halifax, 
Falmouth in Casco Bay, August 20,1754, in Pargellis, Military Affairs. 23-24; Gordon E. Kershaw, 
"Gentlemen of Large Property & Judicious Men": The Kennebeck Proprietors. 1749-1775 (Portland. Me.: 
Maine Historical Society, 1975), 122-49; Robert L. Bradley, The Forts of Maine: An Archaeological and 
Historical Survey (Augusta. Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission. 1981), 18-20.
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and privateering expeditions against merchant vessels and French settlements. There 
were no battles that could even begin to compare with the prolonged sieges that 
characterized the war in Europe. For the most part, assaults were indistinguishable from 
the kind of guerrilla warfare that characterized King Philip's War in New England or the 
colonial piracy and privateering ventures o f the mid-seventeenth century. The aims of 
war were rather modest: with only a few exceptions, attacks were intended to result in 
plunder, captives, revenge, or intimidation, rather than the outright seizure o f territory.65
The scale o f conflict grew larger with each successive imperial war and 
increasingly came to resemble the struggles o f the European theater, both in aims and 
conduct. Ambushes and raids remained important tactics, but they were overshadowed 
by sieges of forts and cities, backed by trains o f heavy artillery and massed infantry firing 
in volley. Although colonial armies continued to hire Indian warriors and backwoods 
sharpshooters, increasingly commanders turned to farmers, laborers, and artisans who had 
no military experience but could be quickly trained and disciplined. Many officers turned 
their noses up at the "skulking" tactics o f guerrilla warfare and looked to European drill 
manuals as a guide to training their troops. The proportion of Indian soldiers in New 
England's armies dwindled, as recruiters saw less value in their tracking skills and more 
to fault in their lack o f discipline. The rapid escalation in the scale o f  warfare caught 
many by surprise. The defensive walls o f Montreal had been built between 1717 and 
1744 on the assumption that an assault on the city could only be carried out by a massed 
attack of colonial infantry, and that the rapids along the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River 
prevented the transportation o f heavy artillery. When General Jeffrey Amherst 
surrounded Montreal in September 1760 with several batteries o f  artillery — the pieces
65 Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars. 1689-1762 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1964), 2.
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transported from Quebec, Oswego, and Lake Champlain — the city's architects were 
proven wrong.66
Because it involved lengthy supply lines, large armies, and massive investments 
in arms and ammunition, siege warfare demanded a much greater commitment on the part 
o f this colonies, both in men and expenditures. The demands were met in part assistance 
from the mother country. For the first time, Britain intervened decisively in the military 
affairs of its colonies, posting 42,000 troops in North America by 1758 and deploying a 
quarter o f the British Navy -- then the largest in the world -- to American waters. 
Parliament also compensated its colonial partners for their military expenditures, to the 
tune o f over £1 million. The contribution o f Massachusetts to the war effort was, in per 
capita terms, even greater. A third o f its duty-eligible males were pressed into service, 
with total enlistments for the war numbering over 30,000. The provincial government, 
while partially compensated by parliamentary subsidies, spent nearly £1 million on the 
war and very nearly collapsed into bankruptcy. That the province had financed and 
fought costly campaigns against Louisbourg and Canada a decade earlier made its 
contribution all the more impressive.67
The large scale o f warfare made the provincial government more active than ever 
before, forcing it to demand more from its citizens and creditors than in previous wars.
66 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare. 97-103; Douglas E. Leach, Roots of Conflict: British 
Armed Forces and Colonial Americans. 1677-1763 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
1986), 64-162; John M. Murrin, "Anglicizing an American Colony: The Transformation of Provincial 
Massachusetts" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1966), 61-148; Andre Charbonneau, Marc Lafrance, and 
Monique Poirier, "The Fortifications of Montreal," in Phyllis Lambert and Alan Stewart, eds., Opening the 
Gates of Eiehteenth-Centurv Montreal (Montreal: Centre Canadien d'Architecture/Canadian Centre for 
Architecture, 1992), 19-30.
67 Anderson, A People's Armv. 58-61; Gwyn, "Financial Revolution," 70-75; idem, "The Royal Navy in 
North America, 1712-1776," in Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds., The British Navv and the Use of 
Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester Leicester University Press, 1988), 129-47; Guy
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Fearing that the very existence o f their colonies was at stake, the members o f the General 
Court temporarily set their factional disputes aside and rallied to the defense o f their 
colony. Not only did the House o f Representatives regularly vote for the enlistment of 
thousands of troops between 1755 and 1762 -- particularly after the high-handed Lord 
Loudoun was removed as commander o f the British forces in late 1757 — it also 
borrowed over £1 million and levied a tax averaging £80,000 new tenor from 1756 to 
1760. All told, the General Court was forced to cover three-fifths o f its expenditures 
during the war and raised between 1,000 and 7,000 troops every year between 1755 and 
1762. O f course, it was the inhabitants of Massachusetts, as soldiers and taxpayers, who 
ultimately bore the burden o f fighting the war. The high levels o f recruitment represented 
a virtual levee en masse in the Bay colony, and in both emotional and material terms New 
Englanders were asked to make a sacrifice comparable to the military efforts of the 
Revolution, the Civil War, and the World Wars o f the twentieth century.68
This high degree o f popular mobilization left the provincial government with a 
substantial debt to its citizens at the end o f the war. In part, this debt consisted of arrears
Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest, trans. Margaret M. Cameron (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), 202-294.
68Anderson, A People's Armv. 1-25; William Pencak, War. Politics, and Revolution in Provincial 
Massachusetts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 135-37. Needless to say, the sacrifice was 
not borne evenly, and some even benefited from the war. Merchants accrued ample returns on money they 
lent to the government, and those who secured contracts to supply campaigns profited handsomely from 
the war effort. The choicest contracts usually went to Bostonians, but merchants from Portsmouth and 
Kittery also reaped rewards from the opportunity. Military suppliers from northern New England enjoyed 
a trading boom during both sieges of Louisbourg, since Piscataqua was closer to Cape Breton than any 
other major English port. William Pepperrell, a merchant from Kittery, was the leader o f New England's 
troops during the first siege, and used his position to open trading possibilities for himself, his son Andrew, 
and fellow members of the Piscataqua oligarchy. Not only did they assist in the outfitting of troops for the 
siege, they also participated in the supply of the citadel after its fall. Between 1745 and 1749, vessels from 
Piscataqua supplied large quantities of food, livestock, tools, building materials, wood, clothes, and sundry 
other goods to the English soldiers stationed at Louisbourg. Between April to September in 1746, the port 
of Piscataqua exported 1,591 tons of merchandise to Louisbourg; an impressive total given that the 
monthly volume of all trade cleared from the port in summer typically averaged a little over 1,000 tons. 
The tonnage between April and September 1747 totalled 1,480. See, Public Record Office, C. 0 . 5/968,
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in pay and a moral obligation to provide for wounded veterans and war widows. Over 
£800,000 in debt in 1763, the General Court would have been hard pressed to provide for 
these people monetarily. But military victories had left the province with a vast quantity 
of public lands at its disposal, allowing it to circumvent the problem o f revenues by 
paying its soldiers with land grants. The practice was not new; Massachusetts had 
distributed public lands to its veterans since the seventeenth century, and the provincial 
government had parcelled out hundreds o f thousands o f acres to its soldiers since the 
1720s.69
Nearly all the grants made to veterans following the Seven Years War were 
located in frontier areas, particularly Maine. A township six miles square east o f the 
Union River, facing Mount Desert Island, was granted to veterans in 1762, one of twelve 
townships created between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers in the same year. Mount 
Desert Island itself was given to governor Francis Bernard. General Joseph Frye, a 
veteran of two wars, was allowed another six-mile township, now known as Fryeburg, at 
a site not far from the old Wabanaki village of Pigwacket, which had been virtually 
abandoned following a bloody 1725 battle with the English. The House of 
Representatives granted two larger tracts adjacent to Fryeburg to Captain Henry Young 
Brown in 1766 and 1770 (now called Brownfield). In all, between 1758 and 1770 the
fols. 81-85,91-94; Bvroti Fairchild. Messrs. William Pepperrell: Merchants at Piscataqua (Ithaca. N. Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1954), 182-83.
69 Murrin, "Anglicizing an American Colony," 118. Jack Radabaugh has estimated that the General Court 
granted 451,163 acres, or 704 square miles, o f land to its veterans between 1675 and 1740. A large portion 
of this acreage was allotted to the proprietors of the "Narragansett" townships, seven towns created in 1733 
to compensate the veterans of King Philip's War and their descendants. Two o f the townships, 
Narragansett No. I (Buxton) and Narragansett No. 7 (Gorham), were located in Maine. See Radabaugh, 
"Military System," 209-14.
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Massachusetts government earmarked over 42 square miles o f territory in Maine for the 
use o f military veterans.70
But the redistribution o f land was only part o f the bargain. The inhabitants of 
Massachusetts had been willing to bear the great burdens of the war only because they 
assumed that the crown and the provincial government would protect their interests.
Most New Englanders who enlisted in the army had done so with their eyes open, 
believing that their very livelihood was threatened by the French. They had tacitly 
entered into a social contract with their government, in which they agreed to make 
sacrifices o f blood and taxes as long as the state continued to defend their lives, liberty, 
property, and faith. Enlisting by the thousands and suffering great financial burdens, the 
people had done their part; they now expected the government to keep its end o f the deal. 
By demonstrating their exclusive allegiance to the crown and to their province during the 
war, New Englanders had earned the right to the generosity and protection o f the state. 
They expected that they would share in the spoils o f war, particularly the vast expanses of 
land that were opened up after the fall o f Quebec.71
At the same time, they assumed that groups who were disloyal, or whose loyalty 
had been questionable, would be denied these same benefits. This reasoning was evident 
in arguments for the expulsion of Nova Scotia's Acadians from their homeland. Since the 
cession of their colony to Britain in 1713, the Acadians had attempted to remain neutral 
in wars between the French and English, refusing to take oaths o f allegiance to the British
70 Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 16:160; 17: 169-74,363,489-90; 18: 140,457. Even private land 
companies used quasi-feudal rewards of land as a recruitment tool; the Pejepscot Company promised 100 
acres to soldiers who volunteered to serve at nearby Fort George. See DHSM. 23:251-52.
71 On the connection between wars, citizenship, and state formation in the modern world, see Charles Tilly, 
Coercion. Capital, and European States. AD 990-1992. rev. ed. (Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell, 1992), 67- 
126; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
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king because they still held the hope that their territory would be reconquered by the 
French.72 In a 1746 message to the governor, the members o f the Massachusetts House 
o f Representatives complained o f the "Traitorous Disposition and practices" o f Acadians 
who had lent tacit or clandestine aid to French and Indian forces planning an assault on 
Annapolis Royal. They protested that Nova Scotia's French-speaking inhabitants were "a 
People who have all the Priviledges o f his Majesty's other Subjects," and yet who "live 
almost or quite without publick Taxes, while we their Neighbours... are burden'd almost 
to ruin, by the necessary Charges o f the Government for the Defense and Protection" of 
Nova Scotia. The delegates jeered at the Acadians' description o f themselves as "Neutral 
Subjects," calling it "a Contradiction in Terms, a Set o f People who have a right to 
Protection, but no Obligation to Obedience, who are his Majesty's Subjects, and yet may 
rebel against him and do what they please, have a Right to be defended by the King, and 
yet not bound to defend the King."73
This logic applied a fortiori to the Wabanakis, a "savage" people whose claims to 
the land were tenuous in English eyes. While Acadians practised plow-driven agriculture 
and had avoided participation in imperial wars, Wabanakis were hunter-gatherers who 
had played a leading role in attacks against New England's frontier communities for 
nearly a century. Although most o f the Wabanakis remaining in Maine had sought to 
remain neutral in the last two wars, their failure to side exclusively with the British was 
seen by New England's leaders as a form o f treason that erased their pretensions to
Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 169-191.
72 Naomi E. S. Griffiths, "The Acadians," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 4: xxvii-xxxi; idem.,
The Contexts of Acadian History. 1686-1784 (Montreal: McGilt-Queen's Press, 1992), 69-77; John B. 
Brebner, New England’s Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1927).
73 DHSM. vol. 11:356-58.
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ownership o f the land. When governor Pownall met with several Wabanakis at Fort St. 
George on his journey to Penobscot Bay in 1759, he informed them that "by breaking 
their Faith and the Conditions o f their Treaties, they had forfeited their Lives, their 
Liberties, and their Lands." He offered, as a token of his magnanimity, to place them 
"under his Protection": he would "Protect their Lives," while saying nothing about their 
lands. Pownall's successor, Francis Bernard also promised to become a custodian o f the 
Wabanakis1 interests, but he, too, gave them no guarantees with respect to their lands. 
Upon hearing Penobscot objections to the rapid pace o f English settlement near their 
river, Bernard dismissed them out o f hand. Unlike past governors, he did not contend 
that the English held legal title to the land; instead, he argued that they had won it by 
military conquest. "The English have conquered this whole Country," he told them, "and 
the Indians must not prescribe to them what shall be the bounds o f their settlements."74
As they witnessed a steady flow of trappers, loggers, and farmers entering their 
territory, Wabanakis had little reason to celebrate the British victory. Some lamented the 
departure of their French "fathers" and hoped that the children o f King Louis would 
return to their shores. Others, like the Penobscot sagamore Tomah (Thomas), proposed 
that the Indians begin a resistance movement against the English. According to Oso, a 
Penobscot woman on friendly terms with the colonists, Tomah had introduced the idea at 
a tribal council in 1764. "Why shall the English live upon our Lands?" he asked his 
listeners. "Let us take them and drive them off... the English have no right to Command 
us; let us be our own Masters and not be Slaves under them." But the majority of the 
council, knowing that they were outmatched by British arms, were unmoved. "What can 
we do?" they asked. "The English have got possession o f our land." Wary o f the
74 "Journal of Pownall," 372; DHSM. 24:129.
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colonists but weary of war, they decided to follow the path o f  peace: "It[']s best for us 
now to live in Friendship."75
75 DHSM. 24: 124-25. On Wabanaki disappointment over the loss o f the French, see letter of Monsieur de 
Meyon to Pontiac, 1763, PAC, AN, Serie C llA , vol. 105, fols. 418-19; James L. Whitehead, ed., "The 
Autobiography of Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, 1-111" Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography 63 
(1939): 221-23.
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FIGURE 5.1. [FALMOUTH HARBOR] (DETAIL), FROM THE ATLANTIC 
NEPTUNE, JOSEPH FREDERICK WALLET DES BARRES, [1776?]
One of over two hundred sheets from Neptune, possibly from its first printing in 1776. Des Barres studied 
mathematical physics as a youth in Switzerland, and was trained as a military engineer at the Royal Military College at 
Woolwich after emigrating to England. He conducted dozens of surveys from his base in Halifax between 1763 and 
1774, and upon returning to England he worked with some twenty assistants to engrave plates for the maps. Des 
Barres's technique, including his use of cross-hatching to represent topography, was typical of military cartography of 
the time. After the American Revolution, both Des Barres and Holland returned to British North America; Des Barres 
serving as governor of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island, and Holland playing an instrumental role in laying out 
the townships of Upper and Lower Canada. Photocopied from the Smith Collection, Osher Map Library, University of 
Southern Maine, Reel 26:12469.
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FIGURE 5.2. [PENOBSCOT BAY] (DETAIL), JOHN NORTH AND JOSEPH SMALL
[?], 1759.
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The map is based on several surveys, including those of North in I7S8 and Small in I7S9, and a concurrent survey and 
sounding the upper reaches of the river by Lieutenant John McKechnie. The map indicates the place where governor 
Thomas Pownall buried a leaden plate "as a Memorial of Possession" on May 23,17S9, with the words: "Province of 
Massachusetts Bay -  Penobscot — Dominions of Great Britain — Possession Confirm’d by Thos. Pownall, Govr." 
Photocopied from William Otis Sawtelle, Thomas Pownall, Governor, Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings 
63 (1929-30), overleaf, 270-71.
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FIGURE 5.3. "A MAP OF THE SOURCES OF THE CHAUDIERE, PENOBSCOT, 
AND KENNEBEC RIVERS," (PORTION), JOHN MONTRESORE, 1761.
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The product of Montresor's second voyage into Maine; the primary purpose of his first voyage was to deliver military 
dispatches between Quebec and New England. Montresor also drew a map after the latter trip, representing the river 
route on an elongated strip of paper. The son of the chief military engineer of Gibraltar’s British forces, Montresor was 
sent to North America in 17S4 and became the chief engineer ofMajor-General Edward Braddock, serving at 
Louisbourg, Quebec, and later in Pontiac's Uprising and the American Revolution. Photocopied from the Library of 
Congress.
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FIGURE 5.4. THE SPECTRUM OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE.
Scale of conflict: Small <---------------------------- — > Large
Size of armies: Small <---------------------------- — > Large
Degree of central control: Weak <---------------------------- — > Strong
Cost of wars: Low <---------------------------- -  > High
Level of technology: Low <---------------------------- -  > High
Character of armies: Individualistic <------------------ — > Regimented
Level of discipline: Low <----------------------------— > High
Objectives of war: Plunder/captives/tribute <----- — > Territorial
conquest/ 
control of
nat. resources
Relationship of soldiers
to state/leaders: Vassalage/kinship < ---------------->  Citizenship
/employees
Rewards for service: Plunder/captives/ <------------------- > Wages and
land/offices salaries
Rationale for fighting: Personal allegiance/ <----------------> Patriotism/
vengeance/profit profesionalism
Military skills: Markmanship/equestrian <--------- > Drill
ability
Tactics: Raids/ambushes <-------------------- > Sieges/military
fronts
Corresponding level of
political organization: Bands/tribes/chiefdoms/ < > Nationstates
tributary states
The chart represents a continuum of correlated traits, running from the smallest to the largest armies. The two columns 
represent ideal types; most armies fall somewhere between the two extremes. Large-scale professional armies differ 
from small-scale bands at least three ways: (1) they are raised by societies with extensive communication networks, 
advanced technology, and a complex division of labor, and are consequently able to produce violence more efficiently 
and on a larger scale than their smaller counterparts; (2) large-scale societies have a much greater demand for 
resources, and hence are far more interested in the conquest of land; (3) large-scale societies arc better able to pay for 
soldiers and munitions, and, all things being equal, well-compensated soldiers are more likely to carry out orders 
faithfully than their underpaid counterparts.
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FIGURE 5.5. DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH FORCES IN YORK COUNTY, MARCH
1748.
Distribution of soldiers, according to an order of the House of Representatives. Each bar represents ten soldiers; white 
bars represent the number of soldiers to be drawn from local militias. The figures have only an approximate 
correspondence to the actual number of soldiers posted at the garrisons; colonels and captains were constantly 
scrambling to fill their muster rolls with the required numbers. The disposition of troops forms a long chain of 
garrison houses and forts that protect the backs of frontier towns. The northernmost posting along the Kennebec River 
were the 25 soldiers at Fort Richmond, the easternmost posting was at Fort S t George. Both were still a considerable 
distance from Norridgewock and Panawapskik. Source: Acts and Resolves. 14:108*9.
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EPILOGUE 
MOSES GREENLEAF’S MAINE
/  believed that the woods were not tenantless, but choke-full o f  honest 
spirits as good as myself any day,— not an empty chamber, in which 
chemistry was left to work alone, but an inhabited house,— and fo r  a few  
moments I  enjoyed fellowship with them.
--Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods
In the decades that followed the American Revolution, thousands o f  families 
uprooted themselves from southern New England and made new homes in Maine. 
Searching for the independence of freehold land ownership, they cleared vast tracts o f 
forest, raised thousands of houses and bams, built hundreds o f meetinghouses and 
schools. Entrepreneurs and settlers established new towns in the backcountry, launched 
the region's first newspapers, chartered its first colleges, and advanced plans for new 
roads and canals. Their collective efforts left a lasting impression on Maine and laid the 
basis for its achievement o f statehood in 1820. In the fifty years between the Revolution 
and the issue of a state charter, Maine developed a distinctive character that has persisted 
to the present day: a region o f tightly-knit communities and hard-working producers, 
humble in their means but fiercely proud o f their singularity.1
1 Charles E. Clark, James S. Leamon, and Karen Bowden, eds., Maine in the Earlv Republic. 1783-1820: 
From Revolution to Statehood (Hanover. N. H.: University Press of New England, 1988); Ronald F. Banks, 
Maine Becomes a State: The Movement to Separate Maine from Massachusetts. 1785-1820 (Middletown, 
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press for Maine Historical Society, 1970); Laura Fecych Sprague, ed., 
Agreeable Situations: Society. Commerce, and Art in Southern Maine. 1780-1830 (Kennebunk. Me.: Brick
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During this same period, Maine was also taking hold as an idea. Before the Seven 
Years War, Maine was a little-used term for Gorges's former province, and York County 
was more an administrative category than a focus o f emotional attachment. But after 
York was divided into smaller counties and renamed the District o f Maine, the revived 
term increasingly became a source o f identity for settlers and a shorthand for a distinctive 
regional culture. This change was actively promoted by the region's political and social 
elite. Maine took shape in the maps o f Osgood Carleton, who, with encouragement from 
the Massachusetts Historical Society, drafted several maps that were engraved and 
published by John Norman in the 1790s. It also evolved in the written works o f James 
Sullivan and William Williamson, who wrote the first book-length histories o f Maine. 
Sullivan, a jurist and Federalist statesman originally from Berwick, wrote his History of 
the District o f Maine in 1795, squeezed between a treatise on the origins of money, a 
history of land titles in Massachusetts, and a dissertation on the freedom o f the press in 
the United States. Twenty-seven years later, Williamson outdid Sullivan, publishing a 
fact-filled if ponderous two-volume history of Maine that has remained a standard 
reference for historians even to the present day. Williamson had begun compiling 
materials for the work in 1817 while he was postmaster o f Bangor and continued to work 
on the book after his tenure as governor o f the state between 1821 and 1823.
Collectively, the work of men such as Carleton, Sullivan, and Williamson promoted the 
view that Maine was a unified region with its own distinctive history and destiny.2
Store Museum, 1987); Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on 
the Maine Frontier. 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
2 James S. Leamon, Revolution Downeast: The War for American Independence in Maine (Amherst,
Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, for the Maine Historical Society, 1993), 193-97; William 
Williamson, History o f the State of Maine. 2 vols. (Hallowell, Me.: Glazier, Masters & Co., 1832; reprint 
ed., Freeport, Me.: Cumberland Press, 1966).
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But few did more to create the idea o f Maine than Moses Greenleaf. Along with 
the rest o f his family, Greenleaf had moved from Essex County to the District in 1790, 
when he was thirteen years old. At the age o f twenty-two, he left the family farm and 
opened a general store in his hometown of New Gloucester in Cumberland County. A 
few years later, he moved eastward: first to Poland, then Kenduskeag, and finally to 
Bangor, where he remained in business until 1806. Struggling to stay in the black, he 
decided to close shop and try his hand at real estate instead. He became a partner in the 
newly-founded township o f Williamsburg in Piscataquis County in 1806, and in the years 
that followed he took a passionate interest in promoting his holdings. By 1810, he had 
moved to Williamsburg along with his wife and children. As he considered methods of 
developing the township and nearby areas, he found himself frustrated by a lack of 
reliable information about Maine's interior. For the next three decades, he set about 
correcting this problem, gathering surveyor’s plats, land surveys, soil samples, historical 
accounts, and census data. He also engaged in searches for stone and mineral deposits, 
and lobbied for the construction of roads, canals, and a railroad in Piscataquis County.3
After several years o f research, he decided to put his findings into print, believing 
that the dissemination o f information about Maine's interior would be a spur to 
commercial development. In 1815, he published a map of Maine, accompanied the 
following year by a 154-page volume entitled A Statistical View of the District of Maine. 
The book contained a compendium of information on subjects ranging from land values 
and soil qualities to climactic variations and population levels. Its contents, as Greenleaf
3 "Greenleaf, Moses," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Dictionary of American Biography. 10 
vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952), vol. 4:582-83; Walter W. Ristow, American Mans and 
Mapmakers: Commercial Cartography in the Nineteenth Century (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1985), 94-96.
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explained in his introduction, gave investors and public officials a thumbnail sketch of 
the District, allowing them to assess its economic potential and possibilities for 
development. When Maine became a state in 1820, he printed a revised edition o f  the 
map and continued to gather information about its lands and people. In 1829, with the 
aid of a SI,000 grant from the state legislature, he published updated and expanded 
versions of both the map and the statistical summary. Included in the new book were 
several plates that used maps to illustrate various facets o f the state: its topography, 
population, political divisions, and territorial history [see Figs. 6.1, 6 .2 ,6.3].4
Where the Maine of Ferdinando Gorges had been a controversial claim, Moses 
Greenleaf s Maine was an established fact, a unit of analysis rather than a figment o f the 
imagination. By 1829, the existence of Maine was beyond dispute; while Gorges's 
writings were marked by passionate advocacy, the tone o f Greenleaf s book was one of 
detached intellectual curiosity. His maps and statistical tables treated the region as an 
object whose qualities could be empirically measured, tabulated, and analyzed; the reality 
of this object received daily confirmation in land registries and tourist maps, 
congressional districts and legal jurisdictions, censuses and tax levies. Dozens o f 
institutions and hundreds o f thousands of people had a vested interest in the Maine 
described by Greenleaf and few still believed that the region's territory might be 
organized differently.
Greenleaf s maps and commentary marked the full flowering o f a view of 
territoriality that had taken root in the seventeenth century. It was based on four
4 Moses Greenleaf, A Survey of the State o f Maine, in Reference to Its Geographical Features. Statistics 
and Political Economy (Portland, Me.: Shirley and Hyde, 1829). On the widely-held belief in the early 
nineteenth century that the dissemination o f laiowledge was the key to a prosperous republic, see Richard
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premises: that land was a resource that could be possessed as private property, that 
governments could grant and protect real property rights, that sovereignty over the land 
could not be shared between states, and that boundaries were defined by objective 
attributes rather than human relationships. This view of the land had gained precedence 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries because it supported and was sustained by 
a larger and more powerful coalition of people and institutions than any other form of 
territoriality.
Indeed, the strength o f Greenleaf s Maine was that it was suited to a large-scale 
society in which tens of thousands o f strangers lived in close contact with one another. 
Among small-scale polities such as the Wabanakis, disputes over land use could be 
resolved through face-to-face mediation and the bonds of trust that daily interaction 
created among neighbors. But in cases where there was greater competition for resources 
and a weaker emotional bond between disputants, personal diplomacy became more 
difficult. Because the earliest English colonists were united more by their common 
pursuit of material betterment than by ties o f kinship, they had little reason to trust each 
other and had ample opportunities for conflict. Frustrated by the constant strife and 
violence o f the early years o f settlement, colonists gradually put their trust in the 
provincial government and county courts, expecting them to enforce contracts and 
preserve civil order just as their counterparts had done in the mother country. Peaceful 
relations were fostered not through personal mediation but by the establishment o f 
institutions with executive power. The legitimacy of these institutions came from their 
willingness to adjudicate conflicts according to their legal merits, showing as little
D. Brown, Knowledee Is Power The Diffusion o f Information in Earlv America. 1700-1865 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. 197-244,268-96.
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favoritism as possible. In the case of land disputes, this meant giving precedence to 
objective criteria such as the contents o f formal deeds, improvements made to the land, 
and surveys of boundary lines. The land had to be viewed as something outside the 
domain of human relations, something that could be measured or possessed but had no 
active role in human affairs. The notion o f objectivity in this respect played much the 
same role as divination and omens among the Wabanakis: it removed potentially 
contentious questions from the social world and resolved them in a way that was 
seemingly above politics.5
Paradoxically, Greenleafs objective view of the land served a valuable subjective 
purpose, preserving social harmony by divorcing the natural environment from human 
relations and offering it up as a catalogue of resources ready for exploitation.6 The image 
of Maine as a bounded area became the coin o f the realm because it reified the state's 
exclusive and undisputed sovereignty over the land, which in turn protected the rights of 
English-speaking land owners. Competing visions o f territoriality that did not strike this 
balance between an impersonal state and the interests o f property owners -  such as 
Gorges's plan for a seigneurial system of land tenure or Wabanaki notions o f the land as a
5 On the tendency of people in large-scale societies to place their trust in institutions and objective 
knowledge, see Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power Two Works, trans. Howard Davis, ed. John Raffan and 
Kathryn Rooney (Chichester: John Wiley, 1979); Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and 
Science in Seventeenth-Centurv England (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1994); Keith Hart, 
"Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum," in Diego 
Gambetta, ed.. Trust: Making and Breaking Coonerarive Relations (London: Blackwell, 1988), 176-93.
6 Treating the land in this way did not entirely remove the possibility of disputes; the decades that followed 
the Revolution were marked by violent conflicts in Maine between squatters and absentee proprietors. But 
the source of the disputes was the failure of the county and provincial courts to decide trespass cases 
impartially, giving a more favorable hearing to wealthy and well-connected proprietors than to 
smallholders from the backwoods. The settlers who led the revolt against the proprietors did not reject the 
rule of law but sought to redress its abuses by demanding that their rights o f ownership — established by 
the objective facts of having cleared and improved the land — be recognized. They emphatically rejected 
the notion that social obligations should be attached to land use and embraced land ownership as a source 
of economic independence and political liberty. Far from abandoning the concept o f private property, they
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shared source of nourishment among kin — fell away because they were supported by 
smaller and less powerful coalitions.
Instead, an implicit bargain was negotiated between tens o f thousands o f land 
holders and English governments at the local and provincial levels. On one hand, the 
inhabitants of New England offered the state substantial support in the form o f taxes, 
military enlistments, and voluntary labor. This popular backing made the provincial 
army a formidable power and strengthened the state's claims to exclusive jurisdiction 
over its territory. But English support for the army was predicated on the assumption that 
the state existed to protect a collective claim to the land by all colonists; the French and 
Indians were considered a danger because their own territorial claims conflicted with 
those of the English. The other side of the bargain was that the state would look after the 
interests o f its citizens, particularly their property rights in land. The state's guarantee 
that it would and could protect these rights -  as when the provincial government finally 
gave its approval to Samuel Waldo's claims to the Muscongus Patent -  gave landholders 
the incentive to develop their holdings, secure in the knowledge that the fruits of their 
labor would accrue to themselves or their children. Confident that their land claims 
would be backed by the government, merchants such as Waldo invested considerable 
sums into the development o f their holdings, tapping into international pools o f capital 
and migrants to promote the settlement o f Maine. The state, in this sense, was Janus­
faced: glowering outward to its frontier it projected a line o f forts and garrisons meant to 
intimidate its external enemies, but smiling inward it presided over a peaceful, prosperous 
commercial community. The potential for violence among competing land owners within
asserted that the state had a moral obligation to protect lands that were, from their point of view, rightfully 
theirs. See Taylor. Liberty Men. 61-121.
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the colony, ever present in the early years o f Maine's existence, was gradually directed 
outward towards the enemies o f the empire as a whole.
While this arrangement suited those who received the state's protection, it was 
catastrophic for those who did not. The growth o f English settlement in Maine, and the 
attendant wealth it brought to both merchants and smallholders, was a direct result of the 
encroachment of the colonists on lands that once belonged to the Wabanakis. While the 
provincial government recognized that the Indians possessed a form o f aboriginal title to 
the land, this right was weakly protected and frequently ignored. The defense o f 
Wabanaki territory rested ultimately on their military strength, backed by the resources o f 
the French state, which treated the Wabanakis as a proxy for its own imperial claims. For 
nearly a century this compromise allowed Wabanakis to retain most o f their traditional 
territories and forced the English to accommodate their demands for peaceful trade. But 
when the French were removed from America in 1763, the Indians lost their most 
effective barrier against incursions by their English-speaking neighbors.
By the end o f the eighteenth century, Wabanaki leaders knew that they could not 
stem the tide of white settlement and tried to negotiate an arrangement that would 
accommodate the immigrants while still allowing the Indians to gain a livelihood. In the 
1790s, the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies, the two organized tribes remaining in the 
District, ceded most of their territories to the state o f Massachusetts in exchange for an 
assortment of gifts, annuities, and fishing and hunting rights. Over the next forty years, 
large portions o f their remaining lands were whittled away by a series o f sometimes 
fraudulent purchases. As their territories shrank, it became impossible for Wabanakis to 
survive solely by hunting, fishing, and gathering, and most families in the nineteenth
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century worked a variety o f occupations, from lumbering to basket weaving, to make 
ends meet.
While some have described these changes as the passing o f a traditional way of 
life, they might equally be seen as a continuation o f the Wabanakis’ ability to adapt 
subsistence strategies to changing circumstances. As in the past, they limited the risk of 
hunger by pursuing a variety o f activities, complementing hunting expeditions with stints 
at farmsteads, shipyards, mills, docks, and logging camps. They also continued to view 
the land in ways that would have been familiar to their ancestors, as the writer Henry 
David Thoreau learned in the three trips he made to Maine's interior in 1847,1853, and 
1857. On portions of each trip he was accompanied by Wabanaki guides, including Joe 
Aitteon, who later became the first elected governor of the Penobscots, and Joseph Polis, 
a hunter from Old Town. Having consulted Greenleaf s map o f Maine in the first trip -  
which he found to be "a labyrinth of errors" as far as the rivers and lakes o f the interior 
were concerned — Thoreau discovered an entirely different way o f mapping the land 
among his guides. The Penobscots saw dozens o f animals hidden in the forest where 
their guest could see none, told stories o f battles against the Mohawks at the sites where 
they had taken place, carried on extensive discussions about the etymology of 
placenames, and were able to orient themselves simply by looking at the surfaces o f rocks 
and trees. Although Thoreau never forgave the Indians for their failure to live up to his 
romantic image of the noble savage, he began in the final voyage to see their survival 
skills as a form of knowledge as rich and complex as his own scholarly learning. "I have 
much to leam o f the Indian," he owned, "nothing o f  the missionary."7
7 Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods: ed. Joseph J. Moldenhauer (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1972), cit. 15,181.
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Yet the Penobscots were increasingly aware that they needed additional skills to 
survive in the modem world. Joe Polis was an accomplished hunter, but he was also 
literate and a strong advocate of formal education. A devout Protestant, Polis belonged to 
the "New Party," a Penobscot faction that supported the establishment o f English- 
language schools at Old Town. He told Thoreau that he wanted his children to attend 
college, since with an education "you could keep'em property -- no other way." Although 
Polis continued to travel along the paths o f his ancestors, he also understood that the 
landscape made by maps, deeds, and surveys was too powerful to deny. Because it was 
supported by a coalition of hundreds o f thousands o f  people, Maine's sovereignty over its 
lands was unquestionable. If the Indians were to win redress for the wrongs that had been 
committed against them, they would have to do so through the courts and the legislature, 
basing their arguments on treaty provisions and legal precedent rather than subjective 
considerations o f need.8
Polis would have been disappointed to learn that the Penobscots were to wait 
another 123 years before they received compensation for their losses. But when 
restitution finally came in 1980, the legal case launched by the Indians revived many 
questions that had laid dormant since the early nineteenth century. What was the basis of 
the state's sovereignty over its territory? How did groups establish rights o f ownership to 
their lands? Is the legal system adequate to resolve disputes between indigenous peoples 
and their settler neighbors? Although the Indians withdrew their case after receiving a 
settlement from state, the questions remain. The history o f the region's colonization has a 
very direct bearing on such issues, and if  there is a lesson to be drawn from this study it is 
that all representations o f the land — even the scientific and dispassionate maps drawn by
8 Ibid., 293.
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Moses Greenleaf and later cartographers ~  are social in character. As vast tracts o f 
Maine's forests are sold by timber companies to real estate developers, and as land use 
becomes an increasingly prominent subject o f public discussion, we would do well to 
remember that determining ownership o f the land is more than a matter o f jurisprudence. 
Behind deeds, treaties, and surveys lies the more fundamental question o f what 
responsibilities we have to each other, and to the plants and animals around us. It is not 
too late to heed the advice o f Wabanaki conference speakers, who knew that it was 
unwise to take from the land without giving something in return.
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FIGURE 6.1. PLATE I, FROM MOSES GREENLEAFS ATLAS ACCOMPANYING
HIS SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE. 1829.
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The first plate of Greenleaf s atlas depicts the topography of the state; Henry David Thoreau found his representation 
of the lakes and mountains of the region to be a "labyrinth of errors." Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of 
Congress.
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FIGURE 6.2. PLATE 5, FROM MOSES GREENLEAF’S ATLAS ACCOMPANYING
HIS SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE. 1829.
The fifth plate depicts the state's counties, listing their populations and the value of their taxable property; dotted lines 
represent the progress of white settlement since theAmerican Revolution. Photocopied from the Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 6.3. PLATE 6, FROM MOSES GREENLEAF’S ATLAS ACCOMPANYING
HIS SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE. 1829.
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The sixth plate represents grants of land in the state. Tracts marked "M" in the northeastern part of the state are 
townships allotted to Massachusetts after Maine was granted statehood. Photocopied at the Library of Congress.
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